“The regulations must contain provision which prohibits the Minister from designating a person by name except where the Minister–– (a) has reasonable grounds to suspect that that person is an involved person (see subsection (3)) and (b) considers that the designation of that person is appropriate, having regard to–– (i) the purpose of the regulations as stated under section 1(3), and (ii) the likely significant effects of the designation on that person (as they appear to the Minister to be on the basis of the information that the Minister has).” (i) the purpose of the regulations as stated under section 1(3), and (ii) the likely significant effects of the designation on that person (as they appear to the Minister to be on the basis of the information that the Minister has).”
“The regulations contained in this instrument that are made under section 1 of the Act are for the purposes of encouraging Russia to cease actions destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine.”
“… I note that on16 March 2023 , 16 days after Ms Khan's request for revocation of her designation was refused, it was reported that Mr Khan attended a meeting at the Kremlin hosted by Vladimir Putin. In this meeting, Mr Khan, alongside at least seven other individuals designated by the UK, was urged to invest in Russia’s economy to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions and was discouraged from ‘hiding’ assets in jurisdictions outside of Russia …German Khan's attendance at this meeting further demonstrates that there continues to be a rational link to the objectives of the 2019 Russia Regulations because it is evidence of his ongoing association with Vladimir Putin, contrary to what has been suggested by Ms Khan.”
“… We did not know whether [he] would be designated, but we understood (given previous inaccurate reporting regarding his relationship with Mr Putin), that it was possible that he may be at some stage in the future. This was an irrevocable and unconditional gift of money from [Mr Khan] to me. To be clear, the money received in Gift 14 is mine, and not [his]. That money was, and is, only intended to be used for my, and my children’s, needs.”
“There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Anzhelika KHAN is associated with German Borisovich KHAN. Anzhelika KHAN is the wife of German Borisovich KHAN. German Borisovich KHAN, hereafter KHAN, is a prominent Russian businessman. Khan is obtaining a benefit from and/or supporting the Government of Russia through his positions on the Supervisory Board of the Alfa Group Consortium and the Board of Directors of ABH Holdings S.A., owner of Russia’s largest privately owned bank ‘Alfa-Bank (Russia)’, and Chairman of the Supervisory Board of A1 Investment Holdings S.A., entities which are carrying on business in sectors of strategic significance to the Government of Russia. KHAN is also a close associate of Vladimir Putin who has been involved in destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine.”
“The concept of association is a key pillar of the UK sanctions regime under SAMLA. It features across all individual UK autonomous sanctions regimes. Designations made on the basis of association with a person who is or has been involved in the activities targeted by the sanctions regime can be justified in a number of ways, one or more of which may be applicable in any given case. This includes increasing the coercive pressure on an involved person to take actions consistent with the objective(s) of the relevant sanctions regime, by incentivising one or more of their associates to influence the involved person’s behaviour and/or to distance themselves from and thereby isolate the involved person, and this is clearly relevant in Ms Khan's case as set out in more detail in §72 below. This effect can be amplified if the designation of an associate also incentivises other individuals who are associated with an involved person to take similar actions, or deters other individuals from becoming associated with an involved person. Furthermore, given the widespread practice of designated persons holding assets via their associates - for example, properties held in the names of family members - as a means of seeking to circumvent the effect of sanctions, designations of these associates can also be critical in ensuring that the designation of the relevant involved person has its intended effect. This point is also clearly relevant in Ms Khan's case due to the extensive financial and material benefit she has obtained from German Khan, as outlined below (see, for example, §25, §50 and §72(d)).”
