Stephen Mark Drabble & Anor v Christopher Bramhall [2026] EWHC 1588 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1588 (KB)Case No KB-2025-004185
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 25/06/2026
Before
MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE
Between
STEPHEN MARK DRABBLEClaimantsMELISSA DRABBLEClaimantCHRISTOPHER BRAMHALLDefendant
The Claimants appeared in person for in personThe Defendant appeared in person for in personHearing Hearing date: 16 June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Thursday 25 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]The First Claimant is married to the Second Claimant who is a Parish Councillor. The Defendant is active on social media and participates in online discussion within local Facebook groups.[2]By a claim form received by the court on 6 November 2025, and sealed on 11 November 2025, the Claimants seek damages, injunctive relief and other remedies. The claim relates to the Defendant’s statements made in two posts in a Facebook community group called “Dove Holes Community Page” on 6 November 2024 and the subsequent republication of the posts. The posts related to the preparations for the annual Dove Holes Bonfire event scheduled for Tuesday 5 November 2024.[3]By order sealed on 18 March 2026, Deputy Master Marzec ordered a trial of preliminary issues namely(i) the meaning of the statements complained about;(ii) whether the statements were defamatory at common law; and(iii) whether they were statements of fact or opinion in relation to each Claimant.[4]Pursuant to [6] of the Master’s order the parties set out their respective positions on the preliminary issues in statements of case dated 4 April 2026 (for the Claimants) and 7 April 2026 (for the Defendant). The Claimants provides slightly different versions of their case on meaning in later documents provided to the court, but confirmed at the outset of the trial that their position was set out in the statements of case dated 4 April 2026[5]In Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567, [2021] EMLR 19 at [8], the Court of Appeal referred to the standard approach for a judge at first instance seeking to determine meaning, namely that the judge should “capture an initial reaction, before reading or hearing argument”. I performed this task by reading the words complained of without knowing what either party wanted to say about their meaning; forming some provisional views; reading the statements of case and skeleton arguments; hearing the parties’ oral submissions at the trial and reserving judgment. This is my judgment on the preliminary issues.

The statements complained of

[6]The statements complained of as defamatory at [6] of the Amended Particulars of Claim were made in two Facebook posts made on the same day.[7]The first was a post at about 5.00 pm on Wednesday 6 November 2024 which included a series of statements as set out below. The text in square brackets below is included so that the statements can be seen in their full context, but are not relied on by the Claimants: “A little bit of information for all the narrow minded followers that think tin man was hard done to on Monday. Firstly…the way the local councillor and her husband spoke was absolutely horrendous! The words coming from their mouths and their tone was not what we should expect from a councillor and event organiser and inevitably wouldn’t be tolerated. [We had written confirmation that we were able to attend this year with the same equipment as before]. Not only was he high on drugs (driving a car round our community centre) but also had a knife on his possession when the police arrived which was seized and put in an evidence bag. 1 person got arrested, not a group attack or any other rubbish you’ve heard. There’s also a false allegation been made that he was kicked in the face when on the floor. This is NOT true[, the police currently have the non steel toe cap boots in their possession for forensic testing which will prove this!] Remember there are 2 sides to a story and I’m pretty sure you’ve all got a good idea of who the sh*t talkers are in the village. [40 years our family have been attending Dove Bonfire with our equipment. Lastly, We would like to say a huge thank you for all the support, pints, pats on the back, handshakes etc. It’s nice to know you’re all behind us]”.[8]The second post was a comment made at 9.09 pm that day, as follows: “I’ve written nothing that can’t be proved eventually”.[9]It appears that this comment was made after a comment from the Second Claimant saying as follows:
“My only statement in response to the post I am blocked from, is if you believe one word of any of it, remove yourself from my friends list, before I look through the likes and remove you myself”
.

