“3… the UK has in place a framework of laws, policies and administrative arrangements to ensure access to work, benefits and services is only available to those who are lawfully present in the UK and have the right [of] access to them. ….. 5. The Home Office has developed safeguards to protect everyone who follows the UK’s rules and minimise the risk that anyone with a legal right to be here is wrongly penalised by the compliant environment measures. …. What is the aim of the compliant environment? 8. The compliant environment as a framework has multiple aims. Including supporting the broader Government framework to enable the legitimate movement of people and goods to support economic prosperity. The compliant environment measures aim to: • Deter and prevent immigration offending, acting as a deterrent for those considering coming to, or remaining in, the UK unlawfully; • Secure compliance with and help to enforce UK immigration laws; • Protect UK taxpayer funded; and • Protect vulnerable migrants from the risk of exploitation. Who does the compliant environment affect? 9. The compliant environment framework is designed to: • Distinguish between those who are present in the UK with lawful status and those who are here irregularly; and, • Ensure where an individual holds lawful status that includes the right to access work, benefits or services they are able to do so.”
“General principles. (1) All those who are in this Act expressed to have the right of abode in the United Kingdom shall be free to live in, and to come and go into and from, the United Kingdom without let or hindrance except such as may be required under and in accordance with this Act to enable their right to be established or as may be otherwise lawfully imposed on any person. (2) Those not having that right may live, work and settle in the United Kingdom by permission and subject to such regulation and control of their entry into, stay in and departure from the United Kingdom as is imposed by this Act; … (4) The rules laid down by the Secretary of State as to the practice to be followed in the administration of this Act for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons not having the right of abode shall include provision for admitting (in such cases and subject to such restrictions as may be provided by the rules, and subject or not to conditions as to length of stay or otherwise) persons coming for the purpose of taking employment, or for purposes of study, or as visitors, or as dependants of persons lawfully in or entering the United Kingdom.”
“3(1) Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, where a person is not a British citizen; (a) he shall not enter the United Kingdom unless given leave to do so in accordance with the provisions of, or made under, this Act; (b) he may be given leave to enter the United Kingdom (or, when already there, leave to remain in the United Kingdom) either for a limited or for an indefinite period.”
“(c) if he is given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, it may be given subject to all or any of the following conditions, namely— (i) a condition restricting his work or occupation in the United Kingdom; (ia) a condition restricting his studies in the United Kingdom; (ii) a condition requiring him to maintain and accommodate himself, and any dependants of his, without recourse to public funds; (iii) a condition requiring him to register with the police. (iv) a condition requiring him to report to an immigration officer or the Secretary of State; and (v) a condition about residence.”
“(2) The Secretary of State shall from time to time (and as soon as may be) lay before Parliament statements of the rules, or of any changes in the rules, laid down by him as to the practice to be followed in the administration of this Act for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons required by this Act to have leave to enter, including any rules as to the period for which leave is to be given and the conditions to be attached in different circumstances; and section 1(4) above shall not be taken to require uniform provision to be made by the rules as regards admission of persons for a purpose or in a capacity specified in section 1(4) (and in particular, for this as well as other purposes of this Act, account may be taken of citizenship or nationality). If a statement laid before either House of Parliament under this subsection is disapproved by a resolution of that House passed within the period of forty days beginning with the date of laying (and exclusive of any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days), then the Secretary of State shall as soon as may be make such changes or further changes in the rules as appear to him to be required in the circumstances, so that the statement of those changes be laid before Parliament at latest by the end of the period of forty days beginning with the date of the resolution (but exclusive as aforesaid).”
“The Secretary of State may by order make further provision with respect to the giving, refusing or varying of leave to remain in the United Kingdom. (2) An order under subsection (1) may, in particular, provide for— (a) the form or manner in which leave may be given, refused or varied; (b) the imposition of conditions; (c) a person’s leave to remain in the United Kingdom not to lapse on his leaving the common travel area.”