“The designation of Ms Khan, which is based on her association with her husband German Khan, is also rationally connected to the purposes identified in regulation 4 of the 2019 Regulations. The designation of Ms Khan on the grounds of her association with German Khan is likely to contribute to achieving those purposes in at least the following ways: a) Designating Ms Khan on this basis will send a signal to Ms Khan, others in her position and the wider international community that there are negative consequences to receiving a financial or other material benefit from persons involved in obtaining a benefit or supporting the Government of Russia. It also signals that associated persons bear some personal responsibility for the consequences of activities which have provided them (whether directly or indirectly) with financial or other material benefit. b) The designation of Ms Khan will disincentivise her from continuing to obtain a financial or other material benefit from her husband. It will also encourage others to dissociate from those individuals who have carried on business in sectors of strategic significance to the Government of Russia, and disincentivise others from associating themselves in future with (and obtaining a financial or other material benefit from) those individuals. In these ways, the designation will isolate German Khan and others in his position. It will also reduce the benefit they gain from their positions, given that this includes the ability to provide financial or material assistance to their associates, such as the extensive financial and material benefit German Khan has provided to Ms Khan. This, in turn, will intensify the costs of their behaviour and amplify the incentives on German Khan and others in his position to take the actions set out above (see §71). c) The designation will also encourage Ms Khan to put pressure on her husband German Khan to take the actions set out above (see §71), in the hope of increasing the likelihood of the sanctions being lifted. Ms Khan explains that, at her request, German Khan previously transferred his shares in four properties to her, including the family home in the UK and their Italian property, and provided two financial gifts [REDACTED] … This suggests that, contrary to what has been claimed, Ms Khan does in fact hold significant influence over German Khan and is in a position to put pressure on him as set out above. German Khan may also be incentivised to act on his own initiative and change his behaviour in the hope that sanctions affecting Ms Khan will be lifted. d) Furthermore, there is a material risk that German Khan could mitigate the impact of his asset freeze by holding assets through and/or moving assets into the names of his family members, including Ms Khan. The holding of assets via associates is a widespread practice. We assess that the likelihood of this risk materialising is increased by the pattern of German Khan's past behaviour, specifically the providing of substantial financial and other assistance to Ms Khan. German Khan provided Ms Khan with [REDACTED] in March 2022, shortly before he was designated. The designation of Ms Khan will therefore reduce the likelihood that German Khan is able to circumvent the effect of the sanctions on himself, and in turn increases the likelihood that the designation of German Khan has its intended effect (see §71).”
“I understand from colleagues at OFSI that the exponential increase in licence applications and queries since the commencement of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in longer assessment times in respect of some licence applications. OFSI (and the UK Government more generally) have taken various steps to respond to the evolving situation and to address the risk of delays in processing licence applications. For example, I understand that: a) OFSI has extended its approach and made increased use of the flexibility granted by general licences to be more responsive to the needs of licence applicants, to address a broad range of recurring issues, and to mitigate the unintended consequences of sanctions on UK persons, while at the same time ensuring that UK sanctions policy objectives continue to be met. Since the invasion of Ukraine OFSI has issued 50 general licences, including the general licences for legal fees and for payments to utilities companies for gas and electricity from which Ms Khan has benefited. b) OFSI is in the process of developing streamlined procedures for assessing licence applications and prioritising cases appropriately. c) OFSI is regularly updating its public guidance in relation to financial sanctions in general and the Russia sanctions regime in particular, as well as expanding its engagement across various sectors to ensure that it supports applicants in understanding the sanctions regimes and preparing complete licence applications. d) OFSI has committed significant additional resources to its licensing functions, with a large increase in the number of staff now dedicated to assessing licence applications and queries arising from the conflict in Ukraine.”
“On14 January 2025 , OFSI issued a new General Licence ‘Interim Basic Necessities for Designated Persons’ (‘the Basic Needs Licence’). This applies to individuals designated for the purposes of an asset freeze by the UK (excluding those designated for the purpose of compliance with United Nations obligations) under the regulations listed in Annex 1 of the licence (‘UK DPs’). The New Licence is available on OFSI’s website page of general licences. In summary, the Basic Needs Licence allows a person to make funds available to or for the benefit of a UK DP up to a permitted maximum of£350 per month in each of the two months following the date of their designation for the purpose of that DP making defined permitted payments. Permitted payments are those for food and beverages, medicines/medical products and personal and household products. The Basic Needs Licence took effect from 00:01 on15 January 2025 and will apply automatically to each UK DP from the point that they are designated until either a specific basic needs licence in respect of that UK DP takes effect or two months after the date of their designation (whichever is earlier). OFSI considers the Basic Needs Licence to be a general licence for basic needs …”
“Padfield does not say anything about individualised consideration, it speaks only to purpose.”
