“The site assessment exercise illustrates that there are a number of sites (detailed in section 2) that could potentially accommodate a new arena facility but all have complications in terms of scheme deliverability. A city centre site would be preferred in terms of suitability, contribution to city centre vitality and regeneration. Of the four city-centre sites identified, two (New Holbeck and Kidacre) stand out in terms of their ability to support a viable arena development. These are very similar and in close proximity to one another, with the Holbeck site more advanced in terms of redevelopment planning. There are a number of significant issues still to be addressed at Kidacre. None of the city centre sites are in public ownership and it would be difficult to satisfy the requirements necessary to pursue a compulsory purchase order. Accordingly, it will be essential to create a competitive situation in order to achieve value in negotiations with current landowners/developers. Given the present advantages of Holbeck over the other city centre locations, a suitable alternative must be found to create a competitive dynamic. The edge of town/out of town sites at Elland Road and Stourton North are in public ownership, which is a significant advantage in terms of deliverability. In evaluating the suitability of site options there is a balance to be struck between town planning and regeneration benefits versus scheme deliverability. It is considered vital that at least one of these sites, and particularly Elland Road, is included in the procurement competition with the land in public ownership brought forward and given optimum chance to provide the preferred scheme. This will ensure at least one deliverable option, levering a competitive response from the market both in terms of: • offering developers without an existing land ownership the opportunity to participate • providing a meaningful alternative option against which owners/developers of city centre sites will need to compete. A city centre site is considered the more desirable location and there are city centre sites that should be capable of delivering a scheme for the City. However, this is dependent upon third party participation. Elland Road should provide an acceptable solution and be more dependable in terms of delivery. This option needs to be included in the developer competition with the owner/developer responses then determining whether this or a city centre site will be favoured.”
“(a) That the findings and recommendations contained in the PMP consultants’ report on the proposed funding and procurement of a multi-purpose arena and associated facilities be supported. (b) That approval be given to the proposed delivery plan to be pursued by the City Council to select an operator and developer/funder for the development of a multi-purpose arena and associated facilities. (c) That the requirement for up to£20m as the public sector investment limit needed to facilitate the development of a multi-purpose arena in the City be acknowledged. (d) That authority be given for the ongoing appointment of PMP Consultants to project manage the implementation of the detailed delivery plan to select a preferred operator and developer/funder to develop a multi-purpose arena and associated facilities. … (f) That the project governance arrangements to be established to guide, manage and control the successful delivery of the next phase of the project to procure an operator and developer/funder for the development of a multi-purpose arena be noted.”
“2.11 The council has identified a series of sites that would potentially be able to accommodate an arena for the city of the scale proposed. The council will consider the relative merits of both city centre and edge of city sites, and their implications for the overall project in commercial and deliverability terMs … 2.12 The Elland Road site adjacent to Leeds United FC’s ground has been made available by the council for inclusion in the site selection process. Importantly this offers developers without an existing land ownership the opportunity to participate. Developers are actively encouraged to come forward with their proposals based on this site or other sites in the city if preferred. In evaluating options a value adjustment will be made to reflect the use of this site or otherwise. 2.13 A major master planning exercise has been undertaken for Elland Road, which considers the suitability of the site for redevelopment incorporating an arena. This information will be made available to interested parties through the data room/council e-tender website.”
“30. [Mr Smith] is ringing round various developers who attended the Open Day to establish whether they propose to participate in the developer competition. • will continue to contact those have been unable to speak to. 31. Conversation with Paul Caddick highlighted that Patrick Nally appeared to have some impact on developer concerns whether arena project is viable given LCC do not propose to take ownership and are simply forwarding a capital contribution. … 36. Key issues – Elland Road • [Mr Smith] reported that he had some concerns on the level of interest the Elland Road site will generate as a result of the reduced area.”
“28. ‘Plan B’ concept discussed. • LCC to keep this alive as an viable alternative proposal/option • PMP team will not do further work on Plan B at this stage, but will continue to bear it in mind • Relevant if have operator on board, but developer proposals are not matching LCC’s expectations.”
“6.0 Alternative Development Procurement Proposal 6.1 A Smith advised that the alternative development option presented to the Board could be used as both a fall back position should the present development procurement process not offer value for money and/or act as a public sector comparator during the procurement process. 6.2 The public sector comparator could take the form of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) wholly owned by the City Council. The Board were advised that the comparator option could be advised to potential bidders at any point during the procurement process if it were considered to be a serious alternative developer solution. 6.3 N Russell stressed that the report sought to set out the principles of an alternative approach, but that more work would be required when the position with the developer interest was clearer after the consultation meetings. 6.4 The Project Board agreed to review the position of an alternative developer procurement approach at a future meeting.”
“Bidder A in the overall score is ahead of Bidder B but they do have added risks in terms of delivering within the timetable they have recommended. This is particularly the case given the current state of the property market and the ‘credit crunch’. … For both bidders, the ability to achieve scheme viability will be challenging. Both are offering to further value engineer new schemes (whilst meeting Planning requirements) so that the expected gap funding needed can be within or close to the£20million limit set by the Council. However, at this time the level of gap funding indicated by the bidders is higher at£30million or more. … Control of the capital cost of the arena is essential. … With regard to developer enabling development, commercial and residential property development has seen a marked downturn in values during the period of this competition with significant risks to scheme viability … … In this context the recommendation is to allow both bidders to proceed to the ITCD stage in February 2008. However, given the concerns highlighted above, the Council should also pursue a pro-active approach to protecting alternative options for delivery which might be pursued if the emerging bids through this OJEU process were adjudged not to provide value for money. This might include contractor based solutions pursued jointly with the preferred operator or alternative. Further consideration of commercial opportunities and legal constraints in this respect should be investigated. A paper on this issue appears elsewhere on the agenda of the meeting of the Project Board.”
“The Project Team would recommend a parallel investigation of both the finance and development/construction Plan B alternatives alongside the continuing negotiation with the selected operators and developers. … We would expect to report back within four weeks with recommendations on how or indeed whether to fully incorporate an alternative approach to either the funding or construction of the arena procurement. In the interim it is important to ensure that both the operator and developer procurement processes are flexible enough to incorporate an alternative delivery method if required, therefore we would also recommend that: (i) The draft Operator Council Contract (provided to Operators at the Final Tender Stage) includes a clause stating that the operator would be willing to work with the Council to deliver an alternative solution if the developer competition proved unsuccessful. (ii) The Developer ITCD includes reference to the potential use of Prudential Borrowing, with further information to follow if appropriate.”
