"4. . . . These recordings were the creation of two brothers, Leonard and Philip Chess. They emigrated from Poland to the USA and their early activities in Chicago in the 1940s centred on the running of clubs which featured the popular musicians of the day. They soon realised that there was also a growing demand by their clientele for recorded music and so they turned their hands to its production. Between about 1947 and 1975 they produced thousands of records by jazz, blues, rhythm and blues, and rock and roll musicians, many by well known artists: for example, Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry and Muddy Waters. The recordings became known as the Chess recordings."
"All in all MCA's title to the Chess recordings was less than perfect."
"The beneficial ownership of Holdings is a mystery"
"33. . . . Mr Young denies knowledge of who its shareholders are. His only contact with Holdings is via Mr Raymond-Claude Foex . . . whom Mr Young has known since the 1960s. Mr Foex . . . says he is prevented by Swiss law from disclosing the identity of the shareholders, although it is improbable that Swiss law would prevent the shareholders from consenting to the revelation of their identity. Mr Foex is now in his 80s. . . . He professes no expertise in the music business."
"34. . . . CRL's field of operation was the re-issue market: it acquired the right, by purchase or licence, to exploit pre-existing master sound recordings produced by others, mostly those created during the 1940s to the 1970s. It came to be regarded a successful independent company operating in this particular field. 35. The rights which Holdings acquired were sub-licensed to CRL. This was done via International, acting as Holdings' agent under an agency agreement evidenced by a letter dated27 November 1981 . . . . On1 January 1982 CRL entered into a five year agreement with International whereby CRL obtained a sub-licence in respect of certain recordings owned by Holdings. . . ."
"51. Despite the absence of the schedule A list, on1 July 1987 Red Dog granted a non-exclusive worldwide licence to Holdings in respect of the exploitation of the Chess masters. Its term was 11.5 years, and sub-licensing was to be permitted. No title list was attached to it, but the arrangement was that Mr Sehorn would send schedule A over when he had returned to New Orleans. Mr Young said that Holdings was the chosen licensee since worldwide rights were being offered: he said that, had only UK rights been offered, the licence would have been taken by CRL. The licence was signed on Holdings' behalf by Mr Young. He also signed on behalf of CRL, which itself joined in the licence as a guarantor of Holdings' obligations. Mr Young signed on behalf of Holdings under a letter of authority from Mr Foex dated17 June 1987 ; and on behalf of CRL pursuant to an authority given to him by Mr Visser, CRL's managing director."
"87. . . . Two days before the trial CRL, which had been defending the action, announced that it did not intend to be represented at the trial, nor was it. On 17 April [1996] it went into administrative receivership. The trial took place on18 April 1996 in the absence of representation from CRL. Jacob J held that the UK copyright in the Chess recordings vested in MCA on10 June 1986 (this was the date on which a licence to a company called Pye determined). He also held that the claim that any licence had been granted by Mr Robinson to Mr Sehorn by the 1976 licence was a false claim and that "
"I was involved in the planning of all [CRL] product releases which reproduced the Chess masters and I therefore know that all of their commercial product was manufactured from masters supplied by Marshall Sehorn/Red Dog. MCA's allegations that [CRL] simply copied MCA's commercial product are wrong."
"15. I derive from that and the earlier cases, therefore, that in order to make a director, other officer or employee of a company personally liable for the company's tort, it is necessary to show either that he was himself the person who committed, or participated in, the act constituting the tort, or that he directed or procured the tortious act to be done by others; and that inquiries into the matter will or may involve an "elusive question" turning on the particular facts of the case, and whose resolution may in turn involve the making of a policy decision as to the side of the line on which the case ought to fall."
"174. I have indicated in the course of my review of the evidence that I consider that there are strong grounds for suspicion that Mr Young is very much more closely interested in Holdings than he was prepared to admit. There are, in my view, grounds for an inference that he may be the, or at least a, beneficial owner of Holdings. Nevertheless, despite my suspicions about the matter, and despite the fact that (as I shall explain) I find that much of Mr Young's evidence was untruthful and misleading, I have concluded that there is insufficient evidence on which to justify a finding that he is in fact beneficially interested in Holdings, or that he does, or ever did, control it, whether on a de jure or on a de facto basis. I feel unable to find, therefore, that he had at any material time a decision making capacity on behalf of Holdings. With some hesitation, I conclude that I cannot find other than that it was Mr Foex who had that authority. 17 . . I find that the relevant decisions were made by Holdings acting by Mr Foex, not by Mr Young, and I am not satisfied that there is any basis for a conclusion that Mr Young either directed or procured the making of those decisions, or participated in their making in any material way. The decisions were simply not, as I find, within his power. In so far as MCA's case against Mr Young was based on the proposition that he authorised, directed or procured Holdings to do anything I find that it fails."
