“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”
“19. [The Divisional Court’s] essential error was that they sought to balance the principle of international cooperation in enforcing the criminal law, against the respect due to the private and family life of accused persons. Concluding that the former was the more potent interest, they held as a matter of law that the latter could prevail only on facts which were ‘striking or unusual’ or which reached a ‘high threshold’. Hence the question which they certified as being of general public importance: ‘Is the public interest in honouring extradition treaties such as to require, in any extradition case, that an appellant must show ‘striking and unusual facts’ or reach ‘a high threshold’ if his article 8 claim is to succeed?’ The effect is to create a strong presumption against the application of article 8 in extradition cases, and to require exceptional circumstances before any objection to extradition on article 8 grounds can succeed, a proposition which has been rejected by the House of Lords, following a substantial body of case law in the European Court of Human Rights. 20. The correct approach is to balance the public interest in the extradition of this particular accused against the damage which would be done to the private or family life of this particular accused and his family. The court must ask how much damage will really be done to the orderly functioning of the system of extradition, or the prevention of disorder or crime, by declining to extradite Mr. Norris in this case. And whether that damage is so great as to outweigh the devastating impact that extradition would have upon the rest of his and his wife’s life together. These questions must, moreover be answered with an eye to the fact that the test imposed by article 8(2) is not whether his extradition is on balance desirable, but whether it is necessary in a democratic society.”
“88 . . . It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that ‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the article, and in the Court’s view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that article. 91 In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country.”
“The right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in Article 6, holds a prominent place in a democratic society. The Court does not exclude that an issue might exceptionally be raised under Article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country. However, the facts of the present case do not disclose such a risk. ”
“…the interference with the applicant’s family life was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, given the seriousness of the crime, of which the applicant was suspected even before she contracted marriage in Austria.”
“46. The Court recalls that it is for the Contracting States to maintain public order, in particular by exercising their right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, to control the entry and residence of aliens. To that end they have the power to deport aliens convicted of criminal offences. However, their decisions in this field must, in so far as they may interfere with a right protected under paragraph 1 of Article 8, be necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see Dalia, cited above, p. 91, § 52, and Mehemi v. France, judgment of26 September 1997 , Reports 1997-VI, p. 1971, § 34). 47. Accordingly, the Court's task consists in ascertaining whether the refusal to renew the applicant's residence permit in the circumstances struck a fair balance between the relevant interests, namely the applicant's right to respect for his family life, on the one hand, and the prevention of disorder and crime, on the other. 48. The Court has only to a limited extent decided cases where the main obstacle to expulsion is the difficulties for the spouses to stay together and in particular for a spouse and/or children to live in the other's country of origin. It is therefore called upon to establish guiding principles in order to examine whether the measure was necessary in a democratic society. In assessing the relevant criteria in such a case, the Court will consider the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant; the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he is going to be expelled; the time elapsed since the offence was committed as well as the applicant's conduct in that period; the nationalities of the various persons concerned; the applicant's family situation, such as the length of the marriage; and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life; whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship; and whether there are children in the marriage, and if so, their age. Not least, the Court will also consider the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country of origin, though the mere fact that a person might face certain difficulties in accompanying her or his spouse cannot in itself exclude an expulsion.”
“–the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and -the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.”
“59. The Court considered itself called upon to establish ‘guiding principles’ in the Boultif case because it had ‘only a limited number of decided cases where the main obstacle to expulsion was that it would entail difficulties for the spouses to stay together and, in particular, for one of them and/or the children to live in the other’s country of origin’ . . . . It is to be noted, however, that the first three guiding principles do not, as such, relate to family life. This leads the Court to consider whether the ‘Boultif criteria’ are sufficiently comprehensive to render them suitable for application in all cases concerning the expulsion and/or exclusion of settled migrants following a criminal conviction. It observes in this context that not all such migrants, no matter how long they have been residing in the country from which they are to be expelled, necessarily enjoy ‘family life’ there within the meaning of article 8. However, as article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world (see Pretty v the United Kingdom, no.2346/02, [61], ECHR 2002-III) and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s society identity (see Mikulic v Croatia, No.53176/99, [53], ECHR 2002-1), it must be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitute part of the concept of ‘private life’ within the meaning of article 8. Regardless of the existence or otherwise of a ‘family life’, therefore, the court considers that the expulsion of a settled migrant constitutes interference with his or her right to respect Page 14 for private life. It will depend on the circumstances of the particular case whether it is appropriate for the Court to focus on the ‘family life’ rather than the ‘private life’ aspect. 60. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that all the above factors (see [57]-[59]) should be taken into account in all cases concerning settled migrants who are to be expelled and/or excluded following a criminal conviction.”