“7.1 The Project Board considered a report providing further information on an alternative procurement route for the construction of the arena, incorporating public sector funding (via prudential borrowing) and increased development risk. The Board noted that under such an approach, the role of the public sector would change from one of facilitating the development to one of potential developer/owner. 7.2 The Board were advised that if the alternative development procurement route was worthy of consideration, that the concept would need to be introduced to potential operators early in the Final Tender Stage, as the preferred operator would ultimately have more of a direct relationship with the public sector than presently envisaged. 7.3 The Board requested confirmation that the existing procurement process for both the operator and the developer would not be prejudiced by the introduction into the process of the alternative development route. 7.4 The Project Board agreed: (i) to note the content of the report and requested a further report to the next meeting, identifying the proposed approach and an evaluation of the risks to the public bodies of pursuing the alternative development procurement route. (ii) to introduce the concept to the shortlisted operators invited to the Final Tender Stage.” (i) to note the content of the report and requested a further report to the next meeting, identifying the proposed approach and an evaluation of the risks to the public bodies of pursuing the alternative development procurement route. (ii) to introduce the concept to the shortlisted operators invited to the Final Tender Stage.”
“5.0 Alternative Development Proposal 5.1 The Project Board considered a report from the project team on alternative financing and delivery models for the arena against the background of increased concern as to the state of the commercial property market; weaker developer responses than originally anticipated; alternative delivery models may provide better value for money and will provide a public sector comparator to maintain the competitive tension within the developer competition. 5.2 The main issues highlighted in the report may be summarised as follows: • Both developer bidders have expressed concern that the arena can be delivered within the£20m public sector gap funding available for the project. • The strong operator response (guaranteed rental streams, good covenants and additional revenue opportunities) create the opportunity to deliver the arena regardless of prevailing commercial market conditions. • The developers recognise that an alternative development approach can still create a deliverable solution. • In view of the credit crunch, the potential use of finance raise by the Council from prudential borrowing becomes more economically attractive. It could be used to replace commercial borrowing by the developer bidders or could be used to finance the Plan B alternative procurement approach. • In recognising the Council’s role in facilitating the arena development, procuring the gap funding and possibly providing debt finance, it would be appropriate for the Council to take ownership of the arena. • With regard to legal/procurement issues associated with the alternative development proposals, it was noted that further detailed analysis of the legal implications of the specific route would be required, as the Council may be able to challenge if it was to fund the arena development through prudential borrowing. • If the Council were to halt the developer competition and procure the arena itself, it would be protected from challenge by the general conditions in the procurement process which allows the Council to withdraw at any time. 5.3 The Project Board agreed to: (i) Continue the developer procurement process, whilst at the same time investigating the contractor delivery model both for Elland Road and/or city centre site. (ii) Introduce hybrid funding approach to the developer competition. (iii) Identify the risks (legal and procurement) of the Council pursuing either the hybrid funding or contractor delivery approach.” • Both developer bidders have expressed concern that the arena can be delivered within the£20m public sector gap funding available for the project. • The strong operator response (guaranteed rental streams, good covenants and additional revenue opportunities) create the opportunity to deliver the arena regardless of prevailing commercial market conditions. • The developers recognise that an alternative development approach can still create a deliverable solution. • In view of the credit crunch, the potential use of finance raise by the Council from prudential borrowing becomes more economically attractive. It could be used to replace commercial borrowing by the developer bidders or could be used to finance the Plan B alternative procurement approach. • In recognising the Council’s role in facilitating the arena development, procuring the gap funding and possibly providing debt finance, it would be appropriate for the Council to take ownership of the arena. • With regard to legal/procurement issues associated with the alternative development proposals, it was noted that further detailed analysis of the legal implications of the specific route would be required, as the Council may be able to challenge if it was to fund the arena development through prudential borrowing. • If the Council were to halt the developer competition and procure the arena itself, it would be protected from challenge by the general conditions in the procurement process which allows the Council to withdraw at any time. (i) Continue the developer procurement process, whilst at the same time investigating the contractor delivery model both for Elland Road and/or city centre site. (ii) Introduce hybrid funding approach to the developer competition. (iii) Identify the risks (legal and procurement) of the Council pursuing either the hybrid funding or contractor delivery approach.”
“Interaction with the developers We would advise SMG that the Council does not wish for it to meet with either developer bidder without the presence of either me or Nick Russell. We consider this essential to preserve the appearance of fairness in the competition, and to ensure that the relationship is effectively managed. … ‘Plan B’ As introduced to SMG at the ITCD stage of the operator competition, the Council is exploring alternative delivery methods should the developer competition not produce a deliverable arena project. Under this scheme, the Council would look to work with SMG to deliver a building of the specification set out in your Facilities Requirements document on Council-owned land. This could be cheaply financed and procured by the Council. Depending upon the site this may include a park and ride scheme. We will wish to advance discussions with SMG around this delivery method, in parallel with the ongoing preferred delivery method that will see a developer ‘married’ with SMG through the competitive procurement exercise. Your views and input, as the selected preferred operating partner for the city and given your extensive experience, will be valuable in these discussions. We ask however that at this stage, the Plan B approach is not discussed with any parties outside the project team.”
“NR [Mr Russell] advised that the programme is now to proceed on a two phase basis. The first phase will concentrate on scheme design, arena design, costs and commercials. The second phase will follow with legal documentation. The first stage will involve a formal written submission in early September 2008. It will be assessed on the basis of value for money and viability against proposals received and the PSC. The second stage will only progress if the Council considers that there is a viable developer proposition. Bidder enquired whether the PSC only included Elland Road? Bidder was advised that the PSC was based on more than one site. Bidder expressed concerns and felt that the recent introduction of an additional ‘city centre’ PSC comparison made the process flawed. NR confirmed that LCC did not start off with the intention of introducing one. Bidder expressed concern that it had always been discussed in meetings and presentations by the council that Elland Rd was being put forwards as a ‘fall-back’ position and that the Council’s preference was always for an Arena in the City Centre subject to affordability; hence that Elland Road was indeed the ‘PSC’. To introduce another City Centre site as a ‘PSC’ at this stage adds to the risk profile of the Bidder as there is a greater chance of not being selected. Had the bidder been informed of the Council’s intention to potentially deliver on other sites in addition to Elland Road at the start of the process, it may well have not entered the competition. Bidder was advised that under Procurement Rules the Council would expect to consider a PSC to assess value for money.”
