Martin Rosenbaum v Information Commissioner & Anor [2025] UKFTT 629 (GRC)

[2025] UKFTT 00629 (GRC)Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0065
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Date 05 June 2025
Choose jurisdiction.
Decided without a hearing.
Before
JUDGE MORNINGTONMEMBER PALMER-DUNKMEMBER MATTHEWSMartin rosenbaumAppellant
Between
INFORMATION COMMISSIONERTHE CABINET OFFICERespondent(s)Decision: The appeal is allowed in part. The requested information is to be disclosed subject to redactions.REASONS

Background to Appeal

[1]This Appeal dated 21 February 2024 and made by Mr Martin Rosenbaum (the “Appellant”) arises following a request for information (the “Request”) made by the Appellant to the Cabinet Office (the “Second Respondent”) on 30 December 2022 in the following terms:
“Please send me the following information: 1) A copy of all information held in the file with reference PREM 49/1946 2) A copy of all information held (including records of discussions) relating to whether this file should be passed to the National Archives and/or made open. According to the National Archives, this file has been retained by the Cabinet Office. See https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C17970201”
[2]The file in question, PREM 49/1946, originates from the Prime Minister’s Office and is part of a series of documents that are historically significant and typically reviewed for transfer to TNA. The Cabinet Office has responsibility for reviewing such records to determine whether they can be disclosed in full, in part, or withheld entirely.[3]The Cabinet Office responded to the Appellant on 31 January 2023 to confirm that it held information falling within the scope of the request but that further time was required to consider public interest arguments.[4]The Cabinet Office further responded on 1 June 2023. In this response it confirmed that the requested information is held by the Cabinet Office, however the entirety of the information was being withheld as it is exempt under sections sections 36(2)(b)(i), (ii), and (c) (relating to prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs), as well as sections 23(1) and/or 24(1) (concerning security bodies and national security), and section 40(2) (personal data) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (‘FOIA’).[5]On 5 June 2023, the Appellant requested an internal review of the Second Respondent’s decision to withhold the requested information. The Appellant made clear that he did not accept that any of the information was exempt by virtue of section 23 FOIA, nor section 24. The Appellant did not accept the application of section 36 FOIA in that he claimed there was no evidence of the qualified person’s opinion being obtained by the Second Respondent and moreover, that the balance of the public interest favours maintaining the exemption. The Appellant did accept the application of section 40 FOIA, but only in circumstance where it was being applied to protect the identity of junior officials.[6]The Cabinet Office confirmed that an internal review was being undertaken, but at the time of the Appellant’s complaint to the Information Commissioner, the internal review had not been completed.[7]Following an intervention by the Information Commissioner during the course of their investigation, the Cabinet Office released a redacted version of the PREM 49/1946 file (Part 1 of the request). However, it continued to withhold the internal discussions relating to the decision-making process around the file’s transfer (Part 2 of the request).

Reasons for Commissioner’s Decision

[8]The matter was referred to the Information Commissioner's Office by the Requestor on 11 September 2023 and, in a decision notice (the “Decision Notice”) dated 15 February 2024, the Information Commissioner (“IC”) held that:
“The Commissioner’s decision is that the Cabinet Office was entitled to apply sections 23(1) or 24(1) in the alternative, to withhold parts of the file. He also finds that sections 36(2)(b)(i) and (ii) were correctly applied to withhold the related information. However, the Cabinet Office did not complete its deliberations on the balance of the public interest within a reasonable time, and therefore breached section 17(3) of FOIA. The Commissioner requires no steps as a result of this decision.”
The Commissioner requires no steps as a result of this decision.”

Sections 23(1) and 24(1) – Security and National Security

[9]The Commissioner accepted that the Cabinet Office was entitled to apply either section 23(1) or 24(1) “in the alternative” to withhold certain content from the file. This is so to avoid inadvertently revealing whether a security body is involved.[10]Based on the content seen by the IC, the Commissioner found that one of the two exemptions applies, and if it were section 24(1), then public interest supports withholding the requested information.

