Karel Grundza v District Court of Novy Jicin, Czech Republic [2025] EWHC 2942 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 2942 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-000336
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL UNDER THE EXTRADITION ACT 2003
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand London WC2A 2LLDate 11 November 2025
Before
HON SIR PETER LANE
Between
KAREL GRUNDZAAppellantDISTRICT COURT OF NOVY JICIN, CZECH REPUBLICRespondent
Mr Stefan Hyman (instructed by Hodge, Jones & Allen) for appellantMs Laura Herbert (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for respondentHearing Hearing date: 21 October 2025
HMTL VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVEDCrown Copyright ©This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 11 November 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives
[1]The appellant appeals against the judgment of District Judge Minhas who, on 29 January 2025, ordered the appellant’s extradition to the Czech Republic. The appellant’s extradition is sought in respect of a “conviction” warrant based on the criminal order of the District Court in Novy Jicin of 30 May 2017, in conjunction with the resolution of the District Court in Novy Jicin of 27 July 2021, in conjunction with the resolution of the Regional Court in Ostrava of 24 September 2021.[2]The arrest warrant details an offence of “rioting” contrary to section 358 (1,2) (a) the Czech Act No. 40/2009, the Criminal Code. The particulars are that on 11 February 2017 at night in Fulnek, Novy Jicin District, Czech Republic, the appellant attacked Zdenek Fiser in a pub. He did not cause him injury. While he was leaving the pub, he smashed the glass door panel. This caused damage in the amount of CZK 500. 6. Box E of the warrant also states: “The accused committed the said act despite the fact that he had previously been punished for a similar criminal activity by the District Court in Prevov which came into force on 15 October 2016”.[3]The length of the sentence is 280 days, all of which remains to be served. The District Judge’s judgment[4]The District Judge set out the appellant’s evidence at paragraph 11 of her judgment and his partner’s evidence at paragraph 12. The District Judge set out her findings (as follows):
“23. I make the following findings: a. I find the RP left the Czech Republic (CR) in the knowledge that he had an outstanding community sentence to serve. In addition, I find the RP knew the consequences of a failure to comply with the community sentence, namely that it would be converted to a sentence of imprisonment. b. I find the RP travelled to the UK in October 2020 alone. He joined his partner and children who had travelled over a month earlier. I accept his account that his mother and siblings resided in the UK. I find the RP had a private and family life in the UK since October 2020. c. On his own account, the RP had no status in the UK. He had not made an application. The RP’s PoE indicated his partner had settled status in the UK, as did his mother with whom he resided. d. I accepted the RP and his partner have three young children. The family live together as a unit with the RP’s mother. I accepted the RP’s account that he is actively involved in the children’s day-to-day care because he is not employed. e. I accepted the RP’s account that he assisted his mother with travelling to her medical appointments. In the absence of medical or documentary evidence to confirm the same, and given the RP was unable to explain in evidence the nature of his mother’s illness beyond an issue with her bones, I find the RP’s mother was not reliant or dependent upon him for her day-to-day care. On the RP’s account, I find the RP’s siblings who all live within a few miles distance could and would assist their mother in the RP’s absence. f. Similarly, in the absence of any medical evidence, despite two periods of hospitalisation in the UK, I find the RP’s partner’s stomach illness is not such that she is dependent or reliant upon the RP. On her account, she suffered with stomach pain/cramps since 2017. She received no treatment aside from painkillers as and when required. She was able to travel from the CR to the UK whilst pregnant, with two children, in September 2020. She managed the care of the children whilst the RP was in an immigration detention centre for a period of 4 months. g. The RP’s PoE recorded he suffered with depression. The RP produced no medical evidence to support his assertion. He indicated he was not prescribed any medication for his depression. I could understand the extant proceedings may cause stress, anxiety or low mood to the RP. In the absence of medical evidence, I did not accept he was formally diagnosed with depression. h. I find the RP to be a fugitive. If his account that he was assaulted by a police officer is correct, I do not accept the RP’s main or primary motivation in leaving the CR was to avoid the police officer. The RP failed to give a coherent explanation for why internal relocation within the CR was not feasible. He acknowledged in evidence the probation service had been in discussion about which town he would carry out his unpaid work so internal relocation to complete his sentence was an option available to him before the assault took place. The RP’s partner had relocated from another part of the CR to Fulnek, where the assault took place – there was no consideration of returning to the area that she had relocated from to evade the officer. i. The