“Revised ITCD Process and Next Steps The Council believes it will be in the interest of all parties to continue to focus on scheme viability and to redesign the ITCD process to this effect. The Council proposes a two stage approach whereby bidders will be invited to develop their scheme and commercial/ financial proposals in the first stage. Subject to Council approval, this will be followed by a second stage where the bidder will be required to agree legal documentation. The dialogue phase closes at the end of the second stage. This paper details the first stage requirements and requires Bidders to submit their best commercial offer. Bidders will need to work towards submitting the following terms: • Scheme Design and Arena Design • Arena Costs • Financial appraisals to support their base bid and their optional variant bid • Outline contract structure to deliver the arena and any associated scheme • Economic and Social Impact Information The Bidder’s submission will then be compared with the Council’s evolving public sector comparators in order to help assess value for money. On the basis of that evaluation the Council will then consider: • Continuation to full tender with bidders. • Closing down the existing competition with no contract awarded. The Council intends to report on the Bidders’ bid proposals and its own public sector comparators to Executive Board in November 2008. … Bidder Submission Requirements … Bidders are expected to submit their best commercial offer which must be supported by a robust arena scheme proposal, arena design and costings.”
“3.0 ITCD Developer Competition Commercial Submissions, Evaluation Report 3.1 A Smith summarised the key aspects of the developer ITCD Commercial submissions as follows:- (i) Background • Bidders had been requested to submit their best commercial offer for developing the arena. • Bidders were requested to submit the following information: – Scheme and Arena designs. – Arena costs (based on Q1 2008 prices). – Financial appraisals to support base and optional variant bid(s). – Outline contract structure. – Economic and social impact information. • Bidders were advised that their proposals would be compared with the Public Sector Comparators (PSC) in order to assess value for money and on the basis of the evaluation the Council would determine whether to continue the developer competition or to close down the existing competition with no contract awarded. (ii) Bidder A [MEL] … • The bidder’s mandatory financial offer identified gap funding requirement of circa£67m , which when normalised was estimated at£69m . When risk adjusted, gap funding requirement increased to£80.4m . • The bidder’s optional variant financial offer identified a gap funding requirement of around£35m , which when normalised was estimated at£42.7m . When risk adjusted, the gap funding requirement increased to£64.4m . … 3.2 The Project Board was advised that since the launch of the developer competition market conditions had significantly changed to such an extent that the developers’ mandatory bids did not represent value for money, whilst the optional variants had not demonstrated a sufficient appetite or ability for taking risks from the Council on a value for money basis. 3.3 The Project Board was informed that the option existed to either continue the developer competition with both bidders, or to close the competition without the award of a contract. It was also noted that it was not possible to continue the competition with only one developer bidder. 3.4 The Project Board agreed to recommend to the City Council’s Executive Board that the developer competition should be terminated without the award of a contract. 4.0 Leeds Arena Developer Competition, Public Sector Comparator 4.1 The Project Board was advised that feedback from the developer bidders during the ITCD phase of the developer procurement process had indicated that given the envisaged contribution from enabling development had virtually disappeared, that the developer proposals were likely to be at a level that would challenge the overall project viability. Accordingly, bidders had been requested to make an interim submission which should represent the best commercial bid. 4.2 It was noted that the developer submissions had been considered in relation to the Council’s Public Sector Comparators (PSC’s) namely, Elmwood Road and Elland Road, to enable the Council to determine whether the project developed via the developer competition would be both affordable and offer value for money to the Council.” … Clay Pit Lane/ Elmwood Road … 4.8 The level of gap funding (assuming a deal with TCS is concluded) has been estimated at£29.3m , which when risk adjusted increases to£42.1m . 4.9 The key risks identified relate to the acquisition of the Brunswick Building from LMU and concluding an agreement with Town Centre Securities to capture car parking income from the Merrion Street car park to support prudential borrowing to generate a capital contribution to fund the arena. 4.10 The Project Board advised that the Elmwood Road TSC Public Sector Comparator produces the smallest gap funding requirement of all the comparable options and, that the base, none-TCS PSC option at Elmwood Road and the PSC at Elland Road both also produce lower gap funding requirements than the normalised developer bids. The consultant team advised that the preferred option that has the potential to be affordable and provide the best value for money would be for the public sector to lead delivery of the arena at Elmwood Road based on acquiring the balance of the site from LMU, that TCS provides a secure£20m of capital (or a rental equivalent) and that appropriate arrangements are established to manage project development and project risk. … 4.12 The Project Board was informed that there was a risk that the Council could face a legal challenge from one or both of the unsuccessful developer bidders, if it were to choose to pursue the PSC route. The Board noted that whilst this risk could not be completely removed, the Council could bring to a close the developer competition at its own discretion. The competition documentation issued to bidders had referred to this option and all bidders had been consistently advised that all costs arising from their participation in the competition were incurred at their own risk. … 4.14 The Project Board agreed to recommend to the City Council’s Executive Board that: (i) Elmwood Road be identified as the preferred site for the arena development subject to concluding satisfactory legal agreements with Leeds Metropolitan University and Town Centre Securities. (ii) The Elland Road PSC option is identified as the reserve site for the arena development if Elmwood Road cannot be satisfactorily progressed or if it ceases to be the most economically viable or no longer offers the best value for money solution to the Council.” (i) Background • Bidders had been requested to submit their best commercial offer for developing the arena. • Bidders were requested to submit the following information: – Scheme and Arena designs. – Arena costs (based on Q1 2008 prices). – Financial appraisals to support base and optional variant bid(s). – Outline contract structure. – Economic and social impact information. • Bidders were advised that their proposals would be compared with the Public Sector Comparators (PSC) in order to assess value for money and on the basis of the evaluation the Council would determine whether to continue the developer competition or to close down the existing competition with no contract awarded. (ii) Bidder A [MEL] … • The bidder’s mandatory financial offer identified gap funding requirement of circa£67m , which when normalised was estimated at£69m . When risk adjusted, gap funding requirement increased to£80.4m . • The bidder’s optional variant financial offer identified a gap funding requirement of around£35m , which when normalised was estimated at£42.7m . When risk adjusted, the gap funding requirement increased to£64.4m . … … … … (i) Elmwood Road be identified as the preferred site for the arena development subject to concluding satisfactory legal agreements with Leeds Metropolitan University and Town Centre Securities. (ii) The Elland Road PSC option is identified as the reserve site for the arena development if Elmwood Road cannot be satisfactorily progressed or if it ceases to be the most economically viable or no longer offers the best value for money solution to the Council.”
