“the Claimant was involved in a network of collusive behaviour, whereby he, along with many other traders, brokers and bank employees all over the world, deliberately tried to nudge Libor to positions beneficial to their own or their employers’ trading positions.”
“… a number of adjectives and adverbs have been inserted into the Claimant's meaning which are not part of the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. They are strained constructions of what is being said in the [publication]. For example, if an individual reader thought that the Claimant's alleged behaviour was ‘selfish’, that would be a personal judgment made by the individual reader. It is neither stated nor implied in the text. Such inferential meanings (that depend upon - and vary between - each individual reader's moral judgment) are not part of the natural and ordinary meaning of words: Brown -v- Bower [54]. In context, a suggestion that the conduct of the Claimant was ‘selfish’ would be an expression of an opinion. If such an opinion is expressly stated by the author, then it can readily be identified as such by readers. I find the notion of an ‘inferred opinion’ conceptually difficult. I suppose it is conceivable that an article may not make express an author's view, but it nevertheless emerges clearly as a result of discernible indications in the text as to what his or her opinion actually is on the given facts. But this is very subjective; and it may be difficult to separate out those cases from cases where what is really happening is simply that the reader is supplying his or her own judgment on the stated facts rather than detecting the author's opinion by implication.”
“The Claimant was involved in a network of collusive behaviour, whereby he, along with many other traders, brokers and bank employees all over the world, deliberately tried to manipulate the Libor rate to the benefit of his own or his employers’ trading positions but to the potential detriment of a very large number of people and entities including those who paid more than they should have done for financial products or services that were linked to the Libor rate.”
‘JUST BE CAREFUL DUDE.’
‘I agree we shouldn’t have been talking about putting fixings for our positions on public chat. Just wanted to get some transparency though.’
‘I know we have now heard this (everywhere) but I was genuinely not aware of any formal policy/guideline of these matters.’” [p.304] “UBS and its high-priced hired guns would now be the ones determining which evidence and witnesses showed up on regulators’ and prosecutors’ radar screens. If UBS didn’t discover certain evidence, or decided for whatever reason not to share it with the authorities – well, it would probably never come to light. … When Gibson Dunn reported that UBS had destroyed all of the recordings of employee phone calls in Tokyo, there was nothing much that investigators could do. Nor did they complain about the fact that UBS had blacked out the identities of certain people, presumably executives, included on various internal e-mail chains that the bank handed over. And they had to trust Gibson Dunn’s matter-of-fact determination that eight million of the documents that UBS initially had flagged as relevant to the investigation simply wouldn’t be available to U.S or British regulators because they were housed on the bank’s Swiss computers and therefore fell under the country’s stringent bank secrecy laws. This was a fantastic turn for UBS, which could now attempt to confine the investigation to an isolated group of wayward employees who no longer worked for the bank or at least already had been suspended.” [pp.308-309] “It was inevitable that someone was going to get charged – after all, one of the main points of the Libor investigation was to prove that US prosecutors could finally nail someone. And, based on what the prosecutors had been picking up from their counterparts at other agencies, UBS and its former employees were starting to look like the most promising targets. … But for the first time, Stellmach and Park thought they were looking at evidence of real manipulation – the type of stuff that could actually hold up in court and that might have affected the wide range of institutions and individuals that had purchased derivatives to protect themselves from volatile interest rates. The damage to one person’s credit card bill might have been negligible, but when you added up all of those credit cards, all of those car loans, all of those mortgages – well, it didn’t look quite so minor. And the blatant nature of the emails and chat snippets resolved any lingering doubts about whether the evidence could be open to a more innocent, benign interpretation. Hayes, in the course of that hours-long gathering, emerged as the obvious target. ‘He’s the one,’
‘Yes’. ‘I probably deserve to be sitting here because, you know, I made concerted efforts to influence Libor,’ he told the SFO in a session a couple of days later. ‘And, you know, although I was operating within a system, or participating within a system in which it was commonplace, you know, ultimately I was someone who was a serial offender within that…’ … Just like that, Hayes had admitted to being a central part of what looked like a vast criminal conspiracy.” [pp.364-365] “And the more he explained his tactics to the SFO, the more he convinced himself that he was innocent – or, at least, no guiltier than anyone else. After all, whose fault was it if he did what he’d been told was okay? How could he be blamed if everyone was doing more or less the same thing? This was just the way the system worked.” [pp.370-371] “The next day, Hayes’s interrogators turned to page 146 of a bundle of documents, a numbered to-do list that had been stored on a shared computer drive at UBS, which a number of managers had access to. Hayes had never seen the document before, but as he examined it, he realised that it was essentially an instruction manual for the bank’s Libor submitters. It showed that the UBS traders who specialised in interest-rate derivatives linked to euros and dollars were in charge of submitting their own Libor data. They didn’t have to go through an intermediary in another department, as Hayes had to do with Darin, in order to tinker with the bank’s Libor submissions. But the real revelation was the explicit instruction to the traders about exactly how to take their derivatives positions into account when setting Libor. It was just so flagrant. ‘It’s hilarious,’
‘I was aware of that I was being dishonest, but on a micro scale, on a scale that was not perceptible to people, that was not really influencing the rates, outside of what I would term my permissible range.’
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