“It is well-established that the question whether an act is incompatible with a Convention right is a question of substance for the court itself to decide; the court’s function is not the conventional one in public law of reviewing the process by which a public authority reached its decision…” (Emphasis in original)
“It is also well-established in the authorities that the context will include (1) the importance of the right …; (2) the degree of interference; (3) the extent to which the subject matter is one in which the courts are more or less well placed to adjudicate, both on grounds of institutional expertise (e.g. they are the guardians of due process but are much less familiar with an area such as the conduct of foreign relations or national security) and democratic accountability (e.g. when it comes to social and economic policy, including the allocation of limited resources).”
“The single question therefore for the appellate court is whether or not the District Judge made the wrong decision. It is only if the court concludes that the decision was wrong … that the appeal can be allowed. Findings of fact, especially if evidence has been heard, must ordinarily be respected. In answering the question whether the District Judge, in the light of those findings of fact, was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not proportionate, the focus must be on the outcome, that is on the decision itself. Although the District Judge’s reasons for the proportionality decision must be considered with care, errors and omissions do not of themselves necessarily show that the decision on proportionality itself was wrong.”
“… Whether the assessment of the lower court was ‘wrong’ and we must apply the approach in In Re B. This means, first, that we are not simply re-hearing the case as if we were the court of first instance. Secondly, findings of fact by the lower court must ordinarily be respected, especially if it has heard oral evidence on factual matters that were in dispute. Thirdly, the focus must be on the outcome of the assessment of proportionality. We are not confined to asking whether the lower court erred in law or reached a conclusion which was not reasonably open to it. There is a spectrum but if, at the end of the day, we consider that the outcome of the assessment of proportionality was wrong, we can and should say so.”
“The accessibility test speaks for itself. For a measure to have the quality of law, it must be possible to discover, if necessary with the aid of professional advice, what its provisions are. In other words, it must be published and comprehensible. The requirement of foreseeability, so far as it adds to the requirement of accessibility, is essentially concerned with the principle summed up in the adage of the American founding father John Adams, ‘a government of laws and not of men’. A measure is not ‘in accordance with the law’ if it purports to authorise an exercise of power unconstrained by law. The measure must not therefore confer a discretion so broad that its scope is in practice dependent on the will of those who apply it, rather than on the law itself. Nor should it be couched in terms so vague or so general as to produce substantially the same effect in practice. The breadth of a measure and the absence of safeguards for the rights of individuals are relevant to its quality as law where the measure confers discretion, in terms or in practice, which make its effects insufficiently foreseeable. Thus a power whose exercise is dependent on the judgment of an official as to when, in what circumstances or against whom to apply it, must be sufficiently constrained by some legal rule governing the principles on which that decision is to be made. But a legal rule imposing a duty to take some action in every case to which the rule applies does not necessarily give rise to the same problem. It may give rise to a different problem when it comes to necessity and proportionality, but that is another issue. If the question is how much discretion is too much, the only legal tool available for resolving it is a proportionality test which, unlike the test of legality, is a question of degree.”
“(4) Where the impugned measure is a discretionary power, (a) what is not required is ‘an over-rigid regime which does not contain the flexibility which is needed to avoid an unjustified interference with a fundamental right’ and (b) what is required is that ‘safeguards should be present in order to guard against overbroad discretion resulting in arbitrary, and thus disproportionate, interference with Convention rights’: per Lord Hughes JSC in Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions[2016] AC 88 , paras 31 and 32. Any exercise of power that is unrestrained by law is not ‘in accordance with the law’. (5) The rules governing the scope and application of measures need not be statutory, provided that they operate within a framework of law and that there are effective means of enforcing them: per Lord Sumption JSC in Catt at para 11. (6) The requirement for reasonable predictability does not mean that the law has to codify answers to every possible issue: per Lord Sumption JSC in Catt at para 11.”