The preliminary issues for the trial

[10]The Deputy Master defined the issues for the trial as follows: “Issues relating to the First Claimant(a) The meaning…of the statement complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in relation to the First Claimant;(b) Whether the statement is defamatory of the First Claimant at common law; and(c) Whether the statement is, in relation to the First Claimant, a statement of fact or opinion. Issues relating to the Second Claimant(d) The meaning…of the statement complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in relation to the Second Claimant;(e) Whether the statement is defamatory of the Second Claimant at common law; and(f) Whether the statement is, in relation to the Second Claimant, a statement of fact or opinion”. (d) The meaning…of the statement complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in relation to the Second Claimant; (e) Whether the statement is defamatory of the Second Claimant at common law; and (f) Whether the statement is, in relation to the Second Claimant, a statement of fact or opinion”.[11]I have re-ordered the issues in respect of each Claimant, so as to determine whether the statements were statements of fact or opinion before considering whether they were defamatory at common law. This is to reflect the principle described by Warby J (as he then was) in Sube v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWHC (QB) at [33] to this effect: “Singh’s case (British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350 [2011] 1 WLR 133)…highlights the dangers of drawing too rigorous a distinction between the question of whether words are defamatory and the question of whether they are fact or comment. To ask the questions separately, in that order, “may not always be the best approach, because the answer to the first question may stifle the answer to the second”: [32]. Put another way, words that are recognisably a statement of opinion may not be harmful enough to reputation to cross the threshold of seriousness, and be defamatory”.[12]The effect is that issues (b)/(c) and (e)/(f) respectively in [10] above have been reversed below. Issues relating to the First Claimant (a): The meaning…of the statement complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in relation to the First Claimant The legal principles

Issues relating to the First Claimant

[13]In Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25 at [11], Nicklin J observed that: “The Court’s task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, which is the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the words bear. It is well recognised that there is an artificiality in this process because individual readers may understand words in different ways: Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157, 173D–E, per Lord Diplock”.[14]At [12], he distilled the principles from the caselaw as follows: “i) The governing principle is reasonableness. ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task. v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties. vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’ taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic “rogues’ gallery” case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases). ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication’s readership. xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the Claimants’ pleaded meaning)” (and see Millett at [8] for the Court of Appeal’s approval of this summary).[15]In certain cases, it is necessary to consider the “levels” of meaning, which were described by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis at [13] as follows:
“They come from the decision of Brooke LJ in Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 11 [45] in which he identified three types of defamatory allegation: broadly, (1) the claimant is guilty of the act; (2) reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant is guilty of the act; and (3) grounds to investigate whether the claimant has committed the act. In the lexicon of defamation, these have come to be known as the Chase levels. Reflecting the almost infinite capacity for subtle differences in meaning, they are not a straitjacket forcing the court to select one of these prescribed levels of meaning, but they are a helpful shorthand. In Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd, for example, Gray J found a meaning of “cogent grounds to suspect” [58]”
.