“1.1 The City Council commenced a competition to procure a developer/site for the arena in July 2007, assuming the following sources of funding, to be secured through a competitive, two stream procurement process. • capitalised operator rental stream (via operator guaranteed rental) • enabling development (brought forward through the developer competition) • public sector gap funding of up to circa£20m (based on feasibility estimates). … 1.4. However, as the developer competition has progressed, market conditions have worsened, creating a difficult environment to secure the amount of enabling development value required to make any scheme viable at the£20m gap funding level. Notable changes in the economy and development market include:- • the ‘Credit Crunch’, considerable tightening of the availability of debt, increased debt costs, tightening of bank lending criteria and more conservative attitude to risk. • falling property values (notably residential apartments in the city centre) and general negative movement in commercial property yields (in part in response to the low availability of debt). • much greater scrutiny of covenant strength and focus on vacant possession values in the event of a tenant default. 1.5 This difficulty was recognised by developer bidders, Council Officers and the Council’s retained consultants as the process progressed, and a number of actions have been taken in an attempt to improve the viability of the developer competition, including: • introduction of alternative financing solutions through Council Prudential Borrowing supported by the guaranteed rental from SMG • introduction of a variant bid for developers, reducing their risk/exposure to enabling development values. 1.6 Against this background and during the ITCD stage of the developer competition, the Council introduced an additional stage in the procurement process, requesting bidders to submit their best commercial offer for developing the arena… 1.7 In parallel with the actions outlined in paragraph 1.5 above to improve the viability of the developers’ proposals and in accordance with the action reported to the Executive Board in May 2008, Council officers have sought to develop a number of alternative development options (Public Sector Comparators), in order to gauge whether the developer competition provided value for money to the Council. In making their interim submission, the bidders were clearly advised that their proposals would be compared with the Public Sector Comparators and, that on the basis of the evaluation the Council would determine whether to continue the developer competition (i.e. invite full tenders) or to close down the existing competition with no contract awarded. 1.8 As this process has progressed, it has become apparent that a scheme developed as a Public Sector Comparator may represent the most cost effective method of project delivery and the best value for money solution.”
“The proposed option that has the potential to be affordable, provide the best value for money and which would accord with both public and business aspirations i.e. Leeds Chamber Property Forum and Leeds Chamber of Commerce would be for the City Council to lead the delivery of the arena development at Clay Pitt Lane. Executive Board must, however, note that this proposed option has a number of contingent factors that need to be addressed: (i) That the City Council conclude an appropriate legal agreement with Town Centre Securities (which could include an agreement to lease the Woodhouse MSCP), in order to capture all Arena event car parking income in the vicinity of the Arena. Payments from Town Centre Securities to the Council will be used to support prudential borrowing to generate a contribution of£20m towards the arena project costs. (ii) The City Council secure the acquisition of the Brunswick Building from LMU. (iii) That an appropriate project delivery mechanism be developed, potentially using the Council’s existing framework agreement with the Strategic Design Alliance, with additional support particularly around design and cost challenge. ”
“First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, always be an honest belief in its truth.”
“In such cases the question is whether the representor can be shown to have become fraudulent by the time of the contract. For this to be established, the representee will have to show not only that the representor knew of the relevant change (he has discovered the change in the facts or he has discovered that he has already made a false statement) but also that his knowledge is sufficient to make him fraudulent: he must realise the significance of the change for the statement he has already made.”
“There is no way of combining an innocent principal and agent so as to produce dishonesty. You may add knowledge to knowledge, or … state of mind to state of mind. But you cannot add an innocent state of mind to an innocent state of mind and get as a result a dishonest state of mind.”
“It is once again the wording, that—Leeds did not want to build the Arena itself. That is true, we did not want to. So I suppose you could say ‘intention’, but I would say—my words would be: no, look, I have told you before, we don’t want to build it ourselves and we want a private developer to do so.”
“I have noted your concern that the master-planning process undertaken ‘queers the pitch’ for other developers/landowners to engage in the process. Whilst I acknowledge your viewpoint, I can assure you that Leeds City Council is commencing a transparent and competitive process for the development of an arena in Leeds. Elland Road, which is largely in Council ownership, is a site that one or more developers may choose as part of that process. Should this be the case, it is important that any proposals that come forward are developed within a master-planning context for the site, so that they can be appraised on a comparable basis. For this reason I feel that the master-planning option, which includes the potential for an arena, will add value to the procurement exercise. However, I can assure you that this is not a ‘fait accompli’ and the City Council is very keen to receive proposals from all potential developers/landowners to ensure that all sites can be appraised as part of the procurement process for the Arena which will be a clear and transparent process against pre-determined criteria which will be approved by Executive Board in the public domain.”
“I believe that Chris Coulson was probably present at the private meeting on the Open Day, based on my hand-written notes, where I have noted ‘CC’ in the ‘our meeting’ section”
“5. Having further considered the witness statements and other evidence, I now realise that Chris Coulson, who is listed as being present at the first meeting, may not have been present at the second meeting. I had mistakenly assumed that my reference to ‘CC/MF’ in my notes meant that Chris Coulson was present. 6. I do not think that I have ever met or seen Chris Coulson before the Arena Open Day and I would not then have recognised him. It is possible that I mistook somebody else present for Chris Coulson, hence the reference in my notes. It is also possible that my notes meant something else altogether, for example a reference to ‘city centre’ or ‘city council’. Another possibility is that this could also have been a reference to Chris Coulson and Martin Farrington being in charge of the Arena process, as I recall this was mentioned during the second meeting and that they were the two LCC people to contact.”
“[Elland Road] not preferred option, don’t want to bld themselves” then the words, “Would be clear and transparent and no, not using us(!)”
“Assurances LCC process fair and transparent”
“everyone believes we are keen to be involved and deliver that”; “Nervous we might not want to do it”
“82. Throughout her witness statement Ms Fletcher refers to ‘assurances’ that LCC did not wish to develop the Arena itself, or that LCC had no intention of building the Arena itself. The message that was given to Ms Fletcher and to MEL was consistent throughout and true, that is that LCC wanted a private sector developer partner to deliver the Arena as it did not want to develop the Arena itself, as it felt the private sector was better placed to manage the risks. These were not further or additional assurances – just re-stating what had already been said. I am certainly not aware that MEL was given an assurance that LCC would not build the Arena itself. 83. If the Developer Procurement was to be cancelled LCC would need to look at every option it had available and see if any meant that an Arena could still be achieved. LCC had throughout retained the right to cancel the Developer Procurement and if this occurred then anything might happen next.”
“When do you say it would have been untrue to say without qualification: the Council does not want to build the Arena itself?”