"176. Similarly, as regards International, and having heard from Mr Ranners, I have no hesitation in accepting that decisions on behalf of International were made exclusively by him, and that there is no basis for any conclusion that Mr Young authorised, directed or procured, or participated in any relevant way in, the doing by International of any of the activities material to this case. This applies to the International/CRL licences dated1 July 1988 and1 July 1991 . I should say that, despite his denials, I have no hesitation in finding that Mr Young negotiated both those licences on behalf of CRL."
"Business as Usual!" was his and CRL's publicly stated stance. The simple fact is that he fully supported CRL's Chess activities and intended that they should continue as long as possible. He had, I find, the authority to stop them but did not. He knew that they were continuing and played his own personal part in their direct promotion. It maybe that he gave no express direction, or passed any express resolution, to the effect that CRL should copy the Chess recordings and issue them to the public. But it is not necessary to prove the making of an express direction or procurement. In the Performing Right Society case, at[1924] 1 KB 1 , at 15, Atkin LJ said that: "
"83. On19 December 1992 CRL issued an advertisement in Music Week, a trade publication. It was headed "
"198 . . . I am inclined towards a lenient view of CRL's and Mr Young's conduct at least down to the Californian judgment dated11 September 1992 in the MCA/Sehorn action. I am prepared to accept that, until then, CRL and Mr Young bona fide regarded the Sehorn route of title as a good one, or at least as arguably good. It is easy to be wise after the event (or the judgment) as to the hopelessness of the 1976 licence as a root of title. 199. However, once the judgment had been given on11 September 1992 – one which, contrary to his evidence, I find that Mr Young did read – it should have been obvious to CRL and Mr Young that Mr Sehorn's title was a hopeless one and that CRL had no title to exploit the Chess recordings. Despite this, however, CRL continued to exploit them, and Mr Young was the prime mover in CRL's defiant and arrogant attitude that it would continue to do so. In my judgment, CRL's and Mr Young's conduct with regard to the exploitation of Chess recordings as from11 September 1992 was about as flagrant as it could be."
"The problem remains that those authorities give no clear guidance as to the circumstances in which a director or employee's involvement in the acts of the company should give rise to personal liability"
"But suppose that the true position is that Mr Young has been a director, actual or "shadow", of one or more of the defendant companies or has enjoyed a position of comparable influence enabling him to authorise, procure and direct their acts. It is still necessary . . . for the evidence to establish that he was personally involved, to a substantial extent, in the release of the product . His involvement in other aspects of the companies' activities would not, or would not necessarily, have involved him in the infringing acts complained of."
"In a case such as the present, where the infringement alleged includes (for example) the sale of the patented product made up into marketable form, and the importation of the product, a literal interpretation of the section might lead to the conclusion that only the person who has actually sold the product and imported it can be an infringer – apart, perhaps, from the exceptional case, contemplated by Sir George Jessel MR in Townsend v Haworth (1875) 48 LJ Ch 770 at 772 where the direct infringer is the "mere cat's-paw" of someone else. This is not however the way the law has developed. It has gone further than this, in two stages. The first stage concerned a general question in the law of tort, arising where two persons were acknowledged or found to have committed tortious acts which led to the same damage. The question was whether these persons had committed individual wrongs for which they were individually liable, or whether they had joined together in committing the same wrong. This was formerly of great importance, for there could only be one action in relation to one tort, so that judgment against one tortfeasor A would release any claim against the other tortfeasor B; and so also with any accord and satisfaction of the liability of A. The severity of this rule was mitigated by statute in 1935, but by then a jurisprudence had grown up concerning the distinction between joint and several tortfeasors. The most celebrated example of this is to found in the judgment of Scrutton LJ in The Koursk[1924] P 140 at 156 where three situations are identified where A might be jointly liable with B: i.e., where A was master and B servant; where A was principal and B agent; and where the two were concerned in a joint act done in pursuance of a common purpose. This list may not be exhaustive, but it forms the basis for all subsequent statements of the law. Thus far, the cases were concerned with the question whether A and B, acknowledged or found to be joint tortfeasors, were responsible individually or jointly for what had been done: The Koursk being a particularly acute case of such a dispute. In Brooke v Bool[1928] 2 KB 578 however a bold step was taken, by applying the gist of The Koursk to determine, not whether the two acknowledged tortfeasors A and B were responsible for the same tort, but whether in a case where B was undeniably liable, A could be held liable as well. In that case A and B had set out together to investigate the source of a gas leak which was B's direct concern alone. A had come with him to help. Because B was too old to carry out a particular task, A carried it out instead. The means of investigation were ill-chosen, and an explosion ensued. A was plainly liable. The Divisional Court held that B was liable too, as a joint tortfeasor engaged in a common venture with A. Brook v Bool has engendered curiously little in the way of subsequent reported authority, but no doubt has been cast in the intervening 60 years on the proposition that participation in a common venture may cause someone to become directly liable as a tortfeasor, together with the person who actually did the damage. The second line of authority concerns persons who are said to have jointly infringed a patent. Essentially this takes a situation where A is an infringer, and adds to it (via the authorities on joint tortfeasors) the possibility that B may also have infringed, not through any act which he himself has done, but by virtue of a common design with A. This also is a bold step, since it applies a common law doctrine to the interpretation of a statute. Nevertheless, in the light of C.B.S. Songs v Amstrad Consumer Electronics[1988] 2 WLR 1191 the principle is firmly established: for although it is true that the Amstrad case was concerned with theCopyright Act 1956 , the statements in the leading speech of Lord Templeman, to which I shall later return, are applicable equally to the patent legislation, and indeed most of the authorities cited in support were drawn from the field of patents."