RP, on his account, feared a single police officer. He did not give evidence he was at risk from more than one local officer in the force. I simply do not find it credible the one incident he described was his primary motivation for leaving the CR. j. I find the RP was motivated by a desire to place himself beyond the reach of the JA. He had previously spent time in the UK and his mother was already in the UK when he left the CR. The RP and his partner had accommodation with his mother immediately available to them. The RP contacted the probation service after he had arrived in a safe place, the UK. His refusal to give the probation service or CR authorities his UK address was, in my view, telling of his intention to avoid the authorities in the CR. The RP’s mother and partner both have settled status, presumably having made an application for the same. The RP failed to make an application; I inferred because he wished to avoid alerting the JA as to his whereabouts in the UK. k. The JA have no evidence to gainsay the incident with the police officer did not occur, but as mentioned above, I reject the RP’s evidence he believed the threat was sufficiently grave or imminent he was required to flee the country. In doing so, I find the RP’s departure from the CR to the UK, in the full knowledge that a failure to comply with the community sentence would result in a sentence of imprisonment, entirely concurred with the informational deficit, locational dynamism and intended consequential elusiveness discussed by Fordham J in Makowska v Poland [2020] EWHC 2371 (Admin). The RP’s departure (locational dynamism) was compounded by his refusal to provide an address to the probation officer (informational deficit), even though he was in a safe place in the UK, and in my view, his failure to regularise his status in the UK was further evidence of his attempts to avoid detection by the Czech authorities…”
[5]The District Judge considered the authorities of Norris v Government of USA (No 2) [2010] UKSC 9, HH v Italy [2012] UKSC 25 and Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski & Others [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) and then proceeded to address Article 8, as follows: “34. Factors said to be in Favour of Granting Extradition(i) There is a strong and continuing important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition and ECHR obligations.(ii) There is a strong public interest in those accused of serious offences being dealt with by the legal processes of the JA.(iii) The decisions and processes of the JA should be afforded mutual confidence and respect, which included the sentencing regime.(iv) The length of sentence outstanding was not insignificant – 280 days.(v) The RP was a fugitive.(vi) The RP is not of good character in the UK or CR.[35]Factors said to be in Favour of Refusing Extradition(i) The RP’s private and family life in the UK since October 2020.(ii) The RP’s caring responsibilities for his wife and mother.(iii) The RP’s lack of status in the UK.(iv) The vintage of the offending.(v) The underlying offending was not serious.(vi) The RP’s depression/low mood.[6]The District Judge then undertook the balancing exercise inherent in Article 8, as follows: “36. I have firmly in mind the guidance which is given to these courts by the former Lord Chief Justice in Celinski in considering whether it is incompatible with the RP’s Article 8 rights to order his surrender. I have reminded myself that there is a very high public interest in ensuring that extradition arrangements are honoured. The request of the JA should be afforded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. The nature and seriousness of the offending and sentence to be served are manifestly serious. All these factors weighed heavily in favour of extradition. I have found the RP to be a fugitive, he required strong, counterbalancing factors against extradition.[37]The underlying offending was committed in 2017. The offence contained violence to both person and property, so cannot be described as minor or trivial. However, there were no injuries, and the damage was low value. The offending occurred almost 8 years ago. In my view, the vintage of the offending and less serious nature of the same, weighed in the balance against extradition. Against this, there was no delay of note by the JA. The domestic proceedings were concluded in a timely manner in the presence of the RP. The RP was required to carry out a community service. The RP notified his probation officer he had travelled to the UK, the AW was issued in 2022 and the RP located in 2024.[38]The RP’s private and family life in the UK was cemented on his fugitivity. Both the RP and his partner were aware he had not served his sentence in the CR. The RP’s partner travelled to the UK, without the RP, to stay with his mother. There was no indication that the accommodation or support from the RP’s mother would not be available if the RP was extradited. The RP’s partner had settled status and was seeking employment. There was no evidence that she could not access public funds if required. The RP was not financially providing for the family.