Section 36(2)(b)(i) and (ii) – Prejudice to Effective Conduct of Public Affairs:

(i) and (ii) – Prejudice to Effective Conduct of Public Affairs:

[11]The Commissioner accepted that the exemptions under s36(2)(b)(i) and (ii) were engaged and that generally the opinion of the Qualified Person (‘QP’) (sought by the Second Respondent during the FOIA request process) that the disclosure would likely inhibit free and frank advice and deliberation, was a reasonable one. The Commissioner accepted that disclosure would risk a ‘chilling effect’ on future decisions about document retention, affecting transparency and candour amongst officials.[12]The Commissioner considered the public interest balancing test under s36 and whilst he recognised that there is significant public interest in transparency, particularly regarding historical records, he placed greater weight upon the need for robust, uninhibited deliberation amongst officials regarding file retention.[13]The Commissioner considered that disclosure may lead to less effective decision-making or inappropriate release of sensitive material and decided that the public interest favoured maintaining the exemption.[14]With respect to procedural matters, the Commissioner found that the Cabinet Office had failed to comply with section 17(3) FOIA due to an excessive delay (103 working days) in confirming reliance on a qualified exemption and completing the public interest test. However, this was treated as a procedural breach only and did not affect the substantive outcome of the Decision Notice.

Appeal and Responses

[15]The appeal relates to the application of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.[16]The Appellant appealed the IC Decision Notice. The Appellant did not contest the IC application of Sections 23 and 24 to Part 1 of his request. However, the IC’s decision to uphold the use of Section 36 (Part 2 of the request) was appealed on the following grounds:(a) Public Interest in Transparency: The Appellant considers that the public should know and understand how and why government files are retained or released to The National Archives, as this affects historical understanding and accountability.(b) Civil Servant Professionalism: The Appellant avers that officials are bound by the Civil Service Code to give accurate and evidence-based advice and the suggestion of a “chilling effect” is overstated.(c) The Cabinet Office ultimately released most of the PREM 49/1946 file with minimal redactions after the ICO complaint. The Appellant states that the released material had little or no national security sensitivity. Moreover, the Appellant states that similar content is already in the public domain by way of other PREM 49 series files. The Appellant considers the Cabinet Office’s earlier decision to withhold the whole file was unjustified and disclosure of the internal decision-making would help explain this anomaly.[17]In summary, the Commissioner’s response to the appeal maintains that the Decision Notice is correct in law and that in all the circumstances, the balance of public interest favoured maintaining the exemptions in s36(2)(b)(i) and (ii) FOIA.[18]The IC stresses that the QP’s opinion was both procedurally valid and substantively reasonable, and that weight must be given to the QP’s assessment.[19]The Commissioner argues the process of government sensitivity reviews depends on uninhibited, honest, and detailed exchanges that would be undermined if disclosure became a realistic outcome of FOIA requests.[20]The Cabinet Office, as Second Respondent supports the Commissioner’s position and expands on the anticipated harm. It argues that:(a) Disclosure of internal review discussions would inhibit the candour of future sensitivity assessments;(b) Officials may become risk-averse or provide more generic, less helpful analysis if there is a risk of public disclosure;(c) Speculative public criticism could arise from misunderstanding the nuance of the deliberations, leading to pressure for procedural changes that weaken the process;(d) Whilst the content of PREM 49/1946 has now largely been disclosed, the deliberations remain sensitive because they include judgments and references about review thresholds and criteria, which should remain confidential.[21]The Cabinet Office also notes that some material may indirectly relate to matters of national security or involve personal data, which would justify further reliance on sections 23, 24, and 40, should the Tribunal consider that a section 36 exemption is insufficient.

Evidence

[22]By way of evidence and submissions the tribunal has had the following, all of which has been taken into account when making this decision:(a) An agreed 512-page bundle of open documents.(b) A closed bundle of documents containing the withheld information, a witness statement from Mr Roger Smethurst, Departmental Records Officer for the Cabinet Office and Head of Government Knowledge and Information Management.

