“ (1) The President of the Tribunal may give directions as to the practice to be followed by the Tribunal …… (3) A Practice Direction may, in particular, require the Tribunal to treat a specified decision of the Tribunal as authoritative in respect of a particular matter. ”
“ Special arrangements are made for the reporting of country guidance cases. Before a case is promulgated and designated as a Country Guidance case it is considered by the relevant country convenor and the Reporting Committee and advice may be tendered to the determining judges.Practice direction 12 .2 states: ‘A reported determination of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT bearing the letters CG shall be treated as an authoritative finding on the country guidance issue identified in the determination, based on the evidence before the members of the Tribunal …. that determine the appeal. As a result, unless it has been expressly superseded or replaced by any less later CG determination, or is inconsistent with other authority that is binding on the Tribunal, such a Country Guidance case is authoritative in any subsequent appeal, so far as that appeal: (a) relates to the country guidance issue in question; and (b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.’ If there is credible fresh evidence relevant to the issue that has not been considered in the Country Guidance Case or if a subsequent case includes further issues that have not been considered in the CG case, the judge will reach the appropriate conclusion on the evidence, taking into account the conclusion in the CG case so far as it remains relevant. ”
“ Fifthly, there has, particularly in the United States, been some debate about the ex parte communications a judge may properly have when preparing his judgment. The view there seems to be that a judge may consult with other judges but not with any law teacher. It is without doubt fundamental that a Judge should not decide a case on a point which has not been raised in argument without giving notice to the parties and allowing them to make submissions. That is a rule which arbitrators are expected to observe and so are judges. But subject to that, English practice would not, in my view, frown on a judge who sought to clear his mind or test his views by discussing the matter with a colleague or a law teacher . ….. I do not think consultation with an appellate judge would be thought improper provided the trial judge did not cede the responsibility for decision which was properly his. ” [Emphasis added.]
“ I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this Realm, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. ”
“ … the fair–minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. ”
“ Guidelines and jurisprudential guides are complementary tools, the purpose of which is to promote consistency, coherence and fairness in the treatment of cases at the Board. The inclusion of such a statutory provision on guidelines and jurisprudential guides indicates Parliament’s intent that the Chairperson should be involved in the adjudication strategy of the IRB as a whole, in order to assist decision makers on matters of substantive and procedural importance. “ The published policy states that the adjudication strategy “is aimed at identifying the relatively small number of cases that merit the division’s particular attention because they are cases that have the potential to shape the Board’s jurisprudence. These cases are the exceptional, as opposed to the routine, cases”
“ If every judge’s judgment were vitiated because he discussed the case with some other judge, a good many judgments existing as valid and unimpeachable ought to fall; and that if such discussions were prohibited many more judgments might fall in an appellate court because of a defect which must have been detected if the subject had been so discussed. ”
“ … Discussions with colleagues do not constitute, in and of themselves, infringements of the panel member’s capacity to decide the issues at stake independently. A discussion does not prevent a decision maker from adjudicating in accordance with his own conscience and opinions nor does it constitute an obstacle to this freedom. Whatever discussion may take place, the ultimate decision will be that of the decision maker for which he assumes full responsibility. ”
“ … the danger that full board meetings may fetter the individual independence of panel members is not sufficiently present to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias or lack of independence …. ”
“ …. provided that factual issues are not discussed at a full board meeting and that the parties are given a reasonable opportunity to respond to any new ground arising from such a meeting. ”
“ The institutionalising of decisions exists in our law and appears to be there to stay. The problem is thus not whether institutional decisions should be sanctioned, but to organise the process in such a way as to limit its dangers. There is nothing revolutionary in this approach: it falls naturally into the tradition of English and Canadian jurisprudence that the rules of natural justice should be flexibly interpreted. ” [Emphasis added.]
“ …….. What I mean is that judges have a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law right and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect. Collegiality is a process that helps to create the conditions for principled agreement, by allowing all points of view to be aired and considered …. Collegiality helps ensure that results are not preordained. The more collegial the court, the more likely it is that the cases that come before it will be determined solely on their legal merits (page 1644 – 1645) …… While a judge spends much time working alone, the crucial decisional points in appellate judging occur in the company of, and in active engagement with, one’s colleagues. ”
“Every private communication to a Judge, for the purpose of influencing his decision upon a matter publicly before him, always is, and ought to be, reprobated; it is a course calculated, if tolerated, to divert the course of justice and is considered and ought more frequently than it is to be treated as what is really is, a high contempt of Court”
“Once the dispute has been submitted to a court of law, [the parties] should be able to rely upon their being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to law”
“….The participation of non-members in the deliberations of a collective body may invalidate its acts. The decision of the disciplinary committee, for example, is likely to be invalid if any non-member of the committee has taken part in its proceedings ….”
