“Article 1: Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. Article 2: Right to education No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
“Labour will end the VAT exemption and business rates relief for private schools to invest in our state schools.”
“In a democratic society, the right to education, which is indispensable to the furtherance of human rights, plays such a fundamental role that a restrictive interpretation of the first sentence of Art.2 of Protocol No.1 would not be consistent with the aim or purpose of that provision.”
“[i]n order to ensure that the restrictions that are imposed do not curtail the right in question to such an extent as to impair its very essence and deprive it of its effectiveness, the Court must satisfy itself that they are foreseeable for those concerned and pursue a legitimate aim”
“…in spite of its importance, the right to education is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations. Provided that there is no injury to the substance of the right, these limitations are permitted by implication since the right of access ‘by its very nature calls for regulation by the State’. In order to ensure that the restrictions that are imposed do not curtail the right in question to such an extent as to impair its very essence and deprive it of its effectiveness, the Court must satisfy itself that they are foreseeable for those concerned and pursue a legitimate aim. However, unlike the position with respect to arts 8-11 of the Convention, it is not bound by an exhaustive list of ‘legitimate aims’ under art.2 of Protocol No.1. Furthermore, a limitation will only be compatible with art.2 of Protocol No.1 if there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved. Although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this sphere. This margin of appreciation increases with the level of education, in inverse proportion to the importance of that education for those concerned and for society at large.”
“I confess that I find it startling that it should be suggested that in a country where education is available in a state school at public expense it should be a breach of the Convention for the state not to continue to provide the funding for a child to go to a private school. Nor in my judgment is that suggestion supported by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In the Belgian Linguistic case it was stated, at p. 281, that: ‘the contracting parties do not recognise such a right to education as would require them to establish at their own expense, or to subsidise, education of any particular type or at any particular level.’ The Protocol proceeded from the premise that each member state possessed a state system of education and article 2 was designed to ensure that access to that system was not denied. Other decisions of that court support this: see W and KL v. Sweden (1985) 45 D&R 143 and Simpson v. United Kingdom (1989) 64 D&R 188.”
“The Strasbourg jurisprudence… makes clear how article 2 should be interpreted. The underlying premise of the article was that all existing member states of the Council of Europe had, and all future member states would have, an established system of state education. It was intended to guarantee fair and non-discriminatory access to that system by those within the jurisdiction of the respective states. The fundamental importance of education in a modern democratic state was recognised to require no less. But the guarantee is, in comparison with most other Convention guarantees, a weak one, and deliberately so. There is no right to education of a particular kind or quality, other than that prevailing in the state. There is no Convention guarantee of compliance with domestic law. There is no Convention guarantee of education at or by a particular institution. There is no Convention objection to the expulsion of a pupil from an educational institution on disciplinary grounds, unless (in the ordinary way) there is no alternative source of state education open to the pupil… The test, as always under the Convention, is a highly pragmatic one, to be applied to the specific facts of the case: have the authorities of the state acted so as to deny to a pupil effective access to such educational facilities as the state provides for such pupils?”
“15. As I see it, the critical point in all the speeches is that underarticle 2 of the Convention a person is not entitled to some minimum level of education judged by some objective standard and without regard to the system in the particular state. The question is that posed by Lord Bingham, namely whether the pupil was denied effective access to such educational facilities as the country provides… 16. The question is then whether the pupil has been denied effective access to the system in place. That question will only be answered in the affirmative where his right to education has been so reduced as to ‘impair its very essence and deprive it of its effectiveness’: 44 EHRR 99, para 154. Lord Hoffmann’s reference to systemic failure must be viewed in the context of the education system provided...”
