“unforeseeable and unavoidable circumstances outside the air carrier's control leading to: - grounding of the aircraft type generally used for the air service in question; - closure of an airport or airspace; - serious disturbance of operations at the airport concerned, including those series of slots at other airports in the United Kingdom or EEA states related to routes which have been affected by such disturbance, during a substantial part of the relevant scheduling period;…”
“8. The key discipline underpinning the regime is what is commonly referred to as the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rule, or the ‘80/20 rule’. In order to retain what are known as ‘grandfather rights’ to the same slots in the equivalent scheduling period the following year, an airline must use at least 80% of its allocated slots during the current scheduling period. If it fails to do so, the relevant series of slots will be placed in the slot pool for reallocation to applicant carriers. 9. From my experience at [Gatwick], I know this use-it-or-lose-it discipline to be critical to the efficient operation of airports. Because of this discipline, airlines have a strong commercial incentive to operate their scheduled services. 10. There is an existing mechanism which permits airlines to hand back slots without suffering the consequences of the 80/20 rule where the cancellation is caused by circumstances outside the airline’s control. This is known as Justified Non-Utilisation of Slots (‘JNUS’)... Under JNUS, airlines can apply to ACL to have slot non-use recorded as justified (and count as operated) where specific qualifying circumstances apply. …supply disruptions affecting fuel, including those related to geopolitical events, can qualify as a JNUS event, but only where they directly cause flight cancellations. A cancellation driven purely by higher fuel costs, as opposed to an actual supply shortage, does not qualify.”
“5.5 Airport slots have significant competitive, operational, and financial value to the airlines which hold them. Under ordinary circumstances, the 80:20 rule helps to encourage efficient use of scarce airport capacity whilst allowing airlines a degree of flexibility in their operations. However, the current conflict in the Middle East is having an impact on the aviation industry and airlines’ ability to operate, including increased operational costs due to higher fuel cost as well as longer flight times due to changes in flight paths to avoid closed or high-risk airspace. Airlines are also seeing a reduction in passenger demand for destinations near conflict zones, but also to other destinations due to rising passenger concern around flying more generally. The conflict in the Middle East, and the impacts of it, is not something that airlines could have predicted or exercise any control over. It is therefore considered necessary to provide some relief from the slot usage requirements and enable airlines to return a proportion of their slots for summer 2026 and winter 2026 seasons without prejudice to their historic rights to the slots. 5.6 This is intended to protect the resilience of the sector by discouraging inefficient slot use by mitigating the risk that empty or near-empty ‘ghost flights’ will be operated in order to retain airlines’ historic rights to their slots. It also mitigates the negative impact such flights would have on the environment and protects future connectivity.”
“9. Impact Assessment … 9.2 …in the Department’s view, the benefits are likely to significantly exceed the costs… In the absence of government intervention… there is a risk that airlines would lose existing slots, undermining their financial viability and threatening connectivity, or that they would operate loss-making and environmentally damaging flights in order to meet the 80% slot usage ratio… 9.3 The main benefits of relief are therefore expected to be that airlines with existing slot holdings will not have to fly loss-making flights 80% of the time in order to preserve those rights, and that the negative environmental impacts (including carbon emissions) associated with airlines running such flights will be avoided. Air passengers are expected to benefit from the proposed relief through the preservation of historic levels of connectivity once the conflict in the Middle East has ended (existing route networks and connections having been incrementally developed over many years). 9.4 The main costs of relief are expected to be that it will be more difficult for airlines seeking to accumulate long-term rights to slots. This could negatively impact new entry and competition amongst airlines. To the extent that the proposed relief result in airlines operating fewer flights, affected airports may also suffer a loss in airport charge income (and perhaps commercial income). 9.5 The legislation will directly impact one small business, Airport Coordination Limited (ACL). According to its published accounts, ACL has around 40 employees, which means that it classifies as a small business. ACL is currently the only slot coordinator for all coordinated airports in the UK. There will be some administrative costs incurred by ACL as a result of this legislation, these costs would be expected to be minor in the context of the sector. There is no specific action proposed to minimise the cost as ACL would generally be able to recover any additional costs it incurs via charges on users. 9.6 There is no increase in regulatory burden as a result of enabling airlines to return a proportion of slots they have been allocated for the summer 2026 and winter 2026 seasons. The alleviation does not create or act as an obstacle to trade, nor does it create a barrier for efficiency and profitability. Instead, it will help protect the financial viability of airlines and promote connectivity by ensuring that airlines are not penalised unnecessarily and do not lose their slots given they have no influence or control over the conflict in the Middle East or the consequential fuel supply issues. …”
“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to— (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”