“I do not recall saying that I was nervous about the developer being advised by the May elections. At every Project Board in the period from January to May I would say: are there any issues out of this that we need to be concerned about? Because we enter a period, as we build up to local elections, where we need to be careful about the type of reports that we take forward. So that it is a general question I ask. It is for the chief officer or the project director to consider, and I think that Chris had misunderstood the question that I asked. I certainly do not recall being nervous about the developer being advised. My personal position throughout this has been we should tell the developer what we should be advised to tell them. If we should tell them everything, we should tell them everything. You discussed with Mr Farrington yesterday what the developer was told, and what the legal advice was, but I had no issues around if we needed to tell developers about what was going on, then we should. But at this point we had no propositions, and my comment was not about the developer being advised but it was about issues around any reports which were going to Executive Board at any time between January and May, were there any issues that we needed to be aware of which may be politically sensitive and may impact on local elections. It is a question that I would then be asked at the corporate leadership team, at the cabinet meetings, and therefore I needed to know that I had asked that question about this. As it happens, and a report did go into the process in April around the operator selection, and it also did have a piece around us investigating Plan B, my view was we just need to get on with that, and I know that was Mr Farrington’s view as well.”
“We are in the middle of a procurement process, there are two developers competing. I was anxious about having this conversation with her. The way she put it to me was that she wanted a word on a few matters, so she started off the conversation with Marketing Leeds and then moved on to the Arena. My recollection was that it was the usual assurance. I would certainly—I was very careful in terms of what I said. I certainly would not have been saying things like “You stand a good chance of winning, please stay in”
“During this meeting on 20 June [2008], Andrew Smith and Nick Russell were both very vague and gave cryptic responses when pressed on the issue of the so-called PSC and mention of another site. My notes show that Nick Russell said that the ‘PSC was based on “robust” figures including a “3rd site”’ and when asked whether the ‘third site’ now being referred to was the so-called PSC, his response was ‘logic would assume this to be the case’ or similar words to that effect. He also said the PSC ‘could be built’ and that MEL would be given further formal feedback following the developer presentations on14 July 2008 . We were concerned by this, but thought that Nick Russell was bluffing because they could not (but actually would not) identify a site. Andrew Smith added that there were ‘a number of sites/options for the PSC’ which seemed to contradict Nick Russell and only added to the confusion.”
“NR [Mr Russell] tabled a note on presentation proposals for14 July 2008 . It is intended to allow the bidders to present where they are on their emerging Arena scheme proposals, financial viability (gap requirement) and economic and social impact implications. It will be used to compare against the public sector comparator (PSC). The PSC is there to test that bidders are offering value for money and it is proposed that the bidder will be given feedback on their presentation and how they fared against the PSC.”
“DW [Mr Williams] brought up the point about the ‘third site’ as an alternative option to City One or Elland Road and asked whether there was a specific site in mind. NR/AS confirmed that the idea behind the conceptual third site was to give some form of benchmarking capacity to the Council in working out a viable benchmark/baseline position against which to rate the bidders’ submissions – the Project Team were aiming to make it ‘as realistic as possible’.”
“ ‘Public Sector Comparator’ ‘it can be built’ ‘stock check’ ”
“4. The Public Sector Comparator and the nature of our competition (Q28). MEL expressed concern about the nature of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC); it has always been known (from even before the initial Arena Bidders Open Day presentation) that Elland Road was being included in the process as a ‘fall back’. MEL has therefore been encouraged by the Core Team to interpret this as that Elland Rd is the PSC ‘to beat’ in terms of the competition. NR confirmed that PSC is not based upon Elland Rd but on a ‘number of sites’. BA enquired where these sites were located? NR would not confirm their location i.e. ‘hypothetical’ city centre location – ‘fully priced up’ scheme included risks. PMP/DTZ are working as hard on the PSC as we are on our bids. PMP expect this process to deliver the best value for money for the Council, but there is a point at which this might not be achieved due to the market; but PMP considering introducing an ‘optional variant’ bid. Bidder expressed concern that this apparent change to the PSC has changed the bidder’s risk profile i.e. thought that they were one of two locations; now it appears that we are one of three or more location[s] being considered.”
“So I think what you are drawing a distinction between is an out of town PSC and an in town or city centre PSC”
“PSC Comparator Bidder query Is this a benchmark of the Elland Road or hypothetical site? AS – it is a real scheme – Council has to test value for money. We will not tell you the site? Query is PSC some level of detail? Yes but not about the competition – test is value for money and balance risk.”
“Whilst the project board at its last meeting agreed that the alternative development procurement concept should be introduced on a confidential basis to the two shortlisted operators, did the Board also agree that it be introduced to the developers (in April). I recall Jean being nervous about the developer being advised of the concept before the May elections, with negative press then appearing. I am aware that we are considering two approaches with firstly the public sector acting as funder, thus allowing costs to be taken cost out of the developer proposals and secondly as contractor/developer, with the developer procurement process being halted altogether. The first of the approaches outlined above is probably acceptable but we need to be clear of the position as the developer meetings will commence in the near future. Any thoughts on the approach and the timing as to when such information should be made available?”
“I have considered this e-mail several times when preparing this witness statement and recall that what had made Ms Dent nervous was the lobbying that occurred by MEL through to the Leeds Chamber Property Forum and the lobbying of Councillor A Carter which was outside the procurement process and therefore inappropriate. I recall that the timing of the local Council election had no bearing whatsoever as to when the PSC was introduced to the developer bidders.”
“…You couldn’t have got it more right, Mr Coulson, could you, in that second paragraph? It is absolutely bang on, isn’t it?”
“MEL was informed on numerous occasions that LCC would not build it themselves because of the risk profile it presented to the Council”
“Note … Whilst the report is titled a ‘Public Sector Comparator’, the content of the report is not a traditional Public Sector Comparator as per HM Treasury definitions and guidance. The report does not seek to provide a technical PSC analysis, it provides a commercial analysis of an alternative procurement route, based around the City Council leading the process. As such, issues such as taxation implications and transaction structure require further detailed investigation if the Council is minded to follow this alternative approach.”
“Public Sector Comparator is a hypothetical risk-adjusted costing, by the public sector as a supplier, to an output specification produced as part of a PFI procurement exercise. It: - is expressed in net present value terms; - is based on the recent actual public sector method of providing that defined output (including any reasonably foreseeable efficiencies the public sector can make); and - takes full account of the risks which would be encountered by that style of procurement.”
“If the proposal required more than£20m gap funding, and although LCC had not agreed to provide further funding, any such funding would be limited to the maximum cost of LCC developing the Arena itself.”
“If the public sector were to consider investing more money, it wouldn’t simply be able to select the lowest gap funding figure provided by the competition, it would need to understand whether that was value for money, i.e. whether the public sector could deliver it at a lower cost. Therefore, effectively, the public sector comparator was a measure of the amount, maximum amount, that it would be reasonable for the public sector to invest in the project. That isn’t to say that it would have been able to.”