“This appeal was presented on the basis that there was both an infringement of A2P1 and unlawful discrimination. It was always accepted by the appellant that these two legal arguments went together. On inspection, I agree with Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal that the case depends on a complaint of unlawful discrimination only. The jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, and in particular Ponomaryov v Bulgaria…, makes it quite clear that, whatever may be the uncertain ambit of A2P1, it does not impose on any state an obligation to provide, or to fund, tertiary education. If, therefore, the UK were simply to decline to provide any university funding, that, whilst it would clearly not be acceptable publicly, would not entail any infringement of A2P1. Equally, it follows that A2P1 does not impose a requirement on the UK to fund tertiary education at any particular level or in any particular way, and whether or not it were to be asserted that such education had become prohibitively expensive for some individuals. This is an example of the UK’s social and political realities being more exacting on the state than the European Convention on Human Rights… (and the Human Rights Act) require; it is not the only one. The law is not the only, nor even the principal, regulator of the provision of public services.”
“The general objective of the exemptions in articles 133 to 135 is, I think, readily apparent and, so far as university education is concerned, it is to ensure that access to the higher educational services this necessarily involves is not hindered by the increased costs that would result if those services were subject to VAT.”
“The court would not be entitled to strike down the rule unless satisfied that it was incapable of being operated in a proportionate way and so was inherently unjustified in all or nearly all cases.”
“What is the test of whether a provision is beyond legislative competence on the ground that it will result in a disproportionate interference with a Convention right?”
“The rationale of that approach is that where there is an ab ante challenge to a legislative provision (that is to say, a challenge to the provision in advance of its application to any particular facts), the striking down of the provision is only justifiable if the court is satisfied that it is incapable of being applied in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights, whatever the facts may be. If the legislation is capable of being applied compatibly with the Convention, then it will survive an ab ante challenge.”
“It is not immediately apparent why, in In re McLaughlin, the compatibility of the legislation witharticle 14 of the Convention depended on the facts of the individual case. One might think that the conclusion reached—that a rule which prevented the children of unmarried parents from benefiting from an allowance available to the children of married parents, by reason of the marital status of their parents or their own birth status, was unjustifiably discriminatory—would apply in any case concerning the denial of the same allowance for the same reason. If that were so, then no issue would arise of the kind which arose in Christian Institute, where the measure was not inherently incompatible with the Convention but might be applied incompatibly in particular cases.”
“The relief sought in this case is a declaration of incompatibility in respect of Resolution 34 as a whole. The challenge is therefore systemic, not individual. It follows that the Claimants must demonstrate that the legislation is incapable of operation in a proportionate way in all, or almost all, cases.”
“I should observe at the outset that there may be an issue as to the scope of the concept of indirect discrimination. As explained earlier, the concept is concerned with measures which, although neutral in appearance, have a disproportionately prejudicial impact upon a group sharing a common characteristic. Every case to date in which the European court has treated the concept as relevant has concerned a group sharing a common characteristic corresponding to a ‘suspect’ ground of differential treatment such as sex, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, nationality, religion or disability. ‘Suspect’ grounds are discussed at paras 100-113 below… The view has been expressed that indirect discrimination is confined to ‘suspect’ grounds: Van Dijk and others (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 5th ed (2018), p 1006. Without necessarily going so far, one might in any event question whether children, considered as a whole, constitute a group of the relevant kind. I do not, however, need to examine that point, which was not raised in argument.”
“91. The question to be examined is whether there has been a discriminatory failure by the authorities of the respondent State to make a distinction in the applicants’ favour on the basis that their relevant circumstances were significantly different from those of other recipients of the Housing Benefit who were adversely affected by the contested policy. More specifically, the issue is whether, as a result of a failure to make a distinction, the impugned general measure, in the form of the legislative changes affecting the recipients of the Housing Benefit, was put in place in such a manner as to produce disproportionately prejudicial effects on the applicants because of their particular circumstances which, in respect of the first applicant, were linked to her daughter’s disability and, in respect of the second applicant, to her gender. 92… The court accepts the applicants’ arguments that in this respect, they were in a significantly different situation and particularly prejudiced by the policy because they demonstrated they had a particular need to be able to remain in their specifically adapted homes for reasons directly related to their status. In the case of the first applicant, loss of her home would cause exceptional hardship given her daughter’s severe mental and physical disabilities. In the case of the second applicant, loss of her home would risk her personal safety. Thus, for these reasons, the consequence of the measure was much more severe for the applicants than for others whose entitlement to Housing Benefit was reduced.”