“In maintaining the confidence of the parties and the public in the integrity of the judicial process it is necessary that judicial tribunals should be independent and impartial and also that they should appear to be so. The Judge must be free of any influence which could prevent the bringing of an objective judgment to bear or which could distort the Judge’s judgment and must appear to be so”
“ The duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses in civil cases include the following: 1. Expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation …. 2. An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the Court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise …. An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of an advocate … 3. An expert witness should state the facts or assumption upon which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which could detract from his concluded opinion. …. 4. An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise. 5. If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available, then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one. In cases where an expert witness who has prepared a report could not assert that the report contained the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth without some qualification, that qualification should be stated in the report …. 6. If, after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on a material matter having read the other side’s expert’s report, or for any other reason, such change of view should be communicated (through legal representatives) to the other side without delay and when appropriate to the Court. ”
“ …. Expert witnesses are armed with the court’s readiness to receive the expert evidence which it needs in order to reach a fully informed decision, whatever the nature of the topic may be. But their evidence ceases to be useful, and it may become counter-productive, when it is not marshalled by reference to the issues in the particular case and kept within the limits so fixed. ”
“ [42] As it seems to me the key to this case …. is the imperative of transparency, a general theme of the CPR but here specifically applied to the deployment of experts’ reports. Thus the aim of rule 35.10(3) and (4) is broadly to ensure that the factual basis on which the expert has prepared his report is patent. ”
“ [24] It seems to me to be axiomatic that a fact finder must not reach his or her conclusion before surveying all the evidence relevant thereto…. The Secretary of State argues that decisions as to the credibility of an account are to be taken by the judicial fact finder and that, in their reports, experts, whether in relation to medical matters or in relation to in-country circumstances, cannot usurp the fact finder’s function in assessing credibility. I agree. What, however, they can offer is a factual context in which it may be necessary for the fact finder to survey the allegations placed before him; and such context may prove a crucial aid to the decision whether or not to accept the truth of them. …… It seems to me that a proper fact finding enquiry involves explanation as to the reason for which an expert view is rejected and indeed placed beyond the spectrum of views which could reasonably be held. ”
“Serious harm consist of (a) death penalty or execution; (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an Applicant in the country of origin; and (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.”
“… a third country national … person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for disbelieving that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin … would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15 … and is unable or, owing to such risk, unable to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country.”
“43. Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 15(c) of the Directive, in conjunction with Article 2(e) of the Directive, must be interpreted as meaning that: the existence of a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is not subject to the condition that that applicant adduce evidence that he is specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances; the existence of such a threat can exceptionally be considered to be established where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict taking place assessed by the competent national authorities before which an application for subsidiary protection is made, or by the courts of a Member State to which a decision refusing such an application is referred reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to that threat.”
“30 . Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the existence of an internal armed conflict can be a cause for granting subsidiary protection only where confrontations between a State’s armed forces and one or more armed groups or between two or more armed groups are exceptionally considered to create a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection for the purposes of Article 15(c) of Directive 2004/83 because the degree of indiscriminate violence which characterises those confrontations reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, if returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would – solely on account of his presence in the territory of that country or region – face a real risk of being subject to that threat (see, to that effect, Elgafaji, paragraph 43).”
“In our judgment the nexus between the generalised armed conflict and the indiscriminate violence posing a real risk to life or person is met when the intensity of the conflict involves means of combat (whether permissible under the laws of war or not) that seriously endanger non-combatants as well as result in such a general breakdown of law and order as to permit anarchy and criminality occasioning the serious harm referred to in the Directive. Such violence is indiscriminate in effect even if not necessarily in aim. As the French Conseil d’Etat observed in Baskarathas , it is not necessary for the threat to life or person to derive from protagonists in the armed conflict in question: it can simply be a product of the breakdown of law and order.”
“Therefore, following NA v the United Kingdom , the sole question for the Court to consider in an expulsion case is whether, in all the circumstances of the case before it, substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary toArticle 3 of the Convention . If the existence of such a risk is established, the applicant’s removal would necessarily breach Article 3, regardless of whether the risk emanates from a general situation of violence, a personal characteristic of the applicant, or a combination of the two. However, it is clear that not every situation of general violence will give rise to such a risk. On the contrary, the Court has made it clear that a general situation of violence would only be of sufficient intensity to create such a risk “in the most extreme cases” where there was a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return (ibid., § 115). ”
“The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the Convention and it would not, therefore, be appropriate for it to express any views on the ambit or scope of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Direction. However, based on the ECJ’s interpretation in Elgafaji, the Court is not persuaded thatArticle 3 of the Convention , as interpreted in NA , does not offer comparable protection to that afforded under the Directive. In particular, it notes that the threshold set by both provisions may, in exceptional circumstances, be attained in consequence of a situation of general violence of such intensity that any person being returned to the region in question would be at risk simply on account of their presence there. ”
“366. In any event, the Al-Shabab withdrawal in August 2011 in our view constitutes evidence which means that it can no longer be said that any person in Mogadishu, regardless of his or her circumstances, is at Article 3 risk from the armed conflict there. As we have already explained, we do not consider that the evidence of the withdrawal means, as at the present date, that it can safely be said that the generality of the population no longer faces an Article 15(c) risk. Those reasons, however, do not apply in relation to Article 3. This is so despite the issue of the “durability” of the new situation being, at first sight, the same for both provisions. It is plain from NA v United Kingdom that the circumstances required in order to make good an Article 3 claim purely by reference to a general situation of violence need to be exceptionally grave. There is on any rational view a significant and immediately apparent difference between an armed conflict between opposing forces, contending for a city (albeit with attendant asymmetrical attacks by one of the parties) and the absence (or relative absence) of overt conventional conflict. There is no evidence we have seen to indicate that Al-Shabab’s conventional forces remain poised outside Mogadishu, ready to re-enter the city at any time. The situation is, thus, sufficiently “durable” to compel us to find that – even if (contrary to paragraph 364 above) an Article 3 risk had existed immediately before Al-Shabab’s withdrawal - it does not exist at present. 367. The consequence of the latest turn of events seems to us to be a good illustration of the different “field of operation” for Article 15(c), identified by the CJEU in Elgafaji , as examined by us at paragraphs 328 to 335 above. The availability of Article 15(c) enables international protection to be afforded in circumstances where the truly exceptional circumstances required by NA v United Kingdom do not pertain. There is thus no justification for succumbing to the temptation of diluting the test for finding an Article 3 risk by reason of generalised violence (or, we might add, of the corresponding test for Article 15(b) harm).”