Application of the legal principles to this issue

[16]Applying these principles, I conclude that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the first Facebook post complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim to bear the single natural and ordinary meaning that the First Claimant(i) had driven a motor vehicle around the community centre while “high” on illegal drugs;(ii) had had a knife in his possession, which the police seized and put in an evidence bag; and(iii) had falsely claimed, or materially exaggerated, that he had been kicked in the face while on the ground.[17]Statements (i) and (ii) are clear from the words used in the publication which state in terms that the First Claimant had done the things alleged. Statements (i) and (ii) were Chase level (1) statements, to the effect that the First Claimant was in fact guilty of the acts alleged: the statements were made in entirely unqualified terms and baldly asserted that First Claimant had acted in the manner alleged.[18]In respect of statement (iii), it is correct that the post did not name the First Claimant as the person who had made the false allegation that he had been kicked in the face on the floor. However, I consider that a hypothetical reasonable reader, reading the post as a whole and in its context, would infer that it was referring to the First Claimant, even if he was not the only one making the false allegations (as appears to be the thrust of the post). This is because he was the one most likely to complain of such a kick as the purported victim of it; it is hard to imagine others doing so without his input; and because this passage in the post comes a matter of lines after the sentence making statements (i) and (ii) which were plainly about him.[19]This meaning broadly reflects the Claimants’ case as advanced at [6](a)-(c) of their statement of case on meaning.[20]The Defendant contended that the post meant no more than that he was “giving his account” of a local incident and that his account was that the First Claimant had been driving whilst under the influence of drugs and had possession of a knife. In my judgment that would be a strained or forced interpretation of the post. The Defendant did say in the post that there were “2 sides to a story” but the statements (i) and (ii) above were made before that observation, and without any caveat: the Defendant simply asserted that these things had happened. I deal with whether statement (iii) was, in substance, a statement of opinion at [30] below.[21]The Claimants argued at [6](d) of their statement of case on meaning that the post also bore the meaning that the First Claimant “was dishonest, was spreading lies about what had happened, and was not to be trusted”. This is, in my judgment, an unreasonable embellishment on statement (iii) above. I do not consider that a hypothetical reasonable reader, who is not “unduly suspicious” or “avid for scandal” (see Koutsogiannis at [12] iii) at [14] above), would conclude that beyond statement (iii), the post meant that the First Claimant was someone who was (generally) dishonest, was spreading “lies” about what had happened and was (generally) someone not to be trusted. Rather, I accept the Defendant’s submissions that such a reader would conclude that the Defendant’s statements related to the specific incidents in question.[22]The Defendant submitted at [6] of his statement of case on meaning that the post also bore the meaning that the First Claimant “spoke [at the meeting] in a manner which the Defendant considered inappropriate or unacceptable”. However, this was no part of the Claimants’ case on meaning and the court cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the Claimants’ pleaded meaning: see Koutsogiannis at [12] xiii) at [14] above. (b): Whether the statement is, in relation to the First Claimant, a statement of fact or opinion[23]In Koutsogiannis at [16], Nicklin J held that when determining whether the words complained of contain allegations of fact or opinion, the court will be guided by the following points: “i) The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact. ii) Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc. iii) The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion. iv) Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, i.e. the statement is a bare comment. v) Whether an allegation that someone has acted “dishonestly” or “criminally” is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact”.[24]Further, as Warby LJ explained in Blake and others v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000:
“22…Section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 [“the 2013 Act”] provides for a defence of “honest opinion” which is relatively generous. But the first condition for the availability of this defence is that the statement was one of opinion: see s 3(2) of the 2013 Act. A statement will only be defensible under s 3, therefore, if it is recognisable as a comment or opinion as distinct from an imputation of fact. If it is not, the defendant will need to prove that it is substantially true (s 2 of the 2013 Act) or that it was a reasonable publication on a matter of public interest (s 4 of the Act). 23. Opinion is synonymous with “comment”
. It is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation or the like. As with meaning, the court deciding whether a statement is one of fact or opinion looks only at the words complained of and their immediate context, and the ultimate question for the court is the objective question of “how the words would strike the ordinary reasonable reader”. This question may be considered after the meaning has been decided, or at the same time, or in the reverse order, which is common practice. 24. This is a highly fact-sensitive process that focuses on the particular statement at issue. One factor for consideration is whether the statement contains any indication of the basis on which it is made. At common law a statement that contains no indication of or reference to any supporting facts is liable to be treated as a statement of fact. The second condition for the statutory defence of honest opinion is “that the statement complained of indicated whether in general or specific terms the basis of the opinion”: s 3(3) of the 2013 Act. Beyond these extreme cases, “[t]he more clearly a statement indicates that it is based on some extraneous material, the more likely it is to strike the reader as an expression of opinion”.[25]Applying these principles, I conclude that statements (i) and (ii), to the effect that the First Claimant had driven a motor vehicle around the community centre while “high” on illegal drugs and had had a knife in his possession, which the police seized and put in an evidence bag, would strike the ordinary reader as statements of fact, for the following reasons.[26]First, the opening words to the post offered to provide the reader with “a little bit of information” to counter the view that “tin man” (the First Claimant) was “hard done to”. The use of the objective word “information” suggested that what was to follow was intended to be factual, not opinion.[27]Second, the statements were made without qualification: the Defendant stated in terms that the First Claimant “was” driving while high on drugs and “had” a knife in his possession.[28]Third, the statements were made without reference to any supporting or extraneous material. Although in his later comment, the Defendant stated that he had not written anything “that can’t be proved eventually”, this was a very general assertion and an ordinary reader would not necessarily link it with (i) and (ii).[29]Accordingly, I agree with the Claimants that these statements would be interpreted as reflecting “concrete past events”; and I do not accept the Defendant’s argument that the ordinary reader would understand these statements as simply reflecting his version of events and were thus statements of opinion.[30]However, I consider that statement (iii) – to the effect that the First Claimant had falsely claimed, or materially exaggerated, that he had been kicked in the face while on the ground – would be considered by the ordinary reasonable reader to be a statement of opinion. This is because the Defendant referred to “extraneous material” to support his statement (see Blake at [24]), namely the fact that the police had in their possession the boots from the foot of the person accused of kicking the First Claimant (which, it was said, would provide forensic proof that the assertion that he had not been kicked as alleged was not true). This was the specific basis of his opinion for the purposes of the Defamation Act 2013, section 3(3). Further, in his later comment, the Defendant referred more broadly to the fact that he had not written anything “that can’t be proved eventually”. (c): Whether the statement is defamatory of the First Claimant at common law[31]At common law, an imputation will be treated as defamatory if it meets two requirements. The “consensus requirement” is that the meaning is one that “tends to lower the Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally”; in other words, the behaviours or views complained of attributed to the claimant in the statement were such that they were “contrary to common, shared views of our society”. The “threshold requirement” is that the meaning is one that “would tend to have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that people would treat the Claimant”: see, for example, also Millett at [9], Blake at [26] and Gatley at 2-001.[32]Applying these principles, the statements about the First Claimant set out at [16] above were all defamatory of him at common law.[33]Statements (i) and (ii), to the effect that he had engaged in serious criminal conduct involving drug use, driving under the influence and possessing an apparently unlawful knife, were plainly statements that would tend to lower the First Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally and would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat him. The Defendant accepted that statements (i) and (ii) were capable of being defamatory and he was right to do so.[34]In my view, the same is true of statement (iii), to the effect that he given a falsely or materially exaggerated account of being kicked in the face while on the ground. I consider that allegation of dishonesty, apparently to the police, would tend to lower the First Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally and would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat him. Issues relating to the Second Claimant (d): The meaning…of the statement complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in relation to the Second Claimant

