“In conclusion, it is the view of the Local Authority that [the child] would be impacted upon the loss of his father, as it would be expected any child with a positive relationship with their father would be. He has a close relationship with his father and it is clear that [the child] has already begun to be emotionally impacted upon by the fear of his father’s extradition. Also it has been identified that [XT] has issues with both her mental health and with alcohol misuse, [the appellant] provides a safeguarding factor for this. Should he be extradited [XT] will need ongoing support from the Family Safeguarding Service under a Child in Need Plan.”
“The important thing is that everyone … is alive to the need to obtain information necessary in order to have regard to the best interests of the children as a primary consideration and to take steps accordingly.”
“(a) The general principles in relation to Article 8” 5. The general principles in relation to the application of Article 8 in the context of extradition proceedings are set out in two decisions of the Supreme Court: Norris v Government of the United States of America (No.2)[2010] 2 AC 487 (“Norris”) and HH [2013] I AC 338. 6. In HH Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC, at para 8, summarised the effect of the decision in Norris; in sub-paras (3), (4) and (5), she made clear that the question raised under Article 8 was whether the interference with private and family life of the person whose extradition was sought was outweighed by the public interest in extradition. There was a constant and weighty public interest in extradition that those accused of crimes should be brought to trial; that those convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; that the UK should honour its international obligations and the UK should not become a safe haven. That public interest would always carry great weight, but the weight varied according to the nature and seriousness of the crime involved. This was again emphasised by Baroness Hale JSC at para 31, by Lord Judge CJ at para 111 (where he set out a number of passages to this effect from Norris) and at para 121, Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore JSC, at para 141; Lord Wilson JSC at paras 161-162 and 167. 7. It is clear from our consideration of these appeals that it is important that the judge in the extradition hearing bears in mind, when applying the principles set out in Norris and HH, a number of matters. 8. First, HH[2013] I AC 338 concerned three cases each of which involved the interests of children: see in particular the judgment of Baroness Hale JSC at paras 9-15, 24-25, 33-34, 44-48, 67-79, 82-86; Lord Mance JSC at paras 98-101; Lord Judge CJ, at paras 113-117, 123-132; Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore JSC at paras 144-146; Lord Wilson JSC at paras 153-156 and 170. The judgments must be read in that context. 9. Second the public interest in ensuring that extradition arrangements are honoured is very high. So too is the public interest in discouraging persons seeing the UK as a state willing to accept fugitives from justice. We would expect a judge to address these factors expressly in the reasoned judgment. 10. Third the decisions of the judicial authority of a Member State making a request should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. Part I of the 2003 Act gave effect to the European Framework Decision of13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between member states (Decision 2002/584/JHA); it replaced the system of requests for extradition by Governments (of which the judicial review before the court in respect of the Polish national is a surviving illustration). The arrangements under Part I of the 2003 Act operate between judicial authorities without any intervention of governments. In applying the principles to requests by judicial authorities within the European Union, it is essential therefore to bear in mind that the procedures under Part I (reflecting the Framework Decision) are based on principles of mutual confidence and respect between the judicial authorities of the member states of the European Union. As the UK has been subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union since1 December 2014 , it is important for the courts of England and Wales to have regard to the jurisprudence of that court on the Framework Decision and the importance of mutual confidence and respect. 11. Fourth, decisions on whether to prosecute an offender in England and Wales are on constitutional principles ordinarily matters for the independent decision of the prosecutor save in circumstances set out in authorities such as R v A (RJ)[2012] 2 Cr App R 8 ,[2012] EWCA Crim 434 ; challenges to those decisions are generally only permissible in the pre-trial criminal proceedings or the trial itself. The independence of prosecutorial decisions must be borne in mind when considering issues under Article 8. 12. Fifth, factors that mitigate the gravity of the offence or culpability will ordinarily be matters that the court in the requesting state will take into account; it is therefore important in an accusation warrant for the judge at the extradition hearing to bear that in mind. Although personal factors relating to family life will be factors to be brought into the balance under Article 8, the judge must also take into account that these will also form part of the matters considered by the court in the requesting state in the event of conviction. 