“An unaccompanied minor child should be reunited as promptly as possible with his or her parents or guardians as well as with siblings. If the minor has arrived first in a country of asylum, the principle of family unity requires that the minor’s next-of-kin be allowed to join the minor in that country unless it is reasonable under the circumstances for the minor to join them in another country. Because of the special needs of children for a stable family environment, the reunification of unaccompanied minors with their families, whenever this is possible, should be treated as a matter of urgency.”
“Family Reunion Requirements for leave to enter or remain as the partner of a refugee 352A. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the partner of a person granted refugee status are that: (i) the applicant is the partner of a person who currently has refugee status granted under the Immigration Rules in the United Kingdom; and (ii) the marriage or civil partnership did not take place after the person granted refugee status left the country of their former habitual residence in order to seek asylum or the parties have been living together in a relationship akin to marriage or a civil partnership which has subsisted for two years or more before the person granted refugee status left the country of their former habitual residence in order to seek asylum; and (iii) the relationship existed before the person granted refugee status left the country of their former habitual residence in order to seek asylum; and (iv) the applicant would not be excluded from protection by virtue of paragraph 334(iii) or (iv) of these Rules or Article 1F of the Refugee Convention if they were to seek asylum in their own right; and (v) each of the parties intends to live permanently with the other as their partner and the relationship is genuine and subsisting (vi) the applicant and their partner must not be within the prohibited degree of relationship; and (vii) if seeking leave to enter, the applicant holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity. … Requirements for leave to enter or remain as the child of a refugee 352D. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom in order to join or remain with the parent who currently has refugee status are that the applicant: (i) is the child of a parent who currently has refugee status granted under the Immigration Rules in the United Kingdom; and (ii) is under the age of 18; and (iii) is not leading an independent life, is unmarried and is not a civil partner, and has not formed an independent family unit; and (iv) was part of the family unit of the person granted asylum at the time that the person granted asylum left the country of their habitual residence in order to seek asylum; and (v) the applicant would not be excluded from protection by virtue of paragraph 334 (iii) or (iv) of these Rules or Article 1F of the Refugee Convention if they were to seek asylum in their own right; and (vi) if seeking leave to enter, holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity.”
“Nothing in these Rules shall be construed as permitting a person to be granted entry clearance, leave to enter, leave to remain or variation of leave as a spouse or civil partner of another if either the applicant or the sponsor will be aged under 18 on the date of arrival in the United Kingdom or (as the case may be) on the date on which the leave to remain or variation of leave would be granted. …”
“The parents and siblings of a child who have been recognised as refugees are not entitled to family reunion under the Immigration Rules. Where an application does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, the caseworker must consider the ‘Family life (as a partner or parent), private life and exceptional circumstances’ guidance or consider whether there are any compassionate factors which may warrant a grant of leave outside the rules. Each case must be considered on its individual merits and include consideration of the best interests of the child in the UK [emphasis supplied]. As the Immigration Rules are specifically designed to meet our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in respect of family or private life, it is not expected there will be significant numbers granted outside the rules. However, it is important that evidence relating to exceptional circumstances is carefully considered on its individual merits.”
“Where a family reunion application does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, caseworkers must consider whether there are any exceptional circumstances or compassionate factors which may justify a grant of leave outside the Immigration Rules. There may be exceptional circumstances raised in the application which make refusal of entry clearance a breach ofECHR Article 8 (the right to respect for family life) because refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family. Compassionate factors are, broadly speaking, exceptional circumstances, which might mean that a refusal of leave to remain would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family, but not constitute a breach of Article 8 [emphasis supplied]. It is for the applicant to demonstrate as part of their application what the exceptional circumstances or compassionate factors are in their case. Each case must be decided on its individual merits. Entry clearance or a grant of leave outside the Immigration Rules is likely to be appropriate only rarely and consideration should be given to interviewing both the applicant and sponsor where further information is needed to make an informed decision.”
“Where an applicant does not meet all the suitability or eligibility requirements …, the decision maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would make a refusal of the application a breach ofArticle 8 of the ECHR , because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family member, whose Article 8 rights it is evident from the information provided would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.”