“It is also important to bear in mind that almost any legislation is capable of challenge under article 14. Judges Pejchal and Wojtyczek observed in their partly dissenting opinion in JD[2020] HLR 5 , para 11: ‘Any legislation will differentiate. It differentiates by identifying certain classes of persons, while failing to differentiate within these or other classes of persons. The art of legislation is the art of wise differentiation. Therefore any legislation may be contested from the viewpoint of the principles of equality and non-discrimination and such cases have become more and more frequent in the courts.’ In practice, challenges to legislation on the ground of discrimination have become increasingly common in the United Kingdom. They are usually brought by campaigning organisations which lobbied unsuccessfully against the measure when it was being considered in Parliament, and then act as solicitors for persons affected by the legislation, or otherwise support legal challenges brought in their names, as a means of continuing their campaign. The favoured ground of challenge is usually article 14, because it is so easy to establish differential treatment of some category of persons, especially if the concept of indirect discrimination is given a wide scope. Since the principle of proportionality confers on the courts a very broad discretionary power, such cases present a risk of undue interference by the courts in the sphere of political choices. That risk can only be avoided if the courts apply the principle in a manner which respects the boundaries between legality and the political process. As Judges Pejchal and Wojtyczek commented, at para 10: ‘Judicial independence is accepted only if the judiciary refrains from interfering with political processes. If the judicial power is to be independent, the judicial and political spheres have to remain separated.’”
“The Court observes at the outset that, as with all complaints of alleged discrimination in a welfare or pensions system, it is concerned with the compatibility with art. 14 of the system, not with the individual facts or circumstances of the particular applicants or of others who are or might be affected by the legislation. Much is made in the applicants’ submissions and in those of the third-party intervener of the extreme financial hardship which may result from the policy... However, the Court is not in a position to make an assessment of the effects, if any, on the many thousands in the same position as the applicants and nor should it try to do so. Any welfare system, to be workable, may have to use broad categorisations to distinguish between different groups in need.”
“For the overwhelming majority of the Charedi community, attending independent faith schools is a non-negotiable part of faith. There are a few Charedi maintained schools and in the short to medium term, low possibility of more opening. There is no ‘choice’ for these families to send their children to non-Charedi state schools, both due to their religious beliefs and because insufficient space in the state sector. In areas such as Gateshead and Stamford Hill, 100 per cent and well over 97 per cent of Charedi children respectively, attend Charedi independent schools. Every child attending a Charedi independent school in the UK is from Charedi background. The only state schools attended by Charedi children are dedicated Charedi state schools and not a single Charedi child attends a state school outside of Charedi state schools.”
“if A, why not also B?”
“Why does the fact that a school charges lower fees justify special treatment?”
“The [SEN] system is simply not working for children, families or local authorities: the money available is not sufficient to provide the services that children are entitled to, many organisations are severely understaffed and in many areas suitable and affordable support does not exist. It means young people, and their families, don’t get the help they need and lose vital weeks, months and years of education and development as a result. They don’t get that time back.”
“it is not, in fact, the taxable person who themselves bear the burden of VAT… they collect the tax on behalf of the tax authorities and account for it to them”
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
“it is clear on Strasbourg jurisprudence, now confirmed by high domestic authority, that [A1P1] protects only ‘goodwill’, as a form of asset with a monetary value, and does not protect an expected stream of future income which, for mainly organisational reasons, cannot be or is not capitalised. In other words, the Convention… protects assets which have a monetary value, not economic interests as such.”
“Strasbourg jurisprudence has drawn a distinction between goodwill which may be a possession for purposes of article 1 of the First Protocol and future income, not yet earned and to which no enforceable claim exists, which may not.”
“The important distinction is between the present-day value of future income (which is not treated by the European court as part of goodwill and a possession) and the present-day value of a business which reflects the capacity to earn profits in the future (which may be part of goodwill and a possession). The capacity to earn profits in the future is derived from the reputation that the business enjoys as a result of its past efforts.”