"My Lords, joint infringers are two or more persons who act in concert with one another pursuant to a common design in the infringement. In the present case there was no common design. Amstrad sold a machine and the purchaser or the operator of the machine decided the purpose for which the machine should from time to time be used. The machine was capable of being used for lawful or unlawful purposes."
"The plaintiffs do not only assert infringement by the defendants. They also say that the defendants have procured, counselled and/or aided other persons to infringe. This may perhaps amount to an allegation of direct infringement by the defendants themselves, but I am inclined to think that it is a claim in respect of a distinct, suggested tort of procuring infringement by others (based upon the principle enunciated by Erle J in Lumley v Gye, 2 E & B 216, 231) . . ."
"My Lords, I accept that a defendant who procures a breach of copyright is liable jointly and severally with the infringer for the damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the infringement. The defendant is a joint infringer; he intends and procures and shares a common design that infringement shall take place. A defendant may procure an infringement by inducement, incitement or persuasion. But in the present case Amstrad do not procure infringement by offering for sale a machine which may be used for lawful or unlawful copying. . . . The purchaser will not make unlawful copies because he has been induced or incited or persuaded to do so by Amstrad. The purchaser will make unlawful copies because he chooses to do so."
"I have set out these cases in some detail in deference to the care with which they were analysed during the argument on this appeal. In truth, however, I believe that they do little more than illustrate how in various factual situations the courts have applied principles which are no longer in doubt, save perhaps as regards the relationships between indirect infringements by procuring and by participation in a common design. There may still be a question whether these are distinct ways of infringing, or different aspects of a single way. I prefer the former view, although of course a procurement may lead to a common design, and hence qualify under both heads. We need not however explore this question" . . . . . . . . . "
"It has . . . long been recognised that a director or other officer of a company may in certain circumstances be personally liable for the company's torts, although he will not be liable merely because he is an officer: he must be personally involved in the commission of the tort to an extent sufficient to render him liable. Whether he is sufficiently involved is a question of fact, requiring an examination of the particular role played by him in the commission of the tort."
"If the company was really trading independently on its own account, the fact that it was directed by Messrs Feldman and Partridge would not render them responsible for its tortious acts unless, indeed, they were acts expressly directed by them. If a company is formed for the express purpose of doing a wrongful act or if, when formed, those in control expressly direct that a wrongful thing be done, the individuals as well as the company are responsible for the consequences, but there is no evidence in the present case to establish liability under either of these heads."
"If the directors themselves directed or procured the commission of the act they would be liable in whatever sense they did so, whether expressly or impliedly."
"The mere fact that a person is a director of a limited liability company does not by itself render him liable for torts committed by the company during the period of his directorship." but went on, at page 324B: "
". . .is it the law of England that a director of a company who has authorised, directed and procured the commission by the company of a tort of the nature specified insection 1(2) of the Copyright Act 1956 can in no circumstances be personally liable to the injured party unless he directed or procured the acts of infringement in the knowledge that they were tortious, or recklessly, not caring whether they were tortious or not?"
"The Federal Court of Appeal of Canada in the Mentmore case [ Mentmore Manufacturing Co Ltd v National Merchandising Manufacturing Co Inc (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195] , eschewed any attempt to give a precise definition of the nature and extent of participation in the tortious act which will render a director who has directed or authorised it personally liable as a joint tortfeasor. As it rightly observed, this is an "elusive question", a "question of fact to be decided on the circumstances of each case."
