“For the moment, we confine ourselves to the above observations. Given the role of the Information Commissioner and the prospect of further guidance, we do not think it is necessary or desirable for this Court to interfere at the present juncture and decide whether the SWP’s current November 2018 Policy Document meets the requirements of section 42(2) of the DPA 2018. In our view, the development and specific content of that document is, for now, better left for reconsideration by the SWP in the light of further guidance from the Information Commissioner.”
“Is there a sufficient legal framework for the use of AFR Locate?”
“The general principles applicable to the ‘in accordance with the law’ standard are well-established: see generally per Lord Sumption in Catt, above, [11]-[14]; and in Re Gallagher[2019] 2 WLR 509 at [16] – [31]. In summary, the following points apply. (1) The measure in question (a) must have ‘some basis in domestic law’ and (b) must be ‘compatible with the rule of law’, which means that it should comply with the twin requirements of ‘accessibility’ and ‘foreseeability’ (Sunday Times v United Kingdom(1979) 2 EHRR 245 ; Sliver v United Kingdom(1983) 5 EHRR 347 ; and Malone v United Kingdom(1984) 7 EHRR 14 ). (2) The legal basis must be ‘accessible’ to the person concerned, meaning that it must be published and comprehensible, and it must be possible to discover what its provisions are. The measure must also be ‘foreseeable’ meaning that it must be possible for a person to foresee its consequences for them and it should not ‘confer a discretion so broad that its scope is in practice dependent on the will of those who apply it, rather than on the law itself’ (Lord Sumption in Re Gallagher, ibid, at [17]). (3) Related to (2), the law must ‘afford adequate legal protection against arbitrariness and accordingly indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise’ (S v United Kingdom, above, at [95] and [99]). (4) Where the impugned measure is a discretionary power, (a) what is not required is ‘an over-rigid regime which does not contain the flexibility which is needed to avoid an unjustified interference with a fundamental right’ and (b) what is required is that ‘safeguards should be present in order to guard against overbroad discretion resulting in arbitrary, and thus disproportionate, interference with Convention rights’ (per Lord Hughes in Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions[2016] AC 88 at [31] and [32]). Any exercise of power that is unrestrained by law is not ‘in accordance with the law’. (5) The rules governing the scope and application of measures need not be statutory, provided that they operate within a framework of law and that there are effective means of enforcing them (per Lord Sumption in Catt at [11]). (6) The requirement for reasonable predictability does not mean that the law has to codify answers to every possible issue (per Lord Sumption in Catt at [11]).”
“In our view, there is a clear and sufficient legal framework governing whether, when and how AFR Locate may be used. … The legal framework within which AFR Locate operates comprises three elements or layers (in addition to the common law), namely: (a) primary legislation; (b) secondary legislative instruments in the form of codes of practice issued under primary legislation; and (c) SWP's own local policies. Each element provides legally enforceable standards. When these elements are considered collectively against the backdrop of the common law, the use of AFR Locate by SWP is sufficiently foreseeable and accessible for the purpose of the ‘in accordance with the law’ standard.”
“96. Drawing these matters together, the cumulative effect of (a) the provisions of the DPA, (b) the Surveillance Camera Code and (c) SWP's own policy documents, is that the infringement of Article 8(1) rights which is consequent on SWP's use of AFR Locate, occurs within a legal framework that is sufficient to satisfy the ‘in accordance with the law’ requirement in Article 8(2). The answer to the primary submissions of the Claimant and the Information Commissioner, is that it is neither necessary nor practical for legislation to define the precise circumstances in which AFR Locate may be used, e.g. to the extent of identifying precisely which offences might justify inclusion as a subject of interest or precisely what the sensitivity settings should be (c.f. Lord Sumption in Catt at [14]). Taking these matters as examples, the Data Protection Principles provide sufficient regulatory control to avoid arbitrary interferences with Article 8 rights. The legal framework that we have summarised does provide a level of certainty and foreseeability that is sufficient to satisfy the tenets of Article 8(2). It provides clear legal standards to which SWP will be held. As to the content of local policies, we take account that AFR Locate is still in a trial period. The content of SWP's policies may be altered and improved over the course of this trial. The possibility (or even the likelihood) of such improvement is not evidence of present deficiency. 97. Finally, under this heading, we refer to the comments by the Home Secretary (in her Biometrics Strategy) as to the legal framework within which AFR Locate presently operates (see above, at paragraph 67). In our view, when considered in context, these comments should be considered as amounting to pragmatic recognition that (a) steps could, and perhaps should, be taken further to codify the relevant legal standards; and (b) the future development of AFR technology is likely to require periodic re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the legal regime. We respectfully endorse both sentiments, in particular the latter. For the reasons we have set out already, we do not consider that the legal framework is at present out of kilter; yet this will inevitably have to be a matter that is subject to periodic review in the future.”