“(1) This section applies if— (a) a person who has limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom applies to the Secretary of State for variation of the leave, (b) the application for variation is made before the leave expires, and (c) the leave expires without the application for variation having been decided. (2) The leave is extended by virtue of this section during any period when— (a) the application for variation is neither decided nor withdrawn, (b) an appeal undersection 82(1) of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 could be brought while the appellant is in the United Kingdom against the decision on the application for variation (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission), (c) an appeal under that section against that decision brought while the appellant is in the United Kingdom, is pending (within the meaning of section 104 of that Act) (ca) an appeal could be brought under theImmigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”), while the appellant is in the United Kingdom, against the decision on the application for variation (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission), (cb) an appeal under the 2020 Regulations against that decision, brought while the appellant is in the United Kingdom, is pending (within the meaning of those Regulations), or (d) an administrative review of the decision on the application for variation— (i) could be sought, or (ii) is pending. (3) Leave extended by virtue of this section shall lapse if the applicant leaves the United Kingdom. (3A) Leave extended by virtue of this section may be cancelled if the applicant— (a) has failed to comply with a condition attached to the leave, or (b) has used or uses deception in seeking leave to remain (whether successfully or not). (4) A person may not make an application for variation of his leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom while that leave is extended by virtue of this section.
“When a person applies for variation of his leave before that leave expires, but it then expires before a decision is taken, the leave is automatically extended to the point at which the appropriate period for appealing a refusal expires. This will protect the immigration status of that person and prevent him from becoming an overstayer.”
“40. First, it is common ground that the purpose of section 3C is to protect the immigration status of those with existing leave who have applied for a variation of that leave and are awaiting a decision of the Secretary of State or are exercising appeal rights in respect of a decision. Without an extension of leave in such circumstances, an applicant would be in the UK unlawfully as an overstayer on the expiry of their original leave. The disadvantages to which overstayers are exposed were summarised by Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore in Pathan v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2020] 1WLR 4506 , at paras 115—117, including the following: “115. There are two types of effect of becoming an overstayer: immediate and long-term. If one is knowingly an overstayer, one automatically commits an offence under section 24(1)(b) of the 1971 Act and becomes liable to imprisonment for a term of up to six months or a fine. Overstaying also tips a person into the Home Office’s hostile environment. Since July 2016 it has been illegal for an overstayer to be in employment. That prohibition remains in place even after an overstayer has applied for a visa extension. It persists until (and if) they are granted leave to remain. Overstayers may find it difficult to rent accommodation and may be prevented from driving. 116. Long term consequences may be even more serious . . .”
“210. … The consequences were that, while he remained in the UK, he (a) committed a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment; (b) became liable to detention pending forcible removal; (c) committed a criminal offence if he continued to work . . . (d) ceased to be entitled to state benefits; (e) became disqualified from occupying rented accommodation; (f) became subject to NHS charging provisions; (g) became subject to the freezing of funds in his bank account; (h) became subject to revocation of his driving licence; and (i) in the various circumstances identified . . . above, became subject to a ban on later re-entry into the UK.” … 41. In so far as it protects an applicant’s immigration status and prevents the applicant becoming an overstayer, section 3C also has a potentially important part to play in the accumulation of the ten years’ continuous lawful residence in the UK which is a requirement for the grant of indefinite leave to remain .... Whilst I do not think that that can be said to be a purpose of the section, it is plainly an important aspect of it and provides the context for each of the cases now before us.”
“The Secretary of State has set out a long-term vision to move away from providing physical documents that evidence immigration status and enable all individuals to be able to demonstrate their immigration status digitally… Providing immigration status information online means in future we will increasingly be able to update a person’s digital status in real-time if their leave is extended by section 3C. This is not possible with the current physical evidence of immigration status, such as a Biometric Residence Permit (BRP), which can only ever show the original expiry date of the person’s leave and has never been able to provide evidence that a person has leave extended under section 3C.”
“Parliament must have conferred the discretion with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act; the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing the Act as a whole and construction is always a matter of law for the court. In a matter of this kind it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line, but if the Minister, by reason of his having misconstrued the Act or for any other reason, so uses his discretion as to thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act, then our law would be very defective if persons aggrieved were not entitled to the protection of the court.”