“319. … once the PSC has the potential to be [a] potential alternative bid worked up in parallel, it is a grossly and obviously improper exercise. LCC owes obligations to developers who have entered the competition on the premise that LCC has determined that the appropriate way of choosing a site and developer is through the competition it has initiated. If it decides, legitimately, that the developers do not offer value for money, then it is entitled to close the competition without a winner and consider afresh what alternative steps need to be taken to procure an arena. 320. What it is not entitled to do, during the course of the competition, is to explore alternative strategies for delivering the arena outside the competition with a view to undertaking some form of comparison between those strategies and the bids of the competitors. So to do would fundamentally breach the defined rules of the competition.”
“(1) LCC uses its own assets (e.g. Woodhouse Lane car park, LCC land at Clay Pit Lane); (2) It purchases land off-market without the market knowing (LMU land at Clay Pit Lane); (3) They do deals with third parties (e.g. LMU, Castle family); (4) They are in principle prepared to use their statutory powers to regulate on-street parking for the PSC, while disallowing all of the MEL on-street parking figures; (5) They put the cost of some items onto a different balance sheet so that they do not appear on the PSC calculations, e.g., the park and ride facility at Elland Road.”
“I don’t think I can contribute much on the queries from LCC, but with respect I do not agree with Mike Birdsall’s suggestions re the PSC evaluation – being done on the same basis as that for the developer competition. The possible PSC delivery route is entirely separate from the developer competition and there is no logic to scoring them the same – indeed there are dangers in doing so, in that the developer bidders can then argue more easily that the PSC was in fact a formal part of their appraisal (already a very significant risk) – which they should have had disclosed to them straightaway, which as I understand it, has not happened. They could argue that they have been unfairly prejudiced by the fact that LCC has used appraisal methods in relation to the developer competition which it has not disclosed to them and the whole procurement process could be challenged, exposing LCC to significant risk of damages claims, lost costs claims etc. The only reference point between the PSC and the developer competition as I understand it is the use (effectively outside of the developer competition) of the PSC to assess the value of the public sector investment in the arena overall through the developer competition. They should not be confused further.”
“In recent e-mails about the reports to the project board Mike Birdsall of YF suggested that the same criteria should be used to judge the PSC models (one for Elmwood Road and the other for Elland Road) as are being used to judge the two developer interim submissions. I have made it clear that this is not appropriate, since technically the PSC model does not form part of the formal evaluation of the developer bids – and has not been disclosed to them. The PSC does not form part of the developer competition and needs to be kept quite distinct from it.”
“Because I had a concern about that because of the Elland Road brief, where there was an arena and a casino designed into it with a hotel.”
“I have drafted the attached Addendum for the Developer ITCD. This deals with “Plan B (funding)” and hopefully helps clarify what we mean by this in terms of how the process would be taken forward. Clearly we need Cobbetts advice at to whether this presents any difficulties from a procurement perspective. [Mark – can you advise]. The ‘Plan B (Contractor)’ option would involve cancelling the present Developer Competition and starting a new OJEU procurement (or possibly several for work/services). From our perspective the key preparation required for this is to understand (work-up) alternatives that the Council might pursue so that it is possible to make a value for money judgment. We don’t need to communicate any of this to Developer Bidders at this stage but the public sector comparator could be a useful tool later. Assuming the attached is acceptable then I suggest we release this prior to the Developer Clarification meetings on 20th and 25th Feb so that we can explain it further to them when we meet.”
“… I have set out below my advice in connection with the proposal to potentially introduce monies obtained by LCC through the use of prudential borrowing and have covered off a number of other concerns within the body of this note.”
“Plan B – Funding essentially involves a prudential borrowing route by LCC, as discussed in outline in relation to Plan B – Contractor. However, the key difference for Plan B – Funding is that the monies obtained through prudential borrowing are planned to be used as a funding mechanism for a developer selected pursuant to the existing procurement process…”
“Proceedings under this regulation must not be brought unless— (a) the economic operator bringing the proceedings has informed the contracting authority or concessionaire, as the case may be, of the breach or apprehended breach of the duty owed to it in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) by that contracting authority or concessionaire and of its intention to bring proceedings under this regulation in respect of it; and (b) those proceedings are brought promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the bringing of the proceedings first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which proceedings may be brought.” (a) the economic operator bringing the proceedings has informed the contracting authority or concessionaire, as the case may be, of the breach or apprehended breach of the duty owed to it in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) by that contracting authority or concessionaire and of its intention to bring proceedings under this regulation in respect of it; and (b) those proceedings are brought promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the bringing of the proceedings first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which proceedings may be brought.”
“18-(20) The contracting authority shall open with the participants selected in accordance with regulations 23, 24, 25 and 26, a dialogue the aim of which shall be to identify and define the means best suited to satisfying its needs. (21) During the competitive dialogue procedure, a contracting authority— (a) may discuss all aspects of the contract with the participant selected; (b) shall ensure equality of treatment among all participants and in particular, shall not provide information in a discriminatory manner which may give some participants an advantage over others; and (c) shall not reveal to the other participants solutions proposed or any confidential information communicated by a participant without that participant’s agreement. (22) The contracting authority may provide for the competitive dialogue procedure to take place in successive stages in order to reduce the number of solutions to be discussed during the dialogue stage by applying the award criteria in the contract notice or in the descriptive document. (23) Where the contracting authority provides for the competitive dialogue procedure to take place in successive stages in accordance with paragraph (22), it shall ensure that the number of economic operators to be invited to participate at the final stage is sufficient to ensure genuine competition to the extent that there is a sufficient number of economic operators to do so. (24) The contracting authority may continue the competitive dialogue procedure until it can identify one or more solutions, if necessary after comparing them, capable of meeting its needs. (25) When the contracting authority declares that the dialogue is concluded, it shall— (a) inform each participant that the dialogue is concluded; (b) request each participant to submit a final tender containing all the elements required and necessary for the performance of the project on the basis of any solution presented and specified during the dialogue; and (c) specify in the invitation to submit a tender the final date for the receipt by it of tenders, the address to which they must be sent and the language or languages in which they must be drawn up.” (a) may discuss all aspects of the contract with the participant selected; (b) shall ensure equality of treatment among all participants and in particular, shall not provide information in a discriminatory manner which may give some participants an advantage over others; and (c) shall not reveal to the other participants solutions proposed or any confidential information communicated by a participant without that participant’s agreement. (a) inform each participant that the dialogue is concluded; (b) request each participant to submit a final tender containing all the elements required and necessary for the performance of the project on the basis of any solution presented and specified during the dialogue; and (c) specify in the invitation to submit a tender the final date for the receipt by it of tenders, the address to which they must be sent and the language or languages in which they must be drawn up.”