“A power on which there are insufficient legal constraints does not become legal simply because those who may have resort to it exercise self-restraint. It is the potential reach of the power rather than its actual use by which its legality must be judged.” (Emphasis added)
“The case law shows that the court has paid very close attention to the facts of particular cases coming before it, giving effect to factual differences and recognising differences of degree.”
“… in order for the interference to be ‘in accordance with the law’, there must be safeguards which have the effect of enabling the proportionality of the interference to be adequately examined. Whether the interference in a given case was in fact proportionate is a separate question.”
“This appeal is concerned with the systematic collection and retention by police authorities of electronic data about individuals. The issue in both cases is whether the practice of the police governing retention is lawful …” (Emphasis added)
“… It lays down principles which are germane and directly applicable to police information, and contains a framework for their enforcement on the police among others through the Information Commissioner and the courts.”
“There is some suggestion in the cases of a relativist approach, so that the more intrusive the act complained of, the more precise and specific must be the law said to justify it.”
“The purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security.”
“The Divisional Court erred in concluding that the interference with the Appellant’s rights under Article 8(1) … occasioned by the Respondent’s use of live automated facial recognition technology … on21 December 2017 and27 March 2018 and on an ongoing basis was/is in accordance with the law for the purposes ofArticle 8(2) ECHR .”
“(a) closed circuit television or automatic number plate recognition systems, (b) any other systems for recording or viewing visual images for surveillance purposes, (c) any systems for storing, receiving, transmitting, processing or checking images or information obtained by systems falling within paragraph (a) or (b), or (d) any other systems associated with, or otherwise connected with, systems falling within paragraph (a) (b) or (c).”
“Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need.”
“Any use of facial recognition or other biometric characteristic recognition systems needs to be clearly justified and proportionate in meeting the stated purpose, and be suitably validated. It should always involve human intervention before decisions are taken that affect an individual adversely.”
“Any use of technologies such as ANPR or facial recognition systems which may rely on the accuracy of information generated elsewhere such as databases provided by others should not be introduced without regular assessment to ensure the underlying data is fit for purpose.”
“These individuals could be persons wanted on suspicion for an offence, wanted on warrant, vulnerable persons and other persons where intelligence is required.”
“Concerns have been raised by privacy experts that an individual may seek to enquire as to whether they have been included in a watchlist outside of the 24-hours retention period. Therefore, it has been deemed appropriate to be able to reengineer watchlists. This can now be achieved via Niche RMS ‘back-end’ database by recording the nominal number of an individual extracted into a watchlist for on given date, this added functionality is available from October 2018.”
“3. AFR Locate The system works by means of a pre-populated Watch List which will contain information and images of subjects and a pre-defined response should these subjects be located by the system. Watchlists will be both proportionate and necessary for each deployment with the rationale for inclusion detailed pre-event in the AFR Locate deployment report. Primary factors for consideration for inclusion within a watchlist will be watchlist size, image quality, image provenance and rationale for inclusion. The numbers of images included within a watchlist cannot exceed 2,000 due to contract restrictions but in any event 1 in 1000 false positive alert rate should not be exceeded. Children under the age of 18 will not ordinarily feature in a watchlist due the reduced accuracy of the system when considering immature faces. However, if there is a significant risk of harm to that individual a risk based approach will be adopted and rationale for inclusion evidenced within the deployment report. The decision for an AFR deployment wherever possible will ultimately be made by the Silver Commander with the DSD project team acting as tactical advisors. Wherever possible the deployment of AFR Locate should be detailed with the Silver Commanders Tactical plan. If a deployment does not feature a Silver Commander the rationale for deployment will be ratified by the Digital Services Division Inspector and be detailed within the AFR Locate Deployment Report.”