“139. The Court considers that the argument based on the balancing of the risk of harm if the person is sent back against the dangerousness he or she represents to the community if not sent back is misconceived. The concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘dangerousness’ in this context do not lend themselves to a balancing test because they are notions that can only be assessed independently of each other. Either the evidence adduced before the Court reveals that there is a substantial risk if the person is sent back or it does not. The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment that the person may be subject to on return. For that reason it would be incorrect to require a higher standard of proof, as submitted by the intervener, where the person is considered to represent a serious danger to the community, since assessment of the level of risk is independent of such a test. 140. With regard to the second branch of the United Kingdom Government's arguments, to the effect that where an applicant presents a threat to national security, stronger evidence must be adduced to prove that there is a risk of ill-treatment (see para 122, above), the Court observes that such an approach is not compatible with the absolute nature of the protection afforded by article 3 either. It amounts to asserting that, in the absence of evidence meeting a higher standard, protection of national security justifies accepting more readily a risk of illtreatment for the individual. The Court therefore sees no reason to modify the relevant standard of proof, as suggested by the third-party intervener, by requiring in cases like the present that it be proved that subjection to ill-treatment is ‘more likely than not’. On the contrary, it reaffirms that for a planned forcible expulsion to be in breach of the Convention it is necessary – and sufficient – for substantial grounds to have been shown for believing that there is a real risk that the person concerned will be subjected in the receiving country to treatment prohibited by article 3. . .”
“19. Where removal is proposed in pursuance of a lawful immigration policy, question (4) will almost always fall to be answered affirmatively. This is because the right of sovereign states, subject to treaty obligations, to regulate the entry and expulsion of aliens is recognised in the Strasbourg jurisprudence (see Ullah[2004] 2 AC 323 , 339, para 6) and implementation of a firm and orderly immigration policy is an important function of government in a modern democratic state. In the absence of bad faith, ulterior motive or deliberate abuse of power it is hard to imagine an adjudicator answering this question other than affirmatively. 20. The answering of question (5), where that question is reached, must always involve the striking of a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community which is inherent in the whole of the Convention. The severity and consequences of the interference will call for careful assessment at this stage.”
“The distinction is vital to the present case. In a domestic case, the state must always act in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. There is no threshold test related to the seriousness of the violation or the importance of the right involved. Foreign cases, on the other hand, represent an exception to the general rule that a state is only responsible for what goes on within its own territory or control. The Strasbourg court clearly regards them as exceptional. It has retained the flexibility to consider violations of articles other than articles 2 and 3 but it has not so far encountered another case which was sufficiently serious to justify imposing upon the contracting state the obligation to retain or make alternative provision for a person who would otherwise have no right to remain within its territory. For the same reason, the Strasbourg court has not yet explored the test for imposing this obligation in any detail. But there clearly is some additional threshold test indicating the enormity of the violation to which the person is likely to be exposed if returned.”
“If a person's proposed extradition for a serious offence will separate him from his family, article 8(1) is likely to be engaged on the ground that his family life will be interfered with. The question then will be whether the extradition is nevertheless justified pursuant to article 8(2). Assuming compliance with all the relevant requirements of domestic law the issue is likely to be one of proportionality: is the interference with family life proportionate to the legitimate aim of the proposed extradition? Now, there is a strong public interest in ‘honouring extradition treaties made with other states’ (the Ullah case[2004] 2 AC 323 , para 24). It rests in the value of international co-operation pursuant to formal agreed arrangements entered into between sovereign states for the promotion of the administration of criminal justice. Where a proposed extradition is properly constituted according to the domestic law of the sending state and the relevant bilateral treaty, and its execution is resisted on article 8 grounds, a wholly exceptional case would in my judgment have to be shown to justify a finding that the extradition would on the particular facts be disproportionate to its legitimate aim.”