“In circumstances where the Council has failed to comply with its obligations of transparency, MEL considers that it has no choice but to set out its concerns in relation to the process on the basis of the limited information made available to date.”
“We now understand that, late in 2007, and in parallel with the procurement competition in which MEL was engaged, Leeds City Council began to consider and then to put into effect an alternative scheme for the development of the Arena, whereby Leeds City Council would acquire a site at Clay Pit Lane and itself develop the Arena on the site. MEL was not made aware of this proposed scheme, and indeed it is hard to reconcile the proposed scheme with the Council’s various assurances to MEL as described above. In mid-2008 Leeds City Council introduced a public sector comparator into the competition. It now appears that the public sector comparator was used to evaluate MEL’s proposals against a new absolute value for money or affordability criterion which was not communicated to bidders and (on the basis of the assurances given to MEL) appears to have formed no part of the competition up to that point. The Council has also indicated that the public sector comparator was ‘evolving’ in parallel with the evaluation of bids. It is apparent that Leeds City Council was considering the alternative scheme of a development on the Clay Pit Lane site when they introduced the new and evolving affordability criterion into the competition in which MEL was engaged. We infer from the sequence of events set out above that the introduction of the new criterion was related to, and resulted from, the Council’s consideration of this alternative scheme. The basis of the competition in which MEL was engaged was therefore altered in light of extraneous developments of which bidders were not made aware. … … In the present case, the dialogue was terminated in light of a new and evolving criterion of which bidders were not aware, and not because MEL’s proposals could not meet Leeds City Council’s needs and requirements.”
“… the assessment of value for money appears to have ignored obvious differences between the commercial proposals made by MEL in response to LCC’s stated needs (in particular in accepting development risk) and the basis of the PSC (under which the Council would lead the development). Moreover the contents of the stated criteria remain wholly unclear. Therefore, quite apart from the fact that the criteria said to have been used were not communicated to bidders, the minutes therefore give no comfort that the decision to terminate was made on the basis of a fair or meaningful assessment of affordability or value for money. It is also highly significant that one of the two PSCs used was a Clay Pit Lane development, which was stated (as part of LCC’s reasons for terminating the process) to be the ‘preferred site’ for the development. We cannot reconcile the terms of the minutes with the point made in your letter, and previously made by LCC, that MEL was not in competition with Clay Pit Lane and that the decision to proceed with Clay Pit Lane was made only after the existing process had been terminated on affordability/value for money grounds. It increasingly appears to MEL that LCC had resolved to pursue a development at Clay Pit Lane significantly before that decision was communicated to MEL and before the competition was terminated and that at least the latter stages of the competition were conducted with a view to that outcome rather than on the basis of LCC’s stated criteria. MEL’s bid was not therefore given a fair and lawful consideration, whether under procurement law or under the terms of the implied contract between MEL and LCC.”
“You suggest that our analysis of the legal position is flawed and without merit. We disagree. However it is of course also the case that our ability to articulate any cause of action which MEL has against LCC is dependent on the information which LCC makes available to MEL. In circumstances where LCC has singularly failed to comply with its obligations of transparency, MEL reserves its right to modify and/or add to the claims which it may wish to bring forward in due course. However, so that there is no question of compliance with Regulation 47(7) of thePublic Contract Regulations 2006 , MEL apprehends a breach of the duty owed to MEL to comply with thePublic Contracts Regulations 2006 and with enforceable Community obligations in respect of the contract to develop the Arena as follows: … 3. LCC is subject to an obligation to act in a transparent way under Article 2 of the Public Contracts Directive and Regulation 4(3) of thePublic Contracts Regulations 2006 . The obligation of transparency is essentially intended to preclude any risk of favouritism or arbitrariness on the part of LCC and implies that all the conditions and detailed rules of the award procedure must be drawn up in a clear precise and unequivocal manner. The competitive dialogue procedure operated by MEL must comply at every stage with the principle of transparency. … 6. LCC infringed EC law on public contracts and in thePublic Contracts Regulations 2006 in the course of the competitive dialogue in particular in that LCC: 6.1.1 failed expressly to state the criteria or sub-criteria used to assess bids in the contract documents or tender notice; and/or 6.1.2 changed the criteria expressly stated in the contract documents or tender notice by the introduction of new criteria or sub-criteria which were not communicated to bidders; and/or 6.1.3 once those new criteria had been adopted, continued to further change those criteria, or its interpretation of those criteria, as the process of the assessment of bids was continuing; and/or 6.1.4 failed to specify the sub-criteria of affordability and/or value for money in an objective way that did not confer upon LCC an unrestricted freedom of choice and in a way that all reasonably well informed tenderers of normal diligence would interpret in the same way; and/or 6.1.5 dismissed MEL’s solution other than by the application of the award criteria in the contract notice or descriptive document.”
“The standard ought to be a knowledge of the facts which apparently clearly indicate, though they need not absolutely prove, an infringement.”
“28. Reference was made to the Council developing an Arena on another ‘third’ site in the event that it could not achieve value for money from developers at Elland Road or City One; please confirm how value for money would be achieved in this scenario outwith a competitive process and the location of this option?”
“Regulation 32(4) specifies a short limitation period. That is no doubt for the good policy reason that it is in the public interest that challenges to the tender process of a public service contract should be made promptly so as to cause as little disruption and delay as possible. It is not merely because the interests of all those who have participated in the tender process have to be taken into account. It is also because there is a wider public interest in ensuring that tenders which public authorities have invited for a public project should be processed as quickly as possible. A balance has to be struck between two competing interests: the need to allow challenges to be made to an unlawful tender process, and the need to ensure that any such challenges are made expeditiously. Regulation 32(4)(b) is the result of that balancing exercise. It may often be the case that a service provider is not aware of the intricacies of regulations such as the [1993] Regulations, and has little or no understanding of how they should be interpreted. If ignorance of such matters were routinely to be regarded as a good reason for extending the time for starting proceedings, the clear intent to regulations 32(4)(b), that proceedings should normally be started promptly and in any event not later than three months after the right of action first arose, would be frustrated.”
“We need to look into the legality of the council mentioning delivering something elsewhere if the sites in the running cannot provide VFM. Were we not told ‘Elland Road’ is the fall-back position? How many have they got? Would we have gone to all this trouble and expense had we known about this at the start of the process?”
“…in order to ensure respect for the principles of equal treatment and transparency, it is important that potential tenderers are aware of all the features to be taken into account by the contracting authority in identifying the economically most advantageous offer, and, if possible, their relative importance, when they prepare their tenders (see, to that effect,Case C-87/94 Commission v Belgium[1996] ECR I-2043 , paragraph 88, andCase C-470/99 Universale-Bau and others[2002] ECR I-11617 , paragraph 98).”
