“As a matter of principle, the court is perfectly entitled to dispense with the calling of oral evidence under CPR Parts 32.2(2)(b) and 32.5(1)(b) where witness statements have been served. The court does not have to follow a pointless procedure in an undefended claim. If it were otherwise, undefended cases up and down the country would be delayed and subjected to inappropriate scrutiny when there was no defence raised and no substantive argument about the claimants’ entitlement. In this case the claimants had to prove their case. They did so by presenting both their statement of case verified by a statement of truth, and also their witness statements. There was no need for the judge to require the witnesses to be called.”
“… if the Defendants choose not to participate in the trial, the Court is not in a position to conduct a cross-examination of the witnesses by reference to the contemporaneous documents, and its ability to test the evidence is heavily constrained. Unless the witness statement is internally inconsistent or manifestly incredible on its face, the Court can only consider whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to make out the claimant's case, on the basis of that evidence and the inferences which can properly be drawn from it.”
“the social considerations referred to is just the cultural mentality of a business man not wanting to be associated with his failed business. This would look badly on the families of the individuals involved and its very normal in our culture to distance ourselves from anything purportedly negative”
“Muhammad Abdullah al-Sari and Mr. Majid Abdulla al-Sari (third party in the memorandum of understanding) own multiple companies including the Appellant [Globe], the Second Party in the MOU and other companies”; and We would like to draw the kind attention of the court that Mr. Mohammed Abdulla Juma Al Saro and Mr. Majid Abdulla Al Sari (third party in the memorandum of understanding) own multiple companies including the Appellant, the Second Party in the MOU and other companies.”
“In none of these cases [i.e. Abouloff] was the question whether the judgment sued upon here was obtained by fraud, litigated in a separate and second action in the foreign jurisdiction. Unless Egan J.'s decision is itself impeached for fraud, it is conclusive of the matter thereby adjudicated upon, namely, whether Costello J.'s judgment was obtained by fraud.”
“The judge did not find it necessary to deal with the question of abuse of process. In my opinion the same result can equally well be reached by this route, which is untrammelled by the technicalities of estoppel… Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police[1982] AC 529 , 536 was a case where the court would not permit a collateral attack on the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. The principle has recently been applied in this court to analogous cases, where issues of fact have been litigated exhaustively in sample cases; it is an abuse of process for a litigant, who was not one of the sample cases, to re-litigate all the issues of fact on the same or substantially the same evidence: see Ashmore v. British Coal Corporation [1990] 2 Q.B. 338. The question is whether it would be in the interests of justice and public policy to allow the issue of fraud to be litigated again in this court, it having been tried and determined by Egan J. in Ireland. In my judgment it would not; indeed, I think it would be a travesty of justice. Not only would the plaintiffs be required to re-litigate matters which have twice been extensively investigated and decided in their favour in the natural forum, but it would run the risk of inconsistent verdicts being reached, not only as between the English and Irish courts, but as between the defendants themselves.”
“The litigants may file motions for reconsideration in respect of the final judgments and rulings rendered in the following instances: 1. If the adverse party has committed an act of fraud which affected the underlying judgment or ruling; 2. If the judgment or ruling has been based on documents which, after the same is rendered, are acknowledged or turned out to be forged, or based on a witness testimony, which, after the judgment or ruling is rendering, turned out to be a perjury; 3. If, after the judgment or ruling is rendered, the moving party obtains instrumental documents which have been withheld by the adverse party; 4. If the judgment or ruling awards legal remedy not claimed by the litigants or in excess of their claims; 5. If the operative part of the judgment or ruling is self-contradictory; 6. By a party who considers that the judgment or ruling rendered on the legal proceeding is adversely affecting its interests where such a party has neither intervened in, nor been impleaded into, the underlying legal proceeding, provided that such a party proves the fraud, collusion or gross negligence of the representative acting on his behalf; or 7. If the judgment or ruling is rendered against a natural or legal person who has not been duly represented in the legal proceeding.”
“In order for fraud to render admissible a petition for reconsideration as provided for in article 169(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, three requirements must be met: first, it must have been committed by the Respondent or his representative; second, the fraud must have impacted the Court’s decision such that it would have reached a different conclusion in the absence of the fraud; third, the fraud must have been hidden from the Petitioner until the judgment was issued. In alleging the fraud, it is not permissible to rely on facts previously presented and discussed before the Court. It is clear from an examination of the records of the appealed judgment that, as the case was being heard on the merits, the First Petitioner submitted a brief to the Court in which he showed that most of the seven companies have not held valid licenses for more than 20 years, are controlled by the First Respondent, and were merged into his companies. This means that the alleged fraud was not hidden from the Petitioner …”
“In order for fraud to render admissible a petition for reconsideration, it must be an act of deception in violation of proper morals that undermines the work of the court. It is established that the fraud must have been discovered after the issuance of the judgment and must have been established before the submission of the petition for reconsideration.”
“The litigants may file motions for reconsideration in respect of the final judgments and rulings rendered in the following instances: … 6. By a party who considers that the judgment or ruling rendered on the legal proceeding is adversely affecting its interests where such a party has neither intervened in, nor been impleaded into, the underlying legal proceeding, provided that such a party proves the fraud, collusion or gross negligence of the representative acting on his behalf.”