“In an article 8 case where this question is reached, the ultimate question for the appellate immigration authority is whether the refusal of leave to enter or remain, in circumstances where the life of the family cannot reasonably be expected to be enjoyed elsewhere, taking full account of all considerations weighing in favour of the refusal, prejudices the family life of the applicant in a manner sufficiently serious to amount to a breach of the fundamental right protected by article 8. If the answer to this question is affirmative, the refusal is unlawful and the authority must so decide. It is not necessary that the appellate immigration authority, directing itself along the lines indicated in this opinion, need ask in addition whether the case meets a test of exceptionality. The suggestion that it should is based on an observation of Lord Bingham in Razgar, para 20. He was there expressing an expectation, shared with the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, that the number of claimants not covered by the rules and supplementary directions but entitled to succeed under article 8 would be a very small minority. That is still his expectation. But he was not purporting to lay down a legal test.”
“The effect of their Lordships' decision (and, if we may say so, the intended effect of this court's decision) in Huang has thus not been to introduce a new interpretation of article 8 but to clarify and reiterate a well understood one. While its practical effect is likely to be that removal is only exceptionally found to be disproportionate, it sets no formal test of exceptionality and raises no hurdles beyond those contained in the article itself.”
“The fact that in the great majority of cases the demands of immigration control are likely to make removal proportionate and so compatible with article 8 is a consequence, not a precondition, of the statutory exercise. No doubt in this sense successful article 8 claims will be the exception rather than the rule; but to treat exceptionality as the yardstick of success is to confuse effect with cause.”
“It is clear that great weight should be accorded to the legitimate aim of honouring extradition treaties made with other states. Thus, although it is wrong to apply an exceptionality test, in an extradition case there will have to be striking and unusual facts to lead to the conclusion that it is disproportionate to interfere with an extraditee’s article 8 rights.”
“What is said in Jaso about the need for ‘striking and unusual facts’ to lead to the conclusion that extradition would be disproportionate does not constitute a separate legal test but recognises the practical reality that article 8 will rarely provide a ground for refusing extradition”
“21 … the learning, here and in Strasbourg, shows that the public interest in giving effect to bilateral extradition arrangements possesses especially pressing force because of its potency (a) in the fight against increasingly globalised crime, (b) in the denial of safe havens for criminals, and (c) in the general benefits of concrete co-operation between States in an important common cause. The gravity of the particular extradition crime may affect the weight to be attached to these factors, but because they are of a strategic or overarching nature, the public interest in extradition will always be very substantial. Accordingly the claim of a prospective extraditee to resist his extradition on article 8 grounds must, if it is to succeed, possess still greater force. That is why there must be ‘striking and unusual facts’ (Jaso), and ‘in practice a high threshold has to be reached’ (Tajik). 22. That is how the balance between the public interest and the individual's right, inherent in the whole of the Convention, is to be struck where an article 8 claim is raised in an extradition case. Their Lordships in Huang disapproved the application of a test of ‘exceptionality’ as the means of striking the balance; though it is perhaps not without interest that the European Commission of Human Rights stated in Launder v United Kingdom (1997) 25 EHRR CD 67 that ‘[I]t is only in exceptional circumstances that the extradition of a person to face trial on charges of serious offences committed in the requesting State would be held to be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with the right to respect for family life.’ The formulations in Jaso and Tajik show that what was sought, incorrectly, to be gathered in a test of ‘exceptionality’ is correctly reflected in a recognition of the force of the public interest in giving effect to a properly founded extradition request: a recognition, that is to say, of the relevant article 8(2) considerations (which in my judgment find concrete form in the three public benefits I have set out at paragraph 21).”
“The Court recalls that article 8.2 permits interference with an individual’s right to respect for his private and family life in certain circumstances. The Court considers that the bringing of criminal proceedings and the imposition of a punishment following conviction fall within these exceptions since they are in accordance with the law and pursue . . . legitimate aims, namely, public safety, the prevention of disorder and crime and protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Court therefore concludes that the prosecution and imprisonment of the applicant does not raise any issues underarticle 8 of the Convention .”
