“What do you think about the layout of our new report cards?” (2) Q2: “What do you think about our evaluation areas?” (3) Q3: “What do you think of our proposed 5-point scale for reporting our inspection findings?” (4) Q4: “What do you think about our approach to ‘exemplary’ practice?” (5) Q5: “What do you think about the other evaluation scales we have considered?” (6) Q6: “Do you have any other ideas we could consider?”
“Over the next few months, we will be assessing the impact of our proposed reforms on leaders’, practitioners’ and inspectors’ workloads, mental health and well-being, through visits to providers and external review”
“What do you consider are the likely workload and well-being implications of these proposals?” (2) Q20: “What could we do to help reduce or manage any unintended consequences?” (3) Q21: “Is there anything else about the changes to inspection that you would like to tell us?”
“In the responses to the consultation, there were some calls for us to move to narrative reports only (the second favourite option among providers in The Big Listen research, and third favourite option among individual education professionals). This was also a particularly strong view of some representative organisations in the schools sector. However, views across other sectors were mixed. A major representative in the early years sector said a 5-point scale would provide more nuance and detail, and more meaningful feedback to improve on their practice than our previous approach. We think a combined approach works best. The narrative gives a detailed picture of performance while the 5-point scale offers the clarity and simplicity that parents asked for. We believe this approach is a fairer way of holding providers accountable for their performance and showing a clear and accurate picture of that performance. We have heard that the ability to compare providers ‘at a glance’ is an important and useful feature of our reporting. A narrative on its own would not have the same level of clarity as the combined approach or be as easy for parents to use.”
“We have also considered the risk that points scales (whether a binary met/not met scale, a 5-point scale, or any other points scale) introduce ‘cliff edges’ into the assessment. We consider that a 5-point scale, applied across 6 core evaluation areas, reduces this concern as it is spread out. Each grade will be published alongside a narrative explaining inspectors’ justification for each grade; this will be particularly important in instances when the provider falls close to the borderline of a grade.” (Emphasis as in original text)
“[R]educing workload and promoting well-being remain central to our approach. We will maintain our focus on raising standards and holding providers to account. But we also believe giving education professionals time and space to receive support allows them to do their best to raise standards and protect children. We accept we have a challenge. To change our approach, we have to change. [...] We are doing what we can to alleviate the pressures of that change on professionals, while being true to our duties to children and learners, and our responsibilities to parents and carers to offer them the nuanced information they have called for.”
“We have taken this concern extremely seriously and have taken action to address it”
“Our revised grading is more nuanced, fair and informative, and we believe it better supports well-being than the previous model or the alternatives considered. [...] We are introducing a more detailed report card with a 5-point grading scale. This recognises providers’ strengths and areas for improvement. It offers a more nuanced form of reporting and replaces the previous ‘overall effectiveness’ grade that we know from the Big Listen caused much anxiety across the education workforce. We also believe that we can reduce anxiety by ensuring consistency in grading...”
“Some respondents suggested that the use of a 5-point scale may lead to increased workload demands. In the consultation response, we considered the relative merits of different grading systems. For the reasons set out there, we have concluded that a 5-point scale, supplemented by narrative summaries, will ensure fair and consistent accountability for providers. We have also taken a range of actions to alleviate potential well-being and workload concerns, including in setting the standards, communicating the new processes, providing support throughout inspections, and reforming inspectors’ practice.”
“Taking this feedback into account we propose …”
“Do you have any other ideas we could consider?”
“We heard that inspectors should have more care and concern for the well-being of the leaders and staff we inspect. We have taken this on board. We will put it into practice through all the changes we are setting out here, from improving inspector training (including mental-health training) to reforming how we inspect.”