“In the light of the improved governance in Somalia and the enhanced security measures in Mogadishu with the departure of Al Shabaab, it appears to be the intention of the Courts to update the country guidance given in AMM and, by implication, that of AM & AM and HH in relation to the Refugee Convention and associated serious harm issues (Art 15(c)) of the Qualification Directive and humanitarian considerations…. … This paper will summarise the security parameters upon which AMM was historically based and compare these to the current situation, focussing in particular on the influence of Al Shabaab, changed humanitarian situation, increasing stabilisation and eliciting a risk assessment in the event of returning Somali citizens…”
“… the critical question is whether there are currently any factors which would justify the broadening of the AMM exclusion which previously applied to businessmen, politicians and those of substantial economic means, to include the returning citizenry at large…. Do the improvements in governance, security, increased territorial control, relocation of aid agency and diplomatic offices from Nairobi to Mogadishu and large influx of Diaspora members warrant a universal retention of Art. 3 and arts. 15(c) eligibility? Having observed that: “No life solution in Mogadishu is without some degree of risk”
“… In current circumstances of supposed improved security in Mogadishu, in contrast to that of July 2011 at the time of AMM, it would be unreasonable to assume that virtually the whole population (apart from the exceptional groups cited in AMM) of Mogadishu would qualify under this definition for Art. 3 treatment… … The ultimate question is whether the level of safety currently prevailing is adequately robust and sustainable. On the basis of the evidence submitted, its quality, coherence, it is my opinion that there are cogent evidential facts to support the proposition that Mogadishu remains unsafe for certain vulnerable groups of returning asylum seekers…. Which would suggest that AMM’s analysis of risk and its correlation to Art. 2, Art. 3 and Art. 15(c) continues to subsist for certain vulnerable categories but the exceptions should be widened.”
“Proportionately, given that the population of Mogadishu has increased, level of economic activity has increased, the currency has increased, visible returning diaspora, decisions being made by people’s pockets and choices do suggest there is a degree of durability.”
“Yes, I think that the groups at risk currently in Mogadishu are those linked to poverty. Those lacking in resources. Those without social capital. In other words, without a clan framework to fall back on… groups who would be candidates for IDP camps. If one would be consigned to an IDP camp on return then he should be entitled to protection…. A case by case assessment is required to ensure those applying for protection are those who would not receive it from other sources.”
“However, as the security situation has improved to a degree in Mogadishu since the departure of Al Shabaab in July/August 2011, there is speculation that AMM findings in relation to Art 15(c) are no longer relevant to the current situation because of the change in the level of security. The facts cited above, which refer to post August 2011 and up to April 2013, after which security benefits appear to taper off, would suggest a situation of security that is temporary and fragile and falls short of the standard of durability required under AMM. Furthermore, there is a trend to understate security risks in the general enthusiasm to support the new government and to attract development funding….”
“With the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu in Aug 2011, the security situation in Mogadishu has unquestionably improved but in a rather eclectic manner…. Mogadishu has seen a period of relative stability over the last 24 months in contrast to the last 21 years… but from a very low base. The city has moved away from its recent history of running street battles involving mortars, rockets and tanks and indiscriminate bombing between Al Shabaab and the allied forces of the SNA and AMISOM. More significantly, with the election of a new President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and the selection of a new Prime Minister with a newly reduced cabinet in November 2012, there have been substantive changes in governance for the better underpinning the improved security situation.”
“It would be disingenuous to argue that the Human Rights situation in Somalia has not improved, particularly at the level of legislation since AMM. The report of the UN Human Rights Commission’s Independent Expert, Shamsul Bari of29 August 2011 , or close to the date of AMM, considers that there has been an “unending saga of human rights deprivation. By contrast, the same Expert, Shamsul Bari, two years later is now full of hope” on the issue of human rights…. Within this legislative framework, the protection of vulnerable sections of the population such as IDPs, minorities, failed asylum seekers and women would be ensured….”
“… there has been a rise in the number of ambushes, assassinations and suicide bombs in the Somali capital. The city has experienced its deadliest attacks in recent times during the last two weeks.”