“As we are testing the technology South Wales Police have deployed in all event types ranging from high volume music and sporting events to indoor arenas.”
“If an interference with Article 8(1) rights is to be justified it must meet the four-part test in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No 2)[2014] AC 700 , namely: (1) whether the objective of the measure pursued is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; (2) whether it is rationally connected to the objective; (3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the objective; and (4) whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community. (See per Lord Sumption at [20]; and especially on question (3), per Lord Reed at [70] to [71] and [75] to [76]).”
“Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the use of AFR Locate on21st December 2017 (Queen's Street) and27th March 2018 (Motorpoint Arena) struck a fair balance and was not disproportionate. AFR Locate was deployed in an open and transparent way, with significant public engagement. On each occasion, it was used for a limited time, and covered a limited footprint. It was deployed for the specific and limited purpose of seeking to identify particular individuals (not including the Claimant) who may have been in the area and whose presence was of justifiable interest to the police. On the former occasion it led to two arrests. On the latter occasion it identified a person who had made a bomb threat at the very same event the previous year and who had been subject to a (suspended) custodial sentence. On neither occasion did it lead to a disproportionate interference with anybody's Article 8 rights. Nobody was wrongly arrested. Nobody complained as to their treatment (save for the Claimant on a point of principle). Any interference with the Claimant's Article 8 rights would have been very limited. The interference would be limited to the near instantaneous algorithmic processing and discarding of the Claimant's biometric data. No personal information relating to the Claimant would have been available to any police officer, or to any human agent. No data would be retained. There was no attempt to identify the Claimant. He was not spoken to by any police officer.”
“Whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure would contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter (i.e. whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned measure).” (Emphasis added)
“… On at least two occasions, in December 2017 and March 2018, the Claimant was targeted by the Defendant’s use of AFR. Through this claim he challenges: (i) the unlawful use of this technology against him on both occasions, and (ii) the Defendant’s ongoing use of AFR in public places in the police area in which he resides, giving rise to a clear risk of the technology again being used against him.” (Emphasis added)
“It is the Claimant’s case that he has twice been the subject of the Defendant’s use of AFR technology …”
“It is the intention during each deployment to allow the AFR application to enrol and therefore process as many individuals as possible”
“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to— (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.” it.”
“The Divisional Court was wrong to hold that the Respondent complied with the Public Sector Equality Duty insection 149 of the Equality Act 2010 in circumstances in which the Respondent’s Equality Impact Assessment was obviously inadequate and based on an error of law (by failing to recognise the risk of indirect discrimination) and the Respondent’s subsequent approach to assessing possible indirect discrimination arising from the use of AFR is flawed.”
“In our view, on the facts of this case there is an air of unreality about the Claimant's contention. There is no suggestion that as at April 2017 when the AFR Locate trial commenced, SWP either recognised or ought to have recognised that the software it had licensed might operate in a way that was indirectly discriminatory. Indeed, even now there is no firm evidence that the software does produce results that suggest indirect discrimination. Rather, the Claimant's case rests on what is said by Dr Anil Jain, an expert witness. In his first statement dated30th September 2018 , Dr Jain commented to the effect that the accuracy of AFR systems generally could depend on the dataset used to ‘train’ the system. He did not, however, make any specific comment about the dataset used by SWP or about the accuracy of the NeoFace Watch software that SWP has licensed. Dr Jain went no further than to say that if SWP did not know the contents of the dataset used to train its system ‘it would be difficult for SWP to confirm whether the technology is in fact biased’. The opposite is, of course, also true.”