Applicable Law

[23]The relevant provisions of FOIA are as follows: 1 General right of access to information held by public authorities. (1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.[36]Prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs (2) Information to which this section applies is exempt information if, in the reasonable opinion of a qualified person, disclosure of the information under this Act— (a)..... (b) would, or would be likely to inhibit--(i) the free and frank provision of advice, or(ii) the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation, or (c) would otherwise prejudice, or would be likely otherwise to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs 24. Section 36(2) is subject to a public interest test, which is found at section 2, namely: 2(2) (a) …. (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.[58]Determination of appeals(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.(2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. 25. The Tribunal was referred to a number of authorities, key aspects of some follow below. Whilst the Tribunal is conscious that it is not bound by other decisions of the First-tier Tribunal and its predecessor Tribunals, where such decisions are referred to, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is appropriate to follow the same approach as those previous decisions. 26. The Tribunal has taken account and carefully considered all of the authorities to which it was directed by the parties. 27. The Upper Tribunal set out a number of principles to be followed in Section 36 cases in IC v Malnick [2018] AACR 29: at paragraph 29: although the opinion of the QP is not conclusive as to prejudice (save, by virtue of section 36(7), in relation to the Houses of Parliament), it is to be afforded a measure of respect. at paragraph 31: a decision whether information is exempt under that section involves two stages: first, there is the threshold in section 36 of whether there is a reasonable opinion of the QP that any of the listed prejudice or inhibition (“prejudice”) would or would be likely to occur; second, which only arises if the threshold is passed, whether in all the circumstances of the case the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing it. at paragraph 32: The threshold question is concerned only with whether the opinion of the QP as to prejudice is reasonable. The public interest is only relevant at the second stage, once the threshold has been crossed. at paragraph 33: Given the clear structural separation of the two stages, it would be an error for a tribunal to consider matters of public interest at the threshold stage. At paragraphs 64-65: 64. We recognise, of course, that the F-tT’s decision must be read as a whole. However, that said, neither in paragraphs 46 and 47, nor in any other passage in the reasons, is there any hint by the tribunal that it was proceeding on the premise that the QP’s opinion was reasonable. Yet that was an essential step in its analysis if it was to proceed properly on the alternative basis that section 36 was indeed engaged. Alternatively, the view expressed at paragraph 46 by reference to paragraphs 42 and 43 show that, if any weight was afforded to the QP opinion, it was very slight on account of the view that the F-tT had taken of the merits of that opinion: a view which, as we have found, was itself flawed. 65. Thus the consideration of the public interest balancing test was flawed by the F-tT either ascribing no weight at all to the QP’s opinion or, if it did, failing to give it appropriate weight given the errors identified under Ground 1 above. 28. A number of principles were set out by the Information Tribunal in Hogan and Oxford City Council v Information Commissioner EA/2005/0026 and 30: 28. The application of the ‘prejudice’ test should be considered as involving a number of steps. 29. First, there is a need to identify the applicable interest(s) within the relevant exemption. … 30. Second, the nature of the ‘prejudice’ being claimed must be considered. An evidential burden rests with the decision maker to be able to show that some causal relationship exists between the potential disclosure and the prejudice and that the prejudice is, as Lord Falconer of Thoronton has stated, “real, actual or of substance (Hansard HL, Vol. 162, April 20, 2000, col. 827).”… 31. When considering the existence of ‘prejudice’, the public authority needs to consider the issue from the perspective that the disclosure is being effectively made to the general public as a whole, rather than simply the individual applicant. … 34. A third step for the decision-maker concerns the likelihood of occurrence of prejudice. A differently constituted division of this Tribunal in John Connor Press Associates Limited v Information Commissioner (EA/2005/0005) interpreted the phrase “likely to prejudice” as meaning that the chance of prejudice being suffered should be more than a hypothetical or remote possibility; there must have been a real and significant risk. … 35. On the basis of these decisions there are two possible limbs on which a prejudice-based exemption might be engaged. Firstly, the occurrence of prejudice to the specified interest is more probable than not, and secondly there is a real and significant risk of prejudice, even if it cannot be said that the occurrence of prejudice is more probable than not. We consider that the difference between these two limbs may be relevant in considering the balance between competing public interests (considered later in this decision). In general terms, the greater the likelihood of prejudice, the more likely that the balance of public interest will favour maintaining whatever qualified exemption is in question. 