“As outlined in section 2.1 of Danish 2 there has been a litany of armed attacks bearing the hallmark of a sophisticated terrorist cell, including suicide bombings remote controlled IEDs and assassinations. Soldiers travel around in armoured personnel carriers and not on foot, targeted assassinations continue, civilian casualties far outnumber military ones, as late as May 2013 a series of attacks have taken place in Mogadishu. 34 people were killed in a series of coordinated suicide attacks on14 April 2013 . So far, it was the deadliest attack since the inauguration of the new government…”
“ … then looked at the data sheet and where there was ambiguity I adjusted numbers to give a more likely picture of what might have occurred. “ In his written response to questions raised by the respondent arising from his report, Dr Mullen had said (Q18) that: “In reporting casualties AMISOM often equates casualties with fatalities. Many military casualties bypass the Mogadishu hospitals…. AMISOM reporting of incidents regularly uses the vague expression “exact number of casualties/fatalities could not be established”
“This is, admittedly, a more rounded interpretation.”
“There are on average several targeted killings per week in Mogadishu, four to five weekly hand grenade attacks in Mogadishu and usually more.”
“Targeted assassinations could be undertaken by anyone who could pay for this.”
“However, the international organisation believed that there is a decrease in the number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu, relative to the last few years. This decrease is due to front-line fighting having moved out of Mogadishu. There are now fewer mass-casualty attacks and killings, in particular due to the cessation of shelling in Mogadishu…”
“Still civilian casualties remain a daily occurrence, principally due to assassinations, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks, and reactions to these attacks by the armed forces. Recent grenade and suicide bomb attacks on theatres and cafes, such as the August 2012 attack on the Jezira Hotel, cause numerous civilian casualties.”
“According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia the number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu has decreased considerably compared to February 2012 and today civilian casualties are at a minimum. In July 2011 two thirds of Mogadishu was under al-Shabaab control. Bombardment and shelling killed many, but this is no longer taking place. Today you have targeted attacks and sometimes by-passers get killed. It’s a question of being at the wrong place at the wrong time.”
“…today there are occasional bombings, assassinations, etc…”
“… a much more sinister form of targeting geared towards peacemakers.”
“The ability of Al Shabaab to kill indiscriminately is linked to two tactics widely used in Mogadishu: one is asymmetrical warfare based on IEDs, mine deployment and assassination of known individuals, such as those associated with the government, defection from Al Shabaab ranks, aid agency personnel and journalists. Events have demonstrated that Al Shabaab has the capacity through asymmetrical warfare to attempt the assassination of low ranking officials up to security chiefs, international UN personnel and even the President himself. The second tactic is the exertion of moral and religious pressure on individuals at the level of the mosque and of the street. This is aptly described at Danish3 p.7.”
“The international NGO (B), Mogadishu, stated that al-Shabaab does not kill civilians indiscriminately. On the other hand, when it is staging large scale attacks it does not mind if civilians are killed.”
“Frequently now we see lobbing of grenades, for example at Bakara Market. This is a different type of strategy. There are so many incidents they are no longer documented.”
“ While the security situation in Mogadishu has improved since then, with a reduction of open conflict and signs of a resumption of economic activity in the city, Al Shabaab retains the ability to stage lethal attacks even in the most heavily guarded parts of the city, with civilians reportedly bearing the brunt of its attacks. The SFG is reported to be failing to provide much of its population with basic security. Thus the reality on the ground, as reported by observers, remains that civilians are injured and killed every week in targeted attacks by gunmen, or attacks by IEDs and grenades.”
“As a prelude to this discussion, there is a major emphasis on whether forced recruitment could have occurred in Mogadishu post the Al Shabaab withdrawal from the central districts of Mogadishu in August 2011…” .. Given the territorial integration of the districts into the TFG/AMISOM jurisdiction, any continued recruitment into Al Shabaab from the madrasses would have to be more circumspect. There is also the vital intelligence function to which children were recruited… … While overt military recruitment may have reduced, it is extremely likely that recruitment into Al Shabaab’s intelligence wing increased…”
“ I have personally interviewed some 15 young men between the age of 16 and 24 over the past 2 years, ten of whom were interviewed post August 2011, who all claim to have been approached by Al Shabaab in and around Mogadishu and were “invited” to join their fighting units… They have recounted that it is generally a process of contacts over many months, with increasing intensity. When the approach is resisted, in most cases other family members become involved in the form of threats or forced marriage of female siblings. Ultimately assassinations of family members is threatened and sometimes carried out…. The consistency in the various narratives by persons totally unknown to each other would suggest that the narrative of forced recruitment into Al Shabaab is plausible.”
“…shows mixed evidence. There is a trend for Al Shabaab to forcibly recruit but this is now mainly in the non-central districts of Mogadishu, which are more difficult to infiltrate. On the other hand, Al Shabaab can offer financial incentives to young men who are unemployed to encourage them to join their ranks…. The coercive element in these approaches is obviously much less. … In outlying areas around Mogadishu, such as Elasha Biyaha and Afgoye it is probable that forced recruitment continues… The Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre consider that children in IDP camps and homeless children are particularly vulnerable to recruitment.”