[39]I accepted the RP was involved in the care of his children. The children are a primary consideration and I have no doubt they would miss their father. Fortunately, the RP’s partner could continue to care for the children in the RP’s absence, as she did when he was detained at the immigration centre and whilst he was in CR, and she travelled to the UK alone. There was no evidence any of the children have additional vulnerabilities that would make the impact of extradition exceptionally severe for them. The sadness they would feel if the RP was extradited could be mitigated by the presence of their mother, paternal grandmother, and aunts/cousins. The children would remain at the same school and accommodation. Aside from the absence of their father, there would be little else that changed for the children. The RP gave evidence his sisters lived nearby and assisted his mother. I find they would be available to offer some assistance to the RP’s partner and children, if required. The children went to the same school as the children of the RP’s sisters. The RP’s partner and children were Czech nationals, it was open to them to travel to the CR with the RP. The RP’s private and family life in the UK weighed against extradition.[40]The RP had no status in the UK. If extradited, he would not be able to return immediately to the UK after he served his sentence. I remind myself of Mr J Chamberlain at para 52 of Pink v Regional Court in Elblag, Poland [2021] EWHC 1238 (Admin). This would not be a consequence of extradition, but a result of the change in immigration rules since Brexit. The RP gave no evidence on this aspect. I presumed he would have to make an application in accordance with the immigration rules to join his family members upon his release. The RP gave no evidence that such an application would not be possible to allow him to rejoin his family. The RP’s lack of status carried little weight in the balancing exercise.[41]I accepted the RP assisted his partner and his mother with their respective health conditions but did not find that either party’s illness was of such gravity that they were dependent on the RP for their care. I placed little weight on the RP’s caring responsibilities towards his partner or mother in the balancing exercise.[42]Similarly, I placed little weight on the RP’s depression/low mood in the exercise. There was no medical evidence to support the same. The RP confirmed he was not in receipt of medication. The RP provided no evidence to rebut the presumption the JA would provide adequate medical care if the RP’s mental health declined. I am confident the JA can cater for the RP’s mental health conditions.[43]I have carefully considered the respective weight to be attributed to both sets of factors. I have carefully balanced both sets of factors together. I am satisfied that greater weight attached to the factors in favour of extradition. The factors against extradition carried weight but, in my judgment, less weight than the factors in favour of extradition.[44]I find it would not be a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 rights of the RP for extradition to be ordered. On balance, the individual or combined weight to be attributed to the factors militating against extradition; the less serious nature of the offending, the vintage of the offending, the RP’s private and family life in the UK, the impact on the RP’s children, partner or mother, the RP’s relationship with his son, the RP’s depression/low mood are not such that they outweighed the weighty public interest in favour of extradition given the RP’s fugitivity and the sentence to be served. On the evidence before me, the hardship or impact which would result from extradition does not go beyond that which is ordinarily present when extradition is ordered. I find the consequences of extradition are not so significant that they will have a disproportionate impact on the Article 8 rights of the RP or his family.[45]If I am wrong in the finding of fugitivity, I would still have found it would not be a disproportionate interference with the RP’s article 8 rights to order extradition. If not a fugitive, the RP was nonetheless fully aware that he was required to complete a community sentence and failure to do so, would result in a custodial sentence. The RP, in my view, did not live an open life in the UK. This is evidenced by his failure to regularise his status when his family members did so for themselves. The RP was under no illusion the sentence of imprisonment would follow. In those circumstances, in my view, the balance still fell in favour of extradition notwithstanding the vintage of the offending, the less serious nature of the offending or the RP’s family circumstances.” Convictions[7]The appellant’s international convictions certificate discloses convictions in 2014-2016, in addition to that of “rioting”, which is the subject of the arrest warrant. They include fraud, causing minor bodily injury, disturbing the peace and theft.[8]In this jurisdiction, the PNC record shows four convictions for theft, as well as failing to remain for a Class A drugs test and failing to surrender, all in 2016. The grounds of challenge[9]The grounds of challenge assert that the District Judge committed errors in her Article 8 assessment, such that her conclusion on that issue was “wrong”. It is said the District Judge made inconsistent findings regarding the seriousness or otherwise of the offending in respect of which extradition is sought. 10.She also underplayed the appellant’s responsibilities towards his children, minimising the effect of extradition by noting that the appellant’s partner had travelled alone to the United Kingdom with two children and whilst pregnant with the third, some time after the appellant had gone there; and that the appellant had been in immigration detention in the United Kingdom for several months; leading to the District Judge’s conclusion that extradition would not have the requisite impact on the children. The appellant contends that this amounted to a failure to make the welfare of the children a primary consideration, contrary to the judgment of Lady Hale in H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa and another [2012] UKSC 25.