“ …he exercised his judgment on a basis different from that which now pertains, namely that Mr Norris was to be extradited on the main price fixing count, and not merely the subsidiary counts.” (Para 110). Mr Sumption fastened on this passage and submitted in his written case that “the main stuffing of the case against”
“12. . . . Mr Norris instructed, through a 'task force' he set up for the purpose, all Morgan entities involved in the price fixing conspiracy to remove, conceal or destroy any documentary material, in particular Morgan's sales files in Europe, evidencing Morgan's involvement in the conspiracy. He also instructed the retention and concealment of certain documents to enable Morgan to continue monitoring the working of the conspiracy. 13. In about November 1999 Mr Norris met several of the coconspirators in England to discuss the United States authorities' investigation into their conspiratorial dealings and meetings, and to devise a false explanation, other than price fixing, to be put to the authorities for the meetings. As Ms McClain put it in her affidavit: 'Norris and his subordinates… discussed ways in which they could conceal the true purpose of the price fixing meetings when asked about them. They decided to falsely characterise their meetings with competitors as discussions of legitimate joint ventures rather than disclose the fact that they were price fixing meetings. Norris expressed his concern that the United States investigators would not believe Morgan's false explanation that the meetings were held to discuss joint ventures, in part because Morgan had no contemporaneous notes of the meetings to support its joint venture explanation. Norris then directed his subordinates to create false summaries of the price fixing meetings that they would use as a guide or script in answering any future questions about what had occurred at their meetings.' 14. To that end, a 'script' was prepared which Mr Norris approved, of false information as to the purpose of the meetings for use in the event of any of the Morgan staff or others involved in the conspiracy being questioned by the authorities or by the federal grand jury. Those provided with the script were rehearsed and questioned about their recollection of the material contained in it. Those who Mr Norris felt would not be able to withstand questioning, he distanced from Morgan by arranging for their retirement or for them to become consultants. In January 2001 false handwritten summaries of potentially incriminating meetings were provided to the United States' authorities' investigators, who made plain they regarded Morgan's accounts of the meetings as false. 15. At or about the same time, Morgan sought to persuade a German company alleged to be a party to the conspiracy, to support it in its false representations to the United States authorities so as, not only to exculpate Morgan, but also to cast blame on a French company, also alleged to be a party to the conspiracy – a solicitation in which Mr Norris took a prominent and personal role.”
“I have no doubt that the prolonged and more serious nature of Mrs Norris's current depression results from the prolonged extradition proceedings... To this extent, the continuing nature of these extradition proceedings has caused Mrs Norris 'hardship' in the sense of severe psychological suffering and mental deterioration. I have no doubt that this would be greatly worsened, were her husband to be extradited.”
“[O]nly the gravest effects of interference with family life will be capable of rendering extradition disproportionate to the public interest that it serves.”
“12. …. the appellate immigration authority must make its own judgment and that judgment will be strongly influenced by the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case. The authority will, of course, take note of factors which have, or have not, weighed with the Strasbourg court. It will, for example, recognise that it will rarely be proportionate to uphold an order for removal of a spouse if there is a close and genuine bond with the other spouse and that spouse cannot reasonably be expected to follow the removed spouse to the country of removal, or if the effect of the order is to sever a genuine and subsisting relationship between parent and child. But cases will not ordinarily raise such stark choices, and there is in general no alternative to making a careful and informed evaluation of the facts of the particular case. The search for a hard-edged or bright-line rule to be applied to the generality of cases is incompatible with the difficult evaluative exercise which article 8 requires.”
“The Commission considers that it is only in exceptional circumstances that the extradition of a person to face trial on charges of serious offences committed in the requesting state would be held to be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with the right to respect for family life. The Commission finds that in the present case no such circumstances have been shown to exist”
“Mindful of the importance of extradition arrangements between States in the fight against crime (and in particular crime with an international or cross-border dimension), the Court considers that it will only be in exceptional circumstances that an applicant’s private or family life in a Contracting State will outweigh the legitimate aim pursued by his or her extradition (see Launder v United Kingdom, no. 27279/95, Commission decision of8 December 1997 ).”
“54. The court does not accept that the grant of the right to the occupier to raise an issue under article 8 would have serious consequences for the functioning of the system or for the domestic law of landlord and tenant. As the minority of the House of Lords in Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council[2006] UKHL 10 ;[2006] 2 AC 465 observed …. , it would be only in very exceptional cases that an applicant would succeed in raising an arguable case which would require a court to examine the issue; in the great majority of cases, an order for possession could continue to be made in summary proceedings.”
“I do not accept, as the appellants argued, that the public authority must from the outset plead and prove that the possession order sought is justified. That would, in the overwhelming majority of cases, be burdensome and futile. It is enough for the public authority to assert its claim in accordance with domestic property law. If the occupier wishes to raise an article 8 defence to prevent or defer the making of a possession order it is for him to do so and the public authority must rebut the claim if, and to the extent that, it is called upon to do so. In the overwhelming majority of cases this will be in no way burdensome. In rare and exceptional cases it will not be futile.”
“… inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the foundations of extradition …”
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