“That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.”
“In addition to article 9 itself, there is a long line of authority which supports a wider principle, of which article 9 is merely one manifestation, viz. that the courts and Parliament are both astute to recognise their respective constitutional roles. So far as the courts are concerned they will not allow any challenge to be made to what is said or done within the walls of Parliament in performance of its legislative functions and protection of its established privileges... As Blackstone said in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 17th ed. (1830), vol. 1, p. 163: ‘the whole of the law and custom of Parliament has its original from this one maxim, “that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that House to which it relates, and not elsewhere”’.” “Proceedings in Parliament”
“The primary meaning of proceedings, as a technical parliamentary term, which it had at least as early as the seventeenth century, is some formal action, usually a decision, taken by the House in its collective capacity. While business which involves actions and decisions of the House are clearly proceedings, debate is an intrinsic part of that process which is recognised by its inclusion in the formulation of Article IX. An individual Member takes part in a proceeding usually by speech, but also by various recognised forms of formal action, such as voting, giving notice of a motion, or presenting a petition or report from a committee, most of such actions being time-saving substitutes for speaking. Officers of the House take part in its proceedings principally by carrying out its orders, general or particular. Members of the public also may take part in the proceedings of a House, for example by giving evidence before it or one of its committees, or by securing the presentation of a petition… Letters to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards are not considered to be privileged unless and until the Commissioner decides that the complaint is appropriate for inquiry (see para 5.22 ).”
“Many in government are answerable to Parliament and yet answerable also to the supervisory jurisdiction of this court. I see nothing about the Commissioner’s role or the statutory framework within which he operates so singular as to take him wholly outside the purview of judicial review.”
“Here is the really significant distinction between the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is concerned at looking at what happens in relation to the administration by government and other relevant public bodies outwith Parliament. The Ombudsman is concerned with proper functioning of the public service outside Parliament. On the other hand, the focus of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards is on the propriety of the workings and the activities of those engaged within Parliament. He is one of the means by which the select committee set up by the House carries out its functions, which are accepted to be part of the proceedings of the House. This being the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, it would be inappropriate for this court to use its supervisory powers to control what the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards does in relation to an investigation of this sort. The responsibility for supervising the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards is placed by Parliament, through its standing orders, on the Committee of Standards and Privileges of the House, and it is for that body to perform that role and not the courts.”
“The jurisprudence to which I have referred is sparse and does not bear directly on the facts of these appeals. It supports the proposition, however, that the principal matter to which article 9 is directed is freedom of speech and debate in the Houses of Parliament and in parliamentary committees. This is where the core or essential business of Parliament takes place. In considering whether actions outside the Houses and committees fall within parliamentary proceedings because of their connection to them, it is necessary to consider the nature of that connection and whether, if such actions do not enjoy privilege, this is likely to impact adversely on the core or essential business of Parliament.”
“There are good reasons of policy for giving article 9 a narrow ambit that restricts it to the important purpose for which it was enacted—freedom for Parliament to conduct its legislative and deliberative business without interference from the Crown or the Crown’s judges. The protection of article 9 is absolute. It is capable of variation by primary legislation, but not capable of waiver, even by Parliamentary resolution. Its effect where it applies is to prevent those injured by civil wrongdoing from obtaining redress and to prevent the prosecution of members for conduct which is criminal.”
“An invocation of Parliamentary privilege is apt to dazzle lawyers and judges outside Parliament. In Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1831) 2 Russ & M 639, 660, Lord Brougham LC warned courts of justice against acceding to claims of privilege ‘the instant they hear that once magical word pronounced’.”
“that the principal matter to which article 9 is directed is ‘freedom of speech and debate in the Houses of Parliament and in Parliamentary committees. This is where the core or essential business of Parliament takes place’: para 47. In considering whether actions outside the Houses and committees are also covered, it is necessary to consider the nature of their connection to those and whether denying the actions privilege is likely to impact adversely on the core or essential business of Parliament.”