“This Appendix, also known as refugee family reunion, is now closed to new applications pending a review.”
“4.3 The Government has made clear in the past its concern that allowing children to sponsor parents would risk creating incentives for more children to be encouraged, or even forced, to leave their family and attempt hazardous journeys to the UK. This would play into the hands of criminal gangs, undermining our safeguarding responsibilities. 4.4 Government policy is not designed to keep child refugees away from their parents, but in considering any policy we must think carefully about the wider impact to avoid putting more people unnecessarily into harm’s way. There is a need to better understand why people choose to travel to the UK after reaching a safe country. It is important that those who need international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach – that is the fastest route to safety.”
“Home Office policy staff told inspectors that most major decisions about family reunion policy were made by ministers and ‘sometimes decisions taken are inevitably political. That is out of our control ultimately.’ The Home Office did not share any advice that it had put to ministers regarding policy options for family reunion. Inspectors asked for the rationale for excluding children from sponsoring family reunion applications. The Home Office’s response echoed what ministers had previously told Parliament: ‘If children were allowed to sponsor parents, this would risk creating incentives for more children to be encouraged, or even forced, to leave their family and risk hazardous journeys to the UK. This plays into the hands of criminal gangs who exploit vulnerable people and goes against our safeguarding responsibilities. This position supports our commitment to protecting vulnerable individuals.’”
“Section 55 was enacted to give effect in domestic law, as regards immigration and nationality, to the UK’s international obligations under article 3 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘UNCRC’). The UK is a party to the UNCRC and in 2008 withdrew its reservation in respect of nationality and immigration matters. Article 3 provides that: ‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’. Although section 55 uses different language, it is conventional and convenient to refer to a duty under section 55 as being to have regard, as a primary consideration, to the best interests of the child.’”
“(ii) The duty is imposed on the Secretary of State. She is bound by it, save to the extent (if any) that primary legislation qualifies it; we were not referred to any qualifying legislation. (iii) The duty applies not only to the making of decisions in individual cases but also to the function of making subordinate legislation and rules (such as the Immigration Rules) and giving guidance. The fact that subordinate legislation or rules are subject to the affirmative vote of either or both Houses of Parliament does not qualify the Secretary of State’s statutory duty under section 55. (iv) The best interests of the child are a primary consideration, not the primary consideration, still less the paramount consideration or a trump card. This does, however, mean that no other consideration is inherently more significant than the best interests of the child. The question to be addressed, if the best interests point to one conclusion, is whether the force of other considerations outweigh it. (v) This in turn means that Secretary of State must identify and consider the best interests of the child or, in a case such as the present, of children more generally and must weigh those interests against countervailing considerations.”
“[T]he evaluation needs to consider, where relevant, the interests both of children in general and of those directly affected by the action. It also needs to indicate the criteria by which the ‘high priority’ given to children’s interests has been weighed against other considerations. In so far as that evaluation shows conflict with the best interests of the children affected, it needs either to demonstrate how that conflict will be addressed, or alternatively what other considerations of equal or greater priority justify overriding those interests.”
“The duty imposed by section 55 of the 2009 Act … applies to the performance of any of Secretary of State’s functions including the making of the rules [my italics].”
“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to— (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”
“103. As to this, three points emerged during the course of the hearing: (1) The claimant’s complaint is really about the relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules, rather than the published guidance on the application of those Rules. As I have already noted, Mr Husain acknowledged that the Secretary of State could not have used an amendment to the Family Reunion Guidance, or anything else short of a change to the Immigration Rules, to introduce the change for which the claimant contends. (2) The ‘establishment’ of the relevant ‘position’ under the Immigration Rules took place in 2000, long before section 55 came into force. The claimant cannot complain about a failure to comply with section 55 in 2000, when section 55 was not in force. (3) Consequently, the claimant’s case is that the Secretary of State failed to comply with section 55 when ‘maintaining’ the relevant position after section 55 came into force. 104. This last point led me to ask during the hearing what the claimant contended was the relevant ‘function’ which the Secretary of State had discharged on one or more occasions since2 November 2009 . I invited the parties to make written submissions on this point after the hearing. …”
“In the hearing, it did not appear to me that Miss Giovannetti was submitting that the Secretary of State had ever made arrangements which were compliant with section 55 in relation to ‘maintaining’ the position established when the Immigration Rules were changed in 2000. Miss Giovannetti confirmed that that was the case. In essence, therefore, the case which she advanced was that the Secretary of State had not discharged a relevant function since2 November 2009 . In putting the Secretary of State’s case in that way, Miss Giovannetti, as I understand it, quite properly accepted that, if the Secretary of State had discharged a relevant function during those years, she had not complied with her duty under section 55 when discharging that function.”
