“Access to the Omya Land is obtained along a road which runs from the public highway, Salt Lane, to the East of Thameside Terminal and ending at the Quarry (“the Omya Access Road”). The Omya Access road is of sufficient width and quality to accommodate large vehicles, including lorries. The entrance to the road is clearly visible to any member of the public using Salt Lane.”
“It is denied, as stated in sub-paragraph 19 b, that a “corridor” had been cut through the Bank. The photograph at page 9 of Annex E to the Particulars of Claim shows the full length of the Bank and was, according to the time stamp on the photograph, taken at 13.26 on7 February 2017 . The photograph does not show any “corridor”, nor any indication of recent excavation of the Bank either in the position alleged or at all. The photograph does not show any lorries or other vehicles in the vicinity of the Bank, despite the Claimant’s assertion that works to the Bank were ongoing on the date the photograph was taken.”
“…following yesterday’s very helpful site inspection, which is helpful for all of us, I think, even those who have been before. The position of the defendants is as follows: we do not maintain that there must have been another access over the Omya land. We no longer maintain that. When we pleaded that we knew there was a road there, we didn’t realise it had been put in for remediation purposes, and so we can see that if that wasn’t put in until remediation took place, there wasn’t another access. So we withdraw that. “We accept that the most likely explanation is that the lorries must have come through Thameside Terminal, that the waste must have been delivered by lorries coming through Thameside Terminal and the most likely explanation is that somehow they were transferred from Thameside Terminal through or over the boundary bund, if you remember the boundary bund. We have no case, and it is for the claimant to suggest, how that happened, to establish how that happened, where that happened and when it happened, but we too cannot see any other way it could have been done.”
“Access to the Omya Land is obtained along a road which runs from the public highway, Salt Lane, to the East of Thameside Terminal and ending at the Quarry (“the Omya Access Road”). The Omya Access road now is of sufficient width and quality to accommodate large vehicles, including lorries, but it is admittedthat as at the date the tipping is alleged to have occurred, there was no vehicularaccess to the Quarry along this route. The entrance to the road is clearly visible to any member of the public using Salt Lane.”
“It is admitted that the most likely route by which the waste material was broughtinto the Quarry was through denied, as stated in sub-paragraph 19 b, that a “corridor” had been cut through the Bank. It is denied that the Defendantscreated or subsequently filled in any corridor. No admissions are made as to theprecise location of the “corridor”, its dimensions, nor the dates when it wascreated and in-filled. It is notedeither in the position alleged by the Claimant orat all.thatTthe photograph at page 9 of Annex E to the Particulars of Claim shows the full length of the Bank and was, according to the time stamp on the photograph, taken at 13.26 on7 February 2017 . The photograph does not show any “corridor”, nor any indication of recent excavation of the Bank. The photograph does not show any lorries or other vehicles in the vicinity of the Bank, despite the Claimant’s assertion that works to the Bank were ongoing on the date the photograph was taken.”
“There is a considerable amount of evidence relating to unlawful activities on the Thameside Terminal site before and after the trespass on Francis quarry was facilitated by access through the Thameside Terminal site. There is evidence of land use and development requiring planning permission and in respect of which no planning permission was granted and waste processing activity requiring permits issued by the Environment Agency and in respect of which no permits were granted.”
“It is submitted that the court may take account of D2’s conduct in managing the operation of Thameside Terminal over 20 years and it is clearly probative when answering the question of whether or not he is the kind of individual who would lend himself to this serious environmental offending. The court may need to consider whether D2 is the kind of individual who might be involved in the unlawful dumping of c20k tonnes of waste. It is submitted that previous actions demonstrate that D2 has no regard for planning and environmental regulation. Despite previous court proceedings he continues unashamedly to undertake large scale unlawful activity (waste processing) on the site ….”
“That the unidentified perpetrators concealed the waste and rebuilt the bund for altruistic purposes there being no other discernible motive for remaining at the scene once the dumping had ceased.”
“10. During December 2016 and January 2017, I observed lorries with the markings of the First Defendant reversing up to what looked like a ‘corridor’ cut in the earth bund separating the quarry from the Terminal site on the North boundary and tipping what I first thought was earth into Francis Quarry, as set out below. …. “12. I carried out these observations, having taken the routes shown by the blue lines on Photograph 1 in the area marked ‘191-192’ and ‘197-198’. During November to January, I saw that there were many lorries bearing the markings of Andrews Excavations Limited tipping what appeared to be earth on to the boundary bund. Some weeks later, I was then able to see the tipping into Francis Quarry. I also heard and then saw the bulldozer referred to by my acquaintance [this is a reference to the dogwalker] levelling the loads that were being tipped in Francis Quarry. Whilst I was there, I say that the lorries were tipping into the Quarry and there was a bulldozer continually working in Francis Quarry. “13. Because of the levels of the quarry and the surrounding land, it was only when I was standing on the highest points that I could see these operations ….”
“At Thameside Terminal (“TT”), which is adjacent to the Omya Land, we saw an excavator in a parked up position on the TT site at the far end of the site. There were 2 men sitting by a gate who looked as though they were having a snack. We drove up to them about 50 yards into TT. One said “where are you going?”
“The bund seems to be a recent introduction, and on my visit it seems the lorries full of top soil were headed in this direction, although at the time of the visit I was more focusing on the activities on the other side of the land. The trees had clearly been pushed over with the force of the earth being dumped on them and clearly tyre marks and visible on the area in question.”
“One of the dump trucks is being loaded while the other is starting to reverse to discard his load, he reverses over the road and I presume onto the bund already created.”
