“… unlikely to be regarded by a jury as measured statements of intent, but rather are likely to be viewed as highly emotional outbursts which, if anything, can be interpreted as an emotional plea from them to receive urgent police assistance.”
“that [B] applied as much force as a man of his age, weight and fitness level could in order to try and control [Mr Collins] in the circumstances as [B] perceived them to be. Consequently, the force used might have been considerable, yet still reasonable.”
“i. that [Mr Collins] was an intruder; ii. that the occupants of the house believed that he could have been a burglar, or that he could have been there to commit another crime; iii. that his strange behaviour caused those present a considerable amount of concern, alarm and fear; iv. that [B] restrained [Mr Collins] by putting him in a headlock face down on the floor and that [the police records] and recorded timings of the 999 calls, indicate that the period of restraint was approximately six minutes; v. that the police were called as soon as possible after [Mr Collins] was confronted and restrained and that it was [B] that suggested that the police be called; vi. that during the struggle on the floor [B] threatened to kill [Mr Collins] and that C told the police that [B] was trying/going to kill [him]; vii. that contrary to the accounts provided, at least two people present expressed concern about [Mr Collins’] welfare whilst he was being restrained, and that the first expression of concern was voiced around 2 minutes before the police arrived.”
“This means that [B] would be acquitted of any offence of violence unless the prosecution proved that the degree of force used was grossly disproportionate. The use of disproportionate force would not be unlawful.”
“It is difficult for a person in circumstances such as these to measure precisely what level of force is required, and to reiterate, if that person does no more than seems honestly and instinctively to be necessary that is itself potent evidence that the force used was proportionate. In my view a jury, looking at the facts as [B] perceived them to be, are unlikely to conclude that the continuation of this method of restraint was grossly disproportionate.”
“Once it has thus been decided on what factual basis the defendant's actions are to be judged, either because they are the things that actually happened and he knew them or because he genuinely believed in them even if they did not occur, then the remaining and critical question for the jury is: was his response reasonable, or proportionate (which means the same thing)? Was it reasonable (or proportionate) in all the circumstances? Unlike the earlier stages which may involve the belief of the defendant being the governing factor, the reasonableness of his response on the assumed basis of fact is a test solely for the jury and not for him.” (Emphasis added)
“The new provision merely affects the interpretation of ‘(un)reasonable in the circumstances’ so that force is not by law automatically unreasonable in householder cases simply because it is disproportionate provided it is not grossly disproportionate.”
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law…”
“The positive duties on the state operate at various levels, as one idea is handed down to another. There is a lower-level, but still general, duty on a state to take appropriate measures to secure the health and well-being of prisoners or people who are in some form of detention. This in its turn gives rise, at a still lower level, to two general obligations: Savage, para 36; Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust (INQUEST and others intervening)[2012] UKSC 2 , para 12, per Lord Dyson; Öneryildiz v Turkey(2005) 41 EHRR 20 , para 89. The first is a systemic duty, to put in place a legislative and administrative framework which will make for the effective prevention of the risk to their health and well-being or, as it was put in Öneryildiz, para 89, effective deterrence against threats to the right to life... The second… is to ensure that, where there is a real and immediate risk to life, preventative operational measures of whatever kind are adopted to safeguard the lives of those involved so far as this is practicable.”
“This involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place an appropriate legal and administrative framework to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions.”
“The Court observes at the outset that the applicants did not contend that the authorities of the respondent State were responsible for the death of their relative; nor did they imply that the authorities knew or ought to have known that he was at risk of physical violence at the hands of third parties and failed to take appropriate measures to safeguard him against such a risk. The present case should therefore be distinguished from cases involving the alleged use of lethal force either by agents of the State or by private parties with their collusion (see McCann andOthers v. the United Kingdom, judgment of27 September 1995 , Series A no. 324; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no. 37715/97, § 90,4 May 2001 ; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, ECHR 2002-IV; Nachova and Others, cited above; and Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria, no. 46317/99,23 February 2006 ), or in which the factual circumstances imposed an obligation on the authorities to protect an individual's life, for example where they had assumed responsibility for his welfare (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, ECHR 2002-II) or where they knew or ought to have known that his life was at risk (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of28 October 1998 , Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII).”
“58. Unregulated and arbitrary action by State agents is incompatible with effective respect for human rights. This means that, as well as being authorised under national law, policing operations must be sufficiently regulated by it, within the framework of a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force (see, mutatis mutandis, Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 56,8 June 2004 ; see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 6, Article 6, 16th Session (1982), § 3), and even against avoidable accident. 59. In view of the foregoing, in keeping with the importance of Article 2 in a democratic society, the Court must subject allegations of a breach of this provision to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administered the force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination (see McCann and Others, cited above, p. 46, § 150). In the latter connection, police officers should not be left in a vacuum when performing their duties, whether in the context of a prepared operation or a spontaneous chase of a person perceived to be dangerous: a legal and administrative framework should define the limited circumstances in which law-enforcement officials may use force and firearms, in the light of the international standards which have been developed in this respect (see, for example, the “United Nations Force and Firearms Principles” – paragraphs 30-32 above).” (Emphasis added)
“[T]he Greek authorities had not, at the relevant time, done all that could reasonably be expected of them to afford to citizens, and in particular to those, such as the applicant, against whom potentially lethal force was used, the level of safeguards required.”