"The common theme of all the passages quoted is that the notion of absolute or unfettered discretion is rejected. Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely - that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended. Although the Crown's lawyers have argued in numerous cases that unrestricted permissive language confers unfettered discretion, the truth is that, in a system based on the rule of law, unfettered governmental discretion is a contradiction in terms. The real question is whether the discretion is wide or narrow, and where the legal line is to be drawn. For this purpose everything depends upon the true intent and meaning of the empowering Act. "
"Parliament conferred a discretion on the Minister so that it could be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act which were to be determined by the construction of the Act; this was a matter of law for the court. Though there might be reasons which would justify the Minister in refusing to refer a complaint, his discretion was not unlimited and, if it appeared that the effect of his refusal to appoint a committee of investigation was to frustrate the policy of the Act, the court was entitled to interfere."
"It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably.' Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington L.J. in Short v. Poole Corporation[1926] Ch. 66 , 90, 91 gave the example of the redhaired teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. That is unreasonable in one sense. In another sense it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into one another."
“No statute confers an unfettered discretion on any minister. Such a discretion must be exercised so as to promote and not to defeat or frustrate the object of the legislation in question … The object is to ascertain the statutory purpose or object which the draftsman had in mind when conferring on ministers the powers set out in section 31.”
“The present appeal raises a point of statutory interpretation: what is the ambit of the power conferred on the minister by section 31(1) … No statutory power is of unlimited scope … Powers are conferred by Parliament for a purpose, and they may be lawfully exercised only in furtherance of that purpose … The purpose for which a power is conferred, and hence its ambit, may be stated expressly in the statute. Or it may be implicit. Then the purpose has to be inferred from the language used, read in its statutory context and having regard to any aid to interpretation which assists in the particular case. In either event … the exercise is one of statutory interpretation.”
“46. The fundamental flaw in the Ministers' argument is to assume that a failure to exercise a discretionary power can only be unlawful—or, to put the matter differently, to assume that an obligation to exercise a discretionary power can only arise—where the exercise of the power is necessary to make effective a legal right. That is too narrow an approach, as was made clear in Padfield's case[1968] AC 997 , where the same argument was advanced (see pp 1020–1021) and rejected. As Lord Reid explained in that case, at p 1033, Julius v Bishop of Oxford 5 App Cas 214 is itself authority for going behind the words which confer a statutory power to the general scope and objects of the Act in order to find what was intended. In the words of Lord Cairns LC in Julius's case, at pp 222–223, “there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty …” 47. The importance of Padfield's case[1968] AC 997 was its reassertion that, even where a statute confers a discretionary power, a failure to exercise the power will be unlawful if it is contrary to Parliament's intention. That intention may be to create legal rights which can only be made effective if the power is exercised, as in Singh (Pargan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[1992] 1 WLR 1052 . It may however be to bring about some other result which is similarly dependent upon the exercise of the power. Authorities illustrating that principle in the context of a statutory power to make regulations, where such regulations were necessary for the proper functioning of a statutory scheme, include Greater London Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1984] JPL 424 and Sharma v Registrar to the Integrity Commission[2007] 1 WLR 2849 , para 26, per Lord Hope of Craighead. In the present case, the exercise of the power to make regulations by1 May 2006 was necessary in order to bring Chapter 3 of Part 17 of the 2003 Act into effective operation by that date, as the Scottish Parliament intended. The Ministers were therefore under an obligation to exercise the power by that date.”
“28 The contrary argument depends to my mind on a misapplication of the so-called Padfield principle: Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food[1968] AC 997 . Under that principle, it is clear that discretionary powers conferred by statute must not be used in such a way as to thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act: per Lord Reid, at p 1030C—D. It can no doubt be said that one of the purposes of the 2002 Act was to reduce the scope for repeat appeals, and that, as Laws LJ observed, the legislation leans in favour of what are called one-stop appeals: JM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] Imm AR 293, para 23. It may be also, as Mr Malik submits, that the exercise of the Secretary of State’s powers has the incidental effect in some cases of adding to the range of matters an appellant is able to raise by way of appeal during the period that his leave is extended under section 3C. 29 However, neither such general observations nor such incidental effects can be translated into an overriding policy requiring the Secretary of State to act in a particular way, nor into a right for the appellant to insist that he does so. …”
“a discretion conferred with the intention it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act can only be validly exercised in a manner that will advance that policy and those objects. More pertinently, the discretion may not be exercised in a way that would frustrate the legislation's objectives.”