“D2 as Joint Tortfeasor “This issue is addressed above and was further dealt with in C’s detailed opening submissions at para 15 onwards. As such some of the contents are repetitious but are repeated with the intent of assisting the court. A relevant section of the opening is extracted below: “1. At 4-03 of Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 23rd Edition it states: ‘If the same evidence would support an action against each, they are joint tortfeasors. They will be jointly liable for a tort which they both commit or for the commission of which they are both responsible, but not where each is independently responsible for a separate tort and the two torts combine to produce the same damage.’ “2. It goes on at 4-04: ‘Thus, the agent who commits a tort on behalf of his principal and the principal himself are joint tortfeasors…a company director and the company itself may be regarded as joint tortfeasors where the director “is sufficiently bound up in [the company’s] acts” to make him personally liable. This will certainly occur where the wrongful acts complained of arise from a director’s participation in a manner that goes beyond the mere exercise of his power of control through the constitutional organs of the company.’ “3. The principles to be applied by the court in determining whether a company director ought to be liable as joint tortfeasor for the wrongs of their company were considered in the judgment of Pumfrey J in Koninklijke PhilipsElectronics NV v Princo Digital Disc GmbH[2003] EWHC 2588 (Pat) . In that judgment Pumfrey J referred to the judgment of Chadwick LJ in MCA Recordsv Charly Records[2001] EWCA Civ 1441 at paragraphs 48-53 which gave the following guidance (abridged for ease of reference): 48. It is because there is a balance to be struck on the facts of each case that it is dangerous for an appellate court to appear to attempt a formulation of the principles which may come to be regarded as prescriptive. But I think it can be said with some confidence that the following propositions are supported by the authorities to which I have referred. 49. First, a director will not be treated as liable with the company as a joint tortfeasor if he does no more than carry out his constitutional role in the governance of the company — that is to say, by voting at board meetings… 50. Second, there is no reason why a person who happens to be a director or controlling shareholder of a company should not be liable with the company as a joint tortfeasor if he is not exercising control through the constitutional organs of the company and the circumstances are such that he would be so liable if he were not a director or controlling shareholder. In other words, if, in relation to the wrongful acts which are the subject of complaint, the liability of the individual as a joint tortfeasor with the company arises from his participation or involvement in ways which go beyond the exercise of constitutional control, then there is no reason why the individual should escape liability because he could have procured those same acts through the exercise of constitutional control… “4. The third and fourth principles to which Chadwick LJ referred were specific to the context of a dispute related to intellectual property. However, it is submitted that the court may be assisted by extracting the core principle in any event: “1. At 4-03 of Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 23rd Edition it states: ‘If the same evidence would support an action against each, they are joint tortfeasors. They will be jointly liable for a tort which they both commit or for the commission of which they are both responsible, but not where each is independently responsible for a separate tort and the two torts combine to produce the same damage.’ “2. It goes on at 4-04: ‘Thus, the agent who commits a tort on behalf of his principal and the principal himself are joint tortfeasors…a company director and the company itself may be regarded as joint tortfeasors where the director “is sufficiently bound up in [the company’s] acts” to make him personally liable. This will certainly occur where the wrongful acts complained of arise from a director’s participation in a manner that goes beyond the mere exercise of his power of control through the constitutional organs of the company.’ “3. The principles to be applied by the court in determining whether a company director ought to be liable as joint tortfeasor for the wrongs of their company were considered in the judgment of Pumfrey J in Koninklijke PhilipsElectronics NV v Princo Digital Disc GmbH[2003] EWHC 2588 (Pat) . In that judgment Pumfrey J referred to the judgment of Chadwick LJ in MCA Recordsv Charly Records[2001] EWCA Civ 1441 at paragraphs 48-53 which gave the following guidance (abridged for ease of reference): 48. It is because there is a balance to be struck on the facts of each case that it is dangerous for an appellate court to appear to attempt a formulation of the principles which may come to be regarded as prescriptive. But I think it can be said with some confidence that the following propositions are supported by the authorities to which I have referred. 49. First, a director will not be treated as liable with the company as a joint tortfeasor if he does no more than carry out his constitutional role in the governance of the company — that is to say, by voting at board meetings… 50. Second, there is no reason why a person who happens to be a director or controlling shareholder of a company should not be liable with the company as a joint tortfeasor if he is not exercising control through the constitutional organs of the company and the circumstances are such that he would be so liable if he were not a director or controlling shareholder. In other words, if, in relation to the wrongful acts which are the subject of complaint, the liability of the individual as a joint tortfeasor with the company arises from his participation or involvement in ways which go beyond the exercise of constitutional control, then there is no reason why the individual should escape liability because he could have procured those same acts through the exercise of constitutional control… 51. Third, the question whether the individual is liable with the company as a joint tortfeasor — at least in the field of intellectual property — is to be determined under principles identified in CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc[1988] AC 1013 and Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Limited[1989] RPC 583 . In particular, liability as a joint tortfeasor may arise where, in the words of Lord Templeman in CBS Songs v Amstrad at page 1058E to which I have already referred, the individual “intends and procures and shares a common design that the infringement takes place”. 52. Fourth, whether or not there is a separate tort of procuring an infringement of a statutory right, actionable at common law, an individual who does “intend, procure and share a common design” that the infringement should take place may be liable as a joint tortfeasor… “5. In the present case, as set out at paragraph 39 of the Particulars of Claim, C says that D2 was bound up in the wrongdoing of D1 and is personally liable as a joint tortfeasor. C says that the dumping at Francis Quarry took place using vehicles owned and controlled by D1, across land where D1 operated under the instruction of D2. Thameside Terminal was owned by Thameside Estates Limited a company whose directors were D2’s wife and son (see paragraph 5 at [3/2]).”