[11]The appellant further contends that the District Judge failed to accord proper weight to the unlikelihood of the appellant being able to satisfy the requirements of United Kingdom immigration law, when seeking to return to his family, following the conclusion of his sentence of imprisonment in the Czech Republic.[12]The District Judge is said to have failed to account, in the balancing exercise, of the time the appellant has spent on electronically monitored curfew in the United Kingdom: Brindusa v Law Court of Targoviste, Romania [2023] EWHC 3372 (Admin).[13]Finally, notwithstanding that the appellant is a fugitive for the purposes of the 2003 Act, the District Judge failed to take account of the fact that the National Crime Agency did not certify the arrest warrant for some two and a half years after it was issued by the respondent. The relevant overarching law on Article 8[14]For the appellant, Mr. Hyman relies upon section 27(3) of the 2003 Act, whereby the appeal may be allowed if the judge ought to have decided a question before her differently; and if she had done so, she would have been required to order the discharge of the person concerned. He relies on what was said by Lord Burnett CJ in Love v Government of the United States of America [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin); namely, that the “appellate court is entitled to stand back and say that a question ought to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong: crucial factors should have been weighed so significantly differently as to make the decision wrong” (paragraph 26).[15]Mr Hyman accepts that in Norris (No 2), the threshold for refusal of extradition under Article 8 is that the interference which it would cause to Article 8 rights must be “exceptionally serious” (paragraph 56). He also acknowledges that in the recent case of Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court of Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23, it has been reaffirmed that, even in cases where family (as opposed to private) life is relied on, “it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an article 8 ECHR ‘defence’ will have any prospect of success” (paragraph 43).[16]Mr Hyman, however, submits that neither Norris (No 2) nor Andrysiewicz concerned persons with dependent children. In contrast, H(H) concerned the impact of extradition on dependent children. Although she did not dissent from the principles in Norris (No 2) Lady Hale said the following:
“33.[…] The family rights of children are of a different order from those of adults, for several reasons. In the first place, as Neulinger and ZH (Tanzania) have explained, article 8 has to be interpreted in such a way that their best interests are a primary consideration, although not always the only primary consideration and not necessarily the paramount consideration. This gives them an importance which the family rights of other people (and in particular the extraditee) may not have. Secondly, children need a family life in a way that adults do not. They have to be fed, clothed, washed, supervised, taught and above all loved if they are to grow up to be the properly functioning members of society which we all need them to be. Their physical and educational needs may be met outside the family, although usually not as well as they are met within it, but their emotional needs can only be fully met within a functioning family. Depriving a child of her family life is altogether more serious than depriving an adult of his. Careful attention will therefore have to be paid to what will happen to the child if her sole or primary carer is extradited. Extradition is different from other forms of expulsion in that it is unlikely that the child will be able to accompany the extraditee. Thirdly, as the Coram Children's Legal Centre point out, although the child has a right to her family life and to all that goes with it, there is also a strong public interest in ensuring that children are properly brought up. This can of course cut both ways: sometimes a parent may do a child more harm than good and it is in the child's best interests to find an alternative home for her. But sometimes the parents' past criminality may say nothing at all about their capacity to bring up their children properly. Fourthly, therefore, as the effect upon the child's interests is always likely to be more severe than the effect upon an adult's, the court may have to consider whether there is any way in which the public interest in extradition can be met without doing such harm to the child”
