“… In short, whatever views may be held as to the continuing threat made by the US Government to prevent a short summary of the treatment of BM being put into the public domain by this court, it would not, in all the circumstances we have set out and in the light of the action taken, be in the public interest to expose the United Kingdom to what the Foreign Secretary still considers to be the real risk of the loss of intelligence so vital to the safety of our day-to-day life. If the information in the redacted paragraphs which we consider so important to the rule of law, free speech and democratic accountability is to be put into the public domain, it must now be for the US Government to consider changing its position or itself putting that information into the public domain.”
“105. *** ***. In giving evidence to the Committee in 2006, the Director General of the Security Service told us: (a) ... when we knew he [BM] was in custody, because we had information we believed relevant to the UK from having lived here, *** (b) *** (c) *** (d) ***. That is a case where, with hindsight, we would regret not seeking proper full assurances at the time...”
“(10) The Tribunal must conduct proceedings and record its decision and reasons appropriately so as not to undermine the effect of an order made under paragraph (1), a direction given under paragraph (2) or (6) or the duty imposed by paragraph (9).”
“The term ‘control principle’ has only formally been used in connection with sharing of information on intelligence and security liaison channels. We therefore propose the following form of words: ‘This sharing is subject to what is known as the “control principle” whereby material provided, on security or diplomatic channels, is not released without the specific consent of the provider. For convenience, we refer to this understanding as the ‘control principle’ although we recognise that this term has only formally been used in connection with sharing on intelligence and security liaison channels.”
“This sharing is subject to what is known as the “control principle” whereby there is an understanding that secret intelligence material provided, on security or diplomatic channels, is not released without the specific consent of the provider.”
“177 The public interest against disclosure requires careful definition. It goes beyond the inherent public interest in the UK having effective and efficient relations with foreign states, and particularly the US. It goes to the willingness of the US to share with the UK all types of secret intelligence material relating to national security. This sharing is subject to the "control principle" described above, whereby material provided through security or diplomatic channels, is not released without the specific consent of the provider. 178 The absence of even the smallest piece of information could make it harder for the UK secret services to construct, from such small pieces of intelligence, a "jigsaw" or "mosaic" enabling a larger and significant picture of a potential threat to be built up from smaller and, by themselves, apparently insignificant pieces of information. 180 Another aspect is the US view that the release of information, provided through security or diplomatic channels, remains subject to the "control principle", even if it has otherwise been placed in the public domain. In evidence, examples were given of the order of the Court that material should be disclosed and the leaking of diplomatic cables by Wikileaks. In the current case, even if the Tribunal ordered the release of information which appeared to it to be already in the public domain, such release would be likely to be regarded by the US as breaching the control principle. 181 The reason for, or the reasonableness of, the attitude adopted by the US does not form a part of the balancing exercise the Tribunal is required to undertake; it is the fact of the existence of those attitudes which matters. Similarly, it is not the fact that information released might be seen to be innocuous (for example, because it was already in the public domain) that has to be weighed in the balance, but that the release itself will be seen as a further breach of the control principle, and could result in a reduction in access to intelligence material. In striking the balance of the public interest there must be regard to the strong desirability of not damaging the UK's access to intelligence material. 182 We have heard closed evidence and seen the disputed information which further strengthens our view, that like the Court in the BM appeal when faced with PII, that the information should not be disclosed because the public interest balance favours maintaining the exemption despite the very strong public interests expressed by F1 – F3 factors set out above [note: which were in favour of disclosure]. 188 In favour of maintaining the exemption is the strong public interest in the UK having access to secret intelligence capable of forming part of a ‘mosaic’ that may be used in identifying and frustrating future terrorist plots. This interest is given added weight by the fact that a further release of material, in breach of the ‘control principle’, could reduce access further. In weighing the public interest, the weight given to maintaining the exemption should be multiplied by the magnitude of the adverse consequences should a terrorist plot aimed at causing loss of life go undetected. 189 All of the material in respect of which the section 27(1)(a) and section 27(2) exemptions are claimed relates to information covered by the ‘control principle’ in that it is either US sourced diplomatic or security material, UK material reporting on US diplomatic or security service views, or UK material responding to US diplomatic or security material. The public interest in maintaining the ‘control principle’ so as not to adversely affect the supply of secret intelligence on national security matters is very high indeed.”
“44. At the risk of repetition, in general terms it is integral to intelligence sharing arrangements that intelligence material provided by one country to another remains confidential to the country which provides it and that it will never be disclosed, directly or indirectly, by the receiving country, without the permission of the provider of the information. This understanding is rigidly applied to the relationship between the UK and USA. However although confidentiality is essential to the working arrangements between allied intelligence services, the description of it as a "control principle" suggests an element of constitutionality which is lacking. In this jurisdiction the control principle is not a principle of law: it is an apt and no doubt convenient description of the understanding on which intelligence is shared confidentially between the USA services and those in this country, and indeed between both countries and any other allies. If for any reason the court is required to address the question whether the control principle, as understood by the intelligence services, should be disapplied, the decision depends on well understood PII principles...”
“(1) The exemption is claimed over confidential exchanges between US officials and UK officials and certain documents that provide comment on US intentions. The release of these documents would, in his view, prejudice the UK’s relationship with the US. This limb also applies to documents relating to The Gambia. (2) The exemption is claimed over communications that detail UK views on US policy, or outline steps that the UK has or will take in handling US requests. The release of these documents would be likely, in his view, to have a prejudicial effect.”
“We accept that Mr Sinclair as a member of the Diplomatic Service and a Senior Civil Servant in the FCO has a much better view of the effect of prejudice of disclosure than the Tribunal. We find no evidence in this case to seriously contradict his view notwithstanding the clear and strong public interest in issues around extraordinary rendition. We therefore find that s. 27(1)(a) and s. 27(2) are engaged for the materials where it is claimed. We have applied the appropriate weight as set out in Hogan when applying the public interest test.”
“The FCO’s principal case before the FTT was that the public disclosure of any of the documents in respect of which section 27 had been claimed would further undermine US confidence in its exchanges with the UK, including in the field of intelligence sharing. The release of such documents would complicate the intelligence-sharing relationship and give rise to a real risk of a further reduction in the flow of intelligence.”
“4. The primary purpose of this practice is to enable any typographical or similar errors in the judgments to be notified to the court. The circulation of the draft judgment in this way is not intended to provide an opportunity to any party (and in particular the unsuccessful party) to reopen or re-argue the case, or to repeat submissions made at the hearing, or to deploy fresh ones. However, on rare occasions, and in exceptional circumstances, the court may properly be invited to reconsider part of the terms of its draft. (see for example Robinson v Fernsby[2004] WTLR 257 and R (Edwards) v The Environment Agency[2008] 1WLR 1587 ). For example, a judgment may contain detrimental observations about an individual or indeed his lawyers, which on the face of it are not necessary to the judgment of the court and appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the evidence, or a concession, or indeed a submission. As we emphasise, an invitation to go beyond the correction of typographical errors and the like is always exceptional, and when such a course is proposed it is a fundamental requirement that the other party or parties should immediately be informed, so as to enable them to make objections to the proposal if there are any.”