“As a matter of principle, the court is perfectly entitled to dispense with the calling of oral evidence under CPR Parts 32.2(2)(b) and 32.5(1)(b) where witness statements have been served. The court does not have to follow a pointless procedure in an undefended claim. If it were otherwise, undefended cases up and down the country would be delayed and subjected to inappropriate scrutiny when there was no defence raised and no substantive argument about the claimants’ entitlement. In this case the claimants had to prove their case. They did so by presenting both their statement of case verified by a statement of truth, and also their witness statements. There was no need for the judge to require the witnesses to be called.”
“The application of the principle in Hollington has in recent years become substantially diluted. In particular: (l) Whilst a court cannot rely upon a bare finding of a prior court for example that a party has been negligent, it can rely upon the substance of the evidence which is referred to in the judgment of the prior court, including for example the contents of a document, the evidence given by a witness and the like: Rogers v Hotle[2015] QB 265 , [40], [55] (Christopher Clarke LJ). (2) Whilst the bare finding of a prior court is opinion evidence which a subsequent court cannot rely upon because the later court must make its own findings of fact, a reference in a judgment to the substance of evidence is itself evidence which the judge in a later case can take into account "in like manner as he would any other factual evidence, giving to it such weight as he thinks fit" : Rogers (supra). (3) Moreover, if the judge in a later case concludes that the matters of primary fact recorded in an earlier judgment justify the conclusions reached in that judgment, he is entitled to reach the same conclusion: Otkritie International v Gersamia[2015] EWHC 821 (Comm) , [25] (Eder J)”
“The elements of the cause of action are as follows: i) A combination, arrangement or understanding between two or more people. It is not necessary for the conspirators all to join the conspiracy at the same time, but the parties to it must be sufficiently aware of the surrounding circumstances and share the same object for it properly to be said that they were acting in concert at the time of the acts complained of: Kuwait Oil Tanker at [111]. ii) An intention to injure another individual or separate legal entity, albeit with no need for that to be the sole or predominant intention: Kuwait Oil Tanker at [108]. Moreover: a) The necessary intent can be inferred, and often will need to be inferred, from the primary facts – see Kuwait Oil Tanker at [120-121], citing Bourgoin SA v Minister of Agriculture [1986] 1 QB: ‘[i]f an act is done deliberately and with knowledge of the consequences, I do not think that the actor can say that he did not 'intend' the consequences or that the act was not 'aimed' at the person who, it is known, will suffer them’. b) Where conspirators intentionally injure the claimant and use unlawful means to do so, it is no defence for them to show that their primary purpose was to further or protect their own interests: Lonrho Plc v Fayed[1992] 1 AC 448 , 465-466; see also OBG v Allan[2008] 1 AC 1 at [164-165]. c) Foresight that his unlawful conduct may or will probably damage the claimant cannot be equated with intention: OBG at [166]. iii) In some cases, there may be no specific intent but intention to injure results from the inevitability of loss: see Lord Nicholls at [167] in OBG v Allan, referring to cases where: ‘The defendant’s gain and the claimant’s loss are, to the defendant’s knowledge, inseparably linked. The defendant cannot obtain the one without bringing about the other. If the defendant goes ahead in such a case in order to obtain the gain he seeks, his state of mind will satisfy the mental ingredient of the unlawful interference tort.’ iv) Concerted action (in the sense of active participation) consequent upon the combination or understanding: McGrath at [7.57]. v) Use of unlawful means as part of the concerted action. There is no requirement that the unlawful means themselves are independently actionable: Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network[2008] 1 AC 1174 at [104]. vi) Loss being caused to the target of the conspiracy.”
“(1) Dishonesty is not itself an element of the tort, see Arcelormittal USA LLC v. Ruia[2020] EWHC 3349 (Comm) , at [27(3)]. (2) Justification is not a defence, see, for example, Palmer Birch v. Lloyd[2018] EWHC 2316 (TCC) ;[2018] 4 WLR 164 , at [192]–[193]; the [2021 Judgment], at [81]; Seneschall v. Trisant Foods Ltd[2023] EWHC 1029 (Ch) , at [151]–[160]. Justification cannot be a defence since the element of unlawful means connotes the absence of justification, see JSC BTA Bank v. Khrapunov[2018] UKSC 19 ;[2020] AC 727 at [10]… (3) The combination element requires that ‘at least one of’ (but not necessarily all of) the conspirators will use unlawful means - see Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. Total Network SL[2008] UKHL 19 ;[2008] 1 AC 1174 , at [213]. Thus, there is no requirement that all of the conspirators will use unlawful means. It is also unnecessary that the combination be, for example, contractual in nature, or that it be an express or formal agreement, see Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v. Al Bader (No.3) [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271 (CA), at [111]. (4) The element of unlawful means comprises conduct lacking ‘just cause or excuse’ (see JSC BTA Bank, at [10]). Contempt of court and steps taken to prevent the enforcement of judgments constitute unlawful means (see at [16]). (5) The intention to injure need not be the defendant's predominant intention, see JSC BTA Bank, at [13]. Nor need he or she act maliciously in the sense that harm to the claimant need not be the end sought. (6) It is enough that harm to the claimant was the means by which the defendant sought to achieve his or her end, i.e., that the defendant knew (or turned a blind eye to the fact) that injury to the claimant would ensue - see ED&F Man Capital Markets Ltd v. Come Harvest Holdings Ltd[2022] EWHC 229 (Comm) 487, [500]. In The Eurysthenes [1977] Q.B. 49 (CA) at 68, Lord Denning M.R. said that ‘If a man, suspicious of the truth, turns a blind eye to it, and refrains from inquiry – so that he should not know it for certain – then he is to be regarded as knowing the truth’. (7) The damage requirement calls for proof of ‘damage caused by the conspiracy", Palmer Birch v. Lloyd, supra, at [239].’”
“…the elements of the Marex tort are: (1) The entry of a judgment in the claimant’s favour, (2) Breach of the rights existing under that judgment, (3) The procurement or inducement of that breach by the defendant, (4) Knowledge of the judgment on the part of the defendant, and (5) Realisation on the part of the defendant that the conduct being induced or procured would breach the rights owed under the judgment.”
“Send mdm su I need 800k back from airplane money's [sic]”
“Below messages refered [sic] to Mdn [sic] Su this morning. Here is outcome! Ms Tseng will lend you USD 800K but The premises are that A. Purely, this is private financing between 'Nobu san' and 'Ms Tseng…' B. After receiving July repayment from Wisco in early of July 2015, Nobu san must immediately repay back plus interest to Ms Tseng… C. Nobu San, please confirm your acceptance immediately so that Ms. Tseng … can arrange payment.”
“In this case, it is said that with those defendants who participated with knowledge that the monies were the proceeds of a fraud, but where the evidence does not establish that they knew of the fraud, it is in the very nature of things that they knew of the existence of a victim of fraud and that their gain from the fraud would be the injury of the victim. It is said that there is no principled reason why the precise identity of the victim should be part of the legal test, particularly in the age of cyber-fraud where conspirators can readily conspire together to conceal and then move the money of the victim on without any of the traditional engagements seen in more traditional forms of fraud. I agree. Suppose that the residual three defendants in this last class knew that they were handling and assisting in the moving of illicit proceeds in a scheme to defraud a company by using false orders enabled by the hacking of its email accounts. Suppose they further agreed to do all of this knowing that their gain is the company's loss. I do not believe that they could avoid liability by saying they did not know the actual identity of the company defrauded or the precise methodology of the conspiracy. It is surely sufficient that they knew that there was a victim and that monies would be procured illicitly from that victim and that they had agreed to play their part.”