Issues relating to the Second Claimant

[35]Applying the legal principles set out at [13]-[15] above, I conclude that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the first Facebook post complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim to bear the single natural and ordinary meaning that(i) the Second Claimant had spoken and behaved in a way that was wholly inappropriate for a parish councillor; and(ii) because of this, she was unfit for her public and community role.[36]In my judgment this meaning is clear from the words in the second paragraph of the post, which explicitly stated that the way “the local councillor” (the Second Claimant) spoke was “absolutely horrendous”; and that the “words” and “tone” she used were “not what we should expect from a councillor” and “inevitably wouldn’t be tolerated”. The latter statement in particular has led me to conclude that meaning (ii) above is appropriate.[37]The meaning contended for by the Defendant at [15] of his statement of case on meaning was not fundamentally different from this meaning, save that he added that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand that he was only expressing his opinion. This is better addressed under issue (e) below.[38]The Claimants contended at [9] of their statement of case on meaning that the post also bore the meaning that the Second Claimant “(b) was one of the dishonest parties in the dispute and one of the people spreading false account of what had happened”; and “(c) was putting forward a false account of what had happened”.[39]I do not consider that a hypothetical reasonable reader, who is not “unduly suspicious” or “avid for scandal” (see Koutsogiannis at [12] iii) at [14] above), would interpret the post in this way.[40]I say this because there was no direct link made in the post between the “local councillor” or “councillor” and the suggestion of false allegations having been made to the effect that there had been a “group attack” (rather than one person being arrested) or of the First Claimant having been kicked when on the floor. The Second Claimant was not, according to the post, the victim of the alleged kick, unlike the First Claimant. There were no other direct references to the Second Claimant in the post beyond the references to the “local councillor” and the “councillor” at the outset.[41]For these reasons, the hypothetical reasonable reader would not necessarily infer that the post meant that the Second Claimant had been involved in these allegations. Nor would such a person understand the post as meaning that she was one of the (unnamed) people who thought that the First Claimant had been “hard done to” or one of the “sh*t talkers” in the village. (e): Whether the statement is, in relation to the Second Claimant, a statement of fact or opinion[42]Applying the legal principles set out at [23]-[24] above, I conclude that the statements that the Second Claimant had spoken and behaved in a way that was wholly inappropriate for a parish councillor and was thereby unfit for her public and community role would strike the ordinary reasonable reader as a statements of opinion, rather than statements of fact. Both statements have the hallmark of being a “deduction”, “inference” or “criticism” (see Koutsogiannis at [18] i) – iii)) of the Second Claimant based on the Defendant’s observation of her at the meeting. I accept the Defendant’s submission that he was expressing “not provable truths, but…subjective opinions”. (f): Whether the statement is defamatory of the Second Claimant at common law[43]Applying the legal principles set out at [31] above I conclude that the statements that the Second Claimant had spoken and behaved in a way that was wholly inappropriate for a parish councillor and was thereby unfit for her public and community role would tend to lower her in the estimation of right-thinking people generally and would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat her. The statement that her words and tone were such that they “inevitably wouldn’t be tolerated” underscore this. I do not accept the Defendant’s submission to the effect that because they were clearly statements of opinion, they could not be defamatory of the Second Claimant at common law. I conclude that they were.