“The implication of this provision is that the petition for reconsideration constitutes an exceptional remedy against final judgments in the specific cases exhaustively enumerated in said Article, including where a judgment is binding upon a party who was not personally present in the proceedings—whether as an original party, intervenor, or third-party joined—but was deemed legally represented therein by the adjudicated party, and provided that the fraud, collusion, or gross negligence of such representative is proven. It also includes the case where a party was not properly represented in the case.”
“1. The petition shall be prosecuted to the court which issued the decision with a brief deposited in the court case management office according to the usual procedures of the action prosecution. 2. The brief should include the manifest of the sentence in which the petition was submitted, its date and the petition reasons or it shall be void. 3. The court to examine the petition may be consisted of the same judges who have issued the decision.”
“… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points on which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”
“… those companies were sold to …[the Bank], in enforcement of such judgements. The defense of the [BVI] companies did [not] refer to this, nor included [i.e. “joined”] in the casefor which a judgement was requested, by way of fraud and collusion, to cause harm to him”
“(1) the power of the court to grant declaratory relief is discretionary. (2) There must, in general, be a real and present dispute between the parties before the court as to the existence or extent of a legal right between them. However, the claimant does not need to have a present cause of action against the defendant. (3) Each party must, in general, be affected by the court's determination of the issues concerning the legal right in question. (4) The fact that the claimant is not a party to the relevant contract in respect of which a declaration is sought is not fatal to an application for a declaration, provided that it is directly affected by the issue. (5) The court will be prepared to give declaratory relief in respect of a "friendly action" or where there is an "academic question" if all parties so wish, even on "private law" issues. This may particularly be so if it is a "test case", or it may affect a significant number of other cases, and it is in the public interest to decide the issue concerned. (6) However, the court must be satisfied that all sides of the argument will be fully and properly put. It must therefore ensure that all those affected are either before it or will have their arguments put before the court. (7) In all cases, assuming that the other tests are satisfied, the court must ask: is this the most effective way of resolving the issues raised. In answering that question it must consider the other options of resolving this issue.”
“The English Courts have therefore clearly jurisdiction to restrain a person who is subject to the English jurisdiction from taking Proceedings in a foreign Court in breach of contract and in fraud. But Mr. Wilfrid Lewis took the point that while an injunction can be granted to restrain the institution or continuation of proceedings in a foreign Court there is no power, after the foreign Court has given judgment, to grant an injunction restraining the person who has obtained it from reaping its fruits. If there is no authority for this it is time that we made one, for I cannot conceive that if an English Court finds a British subject taking proceedings in breach of his contract in a foreign Court, supporting those proceedings, and obtaining a judgment, by fraudulent lies, it is powerless to interfere to restrain him from seeking to enforce that judgment. I am quite clear that such an injunction can be and in this case ought to be granted...”
“The principle on which an English court acts in granting injunctions is not that it seeks to assume jurisdiction over the foreign court, or that it arrogates to itself some superiority which entitles it to dictate to the foreign court, or that it seeks to criticize the foreign court or its procedure; the English court has regard to the personal attitude of the person who has obtained the foreign judgment. If the English court finds that a person subject to its jurisdiction has committed a breach of covenant, or has acted in breach of some fiduciary duty or has in any way violated the principles of equity and conscience, and that it would be inequitable on his part to seek to enforce a judgment obtained in breach of such obligations, it will restrain him, not by issuing an edict to the foreign court, but by saying that he is in conscience bound not to enforce that judgment.”
“The foreign proceedings here were instituted and prosecuted in clear breach of the contract, and the judgment was ultimately obtained by a deliberate and flagrant misrepresentation. The appellants in those circumstances are entitled to all protection which this court can extend to them.”
“36. Mr Marshall emphasised the exceptional nature of an anti-enforcement injunction as opposed to an anti-suit injunction. He said that the only example in the decided cases was the much stronger case of Ellerman Lines Ltd v Read … 37. The principle so laid down [in Ellerman] was restated in Masri v Consolidated Constructors International (UK) Ltd … para 94, per Lawrence Collins LJ albeit in the context of enjoining Yemeni proceedings inconsistent with an English judgment in proceedings in which the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction. 38 Mr Marshall was correct to say that Ellerman Lines Ltd v Read[1928] 2 KB 144 was a stronger case but only to the extent there that the English trial had already taken place so that there was a finding that the Turkish judgment had been procured by fraud. Here the trial has not yet taken place and the allegations of fraud are only allegations. But an interim injunction had been granted in Ellerman’s case to protect the position pending trial: see pp 146—147. So here it seems to me that an injunction against continuing existing enforcement proceedings or initiating new enforcement proceedings should be granted.”
“It is well settled that the injunction will be granted where the foreign litigant has violated the principles of equity and conscience making it inequitable on his part to seek to enforce the judgment obtained in breach of such principles [Ellerman]. In exercising the discretion the court must look at the respective interests of the appellants and the respondents and balance these interests having regard to considerations of comity.”