“Where conspirators act with the predominant purpose of injuring the plaintiff and in fact inflict damage on him, but do nothing which would have been actionable if done by an individual acting alone, it is in the fact of their concerted action for that illegitimate purpose that the law, however anomalous it may now seem, finds a sufficient ground to condemn their action as illegal and tortious. But when conspirators intentionally injure the plaintiff and use unlawful means to do so, it is no defence for them to show that their primary purpose was to further or protect their own interests; it is sufficient to make their action tortious that the means used were unlawful.”
“the plaintiff’s right is that he should not be damnified by a conspiracy to injure him, and it is in the fact of the conspiracy that the unlawfulness resides.”
“a conspiracy is tortious if an intention of the conspirators was to harm the claimant by using unlawful means to persuade him to act to his own detriment, even if those means were not in themselves tortious.”
“… the Mareva jurisdiction has developed as one exercised by court order enforceable only by the court’s power to punish those who break its orders. The documentation issued by the court does not hint at the existence of any other remedy. This regime makes perfect sense on the assumption that the only duty owed by a notified party is to the court.”
“There is, in my opinion, a compelling analogy with the general principle that, for the reasons which I discussed in Stovin v Wise[1996] AC 923 , 943-944, the law of negligence does not impose liability for mere omissions. It is true that the complaint is that the bank did something: it paid away the money. But the payment is alleged to be the breach of the duty and not the conduct which generated the duty. The duty was generated ab extra, by service of the order. The question of whether the order can have generated a duty of care is comparable with the question of whether a statutory duty can generate a common law duty of care. The answer is that it cannot: see Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council[2004] 1 WLR 1057 . The statute either creates a statutory duty or it does not. (That is not to say, as I have already mentioned, that conduct undertaken pursuant to a statutory duty cannot generate a duty of care in the same way as the same conduct undertaken voluntarily.) But you cannot derive a common law duty of care directly from a statutory duty. Likewise, as it seems to me, you cannot derive one from an order of court. The order carries its own remedies and its reach does not extend any further.”
“Punishment for contempt of court is the remedy which the law provides for the addressee’s failure to comply with an injunction such as a freezing order.”
“But contempt requires proof to a standard commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and the sanctions available to the court are not directed primarily at compensation, but at the imposition of a penalty. It is true that, with sensible ingenuity, a sanction can sometimes be tailored in such a way as to encourage the restoration of an asset which has been improperly released from a freezing order or perhaps even compensation: see eg the order made by Colman J in Z Bank v D1[1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 656 , 668. But a civil remedy for breach of a duty of care would be a much more satisfactory and complete protection than potential contempt proceedings for a claimant like the commissioners.”
“A person domiciled in a state bound by this Convention may, in another state bound by this Convention, be sued: … (3) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.”
“43. With regard to the place of the causal event, it must be pointed out at the outset that, in circumstances such as those in the present case, the buyers were supplied by various participants in the cartel within the scope of their contractual relations. However, the event giving rise to the alleged loss did not consist in a potential breach of contractual obligations, but in a restriction of the buyer’s freedom of contract as a result of that cartel in the sense that that restriction prevented the buyer from being supplied at a price determined by the rules of supply and demand. 44. In those circumstances, the place of a causal event of loss consisting in additional costs that a buyer had to pay because a cartel has distorted market prices can be identified, in the abstract, as the place of the conclusion of the cartel. Once concluded, the participants in a cartel ensure through action or forbearance that there is no competition and that prices are distorted. Where the place of a cartel’s conclusion is known, it would be consistent with the aims outlined in para 39 above for the courts of that place to have jurisdiction.”
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