“The prorogation itself takes place in the House of Lords and in the presence of Members of both Houses. But it cannot sensibly be described as a ‘proceeding in Parliament’. It is not a decision of either House of Parliament. Quite the contrary: it is something which is imposed upon them from outside. It is not something upon which the Members of Parliament can speak or vote. The Commissioners are not acting in their capacity as members of the House of Lords but in their capacity as Royal Commissioners carrying out the Queen's bidding. They have no freedom of speech. This is not the core or essential business of Parliament. Quite the contrary: it brings that core or essential business of Parliament to an end.”
“The effect of [the 1840 Act] for our purposes is that the publisher of any document ordered to be printed by Parliament will be protected by the 1840 Act, but that Act cannot of itself confer privilege on the document if the document is not otherwise privileged.”
“The substance of what happens in an Unopposed Return is that the House as a collective body calls for the provision of information from someone outside the House on a matter about which the Members resolve they wish to be informed… One of Parliament’s primary functions is to ensure the public accountability of ministers and their departments, to investigate and expose wrongdoing or abuse of power on the part of the executive and to insist on remedial action. The provision of the Report to Parliament was an essential part of that process. That accountability continued after the publication of the Report.”
“Moreover, we accept the submissions of Counsel to the Speaker that from a procedural point of view the laying by the minister of the Report constitutes his compliance with the direction of Her Majesty given following the Address presented to her as resolved upon by the House. The format, content and manner of laying is prescribed by the House and the Journal Office is responsible for checking the authority by which the report is laid and for making the report available to Members. The call for the report involves a formal Parliamentary motion which has to be presented in the House and returned on a day when the House is sitting.”
“In Warsama & Gannon v Foreign & Commonwealth Office[2020] EWCA Civ 142 , the Court of Appeal was concerned with the application of privilege to an unopposed return; that is to say, a paper ordered by the House of Commons to be printed following a motion on the floor of the House. In a letter of15 December 2020 to the respondent in regard to the present appeals, Counsel to the Speaker of the House of Commons considers the factual position in Warsama to be analogous with that of documents covered by theParliamentary Papers Act 1840 . In both cases, the House of Commons has an interest in the reporting in question being full and frank. Thus, as is the case with evidence provided to a Select Committee, the protection of privilege extends to a person who is not a Member of Parliament, in order to protect that person’s ability to report fully and honestly to the House. That, we find, is the position with the National Audit Office report.”
“Article 9 is a provision of the highest constitutional importance and should not be narrowly construed. It ensures the ability of democratically elected Members of Parliament to discuss what they will (freedom of debate) and to say what they will (freedom of speech). But even given a generous approach to this construction, I find it impossible to attach the breadth of meaning to the word ‘question’ which the Attorney-General urges. It must be remembered that article 9 prohibits questioning not only "in any court" but also in any ‘place out of Parliament.’ If the Attorney-General's submission is correct, any comment in the media or elsewhere on what is said in Parliament would constitute ‘questioning’ since all Members of Parliament must speak and act taking into account what political commentators and other will say. Plainly article 9 cannot have effect so as to stifle the freedom of all to comment on what is said in Parliament, even though such comment may influence Members in what they say. In my judgment, the plain meaning of article 9, viewed against the historical background in which it was enacted, was to ensure that Members of Parliament were not subjected to any penalty, civil or criminal for what they said and were able, contrary to the previous assertions of the Stuart monarchy, to discuss what they, as opposed to the monarch, chose to have discussed. Relaxation of the rule will not involve the courts in criticising what is said in Parliament. The purpose of looking at Hansard will not be to construe the words used by the Minister but to give effect to the words used so long as they are clear. Far from questioning the independence of Parliament and its debates, the courts would be giving effect to what is said and done there.”
“In proceedings in any court or tribunal, it is not lawful for evidence to be tendered or received, questions asked or statements, submissions or comments made, concerning proceedings in Parliament, by way of, or for the purpose of—(a) questioning or relying on the truth, motive, intention or good faith of anything forming part of those proceedings in Parliament; (b) otherwise questioning or establishing the credibility, motive, intention or good faith of any person; or (c) drawing, or inviting the drawing of, inferences or conclusions wholly or partly from anything forming part of those proceedings in Parliament.”