“UNDSS stated that there is no way al-Shabaab would be able to forcibly recruit or mobilize persons in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab only recruits in areas in SC Somalia where it is in control. Regarding recruitment to al-Shabaab in Mogadishu Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, stated that he found it hard to believe that al-Shabaab is able to recruit systematically, and there are no reports on al-Shabaab undertaking forced recruitment or threatening people to be recruited. Forced recruitment by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu today does not make economic sense. However, al-Shabaab may pay persons to undertake operations on its behalf.”
“The local NGO (C) had no reports of forced recruits to al-Shabaab in the city of Mogadishu...” “When asked… an international NGO working in SC Somalia (D) stated that it had not heard about this…” “The NGO reiterated that it did not believe that al-Shabaab is able to undertake forced recruitment in Mogadishu…” “Saferworld found it unlikely that al-Shabaab undertakes forced recruitment today” “Regarding forced recruitment to al-Shabaab in Mogadishu an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (C) stated that al-Shabaab does not have the leverage to undertake forced recruitment today… and the NGO was confident that al-Shabaab is incapable of recruiting in Mogadishu. Dr Mullen comments that: “An outstandingly reliable commentator on the situation in Mogadishu, Tony Burns of SAACID is of the opinion that “Al Shabaab may still recruit in Mogadishu… it still has the brand and the brand is fear”
“Tony Burns… explained that he and his staff hadn’t heard of forced recruitment in Mogadishu since the 2010 Ramadan offensive.”
“… On the other hand, there are also indications that Mogadishu is becoming a multi clan environment where discrimination against the Reer Hamar in particular has declined but not disappeared.”
“The Mayor of Mogadishu has underlined the vulnerability of citizens in general by stating that “the only real protection which people will have at their disposal is their own arms as well as clan protection mechanisms.”
“The quoted Danish 3 report emphasises the continuing need for clan support and sometimes protection in the establishment of a viable livelihood. The 16 districts of Mogadishu are shaped by their clan configurations and this reflects itself in the choice of District Commissioners and their militia support. This clan dimension runs parallel to the Al Shabaab phenomenon where allegiance is to a theocratic hegemony of sharia rather than to a clan. These two concepts coexist side by side as Chapter 2 of Danish 3 elaborates.”
“Regarding clan protection a UN agency, Nairobi, explained that there is less risk for anyone being attacked or violated only because of clan affiliation. It does not matter whether you belong to a strong or a weak clan, or an ethnic minority group…… The clan has now become a social structure rather than a protective structure. This could be due to lessons learned during the previous clan conflicts and the civil war. People are now relating to government structures rather than clans, especially when it comes to business. Regarding clan protection an international NGO (A) explained that this is much less of an issue than it was two to three years ago. Clan protection is no longer important as there are no clan based militias in Mogadishu. Persons returning from abroad are not at particular risk because of their clan affiliation. When asked if this also include members of small minority clans as well as members of ethnic minority groups the international NGO stated that this is the case. The NGO made reference to the Chief of Police in Mogadishu who is a member of a Bravanese minority group.”
“Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre; Mogadishu, reiterated that it is a huge step forward that clan affiliation is no longer a concern. Even marginalized groups such as the IDPs and minority groups are no longer marginalized, harassed or intimidated only because of their clan affiliations. Thus, the security situation for members of small, weak clans and ethnic minority groups has increased considerably during the last year. It is not important which clan or group you belong to. Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre emphasized that there are no limitations in freedom of movement in Mogadishu. Anyone regardless of clan affiliation or sex is free to move around in Mogadishu and no one is being harassed at checkpoints only because of sex or clan affiliation.”
“Regarding access to livelihood in Mogadishu, UNHCR-Somalia explained that the presence of a nuclear family is a requirement for livelihood support, as clan will not help with livelihood.”
“Regarding clan protection a representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu stated that people no longer rely on clan protection. Clan protection is no longer an issue in Mogadishu, and if you feel you are exposed you will adapt by ‘laying low’. If you are laying low you are not in need of additional security or protection. This is the strategy of most of the returning Diaspora. One does not rely on the police or the SNAF for protection or justice. The representative stated that she would not even think of approaching the police as the police forces are all corrupt. … The representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, agreed that the clan is no longer a main issue in Mogadishu. The need for clan protection is ‘going down’ and no one will ask you about your clan affiliation any longer. The only concern is whether you are affiliated with Al-Shabaab or not. On the other hand, whenever a person is planning to settle in Mogadishu he or she will most likely consider his or her clan affiliation before deciding where to settle down. … According to Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, clan is ‘zero’ today in Mogadishu; clans do not offer any protection as there are no clan militias threatening people. Clanism is only common among “primitive clans in the bush.”
“As a minority clan member in Mogadishu protection would have to be purchased at some considerable cost in order to gain a majority clan patron.”
“A corollary of clan control by the Abgal and Habr Gedir (main sub-clans of Hawiye) is that they have a shared interest in maintaining a degree of peace as the peace dividend is prosperity and an enabling economic environment. The approach is inclusive and offers opportunities to the select few with services to offer or resources to invest, but excludes the vulnerable minority clan member or person of modest means. This situation would adversely affect a low income Somali citizen such as a Gadabursi.”
“Absolutely. Sub sub clans are unable to fulfil their obligations and so you have to fall back on the nuclear family….. The nuclear family is gaining prominence over the clan.”
