“(3) For the purposes of this Schedule the amount payable on redemption of a security involves a deep gain if— (a) the issue price is less than the amount so payable; and (b) the amount by which it is less represents more than the relevant percentage of the amount so payable.” (a) the issue price is less than the amount so payable; and (b) the amount by which it is less represents more than the relevant percentage of the amount so payable.”
“[8] Whether the statute is concerned with a single step or a broader view of the acts of the parties depends upon the construction of the language in its context. Sometimes the conclusion that the statute is concerned with the character of a particular act is inescapable: see MacNiven (Inspector of Taxes)v Westmoreland Investments Limited[2001] UKHL 6 ,[2001] STC 237 , [2003]1 AC 311. But ever since WT Ramsay Ltd vIRC[1981] STC 174 ,[1982] AC 300 , the courts have tended to assume that revenue statutes in particular are concerned with the characterisation of the entirety of transactions which have a commercial unity rather than the individual steps into which some transactions may be divided. This approach does not deny the existence or legality of the individual steps but may deprive them of significance for the purposes of the characterisation required by the statute. This has been said so often that citation of authorities since Ramsay's case is unnecessary. ”
“39. The present case, like MacNiven, illustrates the need for a close analysis of what, on a purposive construction, the statute actually requires. The object of granting the allowance is, as we have said, to provide a tax equivalent to the normal accounting deduction from profits for the depreciation of machinery and plant used for the purposes of a trade. Consistently with this purpose, section 24(1) requires that a trader should have incurred capital expenditure on the provision of machinery or plant for the purposes of his trade. When the trade is finance leasing, this means that the capital expenditure should have been incurred to acquire the machinery or plant for the purpose of leasing it in the course of the trade. In such a case, it is the lessor as owner who suffers the depreciation in the value of the plant and is therefore entitled to an allowance against the profits of his trade. 40. These statutory requirements, as it seems to us, are in the case of a finance lease concerned entirely with the acts and purposes of the lessor. The Act says nothing about what the lessee should do with the purchase price, how he should find the money to pay the rent or how he should use the plant. As Carnwath LJ said in the Court of Appeal[2003] STC 66 , 89, para 54: "There is nothing in the statute to suggest that 'up-front finance' for the lessee is an essential feature of the right to allowances. The test is based on the purpose of the lessor's expenditure, not the benefit of the finance to the lessee." 41. So far as the lessor is concerned, all the requirements of section 24(1) were satisfied. Mr Boobyer, a director of BMBF, gave unchallenged evidence that from its point of view the purchase and leaseback was part of its ordinary trade of finance leasing. Indeed, if one examines the acts and purposes of BMBF, it would be very difficult to come to any other conclusion. The finding of the special commissioners that the transaction "had no commercial reality" depends entirely upon an examination of what happened to the purchase price after BMBF paid it to BGE. But these matters do not affect the reality of the expenditure by BMBF and its acquisition of the pipeline for the purposes of its finance leasing trade. 42. If the lessee chooses to make arrangements, even as a preordained part of the transaction for the sale and leaseback, which result in the bulk of the purchase price being irrevocably committed to paying the rent, that is no concern of the lessor. From his point of view, the transaction is exactly the same. No one disputes that BMBF had acquired ownership of the pipeline or that it generated income for BMBF in the course of its trade in the form of rent chargeable to corporation tax. In return it paid£91m . The circularity of payments which so impressed Park J and the special commissioners arose because BMBF, in the ordinary course its business, borrowed the money to buy the pipeline from Barclays Bank and Barclays happened to be the bank which provided the cash collateralised guarantee to BMBF for the payment of the rent. But these were happenstances. None of these transactions, whether circular or not, were necessary elements in creating the entitlement to the capital allowances.”