“The Secretary of State submitted that she had not, since2 November 2009 , discharged any function (such as making a rule or subordinate legislation) which triggered section 55 and that: ‘… it would be a significant extension of the ambit of s. 55 to hold that it applies where the SSHD does not propose to make any changes to her current policy or practice. While the SSHD will, of course, consider representations or recommendations that she should do so, declining to accede to such representations or recommendations is not a ‘function’ engaging s. 55.’”
“9. The Secretary of State is not aware of any occasion since s.55 came into force (2 November 2009 ), when the relevant decision makers (namely Home Office Ministers or the Secretary of State) decided to review the Immigration Rules in order to consider providing a route to family reunion for child refugees (i.e. introducing criteria within the Rules governing decisions whether or not to grant leave to enter to the parents and siblings of refugee children). 10. Records since 2015 indicate that the consistent position of the relevant decision makers, as communicated to officials, has been that they are not prepared to change the existing and long-standing policy of considering applications for leave to enter by immediate family members of child refugees on a case-by-case basis outside the Immigration Rules. Thus, for example, Ministers were clear that changing that policy was not one of the options to be included in 2021 consultation on the New Plan for Immigration (which fulfilled the statutory obligation to review legal routes to the UK from the European Union (EU) for protection claimants, set out in theImmigration and Social Security Co-Ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 ). 11. As to the position before 2015, a search has been conducted, but the Secretary of State been unable to find relevant communications from Ministers to officials dating back beyond that date. To the best of the Secretary of State’s knowledge, even prior to 2015, the relevant decision makers were consistent in their position that they intended to maintain the existing policy, as summarised above. This is supported by Family Reunion Guidance from 2007 to 2011 (see Jason Büültjens’ witness statement, para 7).”
“133. It is not disputed that the Secretary of State discharges a function when she makes a change to the Immigration Rules. In order to discharge that function, she has to consider from time to time whether to make any and, if so, what changes to the Immigration Rules. It seems to me that she can properly be described as discharging a function when she actively engages in that consideration. As part of that consideration, she may have to choose between various options, one of which may be to make no change to the Immigration Rules. It seems to me that when she decides to choose one option rather than another, including the option of making no change to the Immigration Rules, she is discharging her function of reviewing the Immigration Rules and considering and deciding whether to change them in one or more ways. 134. However, the decision in Adiatu [R (Adiatu) v Her Majesty’s Treasury[2020] EWHC 1554 (Admin) ,[2020] PTSR 2198 ] is a salutary reminder that both the public sector equality duty and the duty imposed by section 55 of the 2009 Act have to be kept within sensible bounds. In this context, there are a spectrum of possibilities. (1) At one end of the spectrum, Badmus[R (Badmus) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2020] EWCA Civ 657 ,[2020] 1 WLR 4609 ] concerned a relatively formal process, resulting in a decision which was amenable to judicial review, and including a review of existing policy, a report containing a recommendation that consideration be given to changing the policy and ‘a clear and considered policy choice’ between identified options. It seems to me that if the Secretary of State were to take a decision in the immigration, asylum or nationality context similar to the 2018 Review Decision in Badmus, she would be discharging a function for the purposes of section 55 of the 2009 Act, even if the decision were to make no change to existing arrangements. (2) At the other end of the spectrum is the claimant’s submission that the Secretary of State was exercising a relevant function when she responded to the pre-action protocol letter. It cannot be the case that the section 55 duty is triggered whenever a claimant sends a letter contending that the Secretary of State should change her policy. (3) Indeed, once the Secretary of State has decided to adopt one policy rather than another, I do not consider that she is to be treated as, in effect, re-making that decision every time she applies, repeats, defends or declines to change the policy which she has adopted.”