“201. There was some discussion of what has come to be known as the Padfield principle (Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food[1968] AC 997 ) in relation to ground 1. The principle concerns the exercise of power to promote the policy and objects of the legislation conferring the power, determined by construing the legislation as a whole (see generally R (Palestine Solidarity Campaign Ltd) v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government[2020] 1WLR 1774 ). 202. In his valuable analysis of a challenge in respect of alleged failures in provision under section 4(1)(c) of the 1999 Act, Edis J said in R (Sathanantham) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2016] 4 WLR 128 , para 67: The power to provide accommodation in section 4(1)(c) is a power to provide it to those who have been released on bail. The SSHD has established a system for its exercise . . . She has not decided not to exercise it. If she adopted a policy of declining [every application] to accommodate those who were released on bail this may perhaps violate the rule in Padfield’s case, but that is not what has happened here. What has happened here is that the system which the SSHD has established is trying, but failing, to offer suitable bail accommodation to the small number of high risk bail applicants within a reasonable period of time. The policy which she has established is not irrational or unreasonable, it is simply not working very well. There are several reasons for this which include the complex nature of the task in di–cult cases and maladministration. The complex nature of the task includes the difficulty in sourcing accommodation for asylum seekers generally in what is sometimes a hostile climate. That difficulty is magnified when the detainee is dangerous to a degree which requires the accommodation to be of a particular kind and in a particular location . . . The nature of the problem in this case is not the same as that in Padfield and [M v Scottish Ministers[2012] 1WLR 3386 ]. It is unintended delay which is the problem, not a deliberate decision to delay as in the latter case . . . 203 Mr Tam [Counsel for the SSHD] argued: This is not a case in which it is said that the Regulations are ultra vires; nor has the [Secretary of State] decided not to exercise her powers under section 4(2) and/or 4(5); nor has she adopted a policy of refusing all applications by failed asylum seekers; nor has she imposed insurmountable obstacles to qualifying for section 4 support (e g by imposing qualifying criteria which would, in practice, be impossible for failed asylum seekers to meet) such that the policy objectives of section 4(2) would be frustrated (thus engaging the Padfield principle). 204 This only goes so far. The Secretary of State would be deciding not to exercise her powers under section 4(2) such that the policy objectives of section 4(2) would be frustrated (thus engaging the Padfield principle) if she continued a system which continued the failures evidenced in the present proceedings. There is not so much difference between insisting on a scheme which takes too long and imposing an obstacle in the scheme. To decline to improve a system that is failing to meet the requirements of a duty, when that system can be improved, is equivalent to a decision not to perform a duty; it would be an example of the deliberate decision to delay to which Edis J refers. 205 The policy objective of section 4(2) is the avoidance of a breach of article 3, argued Mr Tam. In my judgment, it is this that makes the matter so serious. Mr Goodman added that it is not the only policy objective; avoiding destitution is a policy objective too. I am not sure that is right in the case of section 4(2), given Limbuela[2006] 1 AC 396 , save as a route to avoiding breach of article 3. But Mr Goodman does not need the added point. In accepting a section 4(2) duty to an individual, the Secretary of State accepts that there is an imminent risk of breach of article 3.”
“235 Where the Secretary of State’s systems work in a way that cause her to be in breach of her legal duty it is proper for the court to say that, because the law is not being complied with. Where there is an aspect of the process that will necessarily cause or contribute to the real risk, both of unlawful decisions and of breach of duty, the court should be prepared to declare it.”