29. These passages received the approval of the Court of Appeal in Dept for Work & Pensions v Information Comr [2017] 1WLR 1 [at paragraph 27] In the same decision, the Court of Appeal further confirmed that: 55. It is clearly important that appropriate consideration should be given to the opinion of the qualified person at some point in the process of balancing competing public interests under section 36. No doubt the weight which is given to this consideration will reflect the tribunal’s own assessment of the matters to which the opinion relates. 30. In APPGER v ICO [2011] UKUT 153 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal held that (at paragraph 75): In our view correctly, it was accepted before us by the FCO and the IC that when assessing competing public interests under section 27 of FOIA the correct approach is to identify the actual harm or prejudice that the proposed disclosure would (or would be likely to or may) cause and the actual benefits its disclosure would (or would be likely to or may) confer or promote. and at paragraph 76 Such an approach requires an appropriately detailed identification, proof, explanation and examination of both (a) the harm or prejudice and (b) benefits that the proposed disclosure of the material in respect of which the section 27 exemption is claimed would (or would be likely to or may) cause or promote. 31. In APPGER v ICO [2013] UKUT 0560 (AAC) the Upper Tribunal gave guidance on how the balancing exercise required by section 2(2)(b) of FOIA should be undertaken: 75. […] the correct approach is to identify the actual harm or prejudice that the proposed disclosure would (or would be likely to or may) cause and the actual benefits its disclosure would (or would be likely to or may) confer or promote […] 76. Such an approach requires an appropriately detailed identification, proof, explanation and examination of both (a) the harm or prejudice and (b) benefits that the proposed disclosure of the material in respect of which the […] exemption is claimed would (or would be likely to or may) cause or promote. Plainly that includes an identification of the relevant material and the circumstances in which it was provided to or obtained by the body claiming the […] exemption.” 32. The Tribunal is satisfied that this approach is also appropriate when considering a Section 36 exemption. 33. On the public interest balancing test, the Upper Tribunal in O’Hanlon v Information Commissioner [2019] UKUT 34 (AAC) [15] identifies the task for the Tribunal: The first step is to identify the values, policies and so on that give the public interests their significance. The second step is to decide which public interest is the more significant. In some cases, it may involve a judgment between the competing interests. In other cases, the circumstances of the case may (a) reduce or eliminate the value or policy in one of the interests or (b) enhance that value or policy in the other. The third step is for the tribunal to set out its analysis and explain why it struck the balance as it did. 34. Hogan also considers the public interest test [at paragraph 55]: The application of the public interest test involves a question of mixed law and fact, not the exercise of any discretion by the IC. and at paragraph 56: FOIA does not include any general provision that there is a presumption in favour of the disclosure of information held by public authorities. However in one important respect FOIA does contain a presumption in favour of disclosure. The duty to communicate under s.1(1)(a) is displaced by a qualified exemption under s.2(2)(b) only if the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure of the information sought. So if the competing interests are equally balanced, then the public authority, in our view, must communicate the information sought. and at paragraph 57: The question to be asked is not; is the balance of public interest in favour of maintaining the exemption in relation to this type of information? The question to be asked is; is the balance of public interest in favour of maintaining the exemption in relation to this information, and in the circumstances of this case? and at paragraph 58: The passage of time will also have an important bearing on the balancing exercise. As a general rule, the public interest in preventing disclosure diminishes over time. 35. In Montague v Information Commissioner (‘IC’) and the Department of International Trade (‘DiT’) [2022] UKUT 104 (AAC) when considering the balance of competing public interests, the Upper Tribunal concluded: 86...The public authority is not to be judged on the balance of the competing public interests on how matters stand other than at the time of the decision on the request which it is has been obliged by Part I of FOIA to make. [para. 86] 87. We therefore conclude that the FTT erred in law in its decision (…) in not confining itself to assessing the balance of the competing public interests for and against disclosure on the basis of matters as they were at the date of DIT’s (initial) refusal decision. 36. The weight to be attached to the Qualified Person’s opinion was dealt with in DWP v IC & Zola [2016] EWCA Civ 758, at paragraph 55: 55. It is clearly important that appropriate consideration should be given to the opinion of the qualified person at some point in the process of balancing competing public interests under section 36. No doubt the weight which is given to this consideration will reflect the tribunal’s own assessment of the matters to which the opinion relates.