Conclusion on meaning

[44]Accordingly, for all these reasons I answer the preliminary issues as follows:(a) The meaning of the statement complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in relation to the First Claimant was that he (i) had driven a motor vehicle around the community centre while “high” on illegal drugs; (ii) had had a knife in his possession, which the police seized and put in an evidence bag; and (iii) had falsely claimed, or materially exaggerated, that he had been kicked in the face while on the ground.(b) Statements (i) and (ii) were statements of fact, but statement (iii) was a statement of opinion.(c) These statements were defamatory of the First Claimant at common law.(d) The meaning of the statement complained of in paragraph 6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim in relation to the Second Claimant was that (i) she had spoken and behaved in a way that was wholly inappropriate for a parish councillor; and (ii) because of this, she was unfit for her public and community role.(e) These were both statements of opinion.(f) These statements were defamatory of the Second Claimant at common law.[45]The Claimants will need to amend their Particulars of Claim to reflect the court’s determination of meaning.

Further directions

[46]The Deputy Master’s 18 March 2026 order at [1], [2] and [9] granted the Claimants permission to serve their draft Amended Particulars of Claim dated 17 March 2026, albeit striking out paragraphs 10, 17 and 24 thereof. The Deputy Master explained that this order had been made because rather than pleading their case “by way of example”, the Claimants should “set out each and every incident they rely on in support of their case on re-publication and on the course of conduct constituting harassment” and “if the Claimants intend to rely on the…incidents [set out in paragraphs 24(b) and (f) of the 17 March 2026 draft] they need to plead an arguable case as to the Defendant’s responsibility for these incidents”: see reasons (A) and (D) of the order.[47]On 7 April 2026 the Claimants served draft re-amended Particulars of Claim. This draft was structured very differently to the 17 March 2026 draft, without the previous helpful side-headings (“Publication”, “Identification”, “Serious Harm” etc) and with different paragraph numbering. The changes that had been made were not indicated by underlining, red text or any other method, making the draft hard to follow. However, it is clear that the Claimants had made at least some other substantive changes that went beyond what the Deputy Master had ordered, such as changing their case on identification and their case on meaning at the new paragraphs [11], [13] and [14].[48]The Defendant contended, rightly, that the Claimants did not have permission to rely on the 7 April 2026 draft re-amended Particulars of Claim.[49]I therefore make the following directions:(i) The draft re-amended Particulars of Claim dated 7 April 2026 is to be disregarded.(ii) The Claimants shall, within 14 days, file and serve draft re-amended Particulars of Claim. This draft should use the 17 March 2026 draft Particulars of Claim as a “base”. It should (a) reflect in struck out text those paragraphs struck out by the Deputy Master in the 18 March 2026 order; (b) show the amendments the Claimants propose to make as a result of the issues identified by the Deputy Master; and (c) show the court’s determination on meaning in accordance with this judgment. These changes should be made in red text, in accordance with PD 17, paragraphs 2.2-2.4.(iii) If the Claimants wish to propose further amendments to the Particulars of Claim, outwith the Deputy Master’s order or the court’s determination on meaning, these should be made in green text. If the Defendant does not consent to any such proposed amendments, the Claimants will need to make an application to amend, to be determined by the Master at the next hearing.(iv) The Defendants must file and serve a Defence within 28 days of receipt of the draft re-amended Particulars of Claim.[50]I reiterate my thanks to the parties for the helpful and concise way in which they presented their respective cases on meaning.