“98. The second ground on which the Lord Chancellor’s Decision is challenged encompasses a number of arguments falling under the general head of ‘irrationality’ or, as it is more accurately described, unreasonableness. This legal basis for judicial review has two aspects. The first is concerned with whether the decision under review is capable of being justified or whether in the classic Wednesbury formulation it is ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it’: see Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn[1948] 1 KB 223 , 233–234. Another, simpler formulation of the test which avoids tautology is whether the decision is outside the range of reasonable decisions open to the decision-maker: see e g Boddington v British Transport Police[1999] 2 AC 143 , 175, per Lord Steyn. The second aspect of irrationality/unreasonableness is concerned with the process by which the decision was reached. A decision may be challenged on the basis that there is a demonstrable flaw in the reasoning which led to it—for example, that significant reliance was placed on an irrelevant consideration, or that there was no evidence to support an important step in the reasoning, or that the reasoning involved a serious logical or methodological error.”
“113. We accept that in principle it was open to the Lord Chancellor to adopt a policy response which did not directly correspond to the problem which it was designed to meet. A policy-maker may reasonably decide that the disadvantages of a finely tuned solution to a problem outweigh its advantages and that a broader measure is preferable, even if the broader measure is both over- and under-inclusive in that it catches some cases in which there is no or no significant problem and fails to catch some cases in which the problem occurs. Such an approach is in any event consistent with the nature of the Scheme, which uses criteria such as PPE as proxies for the complexity of cases. It is inherent in the use of such proxies that they will result in under-compensation in some cases. But this does not cause unfairness if it is off-set by over- compensation in other cases. What matters is that overall a reasonable balance is struck.”
“We need to consider what are the disadvantages of deciding not to “fine-tune” the Regulations thereby allowing the non-banking day salary shift problem to persist unresolved; what are the disadvantages of adopting a solution to the non-banking day salary shift problem; would a solution be consistent or inconsistent with the nature of the universal credit regime; and has a reasonable balance been struck by the SSWP—or rather is it possible to say that no reasonable Secretary of State would have struck the balance in the way the SSWP has done in this case?”
“The SSWP does not point to any way in which the operation of regulation 54 in their cases can be said to further the policies underlying the introduction of universal credit for these respondents.”
“113 I start by saying that I recognise, as does Rose LJ, the extraordinary complexity of designing a system such as universal credit, and that it necessarily involves a range of practical and political assessments of a kind which the court is not equipped to judge. I also accept that in order to be workable any such system may have to incorporate bright-line rules and criteria which do not discriminate fully between the circumstances of different individuals. (In that connection the Secretary of State’s evidence, and Mr Brown in his submissions, placed great weight on the objective of having as fully automated a system as possible, but the point would be valid even in the case of administrative systems that are not computerised.) For those reasons I fully accept that a court should avoid the temptation to find that some particular feature of such a system is “irrational” merely because it produces hard, even very hard, results in some individual cases.”
"The common law no longer insists on the uniform application of the rigid test of irrationality once thought applicable under the so-called Wednesbury principle. The nature of judicial review in every case depends upon the context." 57. It is also well-recognised that in the context of governmental decisions in the field of social and economic policy, which covers social security benefits, "the administrative law test of unreasonableness is generally applied … with considerable care and caution" and the approach of the courts should "in general … [accord] a high level of respect to the judgment of public authorities" in that field. I take those words from para. 146 of the judgment of Lord Reed (with which the other members of the Court agreed) in R (SC) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions[2021] UKSC 26 ,[2021] 3 WLR 428 : see para. 146. In that case the Supreme Court was concerned, as here, with a challenge to the legislation relating to welfare benefits ( sections 13 and 14 of theWelfare Reform and Work Act 2016 ). The claimants' case was that the impugned provisions contravenedarticle 14 of the Convention , but in the part of the judgment from which I quote Lord Reed is making the point that the Strasbourg jurisprudence is in line with the approach taken by the common law, and it is the latter which he is describing. He explains the reasons for adopting a less intensive standard of review in this area, including the need for the courts "to respect the separation of powers between the judiciary and the elected branches of government" (see para. 144). 58. Although the decision in SC is very recent (indeed it post-dates the argument before us), Lord Reed emphasises that the approach which he sets out is well-established in domestic law. I should note in particular a statement which he quotes from the speech of Lord Bridge in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council[1991] 1 AC 521 to the effect that "[where a] … statute has conferred a power on the Secretary of State which involves the formulation and the implementation of national economic policy and which can only take effect with the approval of the House of Commons [my emphasis], it is not open to challenge on the grounds of irrationality short of the extremes of bad faith, improper motive or manifest absurdity"
"When a statutory instrument has been reviewed by Parliament, respect for Parliament's constitutional function calls for considerable caution before the courts will hold it to be unlawful on some ground (such as irrationality) which is within the ambit of Parliament's review. This applies with special force to legislative instruments founded on considerations of general policy."