Discussion and Conclusions

[37]The Appellant takes no issue in relation to the exemptions under s23 and 24 FOIA being applied to Part 1 of the request, nor to s40(2) being applied to permit the redaction of the names of junior officials. The Tribunal has considered the exemptions under s23 and/or s24 and also s40(2) FOIA and considers that they were correctly applied by the Cabinet Office and accordingly, the IC decision in respect of these exemptions is not wrong in law. The names contained within the withheld material are those of junior officials and where other names are referenced, the exemptions under s23 and/or s24 apply.[38]In accordance with section 58 FOIA, the issue for the Tribunal to decide upon is whether the IC’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law and whether the IC was correct in finding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the public interest in maintaining the exemption provided in s36(2)(b)(i) and s36(2)(c) FOIA.[39]Under section 58(2) FOIA, the Tribunal is able to review any finding of fact upon which the Decision Notice was based, consider all of the evidence before it and reach its own decision.[40]Applying the law the following issues arise for the consideration of the Tribunal:(a) Is the opinion of the QP, in this case, the Attorney General, a reasonable one?(b) If so, does the public interest in maintaining the exemption under s36(2)(b)(i) and (c) FOIA outweigh the public interest in disclosure of the withheld information?

Qualified Person’s Opinion

[41]The QP’s opinion provides that the disclosure of internal Cabinet Office discussions about the sensitivity review of PREM 49/1946 would or would be likely to: inhibit the free and frank provision of advice (section 36(2)(b)(i)); inhibit the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation (section 36(2)(b)(ii)); and would otherwise prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs (section 36(2)(c)).[42]The QP accepted that future sensitivity reviewers and advisers might moderate or withhold their frank views if they thought such assessments might be disclosed, potentially undermining the sensitivity review process. The QP concludes that such an outcome would likely slow down decision-making and impair the quality and effectiveness of public administration.[43]Having considered the QP’s opinion and reasons for that opinion, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable for the QP to have reached the conclusions outlined in the opinion submissions.