“156. Thus, SWP may now, in light of the investigation undertaken to date by Mr. Edgell, wish to consider whether further investigation should be done into whether the NeoFace Watch software may produce discriminatory impacts. When deciding whether or not this is necessary it will be appropriate for SWP to take account that whenever AFR Locate is used there is an important failsafe: no step is taken against any member of the public unless an officer (the systems operator) has reviewed the potential match generated by the software and reached his own opinion that there is a match between the member of the public and the watchlist face. 157. Yet this possibility of future action does not make good the argument that to date, SWP has failed to comply with the duty undersection 149(1) of the Equality Act 2010 . Our conclusion is that SWP did have the due regard required when in April 2017 it commenced the trial of AFR Locate. At that time, there was no specific reason why it ought to have been assumed it was possible that the NeoFace Watch software produced more or less reliable results depending on whether the face was male or female, or white or minority ethnic. As we have explained, even now there is no particular reason to make any such assumption. We note that although Dr Jain states that ‘bias has been found to be a feature of common AFR systems’ he does not provide an opinion on whether, or the extent to which, such bias can be addressed by the fail-safe, such as ensuring that a human operator checks whether there is in fact a match. 158. In our view, the April 2017 Equality Impact Assessment document demonstrates that due regard was had by SWP to the section 149(1) criteria. The Claimant's contention that SWP did not go far enough in that it did not seek to equip itself with information on possible or potential disparate impacts, based on the information reasonably available at that time, is mere speculation. In any event, as matters had developed in the course of the trial since April 2017, it is apparent from Mr. Edgell's evidence that SWP continues to review events against the section 149(1) criteria. This is the approach required by the public-sector equality duty in the context of a trial process. For these reasons, the claim made by reference tosection 149(1) of the Equality Act 2010 fails.”
“The first of the modern equality duties was found again in section 71 of the RRA, but following amendments made to it by theRace Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (enacting the General Race Equality Duty). The General Race Equality Duty in the amended section 71 of the RRA required that listed public authorities had ‘due regard’ to the need ‘to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination’ and ‘to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups’.The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and the General Race Equality Duty within it were enacted to give effect to the recommendations in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report and the Inquiry’s findings of ‘institutional racism’. The purpose of the General Race Equality Duty was to create a strong, effective, and enforceable legal obligation which placed race equality at the heart of the public authority’s decision making. The new duty was intended to mark a major change in the law. It represented a move from a fault-based scheme where legal liability rested only with those who could be shown to have committed one or other of the unlawful acts. Instead, the duty-bearer, the public authority, was to be required to proactively consider altering its practices and structures to meet this statutory duty. This was considered important in light of the findings of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.” (Emphasis added)
“It is the clear purpose of section 71 [the predecessor to section 149] to require public bodies … to give advance consideration to issues of race discrimination before making any policy decision that may be affected by them. This is a salutary requirement, and this provision must be seen as an integral and important part of the mechanisms for ensuring the fulfilment of the aims of anti-discrimination legislation. …”
“From my experience and the information available to me, I have seen no bias based on either gender or ethnicity. …”
“To minimise any impact of bias as a result of gender, the NeoFace Algorithm training data set contains roughly equal quantities of male and female faces.”
“1. The data subject has given his consent to the processing. … 5. The processing is necessary— (a) for the administration of justice, (b) for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under any enactment, (c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department, or (d) for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.” (a) for the administration of justice, (b) for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under any enactment, (c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department, or (d) for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.”
“(a) closed circuit television or automatic number plate recognition systems, (b) any other systems for recording or viewing visual images for surveillance purposes, (c) any systems for storing, receiving, transmitting, processing or checking images or information obtained by systems falling within paragraph (a) or (b), or (d) any other systems associated with, or otherwise connectedwith, systems falling within paragraph (a), (b) or (c).”
