“Shaun Atwood [Host] (‘SA’): Today we have Sonia Poulton on the podcast. This podcast is gonna go over everything from Jimmy Saville to more contemporary big story in that category Epstein. We've a whole slew of political names that are gonna come up and I have watched Sonia's documentary three times now. It’s just absolutely blown my mind the level of research she has done into this and whereas you see some people putting videos out really sensationalising and getting into the most extreme claims, what I like about Sonia is that she draws the line at an appropriate place and it enhances the reliability of what she's about to tell us. But before we go to that dark realm, how are you qualified to speak on this subject? Sonia Poulton (‘SP’): Well um apart from the fact that I was actually abused as a child so I do understand that, um but that isn't really my entrance. My entrance was meeting people who had been extensively abused as children, finding an empathy with them, understanding them, where they were coming from, seeing that their biggest problems were actually dealing with the system and challenging the system that had enabled them to be abused. … SA: So, going back to “Paedophiles in Parliament” then Esther Baker and Hemming, we’ve not discussed them yet, have we? […]” “SP: What I can say to you is, Esther Baker came out several years ago, I think her first interview was, was Sky News. I know Esther, I’ve talked to Esther several times. And she came out and she was saying that she had been abused as a child in – at Cannock Chase and she said it was an MP - and she never named the MP, she never said the M… - it was actually John Hemming who outed himself, on his own blog…”
“[11] The Court's task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, which is the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the words bear. It is well recognised that there is an artificiality in this process because individual readers may understand words in different ways: Slim -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd[1968] 2 QB 157 , 173D-E, per Lord Diplock. [12] The following key principles can be distilled from the authorities: see e.g. Slim -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd 175F; Charleston -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd[1995] 2 AC 65 , 70 ; Gillick -v- Brook Advisory Centres[2002] EWCA Civ 1263 [7]; Charman -v- Orion Publishing Co Ltd[2005] EWHC 2187 (QB) [8]-[13]; Jeynes -v- News Magazines Ltd & Anor[2008] EWCA Civ 130 [14]; Doyle -v- Smith[2018] EWHC 2935 [54]-[56]; Lord McAlpine of West Green -v- Bercow[2013] EWHC 1342 (QB) [66]; Simpson -v- MGN Ltd [2016] EMLR 26 [15]; Bukovsky -v- Crown Prosecution Service[2017] EWCA 1529 [2018] 1 WLR 18 ; Brown -v- Bower[2017] 4 WLR 197 [10]-[16] and Sube -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd[2018] EWHC 1234 (QB) [20]: a. The governing principle is reasonableness. b. The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. c. The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. d. Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task. e. Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties. f. Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. g. It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. h. The publication must be read as a whole, and any 'bane and antidote' taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic "rogues' gallery" case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases). i. In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the Claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. j. No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. k. The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership. l. Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. m. In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the Claimant's pleaded meaning).”
“The repetition rule in its simplest application is that, if you publish a statement that Y said that X is guilty, it is not a defence to an action for defamation to establish the literal truth of the publication, i.e. that it is indeed true that Y said that X is guilty. You are repeating and endorsing Y's publication and your justification must address the substance of what Y said, not the fact that he said it. The obvious underlying reason for the rule is that statements of this kind in substance restate the original publication. It is … a rule which encapsulates the fact that publications of the bald kind under consideration do in substance amount to a republication of the reported publication and that that is their meaning.”
“40. There are myriad ways in which the allegations of others can be reported in a publication. It is impossible to lay down hard and fast rules. Over and over again the authorities make clear that it is the effect of the publication overall that matters. In determining meaning, the cardinal principle is that “it is the overall effect of the article that counts”: Poulter -v- Times Newspapers Ltd[2018] EWHC 3900 (QB) [43]-[44]; and Poroshenko -v- BBC[2019] EWHC 213 (QB) [28]. 41. The effect of the repetition rule is that the use of verbs like “alleged” or “claimed” (however often they are repeated in a publication) is unlikely, in itself, to insulate a publisher from the effect of the rule. If the impact of the repetition rule on the meaning of reports of allegations made by others is to be mitigated or avoided, the material that has that effect must be found elsewhere in the publication.”
“The repetition rule clearly applies when the court is considering the meaning of words, but it takes its place alongside all the other matters to which the Court must have regard when determining meaning. The task is to determine what the ordinary reasonable reader would understand the words to mean. The repetition rule cannot be applied mechanistically to the determination of meaning. If Ms Page’s strict application of the repetition rule were correct, then it would make no difference to meaning whether the words complained of were: “X proved/alleged/suggested/hinted that Y was a thief”
“c. The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. … k. The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership.”
“The ordinary and natural meaning or inferred or indirect meaning—any meaning which does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be part of the ordinary meaning of words.”
“The Defendant was not claiming Mr Hemming was a paedophile and has never done so. However, the Claimant has worked in concert with other parties and that includes attacking survivors of child abuse, those alleging it and those who are reporting on it.”