" I believe it is clear that a director will not be liable unless his involvement would be such as to render him liable as a joint tortfeasor if the company had not existed. For example, the law distinguishes between facilitating and procuring a tort. A person who only facilitates a tort is not liable as a joint tortfeasor whereas a person who procures a tort is liable (see CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc[1988] RPC 567 and Belegging-en Exploitatiemaatschappij Lavender BV v Witten Industrial Diamonds Ltd[1979] FSR 59 )."
"In any event, the argument is unsustainable. A moment's reflection will show that, if the argument were to be accepted in the present case, it would expose directors, officers and employees of companies carrying on business as providers of services to a plethora of new tort claims. The fallacy in the argument is clear. In the present case liability of the company is dependent on a special relationship with the plaintiffs giving rise to an assumption of responsibility. Mr Mistlin was a stranger to that particular relationship. He cannot therefore be liable as a joint tortfeasor with the company. If he is to be held liable to the plaintiffs, it could only be on the basis of a special relationship between himself and the plaintiffs. There was none. I would therefore reject this alternative argument."
"A person who procures and induces another to commit a tort becomes a joint tortfeasor (see Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Limited[1989] RPC 583 and Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd[1992] RPC 583 ). There is no reason why a director of a company should be in any different position to a third party and therefore it is possible that a director can be capable of becoming a joint tortfeasor by procuring and inducing the company, for which he works, to carry out a tortious act. However there are good reasons to conclude that the carrying out of duties of a director would never be sufficient to make a director liable. That was the view of the Court of Appeal in C Evans v Spritebrand Ltd[1985] 1 WLR 317 ."
"In my judgment it would be unjust to allow the amendment to plead procurement and inducement by Mr Mehra. I cannot think of any evidence which would have been before the Judge that could have affected the decision that he arrived at and in that sense the amendment could be considered to be a mere technicality. However the amendment would in reality amount to an allegation that Mr Mehra had procured and induced a fraud. That allegation should, if it was to be relied on, have been pleaded at the outset and I do not believe it right to allow such an allegation to be introduced at this stage. That means that the finding of the Judge that Mr Mehra was liable upon that basis cannot stand."
"On the one hand, there is the principle that an incorporated company is separate and distinct in law from its shareholders, directors and officers, and it is in the interests of the commercial purposes served by the incorporated enterprise that they should as a general rule enjoy the benefit of limited liability afforded by incorporation. On the other hand, there is the principle that everyone should be answerable for his tortious acts."
"inquiries into the matter will or may involve an 'elusive question' turning on the particular facts of the case, and whose resolution may in turn involve the making of a policy decision as to the side of the line on which the case ought to fall."
"decisions as to strategy and policy – and the ultimate control of the company - were his and it was those decisions which ultimately carried the day . . . he was Holdings' man in ultimate charge of CRL"
"CRL's business was re-issuing old recordings, and the re-issue of the Chess recordings represented a valuable and important part of that business. That part of its business had been brought to CRL almost exclusively by the efforts of Mr Young and it is obvious that he intended CRL to exploit it to the full, and of course it is equally obvious that he knew that it was doing so. . . . CRL continued to exploit the Chess recordings because Mr Young said it was safe to do so, having first spoken to Mr Sehorn about the matter: "
"5. It soon became clear to me that notwithstanding my title, my authority in the company was limited. I had no real executive powers, as any material decisions regarding the company had to be authorised by Mr Young which inevitably slowed matters. . . . I soon learnt that Mr Young expected to be kept appraised of all company developments. . . . . . . 11. Although I was never told that I was working for Mr Young or that he was my boss, my belief was that as a consultant he represented the shareholders and those entities which ultimately controlled CRL and the associated Charly companies, thus his keen interest in the running of CRL and the authority which was clearly vested in him. . . . I thought of Mr Young as the interface between me and the structure above me comprising of entities whose identities I did not know but to whom I answered. I have no way of knowing when I sought Mr Young's comments on various matters, if he then referred those matters for decision to others, or whether he made the decisions alone."
"Mr Akhtar was called as a witness by MCA. His evidence attributed to Mr Young a rather wider role than did an affidavit he made on7 October 1996 in support of Mr Young's defence to the summary judgment application then being mounted against him. He there deposed that Mr Young had a "well defined role" within CRL, revolving around the negotiation and acquisition of copyrights. Considerable play was made in cross-examination about the change of emphasis in Mr Akhtar's evidence to me as compared with what he had said in the affidavit; but I found him to be a truthful witness and accept the essence of his evidence to me. The wider role he attributes to Mr Young is consistent with other evidence."
"I was involved in the planning of all [CRL] product releases which reproduced the Chess masters"
"The court may in an action for infringement of copyright having regard to all the circumstances, and in particular to- (a) the flagrancy of the infringement, and (b) any benefit accruing to the defendant by reason of the infringement, award such additional damages as the justice of the case may require."
Showing the 50 most senior of 56.