"I recognise, as does Rose LJ, the extraordinary complexity of designing a system such as universal credit, and that it necessarily involves a range of practical and political assessments of a kind which the Court is not equipped to judge. I also accept that in order to be workable any such system may have to incorporate bright-line rules and criteria which do not discriminate fully between the circumstances of different individuals. … I fully accept that a Court should avoid the temptation to find that some particular feature of such a system is 'irrational' merely because it produces hard, even very hard, results in some individual cases."
“(1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to— (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”
“(1) The PSED must be fulfilled before and at the time when a particular policy is being considered. (2) The duty must be exercised in substance, with rigour, and with an open mind. It is not a question of ticking boxes. (3) The duty is non-delegable. (4) The duty is a continuing one. (5) If the relevant material is not available, there will be a duty to acquire it and this will frequently mean that some further consultation with appropriate groups is required. (6) Provided the court is satisfied that there has been a rigorous consideration of the duty, so that there is a proper appreciation of the potential impact of the decision on equality objectives and the desirability of promoting them, then it is for the decision-maker to decide how much weight should be given to the various factors informing the decision.” 84 Often, compliance with s. 149 is evidenced by the production of a formal EIA. But there is no statutory requirement to produce such a document. Indeed, there is no obligation to produce any contemporaneous document. However, if there is no such document it may be more difficult to show that the duty has been discharged “in substance” and “with rigour”.”
“In my judgment, it is important to emphasise that [the PSED] is not a duty to achieve a result, namely to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination or to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups. It is a duty to have due regard to the need to achieve these goals”
“162. The touchstone is the statutory language. A decision maker must simply give ‘due regard’ to the listed equality needs whenever it exercises a function. What regard to those needs is due in any particular context is a question, in the first instance, for the decision maker. On an application for judicial review, the question whether the duty has been complied with by the decision maker is a question of evaluation for the first instance judge. On an appeal, this court cannot interfere with that evaluation unless a challenge to that assessment shows that it is ‘wrong’. That is a high hurdle (see, for example, Volpi v Volpi[2022] EWCA Civ 464 ;[2022] 4 WLR 48 ).”
“The Home Secretary should commission officials to undertake a full review and evaluation of the hostile/compliant environment policy and measures – individually and cumulatively. This should include assessing whether they are effective and proportionate in meeting their stated aim, given the risks inherent in the policy set out in this report, and its impact on British citizens and migrants with status, with reference to equality law and particularly the public sector equality duty. This review must be carried out scrupulously, designed in partnership with external experts and published in a timely way.”
“This overarching EIA stands as a living document and will be kept under regular review. Where the Home Office identifies any impact, which has not been recorded below, this document will be updated to reflect the considerations we have undertaken, and any differential impact identified. Likewise, as new data continues to emerge the Home Office will use it to inform our considerations and update this EIA where appropriate.”