“(1) A relevant authority must have regard to the surveillancecamera code when exercising any functions to which the coderelates. (2) A failure on the part of any person to act in accordance with any provision of the surveillance camera code does not of itself make that person liable to criminal or civil proceedings. (3) The surveillance camera code is admissible in evidence in any such proceedings. (4) A court or tribunal may, in particular, take into account a failure by a relevant authority to have regard to the surveillance camera code in determining a question in any such proceedings.”
“(a) Encouraging compliance with the surveillance camera code; (b) Reviewing the operation of the code; and (c) Providing advice about the code (including changes to it or breaches of it).”
“35 The first data protection principle (1) The first data protection principle is that the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes must be lawful and fair. (2) The processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes is lawful only if and to the extent that it is based on law and either— (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing for that purpose, or (b) the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for that purpose by a competent authority. (3) In addition, where the processing for any of the law enforcement purposes is sensitive processing, the processing is permitted only in the two cases set out in subsections (4) and (5). (4) The first case is where— (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing for the law enforcement purpose as mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and (b) at the time when the processing is carried out, the controller has an appropriate policy document in place (see section 42). (5) The second case is where— (a) the processing is strictly necessary for the law enforcement purpose, (b) the processing meets at least one of the conditions in Schedule 8, and (c) at the time when the processing is carried out, the controller has an appropriate policy document in place (see section 42). (6) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule 8— (a) by adding conditions; (b) by omitting conditions added by regulations under paragraph (a). (7) Regulations under subsection (6) are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. (8) In this section, "sensitive processing" means— (a) the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership; (b) the processing of genetic data, or of biometric data, for the purpose of uniquely identifying an individual; (c) the processing of data concerning health; (d) the processing of data concerning an individual's sex life or sexual orientation.” (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing for that purpose, or (b) the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for that purpose by a competent authority. (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing for the law enforcement purpose as mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and (b) at the time when the processing is carried out, the controller has an appropriate policy document in place (see section 42). (a) the processing is strictly necessary for the law enforcement purpose, (b) the processing meets at least one of the conditions in Schedule 8, and (c) at the time when the processing is carried out, the controller has an appropriate policy document in place (see section 42). (a) by adding conditions; (b) by omitting conditions added by regulations under paragraph (a). (a) the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership; (b) the processing of genetic data, or of biometric data, for the purpose of uniquely identifying an individual; (c) the processing of data concerning health; (d) the processing of data concerning an individual's sex life or sexual orientation.”
“…the processing of… biometric data… for the purpose of uniquely identifying an individual.”
“…personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual, which allows or confirms the unique identification of that individual, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”
“1. Statutory etc purposes This condition is met if the processing- This condition is met if the processing- (a) is necessary for the exercise of a function conferred on a person by an enactment or rule of law, and (b) is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest. 2. Administration of justice This condition is met if the processing is necessary for the administration of justice. … 6. Legal claims This condition is met if the processing- (a) is necessary for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal proceedings (including prospective legal proceedings)…”