“Against this background, the Court must examine in the present case not only whether the use of potentially lethal force against the applicant was legitimate but also whether the operation was regulated and organised in such a way as to minimise to the greatest extent possible any risk to his life.” (Emphasis added)
“41 … in paragraph 60 of the judgment the Court is not dealing with the content of the framework duty but is turning to consider, against the background of the framework duty, the way in which the particular operation under consideration was regulated and organised. It is not saying that the framework itself must "minimise to the greatest extent possible" any risk arising in respect of the situations in which force may foreseeably be used. The "background" to which it refers is the requirement that policing operations must be sufficiently regulated "within the framework of a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force, and even against avoidable accident"… and that "a legal and administrative framework should define the limited circumstances in which law enforcement officials may use force and firearms"… That is the point picked up in paragraph 71, where the Court refers to the failure of the Greek authorities to do "all that can reasonably be expected" of them to afford the level of safeguards required. In my judgment those passages, rather than paragraph 60, are the best indicators of the test to be applied when considering the general question whether the framework is sufficient to comply with Articles 2 and 3, as distinct from the question whether a particular operation has been planned and organised in a way that complies with those articles… 42. The language of "minimise [risk] to the greatest extent possible" is to be found in other cases, in the context of Article 3 as well as Article 2. In each case, however, it is used in relation to the conduct of a particular operation, not in relation to the legislative and administrative framework…”
“The emphasis in respect of the framework is on reasonable safeguards, not on regulation of such detail as to minimise to the greatest extent possible any risk to life or risk of ill-treatment.”
“…establish a framework of laws, precautions, procedures and means of enforcement which will, to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, protect life.”
“Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
“… by requiring a State to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of9 June 1998 , Reports 1998-III, p. 1403, § 36), Article 2 § 1 of the Convention imposes a duty on that State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions (see Osman, cited above, § 115).”
“175. The exceptions delineated in paragraph 2 indicate that Article 2 extends to, but is not concerned exclusively with, intentional killing. The text of Article 2, read as a whole, demonstrates that paragraph 2 does not primarily define instances where it is permitted intentionally to kill an individual, but describes the situations where it is permitted to “use force” which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life. The use of force, however, must be no more than “absolutely necessary” for the achievement of one of the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom,27 September 1995 , § 148, Series A no. 324, andSolomou and Others, cited above, § 64). 176. The use of the term “absolutely necessary” indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed than that normally applicable when determining whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society” under paragraphs 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 2. Furthermore, in keeping with the importance of this provision in a democratic society, the Court must, in making its assessment, subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination (see McCann and Others, cited above, §§ 147-150, and Andronicou and Constantinou, cited above, § 171; see also Avşar v. Turkey, no. 25657/94, § 391, ECHR 2001-VII, and Musayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 57941/00, 58699/00 and 60403/00, § 142,26 July 2007 ).”
“In respect of the means to ensure adequate protection against rape, States undoubtedly enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. In particular, perceptions of a cultural nature, local circumstances and traditional approaches are to be taken into account.”
“The limits of the national authorities' margin of appreciation are nonetheless circumscribed by the Convention provisions. In interpreting them, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within Contracting States and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved(see Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom[GC], no. 28957/95, § 74, ECHR 2002-VI).”
“the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament”
“46. These authorities demonstrate that the law of parliamentary privilege is essentially based on two principles. The first is the need to avoid any risk of interference with free speech in Parliament. The second is the principle of the separation of powers, which in our constitution is restricted to the judicial function of government, and requires the executive and the legislature to abstain from interference with the judicial function, and conversely requires the judiciary not to interfere with or to criticise the proceedings of the legislature. These basic principles lead to the requirement of mutual respect by the courts for the proceedings and decisions of the legislature and by the legislature (and the executive) for the proceedings and decisions of the courts. 47. Conflicts between Parliament and the courts are to be avoided. The above principles lead to the conclusion that the courts cannot consider allegations of impropriety or inadequacy or lack of accuracy in the proceedings of Parliament. Such allegations are for Parliament to address, if it thinks fit, and if an allegation is well founded any sanction is for Parliament to determine. The proceedings of Parliament include parliamentary questions and answers. These are not matters for the courts to consider. 48. In my judgment, the irrelevance of an opinion expressed by a parliamentary select committee to an issue that falls to be determined by the courts arises from the nature of the judicial process, the independence of the judiciary and of its decisions, and the respect that the legislative and judicial branches of government owe to each other. 49. However, it is also important to recognise the limitations of these principles. There is no reason why the courts should not receive evidence of the proceedings of Parliament when they are simply relevant historical facts or events: no “questioning” arises in such a case: see para 35 above. Similarly, it is of the essence of the judicial function that the courts should determine issues of law arising from legislation and delegated legislation. Thus, there can be no suggestion of a breach of parliamentary privilege if the courts decide that legislation is incompatible with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: by enacting theHuman Rights Act 1998 , Parliament has expressly authorised the court to determine questions of compatibility, even though a minister may have made a declaration under section 19 of his view that the measure in question is compatible.”
“By having regard to such material the court would not be “questioning” proceedings in Parliament or intruding improperly into the legislative process or ascribing to Parliament the views expressed by a minister. The court would merely be placing itself in a better position to understand legislation.”