“60. The aims of the policy and their fulfilment mean that the compliant environment framework and the measures within are designed to largely focus on individuals who are third-country national migrants (both regularised and irregular) in the UK rather than British or Irish citizens, In some areas, such as employment and private rented housing, everyone is subject to checks, including British and Irish citizens. In other areas, such as banking and driving, restrictions are only imposed on individuals who are known to be present in the UK irregularly. 61. This does mean that third-country migrants in the UK may interact with and be impacted by the compliant environment framework more so than British or Irish citizens, thereby causing a directly differential impact. 62. It is considered that this directly differential impact is the result of the broader way in which immigration control in the UK is managed and is not directly as a result of the compliant environment itself. 63. This is because at a high-level, the UK’s immigration system differentiates between those: who do not require permission to enter and stay (that is British and Irish citizens); and, third-country national migrants who do. In respect of third-country nationals, the immigration system also provides for conditions to be attached to any limited or temporary permission to stay that they are given – these conditions can include restrictions relating to work, access to public funds, and so on. Similarly, the immigration system criminalises migrants who either enter the UK without permission; remain longer than any limited permission allows; or, breach a condition associated with their permission to be in the UK. This approach and the powers which enable its operation are set out in legislation. They stem from theImmigration Act 1971 but have been built on ubstantially by numerous pieces of succeeding legislation; including pieces of legislation which restrict the rights and activities that migrants whose status has become irregular can utilise. …. 65. The operation of the compliant environment framework, and the resulting directly differential impact, is consistent with the overall approach the UK takes to immigration control. As a result, the Home Office also considers the compliant environment framework to be a proportionate means of achieving legitimate aim, rational, fair and reasonable because it is based on the existing framework and legislation underpinning immigration control in the UK. 66. Turning to look at decisions made under the compliant environment framework, it should be noted that nationality alone would not be the reason why an individual is affected by the measures. Decisions to prevent access to work, benefits and/or services are taken on the basis of someone’s immigration status in the UK; primarily whether they have permission to be in the UK or not, and whether any permission provides them the appropriate right they are seeking to access. Thus, although there is a link between nationality and immigration status, the Home Office does not consider decisions made under the compliant environment measures to have directly differential impact in respect of this protected characteristic.” … 82. The data set out above therefore suggests that there may also be an indirectly differential impact in respect of ethnicity. Although the area is complex and limited by available data, our consideration thus far may suggest that non-white ethnic groups, and in particular those identifying as part of the black ethnic group, may more frequently interact with and be affected by the compliant environment measures. On the basis that lower socio-economic indicators may mean certain ethnic groups interact more frequently with the compliant environment measures and the measures contained within. 83. However, the reasons for apparent lower socio-economic status among ethnic groups is complex and the result of a wide range of factors. It is not considered to be as a result of the operation of the compliant environment alone. 84. Likewise, the indirect differential impacts identified in the preceding paragraphs are considered to be justified as a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate policy aim. Namely, of the compliant environment framework protecting taxpayer funded services; and protecting vulnerable migrants from exploitation. They are also considered to be the result of the approach to immigration control that the UK operates more broadly, as well as migration trends, both historic and current.”
“Extrapolating the general UK population, although the margin is small, could initially indicate that women may be subject to the compliant environment measures more frequently than men and this may result in an indirect differential impact.”
“In response to the Windrush scandal the Home Office has committed to undertake a full evaluation and review of the compliant environment. This process is currently underway and will be delivered in continuous stages, but it will take some time to fully conclude. Therefore, in parallel, the Department has proactively worked to put in place additional policy-based as well as operational safeguards to better protect those who are lawfully present in the UK and who hold permission to access work, services and/or benefits. These safeguards also mitigate the risk of unintended consequences and offer avenues allowing those who believe they have been incorrectly impacted by the measures to contact the Department.”
“(1) Every child matters even if they are someone subject to immigration control. (2) In accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child the best interests of the child will be a primary consideration (although not necessarily the only consideration) when making decisions affecting children. (3) Ethnic identity, language, religion, faith, gender and disability are taken into account when working with a child and their family. (4) Children should be consulted and the wishes and feelings of children taken into account wherever practicable when decisions affecting them are made, even though it will not always be possible to reach decisions with which the child will agree. In instances where parents and carers are present they will have primary responsibility for the children’s concerns. (5) Children should have their applications dealt with in a timely way and that minimises the uncertainty that they may experience.”
“69 The meaning and effect of section 55 has been considered by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, including ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2011] 2 AC 166 , Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2013] 1 WLR 3690 and R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Children’s Comr intervening)[2017] 1WLR 771 . 70 There was no dispute before us as to the propositions established by those authorities which for present purposes may be summarised as follows: (i) Section 55 was enacted to give effect in domestic law, as regards immigration and nationality, to the UK’s international obligations under article 3of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). The UK is a party to the UNCRC and in 2008 withdrew its reservation in respect of nationality and immigration matters. Article 3 provides that: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”