“… the procedure for awarding a public contract must comply, at every stage, particularly that of selecting the candidates in a restricted procedure, both with the principle of equal treatment of the potential tenderers and the principle of transparency so as to afford all equality of opportunity in formulating the terms of their applications to take part and their tenders.”
“It seems to me that the language of ATI in particular is designed to secure, as it says, that the bidders know all the elements or sub-elements which could affect their preparation of the bid.”
“85. According to the applicant, the Council infringed the principle of transparency by entrusting the services in question to the OIB independently of the tendering procedure. 86. As regard the infringement of that principle, it should be noted that, according to the case-law on public contracts, the contracting institution must comply, at each stage of a tendering procedure, not only with the principle of the equal treatment of tenderers, but also with the principle of transparency (Case C-87/94 Commission v Belgium[1996] ECR I-2043 , paragraph 54, andCase T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services v Parliament[1998] ECR II-4239 , paragraph 85). 87. The principle of transparency implies an obligation upon the contracting authority to publish all precise information concerning the conduct of the entire procedure (see, to that effect, Embassy Limousines & Services v Parliament, paragraph 85). 88. In the circumstances, it is apparent that the applicant was not kept informed, before the letter of16 January 2006 , of the discussions that had begun between the Council and the OIB which concluded in the Council’s decision to entrust the management of the crèche to the OIB. According to the information set out in the letter of16 January 2006 , those discussions commenced in the second half of 2005 when the OIB submitted its proposal. 89. However, according to case-law, the objectives of publicity with which the contracting authority must comply under the obligation of transparency are, first, to ensure that all tenderers are afforded equality of opportunity (see, to that effect, Commission v Belgium, paragraphs 54 and 55) and, secondly, to protect the legitimate expectations of the tenderers, who have been encouraged to make irreversible investments in advance (see, to that effect, Embassy Limousines & Services v Parliament, paragraphs 85 and 86). 90. In the present case, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that either of those objectives was compromised. First, since all the tenderers met with the same lack of publicity with regard to the correspondence between the Council and the OIB, it could not have rendered the chances of the applicant and of the other tenderers unequal. Secondly, the applicant has failed to demonstrate – and has not even claimed – that it was encouraged to make investments going beyond the risks inherent in participating in a tendering procedure. 91. Consequently, the applicant’s arguments alleging infringement of the principle of transparency must be rejected as unfounded.”
“91. I am accordingly satisfied that in the circumstances of this case both of the Teckal criteria are satisfied and that, since the local authorities are not to be regarded as contracting with an outside body, Community legislation which is designed to secure the free movement of services and the opening-up to undistorted competition has no application. So the Directive is not intended to apply where a borough such as Harrow intends to contract with LAML. 92. The 2006 Regulations give effect to the Directive in English law. In other words, they are the way in which English law secures the free movement of services and the opening-up to undistorted competition in relation to contracts which are to be placed by English local authorities. That being the purpose of the Regulations, they, too, cannot be meant to apply in circumstances where that purpose is not relevant because a contracting authority intends to contract with a body which is not properly to be regarded as an outside body. Although the Teckal criteria were formulated with particular reference to the predecessors of the Directive, they are simply a way of identifying situations where the authority can be regarded as obtaining the products or services which it requires in-house and, so, where there is no need to secure the free movement of services and the opening-up to undistorted competition. In my view, the criteria are an equally good indication of situations where, for that reason, the 2006 Regulations have no application. The insight of Advocate General Trstenjak in para 83 of her opinion in Coditel Brabant[2008] ECR I-8457 , 8482 is instructive. To hold that the Regulations did apply in these circumstances would involve saying that the legislature intended to attach weight to competition law objectives in an area where they have no legitimate application. This would, in turn, involve inappropriate interference with local authorities’ right to co-operate in discharging their public functions.”
“112. It follows that, in order for the condition concerning the existence of unlawful conduct to be fulfilled, the applicant must show not only that the Commission breached one of the rules of law relied on by the applicant, having regard to the circumstances of the decision not to take up the lease and consequently to terminate the pre-contract negotiations, but also that that breach constituted a manifest and serious disregard of the limits imposed on the Commission’s discretion.”
“81. According to the applicant, the fact that the Council evaluated the proposal submitted by the OIB independently of the tendering procedure constitutes infringement of the principle of equal treatment. 82. The general principle of equality is one of the fundamental principles of Community law. That principle requires comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is subjectively justified (Case C-304/01 Spain v Commission[2004] ECR I-7655 , paragraph 31). 83. Given that, as was established in the examination of the fourth plea, the OIB is a department of the Community institutions, its situation cannot in any way be compared to that of the participants in a tendering procedure. Accordingly, the fact that the Council evaluated the proposal submitted by OIB independently of the tendering procedure cannot constitute infringement of the principle of equal treatment. 84. The applicant’s arguments alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment must therefore be rejected as unfounded.”
“As regards the existence of any manifest errors of assessment, it must be borne in mind that an institution using the tendering procedure has broad discretion with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding to award a contract and that review by the Court must be limited to checking that the rules governing the procedure and statement of reasons are complied with, the facts are correct and there is no manifest error of assessment (see judgment of12 July 2007 inCase T-250/05 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 89, and the case-law cited). The applicant has not put forward any facts capable of establishing that the decision to abandon the tendering procedure was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. With regard to the decision to have recourse to the services of the OIB and, in particular, the supposed advantages to be gained from such a decision, while the Council is of course required to justify its choice to the political authority and internal auditors, it is not required to demonstrate to a participant in a tendering procedure the advantages of the decision to perform the services in question by its own means. Such a decision is a matter of policy and thus within the Council’s discretion. It follows that the Court is not required in these proceedings to examine whether the decision to have recourse to the services of the OIB is justified economically and at institutional level.”
“58. [The applicant] accepted that if he had succeeded in establishing that there was a service contract, this would add nothing to his case. It would then be unnecessary to imply any contract. Initially he suggested that even then the implied contract argument might entitle him to bring a claim for six years rather than within the much stricter three-month period permitted under the Directive. However, in reply he resiled from that position and conceded that it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Directive to imply any such contractual right. 59. That concession was, in my view, rightly made and is consistent with the decisions of two first-instance judges, Morgan J in Lion Apparel Systems Ltd v Firebuy Ltd[2007] EWHC 2179 (Ch) at [212] and Flaux J in J Varney and Sons Waste Management Ltd v Hertfordshire CC[2010] EWHC 1404 (QB) at [232]-[235] citing Monro v Revenue and Customs Commissioners[2008] EWCA Civ 306 .”