“However, by contrast, the key UN organisation working with refugees, UNHCR, maintains that “clan dynamics in combination with other factors are an important element when considering risk” (Danish 3 2.1). “Newcomers would certainly attract adverse attention; including those originating from Mogadishu but have left a long time ago.””
“UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, confirmed that someone in Mogadishu will not be at risk today solely because he/she is of a different clan, although clan dynamics in combination with other factors are an important element when considering risk, including for the IDP population. It is obvious that one is safer when he or she is residing in an area dominated by his or her own clan or if one has good relations with a dominating clan. … Information about a newcomer, particularly, when he/she does not belong to the existing clans or nuclear families or when he/she originates from an area formerly or presently controlled by an insurgent group; would certainly attract adverse attention. Even those who originate from Mogadishu may be perceived as newcomers, if they left a long time ago and have lost all links with their clan-based community.”
“A Gadabursi (the clan of which MOJ is a member) which is a majority clan but numerically minor in Mogadishu, would therefore require cross-clan alliances and the resources to fund them to survive. Therefore, low income migrants…. or failed asylum seekers… are unlikely to be able to achieve the level of security acceptable to Arts 2, 3 ECHR and Art 15(c). This would imply exposure to violence and conversely the ability of the state to provide security safeguards to its citizens.”
“If one calculates the cost of human trafficking:$15,000 to$25,000 . This has to be raised by family members. A returning minority clan member would be under a social obligation to reimburse a proportion of the cost of travel to Europe…. The person travelling represents a group of people because it is entirely beyond the capacity of the vast majority of Somalis to travel to Europe.”
“There are enhanced vulnerabilities arising from …. minority clan profiles (including someone like a Gadabursi who would be a de facto minority in a cosmopolitan Mogadishu) but this would have to be examined on a case by case basis.”
“The major clans do not appear to be demonstrably exploitative in relation to minority groups but access to livelihood opportunities are blocked unless they (minorities) have resources to invest. The question then arises is whether the characteristics of social exclusion is more operative than life threatening mechanisms in Mogadishu. Social exclusion because of cultural or economic reasons is not a life threatening experience. Therefore there is a need to have a hierarchy of risk within the new dispensation since the election of President Mohamud and a degree of substantial normalisation of conditions in Mogadishu…”
“the only real protection which people will have at their disposal is their own arms as well as clan protection mechanisms.”
“… With increasing stabilisation, there have been three factors which have acted as drivers to population movements around Mogadishu: one, post famine returns to agricultural areas where agro-pastoralism is practiced, such as the inter-riverine areas of Shabelle and Juba, two, the downsizing of the Afgoye corridor encampment due to the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from the camp and from the area in general and travel back to areas of greater stability in urban and rural settings and three: the expulsion of IDPs from inner city informal sites that are being re-occupied by their original owners and where land values have rocketed.”
“… Internally Displaced Persons (or IDPs) who, in the main are destitute, vulnerable and clan vulnerable, but are highly sensitive and responsive to stabilisation, decline of conflict, risk reduction because their survival strategy has been strongly risk averse. In many respects they are the weathervane of the security status of an area…”
“The issue of the humanitarian dimension of the IDP problem is highlighted in the Amnesty Report. The situation is quite dire. IDPs have been living in overcrowded and unsafe settlements and remain extremely vulnerable to various forms of human rights abuses, including widespread sexual violence…”
“Humanitarian law and human rights abuses were committed by all parties. They have reportedly attacked IDP camps, perpetrated widespread sexual and other gender-based violence, forcibly recruited internally displaced children and fought each other near civilian settlements. IDP’s health situation remained critical with most outbreaks of contagious diseases coming in areas hosting displaced people. Developments such as increased security, an improving economy and urban migration led to an increase in forced evictions of IDPs in urban centres across the country such as Mogadishu…. A number of the most vulnerable victims were unable to seek refuge elsewhere because of their limited resources.”
“They are of two kinds: those who have left their homes in Mogadishu for security reasons and have come back to re-occupy them but retain food entitlements, or others who have literally moved camp from an out of town location to an urban one (though given the current pressure on urban land, these would be in a minority).”
“internally displaced persons (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of residence in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.”
“Such a lack of variation between time periods in an emergency situation is an unusual phenomenon and generally indicates that there are problems in either collection or analysis of data. This becomes evident in February 2013 when it is acknowledged that there are adjustments required and the figures should be “triangulated” or cross-verified by observation. Then in September 2013, in what is assumed to be after the cross-verification having taken place, revised figures are published.”
“The pressure from being associated with Islamists on the one hand and the reduced tension in Mogadishu on the other, combined to convince many former Eelasha Biyaha residents to return to their homes in the city of Mogadishu. The influx of former residents back to Mogadishu and the decline in numbers at Eelasha Biyaha is a significant explanatory variable for the increase in IDPs.”