“The Administrative Court erred in holding that the Respondent had not exercised a relevant function for the purposes ofs 55 of the Borders and Citizenship Act 2009 at any point since that provision came into force. On a proper interpretation and application of s 55, the Respondent exercised a relevant function (i) on the multiple occasions when, as the Administrative Court found, she made judicially reviewable decisions not to review the relevant paragraphs of the Immigration Rules to consider whether (inter alia) she should provide a more straightforward route to family reunion for refugee children and/or (ii) when she operated her overall system for refugee family reunion. Further or in the alternative, the Respondent is in breach of s 55 as that section does not permit (and it would frustrate Parliament’s intent in enacting it for) the Respondent to refuse to discharge a relevant function indefinitely, as has been the case here.”
“In relation to ground 1, at §133 of his judgment, Lavender J held that when the Respondent ‘actively engages’ in considering whether to amend the Immigration Rules she is engaging a function. The Respondent submits that she is not exercising a function when she does not propose to make any changes to her current policy or practice (whether or not she is considering any representations or recommendations that she should do so).”
“10. The Secretary of State’s policy in the realm of family reunification, as expressed in the Immigration Rules, dates from the year 2000. Its most important feature, for the purposes of these appeals, is that no provision has ever been made for family reunification in the case of a child who has gained refugee status in the United Kingdom. This discrete regime is currently contained in Part 8 of Appendix FM to the Rules, at paragraphs 352A-352G and 819L-819U. In short, spouses and minor children of a ‘sponsor’ can, subject to satisfying the governing conditions, secure family reunification in the United Kingdom by the grant of leave to enter. However, this possibility does not exist where the sponsor is a child. 11. Thus a blanket prohibition is in operation. Historically, there was a short lived exception to this prohibition relating to the parents of unaccompanied children who had fled Kosovo and secured asylum in the United Kingdom. This concession was confined to the short time frame of July to September 1999. With effect from02 October 2000 , the family reunification regime enshrined in the Immigration Rules contained the aforementioned blanket prohibition. From then to 2006 the Secretary of State operated a policy of permitting the parents or siblings of unaccompanied minor refugees to enter the United Kingdom for the purpose of reunification only where compelling and compassionate circumstances were demonstrated. Since 2006 the Secretary of State’s policy has extinguished this possibility. …”
“Do you allow children recognised as refugees or granted subsidiary protection to sponsor relatives for purposes of family reunion? If yes; When did you start allowing child sponsors and what impact did this have? If yes; How many family reunion visas have you granted, in the last five years, where the sponsor was a child?”
“The UK are currently reviewing the policy on refugee Family Reunion and listening to the concerns from Non-Government Organisation’s [sic] that the current policy and the Immigration Rules on family reunion are too narrow. This work is part of our wider asylum and resettlement strategy. We are gathering evidence on whether changes to policy creates a ‘pull factor’ that may lead to more people risking dangerous journeys to Europe, and on the number of refugee family reunion applications that could be expected with associated analysis of the impact of the cost on public services.”
“The ‘exercise of the [public authority’s] functions’ for the purposes of s 149 (1) consists of the implementation of the measures that the public authority decides upon. … A public authority must have regard to the equalities implications of the steps that it intends to take. It need not have regard to the equalities implications of other steps, which it is not taking, and is not even considering.”
“Finally, we would note that the Divisional Court placed emphasis on the fact that SWP continue to review events against the section 149(1) criteria. It said that this is the approach required by the PSED in the context of a trial process. With respect, we do not regard that proposition to be correct in law. The PSED does not differ according to whether something is a trial process or not. If anything, it could be said that, before or during the course of a trial, it is all the more important for a public authority to acquire relevant information in order to conform to the PSED and, in particular, to avoid indirect discrimination on racial or gender grounds.”