“The scheme in outline [3] The central element of the scheme devised by Citibank International plc ('Citibank') to enable SPI to take advantage of the change-over was extremely simple. During the old regime, SPI would grant Citibank an option ('the Citibank option') to buy short-dated gilts, at a price representing a heavy discount from market price, in return for a correspondingly large premium. The premium received on the grant of the option would not be taxable. After the new regime came into force, Citibank would exercise the option. SPI would have to sell the gilts at well below market price and would suffer an allowable loss. [4] If that was all there was to the transaction, there would also have been a risk that SPI or Citibank would have made a real commercial profit or loss. The premium would have been fixed by reference to the current market price, but the possibility of a rise or fall in interest rates during the currency of the option created a commercial risk for one side or the other. Neither side wanted to incur such a risk. The purpose of the transaction was to create a tax loss, not a real loss or profit. The scheme therefore provided for Citibank's option to be matched by an option to buy the same amount of gilts ('the SPI option') granted by Citibank to SPI. Premium and option price were calculated to ensure that movements of money between Citibank and SPI added up to the same amount, less a relatively small sum for Citibank to retain as a fee. In addition, SPI agreed to pay Citibank a success fee if the scheme worked, calculated as a percentage of the tax saving. [5] The calculation of the SPI option price obviously needed careful thought. In one sense, of course, it did not matter. Whatever price was selected would be reflected in the corresponding premium and subsequent movements in the market price would cancel each other out. But the option price for SPI had to be higher than the option price for Citibank, otherwise the 'profit' realised by SPI on the exercise of its option would cancel out the 'loss' which it suffered on the exercise of the Citibank option and the whole exercise would be futile. Indeed, the greater the difference between the Citibank price and the SPI price, the greater would be the net tax loss created by the scheme. The difference did give rise to a potential cash flow problem because, if Citibank paid the premium for its option, it would be out of pocket in respect of the difference between the two premiums between the date on which the options were granted and the date on which they were exercised. But this was covered by a collateral agreement under which SPI agreed to deposit the difference with Citibank, free of interest, until its option had been exercised or lapsed. This enabled the payment of both premiums to take the form of book entries. [6] On the other hand, the purpose of the SPI option was to reduce or eliminate the possibility that the outcome of the transaction would be affected by events in the real world such as movements in interest rates. So the SPI option price had to be sufficiently below market price as to be, for practical purposes, out of the possible range of such movements. There was also a third consideration. Plainly it was inconceivable that Citibank, having parted with a large premium for its option, would not exercise it. Equally, if the SPI price had been very low, it would have been inconceivable that SPI would not have countered by the exercise of its own option. That might have given rise to a doubt about whether in truth there was any transaction in gilts at all. It would have been inevitable that the obligations of Citibank and SPI to deliver gilts would cancel each other out and that none would change hands. So the SPI option price had to be close enough to the market price to allow for some possibility that this would not happen.”
“The question of construction [18] SPI is entitled to treat the loss suffered on the exercise of the Citibank option as an income loss if the option was a 'qualifying contract' within the meaning of s 147(1)) of theFinance Act 1994 (the 1994 Act). Section 147A(1) (inserted by theFinance Act 1996 (the 1996 Act)) provides that a 'debt contract' is a qualifying contract if the company becomes subject to duties under the contract at any time on or after1 April 1996 . By s 150A(1) (also inserted by the 1996 Act) a 'debt contract' is a contract under which a qualifying company (which means, with irrelevant exceptions, any company: see s 154(1)) 'has any entitlement … to become a party to a loan relationship'. A 'loan relationship' includes a government security. So the short question is whether the Citibank option gave it an entitlement to gilts. [19] That depends upon what the statute means by 'entitlement'. If one confines one's attention to the Citibank option, it certainly gave Citibank an entitlement, by exercise of the option, to the delivery of gilts. On the other hand, if the option formed part of a larger scheme by which Citibank's right to the gilts was bound to be cancelled by SPI's right to the same gilts, then it could be said that in a practical sense Citibank had no entitlement to gilts. Since the decision of this House in W T Ramsay Ltd v IRC[1981] STC 174 ,[1982] AC 300 it has been accepted that the language of a taxing statute will often have to be given a wide practical meaning of this sort which allows (and indeed requires) the court to have regard to the whole of a series of transactions which were intended to have a commercial unity. Indeed, it is conceded by SPI that the court is not confined to looking at the Citibank option in isolation. If the scheme amounted in practice to a single transaction, the court should look at the scheme as a whole. Mr Aaronson QC, who appeared for SPI, accepted before the Special Commissioners that if there was 'no genuine commercial possibility' of the two options not being exercised together, then the scheme must fail.”
“[22] Thus there was an uncertainty [in Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v White[1989] AC 398 ] about whether the alleged composite transaction would proceed to completion which arose, not from the terms of the alleged composite transaction itself, but from the fact that, at the relevant date, no composite transaction had yet been put together. Here, the uncertainty arises from the fact that the parties have carefully chosen to fix the strike price for the SPI option at a level which gives rise to an outside chance that the option will not be exercised. There was no commercial reason for choosing a strike price of 90. From the point of view of the money passing (or rather, not passing), the scheme could just as well have fixed it at 80 and achieved the same tax saving by reducing the Citibank strike price to 60. It would all have come out in the wash. Thus the contingency upon which SPI rely for saying that there was no composite transaction was a part of that composite transaction; chosen not for any commercial reason but solely to enable SPI to claim that there was no composite transaction. It is true that it created a real commercial risk, but the odds were favourable enough to make it a risk which the parties were willing to accept in the interests of the scheme. [23] We think that it would destroy the value of the Ramsay principle of construing provisions such as s 150A(1) of the 1994 Act as referring to the effect of composite transactions if their composite effect had to be disregarded simply because the parties had deliberately included a commercially irrelevant contingency, creating an acceptable risk that the scheme might not work as planned. We would be back in the world of artificial tax schemes, now equipped with anti-Ramsay devices. The composite effect of such a scheme should be considered as it was intended to operate and without regard to the possibility that, contrary to the intention and expectations of the parties, it might not work as planned. [24] It follows that in our opinion the Special Commissioners erred in law in concluding that their finding that there was a realistic possibility of the options not being exercised simultaneously meant, without more, that the scheme could not be regarded as a single composite transaction. We think that it was and that, so viewed, it created no entitlement to gilts and that there was therefore no qualifying contract.”