“So far, we have discussed the potential impact of our proposals on equality, inclusion and diversity for learners. We are also considering their impact on leaders and staff of settings we inspect, and on our inspector workforce. This is particularly important considering the greater nuance in our reporting. We want our more collaborative and supportive inspection methodology to have a positive impact on the workload and well-being of those we inspect. To check this, we will use piloting and further consultation and review.” 92. Insofar as the Claimants argue that the consideration of well-being was limited only to the implications of inspections, and not of reporting, Ofsted plainly had due regard to the equality impact of both its reporting and inspection proposals, in particular in respect of workload and well-being. 93. The PSED is directed only at the statutory considerations. It is a duty “of process and not outcome”: R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales[2020] 1 WLR 5037 (CA) at [176]. It is a matter for the decision-maker how much weight to give any particular equalities consideration: Hotak v Southwark LBC[2016] AC 811 (SC) at [75]. In consequence, having given due regard to the equalities impacts of Proposal 1 on a range of cohorts (including teachers), Ofsted was not obliged to give any particular focus to the matters raised by the Claimants (such as the particular equalities implications of the 5-point scale). XI. Interim relief 94. Although I have refused permission on all grounds, had I considered any of them arguable I would have refused interim relief. Given that this point was addressed by Counsel in some detail in written and oral submissions (and was the subject of 3 detailed witness statements from Mr Whiteman), I will provide some brief reasons for that conclusion. 95.Section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides that the question on an interim relief application is whether “it appears to the court to be just and convenient” to grant the relief sought. Under American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd[1975] AC 396 , the court has to consider the following: first, to assess whether there is a “serious issue to be tried”; and second, if so, to determine where the “balance of convenience” lies. 96. This injunction application fails at the “serious issue to be tried” hurdle (there being no arguable grounds for judicial review). But it would also have failed on “the balance of convenience” and by some margin. As to this latter point, it is well-established in the case law that the fundamental principle is that the court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been ‘wrong’. That standard is modified in important respects in the public law context because the balance of convenience will ordinarily lean in favour of refusing relief where a public authority proposes to act conscientiously in the exercise of its powers. See R (FTDI Holding Ltd) v Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster[2025] EWHC 241 (Admin) at [15] and [17], per Singh LJ and Chamberlain J. 97. In short, the special feature of public law cases is that, other things being equal, it is likely to be in the public interest to allow a defendant public authority to exercise powers in what it considers to be a lawful manner. The weight to be accorded to this public interest will naturally vary from context to context, but may be considerable. In many cases, the claimant would need to point to something very compelling to outweigh it. In deciding whether a claimant has done so, the court will consider both the prima facie strength of the claim and the gravity of the consequences that would follow if interim relief were not granted. 98. By the interim injunction application of16 September 2025 , the Claimants seek to prevent Ofsted from introducing the 2025 Framework pending determination of their claim. They suggest a determination in a 2 day hearing to be held before the end of the current Term, December 2025. I have to assess the justice of making such an order for such a period on the factual position as it appears today, when the 2025 Framework is to come into force in a matter of days. 99. My starting point is that Ofsted (and HMCI) is the public authority entrusted by Parliament to inspect education providers in England. Ofsted and/or HMCI do so pursuant to statutory duties which I have summarised in Section II. It is plainly in the public interest that Ofsted and HMCI be permitted to carry out their statutory functions, and to exercise their powers, in what they consider to be the appropriate manner. They have been appointed to devise and implement a framework for inspections that they conscientiously consider to be in the best interests and welfare of children, schools, professionals and parents. Under the principles I have summarised above, the Claimants must show a particularly compelling reason for frustrating that evaluation. I also refer to the observations of Lindblom LJ at [78] in R (X) v Office for Standards in Education [2020] EMLR 434. That case concerned an attempt to restrain publication of an Ofsted report and these observations as to the importance of the public interest apply with even greater force when there is an attempt, as in the case before me, to restrain Ofsted in the exercise of its statutory function relating to inspection and reporting. 100. As matters stand, and as I have explained above at [60], routine inspection activity has been briefly paused since1 September 2025 (with the authorisation of the Secretary of State) for the specific purpose of allowing providers time to prepare for the new 2025 Framework. Ofsted intends to commence inspections under the renewed framework next week from10 November 2025 . If interim relief were granted, Ofsted would be compelled to adopt one of the following two unattractive approaches in the interim. 101. First, Ofsted could continue the current 2-month pause to routine inspection activity past10 November 2025 , for the period of time (which may be 2 months or indeed longer depending on other court priorities) required to determine the claim. This approach will put the safety and well-being of the over 15 million children and young people at risk, by allowing potential harms to go unnoticed and uninspected. The clear and consistent oversight of education is of vital public importance. A continued pause would also have broader consequences for the education sector. It would cause a substantial backlog in Ofsted’s tight inspection calendar. I note that following the 5-month pause to school inspections occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, Ofsted took nearly 5 years to ‘catch up’ while maintaining its scheduled inspection activity in parallel. A pause would also delay providers’ applications for funding dependent on inspections. The Claimants have properly disavowed this “pausing” approach in Mr Whiteman’s recent evidence. 102. Second, Ofsted could restart inspection activity under the pre-existing framework 2019 Framework, as updated. In Mr Whiteman’s evidence the Claimants suggest that “Ofsted would suffer little if any prejudice” under this approach, because the Court “would simply be maintaining the status quo during the currency of these proceedings”