“Since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Government has been closely monitoring UK jet fuel stocks and working with airlines, airports and fuel suppliers to understand impacts and what Government can do to ensure passengers keep moving and businesses are supported. Whilst there is currently no shortage of jet fuel, we recognise that industry is facing challenges in delivering operations as planned due to wider impacts of the conflict in the Middle East. We want to support the industry in planning operations for remainder of Summer 2026 season and for the upcoming Winter 2026 season. To this end, the Government is considering implementing a slot hand back provision for Summer 2026 and the upcoming Winter 2026 season. The hand back provision will provide an overall maximum of 10% in-season hand back for Summer 2026 and Winter 2026 season respectively. For each season, up to 5% will be required to be returned by a set date and the remaining 5% will be flexible provision which airlines could make use of if needed at any point throughout the remainder of the season. Airlines will only be able to hand back slots under this provision if passengers are given 14 days-notice of the cancellation of the corresponding flights. Any slots that are handed back would be treated as if they had been operated for the purpose of assessing the 80% slot usage requirement. The coordinator will not be permitted to reallocate slots that are handed back. Final decisions as to whether to proceed with this measure, and the details of percentages and dates, will be made in light of responses to this consultation. These will then be confirmed in a letter to industry stakeholders, and in a Statutory Instrument (SI) which would be laid before Parliament as soon as possible following prorogation. The SI would be made using powers in theRetained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 which will expire on23 June 2026 . There would be no change to other slots rules which would remain as currently set out in Regulation 95/93, as amended. To help inform consideration of this proposal, please could you provide your views on the following questions: Do you have any evidence that the current slot rules are affecting airlines’ ability to schedule and operate flights for the Summer 2026 season? Do you have any evidence that the current slot rules will affect airlines’ ability to schedule and operate flights for the upcoming winter 2026 season? Do you agree with Government providing alleviation through a hand back provision? In your view, how would the hand back provision described above support operational planning? We propose to cap the number of slots which can be handed back at 10% of slots held by an airline at a particular airport: Do you agree that a limit on the number of slots which can be returned is sensible, and Is 10% of slots held at a particular airport the right limit? Do you have any views on when this measure should come into effect?”
“Government has confirmed that there is currently no fuel shortage, with strong visibility for at least the next four weeks. Introducing blanket slot alleviation in these circumstances would not benefit passengers, who may potentially lose thousands of pounds on pre-booked hotels, holidays and flights; would not address any future jet fuel supply disruption; and would instead only add further commercial impacts on airports who employ thousands of people, many from their local communities. Such a substantial intervention at this point would distort an otherwise functioning independent market and damage consumer confidence. The existing regulatory framework is already sufficient. The 80:20 slot rule together with the Justified Non-Utilisation of Slots (JNUS) framework under Regulation 95/93 provides targeted and proportionate protection where flight operations are genuinely prevented by unforeseen, unavoidable disruptions (including fuel supply crises) without resorting to blanket alleviation. ACL’s own published guidance (version 8.0, April 2026) confirms that any cancellations directly attributable to a jet fuel shortage will qualify for JNUS relief. This means that if war or other extraordinary events cause an actual fuel supply shortfall requiring flight cancellations, airlines’ historic slot rights would already be protected under existing law. By contrast, cancellations driven purely by higher fuel costs, essentially commercial decisions, are rightly excluded from JNUS. The existing framework is evidence-based, well understood by industry and avoids distorting capacity where no shortage exists.”
“no provision may be made in relation to a particular subject area unless it is considered that the overall effect of the changes made in that area do not increase the regulatory burden. The relevant area in this context is airport slots. It is not considered that the temporary alleviation introduced by this instrument adds to the regulatory burden.”
“The Secretary of State considers that the overall effect of the changes made by the Regulations in relation to airports slot allocation does not increase the regulatory burden...”
“This Instrument is made in exercise of powers in section 14(3) of the [2023 Act]. Section 14(3) powers give the UK Government the ability to revoke and to replace any secondary direct assimilated law with any alternative measure the Government considers appropriate provided there is no increase in regulatory burden. … There is no increase in regulatory burden as a result of enabling airlines to return a proportion of slots they have been allocated for the summer 2026 and winter 2026 seasons. The alleviation does not create or act as an obstacle to trade, nor does it create a barrier for efficiency and profitability…”
“Having considered the authorities and the submissions with care, in my judgment, the better view is that time ran from the date on which the 2020 Regulations came into force, namely,20 March 2020 , which is when the claimants became directly affected in law by its provisions. By this date, the 2020 Regulations had been published, so they were readily available to the public and they had been laid before Parliament, so it was known that there was not going to be any Parliamentary challenge. The date of coming into force is set out in the Regulations, thus providing clarity and certainty to all.”
“The Regulations are a technical and time-limited measure relating to the management of airport slots and apply at the level of airports, airlines and the slot allocation process. Having considered the purpose and effect of the Regulations, the Department's conclusion is that the policy does not give rise to identifiable impacts in relation to protected characteristics and that no further equality assessment is required under the 2010 Act.”