“The considerable movement of IDPs to Mogadishu may be indicative of an association between relocation and improved security but it could equally be associated with an increased number of family reunions, seeking out employment opportunities, evictions or cross border repatriations. It is significant that UNHCR, in its Population Movement Trends for October 2013 at the national level, as distinct from Mogadishu, cites the principal reasons for movement as: drought, lack of livelihood, forced return, eviction, cross border return (particularly from Kenya) ahead of insecurity, which comes near the bottom of the list…”
“The ability to access protection in Mogadishu would be contingent on three significant resources: financial wealth, social status and clan protection…. Returning migrant citizens without a minimal combination of these attributes are unlikely to gain access to livelihoods or safety and are likely to end up in an IDP camp. The vulnerability is compounded if the retuning citizen is from a minority clan…”
“This immutable vulnerability can only be reversed through access to resources or patronage from a major clan member or group…” and at paragraph 68 of his report stated: “The very poor and ostracised are, of course, powerless to act and become passive agents in the threat-violence continuum and whose risk rating goes off the charts. Only those with a degree of power, either political or economic, can influence and shape decisions relating to their security and reduce their vulnerability…. Prosperous businessmen, with close links to the Diaspora, have at their disposal bodyguards and have means of protection. Meantime, the humanitarian crisis has worsened and minority populations have become more vulnerable. Using any classical risk index, there is a pervasive and systemic environment of risk affecting the vulnerable and minority populations of Mogadishu and this has to be acknowledged in any new CG…”
“Arguably, the destitute minority populations because of the lack of a social network or social capital or protective mechanisms are at highest risk and as confirmed in the UNHCR report on IDPs, are the least likely to migrate…”
“Forced repatriation of individuals of modest means, without powerful clan support networks would face a situation where, in the words of Tony Burns statement19 August 2013 … “ there remains an unacceptable risk that returnees to Mogadishu city would be at risk of direct and/or indiscriminate threat of personal, psychological and economic harm from a broad range of actors and drivers”
“According to UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, many people from the Diaspora have returned to Mogadishu, also, because they see business opportunities. In general, there is no discrimination for the sole reason of belonging to the returning Diaspora. Regarding returns from the Diaspora, an international agency, Nairobi, explained that ordinary people returning to Mogadishu and other locations in S/C Somalia are citing improvements in the security situation as some of the reasons for returns. Others have also been shocked by what they see when they come back, especially those who have been abroad for many years. An international agency, Nairobi, explained that Mogadishu is now a ‘buzz’, people are going around minding their own business and there is an increasing freedom of movement for everyone. Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that there is an increasing number of Somalis returning to Mogadishu from abroad as compared to October 2012. However, the 14 April [2013] attack may result in a slight decrease for the time being as many will give it a second thought before going back to Mogadishu. A representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu explained that those who are returning to Mogadishu and other locations in S/C Somalia are mostly resourceful people who see opportunities, have business to do and/or seek political influence and positions. It would be extremely difficult to return to Mogadishu if you have no one to rely on when you come back. The representative stated that an increasing number of Somalis from the Diaspora are returning. Safety and security are issues to consider before you return as there are frictions between those who stayed behind and those who are now returning from their refuge abroad. The Diaspora is being perceived as competitors as they may take up jobs from the locals and their increasing presence in Mogadishu has resulted in price increases on goods as well as on properties. … Concerning the Diaspora people coming back to Somalia, Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, said that they are most welcome with their money and skills. He did not know about a general tension between local people and the ones who have returned from the Diaspora. In his opinion, the ones who have negative attitudes towards the Diaspora might suffer from an inferiority complex. Mohamed Farah Siad added that he has told three of his sons now living in Ohio, USA, to come back to Mogadishu to work with him. He expects his sons to be back in Mogadishu in three months… … The representative of a Diaspora organization in Mogadishu explained that the first three months in Mogadishu are the hardest for a returned member of the Diaspora. However, most people from the Diaspora are staying despite the difficulties they may face during the first few months. On the other hand, a number of returnees are going back to their country of asylum because they could not find a job in Mogadishu. Males as well as females are returning to Mogadishu. … An international NGO (B), Mogadishu, explained that there are many people coming to Mogadishu these days. All flights from Nairobi, Istanbul and the Middle East are fully booked. However, the 14 April attack may for a while make people more hesitant to return. On the other hand, many people are coming to Somalia to settle. An international NGO (C), Nairobi, stated that the most important developments at the moment are that people are coming back and staying, and making investments. This is very positive and important. According to the international NGO (C), Nairobi, many Somalis from the Diaspora are these days coming to Mogadishu to invest and seek opportunities for economic activity. These people are dependent on a reasonable level of security to pursue their activities. Al-Shabaab’s recent attacks on the Lido Beach and on a restaurant where the new westernized middle class of Mogadishu gather had the intention to create fear among these people. So far al-Shabaab has not managed to scare people away from Mogadishu, but it is crucial that the SNG as soon as possible, and in a convincing way, can demonstrate that it is able to prevent terrorist attacks in the city.”
“The profile of returning Diaspora members includes the better educated and businessmen seeking out investment opportunities.”
“After two decades of anarchy and misery, Mogadishu is enjoying something of a renaissance. The spectacular ruins are being patched up. Hotels are being built. There are even streetlights in some places. And everywhere you hear accents: Texan, Geordie, Minnesotan, south London, Scandinavian. Somalia’s far-flung Diaspora is coming back – in big numbers – to visit, to help out, to make money, and to find out if this renaissance has any chance of lasting. The jury is still out on that one.”
“He has been working for a charity that helps young people struggling to find jobs. Right now he is organising a hugely popular televised talent competition, Idols – Somali-style.”