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
“In deciding complaints under article 14, four questions arise: (i) Does the subject matter of the complaint fall within the ambit of one of the substantive Convention rights? (ii) Does the ground upon which the complainants have been treated differently from others constitute a ‘status’? (iii) Have they been treated differently from other people not sharing that status who are similarly situated or, alternatively, have they been treated in the same way as other people not sharing that status whose situation is relevantly different from theirs? (iv) Does that difference or similarity in treatment have an objective and reasonable justification, in other words, does it pursue a legitimate aim and do the means employed bear ‘a reasonable relationship of proportionality’ to the aims sought to be realised (see Stec v United Kingdom(2006) 43 EHRR 47 , para 51)?”
“The general approach adopted to article 14 by the European court has been stated in similar terms on many occasions, and was summarised by the Grand Chamber in the case of Carson v United Kingdom(2010) 51 EHRR 13 , para 61 (‘Carson’). For the sake of clarity, it is worth breaking down that paragraph into four propositions: (1) ‘The court has established in its case law that only differences in treatment based on an identifiable characteristic, or “status”, are capable of amounting to discrimination within the meaning of article 14.’ (2) ‘Moreover, in order for an issue to arise under article 14 there must be a difference in the treatment of persons in analogous, or relevantly similar, situations.’ (3) ‘Such a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.’ (4) ‘The contracting state enjoys a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment. The scope of this margin will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and the background.’”
“I do not accept … that the matters complained of in this case constitute a difference of treatment for the purposes of Article 14. The relevant Immigration Rules treat child and adult refugees the same: neither child nor adult refugees are permitted by the relevant Immigration Rules to sponsor applications for leave to enter by their parents or siblings.”
“… I do not find this to be a helpful way of looking at the matter. The concept of ‘nuclear family’ is not as clear-cut as Mr Husain suggested. For instance, some adult refugees will be individuals who are 18 or more years old and who may have been living with their parents as dependent relatives before they left their country of habitual residence. For these adult refugees, their nuclear family may well consist of their parents and siblings, so that their situation is substantially similar to that of many child refugees.”
“The Administrative Court erred in holding that there was no relevant difference in treatment, for the purposes ofArticle 14 ECHR , between refugee children seeking to reunite with their parents and minor siblings on the one hand and adult refugees seeking to reunite with their partners and minor children on the other; and/or in holding that refugee children seeking to reunite with their parents and siblings were not in a relevantly different situation from adult refugees seeking to reunite with their parents and siblings; and therefore in failing to consider the issue of justification.”
“Any difference in treatment between groups in an analogous position is justified in any event. Age is not a suspect reason (nor, indeed, is the ‘status’ on which the Claimant relies). Furthermore, this is an issue of social policy where a wide margin should be accorded to the state: SC, paras 115(2), 129(2), 143-161, 203. The SSHD has explained on numerous occasions, including in Parliament, why she has adopted the policy she has. Plainly, this is not a matter capable of empirical proof; rather, it is a matter of judgement. Against that background, any difference in treatment has objective and reasonable justification.”
“42. The SSHD has legitimate concerns about the welfare of child refugees. The SSHD’s consistent policy judgment has been that allowing children in this position to become sponsors could have the unintended consequence of incentivizing some families to send their children alone on long and dangerous journeys to the United Kingdom to act as ‘anchors’ to facilitate later asylum applications by family members. The SSHD is especially concerned that such journeys put children at risk of being trafficked or otherwise abused. Contrary to the Claimant’s claim, there is evidence to support the SSHD’s position: see, for example, an ‘ad-hoc query’ sent by Belgium to other members of the European Migration Network in which it asked several questions in relation to the ‘anchor child phenomenon’ which it described as ‘increasing’ in Belgium … Germany, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Norway all replied to the effect that they recognised the phenomenon in their own States. 43. But in any case, this is not a matter which is readily capable of empirical proof; rather, it is a matter of judgment. The SSHD’s judgment on this issue is not manifestly without reasonable foundation: to the contrary, it is entirely reasonable. Against this background, any difference in treatment between adult refugees and child refugees is justified.”
“The Belgian Immigration Office notes an increasing number of unaccompanied minors who lodge an asylum application in Belgium and for which it, soon afterwards, is requested (mostly by the Greek authorities) to take over the parents or other family members in the framework of Dublin III. The Belgian authorities are concerned about these young children who are left alone at the hands of smugglers and they wish to know whether other Members States are confronted with this phenomenon (‘unaccompanied minors who lodge an asylum application in the Member State and for which the authorities, soon afterwards, are requested to take over the parents and other family members’, sometimes referred to as ‘anchor child phenomenon’).”