. Discussion (1) Seriousness[17]The appellant submits that the District Judge made inconsistent findings regarding seriousness. In the balance sheet part of her judgment (paragraphs 34 and 35), she referred to “those accused of serious offences” being dealt with by the legal processes of the requesting authority; but on the other side of the scales, she said the “offending was not serious”.[18]I do not consider that there is any merit in this complaint. As the headings to paragraphs 34 and 35 make plain, the District Judge was setting out the factors respectively “said to be” in favour of granting and refusing extradition. They were not her findings. Those are to be found in the paragraphs which follow. I agree with Mr Hyman that the fourth sentence of paragraph 36 could be better expressed. The nub of the District Judge’s finding on seriousness is, however, contained in paragraph 37. There, the District Judge found that, since the offending involved violence to person and property, it could not be described as minor or trivial. But, amongst the factors that needed to be weighed in favour of the appellant was the “less serious nature” of the offending. I agree with Ms Herbert that, properly read, the District Judge was making an assessment that was not inconsistent. The not insignificant sentence, which needs to be seen in the light of the appellant’s previous convictions in the Czech Republic, meant that the offending bore a degree of seriousness; but it was not very high. That assessment seems to me to be right. It was certainly one that the judicial fact finder was entitled to reach on the evidence before her. (2) The appellant’s children[19]I turn to the complaint that the District Judge failed to have proper regard to the effect of extradition on the appellant’s three children. Mr Hyman points out that the best interests of the children do not feature in the balance sheet exercise in paragraph 35. Since neither he nor Ms Herbert appeared before the District Judge, we do not know how this aspect of the case was put to her. There is, however, a reference at paragraph 35(i) to the appellant’s family life, which must include the children. What is more important and, in my view, dispositive of this head of challenge, is that the District Judge said at the outset of her consideration of the children at paragraph 39, that they were “a primary consideration”. She then embarked on a detailed assessment of the position in which they would find themselves, in the event of the appellant’s extradition. I do not accept that the District Judge gave undue prominence, let alone relied solely upon, the fact that the mother had come on her own to the United Kingdom with the children, after a period alone with them in the Czech Republic, following the appellant’s decision to flee to this country. The same is true of the period during which the appellant was held in immigration detention. It is manifest from paragraph 39 that the District Judge regarded these as among a number of relevant factors, including the absence of any evidence the children have “additional vulnerabilities that would make the impact of extradition exceptionally severe for them.” The children also had additional support available, over and above their mother.[20]In conclusion, the District Judge’s findings regarding the impact of extradition on the children were open to her, as the primary fact finder. There is nothing in the judgment of Lady Hale in H(H) that suggests the District Judge’s findings were “wrong”, in the sense described in Love. The weight ascribed by the District Judge to the various Article 8 factors touching upon the position of the children has not been shown to be so significantly problematic as to lead this court to find that her evaluation was flawed. (3) Immigration position[21]The District Judge addressed the immigration position of the appellant at paragraph 40 of her judgment. At the hearing before me, Mr Hyman understandably did not press this aspect of the challenge with any vigour. Since the appellant is recorded by the District Judge as not having given any evidence on this matter, it is difficult to see how her decision in this regard can be said to be wrong: see Gurskis v Latvia [2022] EWHC 1305 (Admin), paragraph 22.[22]The appellant refers now to the Home Office’s Electronic Travel Authorisation Scheme. He contends that he is likely to be refused permission to enter the United Kingdom under this scheme and the related immigration rules, on the ground that his presence here would not be regarded as conducive to the public good because of his criminal record. There is a good degree of speculation inherent in this submission, which effectively involves second-guessing the view the Secretary of State is likely to take of the appellant, when the time comes to consider any application. More importantly, the submission ignores the fact that Part 9 of the immigration rules states that all decisions must be compatible with the ECHR. Thus, the Secretary of State will be unable to refuse the appellant entry if to do so would violate the Article 8 rights of the appellant’s children. Even if the submission now made had been put to the District Judge, it is therefore fanciful that she would have regarded it as carrying any significant weight. (4) Curfew[23]It does not appear that the curfew issue was put to the District Judge. Since her judgment, the appellant has been subject to the electronically monitored curfew restrictions for an additional nine months. I therefore accept that it is appropriate for this court to consider whether, had the District judge known that fact, it would have affected the balancing exercise.