Public Interest Balancing Test

[44]However, having considered the QP’s opinion, the Tribunal must weigh the public interests for and against disclosure by reference the prospective harms and prejudices described by the Cabinet Office (Second Respondent).[45]The Tribunal has considered the purported actual harms which the Cabinet Office considers would arise in the event of disclosure and considered both the balance of the public interest and the likelihood of the occurrence of prejudice under each category.[46]The Tribunal places significant weight on the transparency and fairness of the process by which files are reviewed for transfer to The National Archives. We consider that such decisions should be subject to scrutiny to ensure that material is not withheld merely to prevent embarrassment to government and that any continued non-disclosure is based on substantive and well-reasoned grounds.[47]The Tribunal shares the Appellant’s view that there is a strong public interest in upholding standards of good decision-making, transparency, and integrity in public administration. Public confidence in the government’s records management depends on demonstrating that decisions are taken in a robust, consistent, and fair manner.[48]In the Tribunal’s assessment, the withheld material is relatively benign and does not contain candid or controversial exchanges. The Tribunal finds that the Cabinet Office’s concern over inhibiting future frank advice is overstated and not supported by the content of the material in question.[49]The Tribunal is not persuaded that disclosure would result in a chilling effect sufficient to outweigh the strong public interest in transparency and in this regard places less weight upon the QP’s opinion. The Tribunal draws upon the Upper Tribunal decision in Davies v Information Commissioner and the Cabinet Office [2019] UKUT 185 (AAC), which held that claims of chilling effect must be treated with caution because civil servants are expected to be impartial and robust and cannot assume confidentiality of advice since the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Moreover, the UT states that chilling effect arguments operate at various levels and are likely to be strongest if the issue in question is still live, however the issue in this case is not live since the withheld material is a note of a discrete disclosure decision made at a point in time and is not an ongoing matter of policy formulation, and accordingly, the weight to be attached to the ‘chilling effect’ is diminished.[50]The Tribunal notes that the Cabinet Office appears to concede that internal commentary on record management was sometimes made without attention to accuracy or clarity. We found such practice difficult to reconcile with the importance of transparency and accountability in decisions about public access to historical records.[51]The Tribunal considers that disclosure would in fact promote better quality and more considered and accurate internal commentary and would enhance rather than diminish the effectiveness of public administration. We do not accept that disclosure would be burdensome or counterproductive, as suggested by the Cabinet Office.[52]It is also of note that that a significant portion of the PREM 49/1946 file was ultimately released upon this appeal being made by the Appellant, suggesting that the Cabinet Office had adopted a cautious or overly restrictive approach. In the Tribunal’s view, decisions to withhold information should not depend on whether an appeal is lodged but should reflect a consistent and principled application of FOIA.[53]The Tribunal accepts that the requested information is to be subjected to some redactions under s23 and/or s24 FOIA (which is also accepted by the Appellant) and some redactions under s40(2) FOIA relating to the names of junior officials.[54]Under s40(2) FOIA, information is exempt from disclosure if it contains personal data and when one of the conditions listed in s40(3A), (3B) or 40(4A) is satisfied. Section 3(2) of the Data Protection Act defines personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual”. A person’s name, on its own and in the abstract does not necessarily constitute personal data. However, the context of the name alongside a recorded opinion and details of employment is what makes a name personal data in this case. The withheld information includes names of junior officials. The condition under Section 40(3A)(a) is that the disclosure of the withheld information to a member of the public would contravene any of the data protection principles.[55]The relevant Data Protection Principle in this case can be found in Article 5(1)(a) UK GDPR which provides that personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.[56]Article 6 (1) UK GDPR provides that processing shall only be lawful if one of the conditions listed in the Article applies.[57]Article 6(1)(f) is the condition most applicable in this case and provides that processing of personal data shall only be lawful if the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the Applicant except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights of the data subjects (i.e. the civil servants) which require protection of personal data.[58]In South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner [2013] UKSC 55; [2013] 1 WLR 2421 Lady Hale DP observed (at paragraph 18) that the proper interpretation and application of condition 6 (now the legitimate interests test under DPA 1998) required three discrete questions to be answered:(a) Is the data controller or the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed pursuing a legitimate interest or interests? (“Legitimate interests test”)(b) Is the processing involved necessary for the purposes of those interests? (“Necessity test”)(c) Is the processing unwarranted in this case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject? (“Balancing test”)[59]Whilst the tribunal accepts that the Appellant has an interest in some of the withheld information, it does not accept that there is any legitimate interest in obtaining the names of the junior officials involved in the decision-making process relating to the file being sent to The National Archives.[60]The Upper Tribunal’s decision in Cox v Information Commissioner & Home Office [2018] UKUT 119 (AAC) is binding upon this Tribunal. In this case, despite the submissions for Mr Cox, which are extremely similar to those of the Appellant, that there was always a legitimate interest in knowing the identity of public officials exercising public power , the Upper Tribunal held that “A legitimate interest does not appear simply by virtue of the data subject’s employer” and that “the ordinary principle that it is senior civil servants who carry the can in terms of responsibility and accountability was a conclusion which the Upper Tribunal was not prepared to disturb”. Accordingly, it is trite law that there is usually little legitimate interest in personal data of junior government officials.[61]The Tribunal accepts that there is a legitimate interest in holding senior public officials to account but that there is no benefit in disclosing the names of junior officials.[62]Once the redactions are dealt with under s23 and/or s24 and s40(2) FOIA, there are no cogent arguments relating to a future chilling effect. The fact that it may take longer, may require more consideration and removes the ability to use shorthand between civil servants is not a compelling argument as to why the remaining requested information is to be withheld. Moreover, the Tribunal consider that an alternative shorthand would likely be used and that the process would be unlikely to take any longer than it currently does.[63]For these reasons, the Tribunal allows the appeal in part and orders that the withheld material relating to the Cabinet Office’s deliberations on PREM 49/1946 be disclosed within 30 days of this decision, subject to redactions under s23, s24 and s40(2) FOIA as detailed in the closed decision. Signed Judge Peri Mornington Date: 28 May 2025