“1. Are your authorities confronted with the so called ‘anchor child phenomenon’? If so, please describe the overall phenomenon that you experience 2. If yes to the first question: In which procedure is this phenomenon visible: Dublin, other? 3. If yes to the first question: Which age group do the children fall into? 4. If yes to the first question: Which nationalities are concerned by this phenomenon? 5. If yes to the first question: Has you recently noticed an increasing number of such cases? Please provide estimates 6. Which measure do you have in place to prevent and tackle the so-called ‘anchor child phenomenon’? Please elaborate on when the measure was taken, possible impacts etc. The Belgian Immigration Office answered those questions itself in some detail. The answer to question 1 echoed the preamble, but I should also note answer 3, which reads: “The Belgian Immigration Office notices that the children concerned are increasingly younger of age. The youngest was 3 years of age. A large portion of them is under 12 years old. These children are extremely vulnerable during their illegal trip from Greece to Belgium. Most parents pay smugglers to get them to Belgium. Younger children cost less to smuggle.”
“The Respondent recognises that it will usually be in the best interests of children not to remain separated from their parents and siblings. However, the strength of that consideration will vary from case to case, depending on the age, maturity, personal history and life experiences of the child, and all the individual circumstances of the case. Conversely, the Respondent considers that, in general terms, there is a legitimate concern not to encourage or incentivise families to send a child on a long and dangerous journey to claim asylum, with the expectation that the rest of the family will then be entitled to join them. The best interest considerations do not all point in the same direction, nor will they be of equal force in all cases. The current system is a legitimate response to that tension.”
“(i) This is a systemic challenge and so the question is whether the scheme is incapable of being operated in a proportionate manner: R (JCWI) v SSHD[2021] EWCA Civ 542 ;[2021] 1 WLR 1151 at [117-119]; MM (Lebanon) v SSHD[2017] UKSC 10 ,[2017] 1 WLR 771 at [55]-[58]. (ii) The Court should afford a wide margin of appreciation to the state: age is not a core status or suspect ground (whether or not in conjunction with refugee status) and the more peripheral a status is, the lower the burden of justification: Mathieson v SSWP[2015] UKSC 47 ,[2015] 1 WLR 3250 at [21]; R (Akbar) v SSJ[2019] EWHC 332 (Admin) at [92]. (iii) Immigration control is a matter of socio-economic policy, and therefore a matter in respect of which a particularly wide margin is appropriate: see JCWI at [134(iv)].”
“The burden of justification is on R. R is required to show that, balancing the severity of the effects of her differential treatments of refugee children against the importance of her objective, to the extent that the differential treatment will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter. The sources below establish that there is no evidence that the differential treatment of refugee children furthers R’s sole objective: namely, deterring children who would otherwise (if a straightforward path to family reunion were made available) undertake hazardous journeys to the UK. The absence of such evidence over a 25-year period, despite R’s efforts to obtain it, founds a strong inference that the contribution to R’s objective is non-existent, or (at best) minimal. The question for the Court is whether, in light of this, R’s view of the deterrent effect – unquantified, unevidenced, and dubious as it is – is sufficient to justify the well-established and extensive harms the differential treatment causes to vulnerable refugee children. A’s submission is that, on any standard of review (and certainly on the searching standard appropriate here), it is not.”
“(1) in general, it is in the best interests of unaccompanied refugee children to be reunited with their families; and (2) in general, it is in the best interests of unaccompanied refugee children to have a straightforward path to that result.”
“The Administrative Court erred in holding that (i) the Respondent’s repeated refusals to review the relevant paragraphs of the Immigration Rules were rational, and/or (ii) the Rules themselves, the Respondent’s maintenance of them, and/or the Respondent’s refusal to amend them to provide a straightforward route to family reunion for refugee children were rational.”
“We found no evidence to support the Government’s argument that the prospect of family reunification could encourage families to send children into Europe unaccompanied in order to act as an ‘anchor’ for other family members.”