[24]I have no doubt that it would not. The curfew is from midnight to 5am. Given that(i) the appellant has three young children whom he helps to look after; and(ii) he has no employment, the restriction is inherently unlikely to have any significant effect upon his lifestyle and there is no evidence that it does. In all the circumstances, the District Judge could not reasonably have ascribed any significant weight to the curfew. Nor is this a borderline case, where the factors for and against extradition are finely balanced, making the attribution of even modest weight to the curfew potentially decisive. Mr Hyman argued to the contrary, based largely on the lack of seriousness in the offence itself. That, however, has to be seen in the light of the not insignificant period of imprisonment that awaits the appellant, which in turn appears to have been calibrated in the light of his criminal record in the Czech Republic. (5) Delay[25]The final matter is the period of about two and a half years that elapsed before the NCA certified the arrest warrant. Again, this was not put to the District Judge as a factor that might reduce the weight of the public interest in extraditing the appellant.[26]Reliance is now placed on the judgment of Chamberlain J in Pabian v Circuit Court in Warszawa, Poland [2024] EWHC 2431 (Admin). As can be seen from paragraph 53 of the judgment in that case, the delay between the issuing of the warrants by the requesting authority and the certification of the warrants by the NCA was more than four years. Chamberlain J regarded this delay as “undoubtedly substantial”. The evidence before him did not adequately explain the delay. The respondent “could have given evidence about when the warrants were registered on SIS and about whether any direct approach was made to the UK authorities.” If there had not been any such approach, Chamberlain J said there was “nothing to indicate why not, given that the Polish authorities had corresponded with the Appellant at an address in the UK and knew of the conviction at Snaresbrook ,” where he had been convicted of possession of class A drugs. The NCA could, equally, have given evidence from its own records to explain “what action (if any) it took between 2015 and 2020 or, if it took no such action, why not… Having given no adequate explanation, I must assume there is none; and that steps that could have been taken by … the NCA … were not taken”. Chamberlain J held that the appellant’s fugitive status was not a reason why any delay in issuing and/or certifying should not be taken into consideration as a factor weighing against extradition. In the event, however, having re-made the Article 8 decision, he dismissed the appeal, “despite the unexplained delay”: paragraphs 55 to 60.[27]At paragraph 51, Chamberlain J explained how delay on the part of the NCA may be relevant in the Article 8 exercise. It is “likely to be of particular importance in cases where extradition would disrupt family relationships which have started or significantly developed during the period of delay” or “where the requested person has built up a private life in this country during that period”. If the person concerned arrived as a fugitive, the “weight to be given to the interference is attenuated, but not extinguished.”[28]In the present case, the arrest warrant was issued on 29 March 2022 and certified by the NCA on 14 August 2024. The delay is significantly less than in Pabian. In the circumstances, it is unsurprising that counsel for the appellant does not appear to have put the delay in issue before the District Judge. In any event, any weight to be attributed to this delay is manifestly very limited. The appellant was found in terms by the District Judge not to have been living openly in the United Kingdom. I note that he is recorded as having employed aliases and a false date of birth. Whilst there came a time when the appellant came to the attention of the immigration authorities, there is nothing to suggest that the NCA would thereby have become aware of the appellant’s location. The case is therefore more akin to RT v Circuit Court in Tarnobrzej (Poland) [2017] EWHC 1978 (Admin). There, the Divisional Court held that, where someone has “had contact with various official bodies here… neither the foreign judicial authority nor the NCA can be expected to explore the byways and alleyways of British officialdom to discover whether someone is in this country.” (paragraph 62). I note that the appellant’s convictions in this jurisdiction date from 2016, some four years before he arrived in 2020. They would not, therefore, have been likely to shed light on where the appellant was in 2022.[29]There can also be no question of the appellant forming a false sense of security about his ability to remain in the United Kingdom with his family in the two and a half years between issuance and certification of the warrant. Whatever the position regarding extradition, the appellant’s immigration position was precarious, as evidenced by his detention and subsequent release on bail, under immigration powers.[30]As Chamberlain J held, the effect of a delay in certification can relate to the family or private life which the person concerned builds in the interim. In the present case, the District Judge specifically addressed the family life position as at the date of the hearing. The evidence before her did not show that the family life had undergone any material change between 2022 and 2024. Nor was my attention was drawn to any new evidence in this regard.[31]Finally, the fact remains that the appellant was found to be a fugitive. Whilst that does not eliminate the need for consideration to be given to long, unexplained delay, fugitivity can attenuate the weight to be given to any such delay. It would do so in this case, irrespective of what I have said above. Outcome[32]For the above reasons, the conditions in section 27(3) are not met and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.