“42 Safeguards: sensitive processing (1) This section applies for the purposes of section 35(4) and (5) (which require a controller to have an appropriate policy document in place when carrying out sensitive processing in reliance on… a condition specified in Schedule 8). (2) The controller has an appropriate policy document in place in relation to the sensitive processing if the controller has produced a document which— (a) explains the controller's procedures for securing compliance with the data protection principles (see section 34(1)) in connection with sensitive processing in reliance on the consent of the data subject or (as the case may be) in reliance on the condition in question, and (b) explains the controller's policies as regards the retention and erasure of personal data processed in reliance on the consent of the data subject or (as the case may be) in reliance on the condition in question, giving an indication of how long such personal data is likely to be retained. (3) Where personal data is processed on the basis that an appropriate policy document is in place, the controller must during the relevant period— (a) retain the appropriate policy document, (b) review and (if appropriate) update it from time to time, and (c) make it available to the Commissioner, on request, without charge. (4) The record maintained by the controller under section 61(1) and, where the sensitive processing is carried out by a processor on behalf of the controller, the record maintained by the processor under section 61(3) must include the following information— (a) …which condition in Schedule 8 is relied on, (b) how the processing satisfies section 35 (lawfulness of processing), and (c) whether the personal data is retained and erased in accordance with the policies described in subsection (2)(b) and, if it is not, the reasons for not following those policies. (5) In this section, “relevant period”, in relation to sensitive processing …in reliance on a condition specified in Schedule 8, means a period which— (a) begins when the controller starts to carry out the sensitive processing …in reliance on that condition, and (b) ends at the end of the period of 6 months beginning when the controller ceases to carry out the processing.” (a) explains the controller's procedures for securing compliance with the data protection principles (see section 34(1)) in connection with sensitive processing in reliance on the consent of the data subject or (as the case may be) in reliance on the condition in question, and (b) explains the controller's policies as regards the retention and erasure of personal data processed in reliance on the consent of the data subject or (as the case may be) in reliance on the condition in question, giving an indication of how long such personal data is likely to be retained. (a) retain the appropriate policy document, (b) review and (if appropriate) update it from time to time, and (c) make it available to the Commissioner, on request, without charge. (a) …which condition in Schedule 8 is relied on, (b) how the processing satisfies section 35 (lawfulness of processing), and (c) whether the personal data is retained and erased in accordance with the policies described in subsection (2)(b) and, if it is not, the reasons for not following those policies. (a) begins when the controller starts to carry out the sensitive processing …in reliance on that condition, and (b) ends at the end of the period of 6 months beginning when the controller ceases to carry out the processing.”
“1. Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need. 2. The use of a surveillance camera system must take into account its effect on individuals and their privacy, with regular reviews to ensure its use remains justified. 3. There must be as much transparency in the use of a surveillance camera system as possible, including a published contact point for access to information and complaints. 4. There must be clear responsibility and accountability for all surveillance camera system activities including images and information collected, held and used. 5. Clear rules, policies and procedures must be in place before a surveillance camera system is used, and these must be communicated to all who need to comply with them. 6. No more images and information should be stored than that which is strictly required for the stated purpose of a surveillance camera system, and such images and information should be deleted once their purposes have been discharged. 7. Access to retained images and information should be restricted and there must be clearly defined rules on who can gain access and for what purpose such access is granted; the disclosure of images and information should only take place when it is necessary for such a purpose or for law enforcement purposes. 8. Surveillance camera system operators should consider any approved operational, technical and competency standards relevant to a system and its purpose and work to meet and maintain those standards. 9. Surveillance camera system images and information should be subject to appropriate security measures to safeguard against unauthorised access and use. 10. There should be effective review and audit mechanisms to ensure legal requirements, policies and standards are complied with in practice, and regular reports should be published. 11. When the use of a surveillance camera system is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and there is a pressing need for its use, it should then be used in the most effective way to support public safety and law enforcement with the aim of processing images and information of evidential value. 12. Any information used to support a surveillance camera system which compares against a reference database for matching purposes should be accurate and kept up to date.”