13. Sixth in relation to conviction appeals: (i) The judge at the extradition hearing will seldom have the detailed knowledge of the proceedings or of the background or previous offending history of the offender which the sentencing judge had before him. (ii) Each member state is entitled to set its own sentencing regime and levels of sentence. Provided it is in accordance with the Convention, it is not for a UK judge to second guess that policy. The prevalence and significance of certain types of offending are matters for the requesting state and judiciary to decide; currency conversions may tell little of the real monetary value of items stolen or of sums defrauded. For example, if a state has a sentencing regime under which suspended sentences are passed on conditions such as regular reporting and such a regime results in such sentences being passed much more readily than the UK, then a court in the UK should respect the importance to courts in that state of seeking to enforce non-compliance with the terms of a suspended sentence. (iii) It will therefore rarely be appropriate for the court in the UK to consider whether the sentence was very significantly different from what a UK court would have imposed, let alone to approach extradition issues by substituting its own view of what the appropriate sentence should have been. As Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC said in HH [2013] I AC 338 at para 95 in relation to the appeal in the case of PH, a conviction warrants: ‘But I have concluded that it is not open to us, as the requested court, to question the decision of the requesting authorities to issue an arrest warrant at this stage. This is their case, not ours. Our duty is to give effect to the procedure which they have decided to invoke and the proper place for leniency to be exercised, if there are grounds for leniency, is Italy.’ Lord Judge CJ made clear at para 132, again when dealing with the position of children, that: ‘When resistance to extradition is advanced, as in effect it is in each of these appeals, on the basis of the article 8 entitlements of dependent children and the interests of society in their welfare, it should only be in very rare cases that extradition may properly be avoided if, given the same broadly similar facts, and after making proportionate allowance as we do for the interests of dependent children, the sentencing courts here would nevertheless be likely to impose an immediate custodial sentence: any other approach would be inconsistent with the principles of international comity. At the same time, we must exercise caution not to impose our views about the seriousness of the offence or offences under consideration or the level of sentences or the arrangements for prisoner release which we are informed are likely to operate in the country seeking extradition. It certainly does not follow that extradition should be refused just because the sentencing court in this country would not order an immediate custodial sentence: however it would become relevant to the decision if the interests of a child or children might tip the sentencing scale here so as to reduce what would otherwise be an immediate custodial sentence in favour of a non-custodial sentence (including a suspended sentence).’ ” (i) The judge at the extradition hearing will seldom have the detailed knowledge of the proceedings or of the background or previous offending history of the offender which the sentencing judge had before him. (ii) Each member state is entitled to set its own sentencing regime and levels of sentence. Provided it is in accordance with the Convention, it is not for a UK judge to second guess that policy. The prevalence and significance of certain types of offending are matters for the requesting state and judiciary to decide; currency conversions may tell little of the real monetary value of items stolen or of sums defrauded. For example, if a state has a sentencing regime under which suspended sentences are passed on conditions such as regular reporting and such a regime results in such sentences being passed much more readily than the UK, then a court in the UK should respect the importance to courts in that state of seeking to enforce non-compliance with the terms of a suspended sentence. (iii) It will therefore rarely be appropriate for the court in the UK to consider whether the sentence was very significantly different from what a UK court would have imposed, let alone to approach extradition issues by substituting its own view of what the appropriate sentence should have been. As Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC said in HH [2013] I AC 338 at para 95 in relation to the appeal in the case of PH, a conviction warrants: ‘But I have concluded that it is not open to us, as the requested court, to question the decision of the requesting authorities to issue an arrest warrant at this stage. This is their case, not ours. Our duty is to give effect to the procedure which they have decided to invoke and the proper place for leniency to be exercised, if there are grounds for leniency, is Italy.’ Lord Judge CJ made clear at para 132, again when dealing with the position of children, that: ‘When resistance to extradition is advanced, as in effect it is in each of these appeals, on the basis of the article 8 entitlements of dependent children and the interests of society in their welfare, it should only be in very rare cases that extradition may properly be avoided if, given the same broadly similar facts, and after making proportionate allowance as we do for the interests of dependent children, the sentencing courts here would nevertheless be likely to impose an immediate custodial sentence: any other approach would be inconsistent with the principles of international comity. At the same time, we must exercise caution not to impose our views about the seriousness of the offence or offences under consideration or the level of sentences or the arrangements for prisoner release which we are informed are likely to operate in the country seeking extradition. It certainly does not follow that extradition should be refused just because the sentencing court in this country would not order an immediate custodial sentence: however it would become relevant to the decision if the interests of a child or children might tip the sentencing scale here so as to reduce what would otherwise be an immediate custodial sentence in favour of a non-custodial sentence (including a suspended sentence).’ ”