“The 2019 Regulations are published and thus readily accessible. They operate in a foreseeable manner. They do not give the Secretary of State anything remotely approaching an unfettered discretion. A person may not be designated unless the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that the person is an ‘involved person’: regulation 6(1). The test for being an ‘involved person’ is tightly defined. The circumstances in which the power of designation might be exercised are foreseeable to a degree that is reasonable. It is, in particular, foreseeable that a person who positively supports Russia’s propaganda war against Ukraine (for example, by parroting Russia’s propaganda narrative), rather than simply expressing an independent view which happens to align with Russia’s interests, might be subject to designation.”
“There are strong safeguards against arbitrariness. Aside from the need for reasonable suspicion of being an ‘involved person’, and the tightly drawn test for being ‘an involved person’: (1) The purpose of the Regulations is explicitly prescribed, in clear and narrow terms: ‘encouraging Russia to cease actions destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine’ (regulation 4(a)). (2) The power to designate a person may only be exercised for the narrowly drawn statutory purpose: Padfield[1968] AC 997 , 1030C per Lord Reid. (3) The 2019 Regulations were subject to the made affirmative procedure, and, for the first three years of their operation, the Secretary of State was required to provide annual reports to Parliament on their operation: section 30 of the 2018 Act. (4) The need for the designation to be publicised, together with a statement of reasons: regulation 8(2)(b), 8(6)(a)(ii). (5) The obligation to withdraw a designation when it no longer fulfils its statutory purpose: section 22(3) of the 2018 Act. (6) The system of exceptions (for example, to allow payments to be made into a frozen account): regulations 58-63. (7) The system of licences (whereby a designated person may seek authority to do anything which would otherwise be prohibited by a sanction): regulations 64-68. (8) The right to request an administrative review of the designation: section 23 of the 2018 Act. (9) The right to challenge a decision made on an administrative review, with that challenge being determined by the court: section 38 of the 2018 Act. (10) The statutory duty not to act incompatibly with Convention rights: section 6(1) of the 1998 Act. It follows that any decision under the Regulations that interferes with qualified Convention rights must be justified. In particular, the stringent four-part proportionality test must be satisfied before a person can be designated: Bank Mellat[2014] AC 700 , para 74.”
“190. First, it is important to recall that what is required under the second limb of the Bank Mellat test for proportionality is a rational connection, no more and no less. There does not have to be a perfect fit between the legitimate aim and the means chosen to achieve it, provided there is a rational connection between them. 191. Secondly, this is an objective test. It calls for analysis by the court itself. As I have already mentioned, proportionality is, unlike conventional judicial review grounds, concerned with the substance of the matter, not the process by which the decision was reached. If, as a matter of objective analysis, there is a rational connection proved to the court’s satisfaction, it is immaterial whether or not this featured in the reasoning process of the decision-maker at the time.”
“In this sense, the aim and the purpose of sanctions are not restricted to State institutions, or those who exercise political power and influence. In this way sanctions may provide a peaceful way to impose pressure on a hostile State.”
“I would accept that these sanctions are both severe and open-ended. But this does not meet the fundamental point that sanctions often have to be severe and open-ended if they are to be effective. If sanctions are to be effective, a serious price has to be paid by those who are within the definition of people to be designated under the 2019 Regulations. On the other side of the balance is Russia’s very serious violation of international law and the need to bring the invasion of Ukraine to an end.”
“Undoubtedly, this is a case where close scrutiny is necessary in order to adjudicate on a complaint that Convention rights have been infringed. And it is the structured analysis articulated in Bank Mellat that must be applied. But the Court does not assume the role of primary decision maker on issues that turn on the exercise of judgment or the determination of policy, limiting itself instead to asking whether the decision was one properly open to the Executive. …” (Emphasis added)
“In the circumstances I conclude that the Secretary of State has not failed to strike a fair balance between the rights of Ms Khan and her family and the interests of the community.”
“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
“Furthermore, it is of some relevance that the Appellant and his family are able to meet the costs of their needs through the system of licensing operated by OFSI at HM Treasury. If they have reason to complain about the way in which the licensing system is operated in practice in relation to them, they have a remedy available against HM Treasury but that would not be a reason to question the lawfulness of the designation of Mr Shvidler as such.”