“parties to litigation, by whomsoever commenced, cannot bring into question anything said or done in the House by suggesting (whether by direct evidence, cross-examination, inference or submission) that the actions or words were inspired by improper motives or were untrue or misleading”
“The courts would be failing in the due discharge of the new role assigned to them by Parliament if they were to exclude from consideration relevant background information whose only source was a ministerial statement in Parliament or an explanatory note prepared by his department while the Bill was proceeding through Parliament. By having regard to such material the court would not be ‘questioning’ proceedings in Parliament or intruding improperly into the legislative process or ascribing to Parliament the views expressed by a minister. The court would merely be placing itself in a better position to understand the legislation.”
“The proportionality of a statutory measure is not to be judged by the quality of the reasons advanced in support of it in the course of parliamentary debate, or by the subjective state of mind of individual ministers or other members. Different members may well have different reasons, not expressed in debates, for approving particular statutory provisions. They may have different perceptions of the desirability or likely effect of the legislation. Ministerial statements, especially if made ex tempore in response to questions, may sometimes lack clarity or be misdirected. Lack of cogent justification in the course of parliamentary debate is not a matter which ‘counts against’ the legislation on issues of proportionality. The court is called upon to evaluate the proportionality of the legislation, not the adequacy of the minister’s exploration of the policy options or of his explanations to Parliament. The latter would contravene article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The court would then be presuming to evaluate the sufficiency of the legislative process leading up to the enactment of the statute.”
“‘Veracity’ is apt to include accuracy.”
“58… If a party to proceedings before a court (or the Information Tribunal) seeks to rely on an opinion expressed by a select committee, the other party, if it wishes to contend for a different result, must either contend that the opinion of the committee was wrong (and give reasons why), thereby at the very least risking a breach of parliamentary privilege, if not committing an actual breach, or, because of the risk of that breach, accept that opinion notwithstanding that it would not otherwise wish to do so. This would be unfair to that party. It indicates that a party to litigation should not seek to rely on the opinion of a parliamentary committee, since it puts the other party at an unfair disadvantage and, if the other party does dispute the correctness of the opinion of the committee, would put the tribunal in the position of committing a breach of parliamentary privilege if it were to accept that the parliamentary committee’s opinion was wrong. 59. If it is wrong for a party to rely on the opinion of a parliamentary committee, it must be equally wrong for the tribunal itself to seek to rely on it, since it places the party seeking to persuade the tribunal to adopt an opinion different from that of the select committee in the same unfair position as where it is raised by the opposing party. Furthermore, if the tribunal either rejects or approves the opinion of the select committee it thereby passes judgment on it. To put the same point differently, in raising the possibility of its reliance on the opinion of the select committee, the tribunal potentially made it the subject of submission as to its correctness and of inference, which would be a breach of parliamentary privilege. This is, in my judgment, the kind of submission or inference, to use the words ofsection 16(3) of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 , which is prohibited.”
“183… First, the courts should go no further than ascertaining whether matters relevant to compatibility were raised during the legislative process, if they are to avoid assessing the adequacy or cogency of Parliament’s consideration of them… The distinction between determining whether, as a question of historical fact, an issue was before Parliament, on the one hand, and determining the cogency of Parliament’s evaluation of that issue, on the other hand, is real and must be respected. Undertaking a critical assessment of Parliamentary debates would be contrary to both authority and statute. Furthermore, as I have explained at paras 167-171 above, it would mistake the nature of Parliamentary processes, and create a risk that the courts might undermine Parliament’s effectiveness. Trawling through debates should not, therefore, be necessary, and is unlikely to be appropriate: a high level review of whether a topic was raised before Parliament, whether in debate or otherwise, should suffice. 184. Secondly, the courts must not treat the absence or poverty of debate in Parliament as a reason supporting a finding of incompatibility.”