“1.8 This code has been developed to address concerns over thepotential for abuse or misuse of surveillance by the state inpublic places.” “2.1 Modern and forever advancing surveillance camera technology provides increasing potential for the gathering and use of images and associated information. These advances vastly increase the ability and capacity to capture, store, share and analyse images and information. This technology can be a valuable tool in the management of public safety and security, in the protection of people and property, in the prevention and investigation of crime, and in bringing crimes to justice. Technological advances can also provide greater opportunity to safeguard privacy. Used appropriately, current and future technology can and will provide a proportionate and effective solution where surveillance is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and meets a pressing need.” “2.2 In general, any increase in the capability of surveillance camera system technology also has the potential to increase the likelihood of intrusion into an individual's privacy.The Human Rights Act 1998 gives effect in UK law to the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Some of these rights are absolute, whilst others are qualified, meaning that it is permissible for the state to interfere with the right provided that the interference is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and the interference is proportionate. Amongst the qualified rights is a person's right to respect for their private and family life, home and correspondence, as provided for byArticle 8 of the ECHR .” “2.3 That is not to say that all surveillance camera systems use technology which has a high potential to intrude on the right to respect for private and family life. Yet this code must regulatethat potential, now and in the future. In considering the potential to interfere with the right to privacy, it is important to take account of the fact that expectations of privacy are both varying and subjective. In general terms, one of the variables is situational, and in a public place there is a zone of interaction with others which may fall within the scope of private life. An individual can expect to be the subject of surveillance in a public place as CCTV, for example, is a familiar feature in places that the public frequent. An individual can, however, rightly expect surveillance in public places to be both necessary and proportionate, with appropriate safeguards in place.” “2.4 The decision to use any surveillance camera technology must, therefore, be consistent with a legitimate aim and a pressing need. Such a legitimate aim and pressing need must be articulated clearly and documented as the stated purpose for any deployment. The technical design solution for such adeployment should be proportionate to the stated purpose ratherthan driven by the availability of funding or technologicalinnovation. Decisions over the most appropriate technology should always take into account its potential to meet the stated purpose without unnecessary interference with the right to privacy and family life. Furthermore, any deployment should not continue for longer than necessary.” “3.2.3 Any use of facial recognition or other biometriccharacteristic recognition systems needs to be clearly justifiedand proportionate in meeting the stated purpose, and be suitablyvalidated 4. It should always involve human intervention before decisions are taken that affect an individual adversely.” (Footnote 4: “The Surveillance Camera Commissioner will be a source of advice on validation of such systems.”) “4.8.1 Approved standards may apply to the system functionality, the installation and the operation and maintenance of a surveillance camera system. These are usually focused on typical CCTV installations, however there may be additional standards applicable where the system has specific advanced capability such as ANPR, video analytics or facialrecognition systems, or where there is a specific deployment scenario, for example the use of body-worn video recorders.” “4.12.1 Any use of technologies such as ANPR or facialrecognition systems which may rely on the accuracy of information generated elsewhere such as databases provided by others should not be introduced without regular assessment to ensure the underlying data is fit for purpose.” “4.12.2 A system operator should have a clear policy to determine the inclusion of a vehicle registration number or a known individual's details on a reference database associated with such technology. A system operator should ensure that reference data is not retained for longer than necessary to fulfil the purpose for which it was originally added to a database.”
“3. Compliance with Data Protection Principlesa) 'lawfulness and fairness' The lawfulness of South Wales Police processing is derived from its official functions as a UK police service, which includes the investigation and detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders, including acting in obedience to court warrants that require the arrest of defendants who have failed to attend court. b) 'data minimisation' South Wales police only processes sensitive personal data when permitted to do so by law. Such personal data is collected for explicit and legitimate purposes such as biometric data during the deployment of Automatic Facial Recognition technology. c) 'accuracy' During AFR Locate deployments South Wales Police collects the information necessary to determine whether the individual is on a watchlist. If an intervention is made the process will not prompt data subjects to answer questions and provide information that is not required. Where processing is for research and analysis purposes, wherever possible this is done using anonymised or deidentified data sets. d) 'storage limitation' Providing complete and accurate information is required when constructing a watchlist. During AFR Locate deployments watchlists will be constructed on the day of deployment and where the deployments extend beyond 24 hours these will be amended daily. Where permitted by law and when it is reasonable and proportionate to do so, South Wales Police may check this information with other organisations – for example other police and law enforcement services. If a change is reported by a data subject to one service or a part of South Wales Police, whenever possible this is also used to update the AFR application, both to improve accuracy and avoid the data subject having to report the same information multiple times. e) 'integrity and confidentiality' South Wales Police has a comprehensive set of retention policies in place which are published online, further information specific to AFR can be found on SWP AFR webpage. All staff handling South Wales Police information are security cleared and required to complete annual training on the importance of security, and how to handle information appropriately. In addition to having security guidance and policies embedded throughout SWP business, SWP also has specialist security, cyber and resilience staff to help ensure that information is protected from risks of accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access.”
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