“… Individualised returns clearly take place on a voluntary basis and it is evident from the volume of air traffic landing in Mogadishu that many expatriates are returning. These tend to be from the upper income groups but whose families remain at safe European locations.”
“There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the families of virtually all the warlords have gained asylum in Europe and that the business class seats on the Turkish Airlines flights from Ankara to Mogadishu are generally the first to be sold.”
“… it is my opinion that even given the strong demand factor for inward and outward flights there is a weak correlation between the availability of these flights and security concerns on the ground, as travel on these flights already suggests a behaviour of a high level of risk taking…”
“… returnees are viewed as being influenced by western thinking and lifestyle which would be in total contrast to the Wahabist jihadism pursued by Al Shabaab and would be likely to elicit punishments in the form of amputations of limbs, torture, beatings and even killings, thus clear ECHR infringements.”
“While a Gadabursi returnee may not stand out like a blue-eyed white European, as a returnee from the UK, his demeanour, dress, possessions would distinguish him from indigenous Somalis who have remained behind.”
“… The groups that would require particular attention are those considered to be “at the bottom of the heap” and most vulnerable, such as Bantu groups, the Banjuni, the Midgaan and the other occupational caste clans such as the Eyle, Boon, Tumal and the Yibir. Coincidentally, these groups are all considered to be “Gibil madow” (dark coloured). They are also, in majority, vulnerable economically and most likely to be involved in daily labouring activities, often former agricultural workers, and residing in IDP camps. They have no homeland or land entitlements apart from by patronage. Extreme poverty therefore emerges as a key feature of continuing Art. 3 eligibility, while acknowledging its strong correlation to minority clan status. The second major group to be considered for Art. 3 status is those who have been threatened on religious grounds by Al Shabaab.”
“Financial transfers; internet; journalists; peacemakers; religious leaders; clan leaders”
“Generally the targets selected have a link to government or international aid agencies”
“Potential Risk Profiles: 1. Individuals associated with, or (perceived as) supportive of the SFG and the international community, including the AMISOM forces; 2. Individuals (perceived as) contravening Islamic Sharia and decrees imposed by Al-Shabaab, including converts from Islam, other “apostates” and moderate Islamic scholars who have criticized Al-Shabaab extremism; 3. Individuals (perceived as) opposing the SFG and related interests and individuals (suspected of) supporting armed anti-Government groups; 4. Individuals in certain professions such as journalists, members of the judiciary, humanitarian workers and human rights activists, teachers and staff of educational facilities, business people and other people (perceived to be) of means; 5. Individuals (at risk of being) forcibly recruited; 6. Members of minority groups such as members of the Christian religious minority and members of minority clans; 7. Individuals belonging to a clan engaged in a blood feud; 8. Women and girls; 9. Children; 10. Victims and persons at risk of trafficking; 11. Sexual and/or gender non-conforming persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals); 12. Persons with a mental disability or suffering from mental illness.”
“This shows, in my view, that the battle against Al Shabaab is far from over and that Mogadishu, but also other parts of south-central Somalia, is not a safe place where ordinary Somalis (locals or those deported there) would be able to live without a considerable threat to their physical integrity and psychological well-being. The positive news that are occasionally transmitted from within Somalia are certainly correct (although I have the feeling that the enthusiasm about "Somalia rising" that was prevailing after the presidential elections in the second half of 2012 has thinned out by now. Things are getting better, but only for some people and in some places. Most people who benefit from the current situation are (diasporic or local) businessmen and members of the political elite who engage in lucrative deals with foreign companies and foreign governments. 42 Against this background, it is my view that an Article 15(c) risk exists, as described by the tribunal in the case of AMM & Ors (Somalia) v SSHD [2011] UK UT445 (IAC) (22 November 2011 ) "as a general matter, in respect of the majority of those in Mogadishu" and those returning from the diaspora without special arrangements and protection in place. Article 15(c) is, according to Paragraph 328 of the Tribunal’s decision in the case of AMM, concerned “with “threat […] to a civilian’s life or person” rather than to specific acts of violence […] the threat is inherent in a general situation of armed conflict. […] The violence that gives rise to the threat is described as “indiscriminate”
“From 2009 to mid-2011, Al Shabaab had been the de facto government in most parts of south-central Somalia. It had physically controlled vast areas including 90 per cent of the capital city, and had delivered services from justice to health care and schooling. Out of a mixture of fear and appreciation for keeping law and order, many ordinary people supported Al Shabaab’s rule or at least tolerated it. But from mid-2012 onwards, a new trend regarding the security situation in southern Somalia including Mogadishu emerged. On the one hand, Al Shabaab was severely weakened as a military power in Somalia. It was evicted from its most important remaining strongholds in Kismayo and Jowhar in December 2012. The security in Mogadishu was strengthened to some degree and in early 2013, a sense of optimism reigned in the international media and among some external observers and Somalis that Somalia could rise again as a stable and peaceful entity -- despite the many challenges facing the new administration.”
“The evidence suggests that Al Shabaab recently reorganised itself, if anything, as a smaller movement under the radical leadership of Ahmed Abdi Godane, its amir . This, in my view, is an important reason for the stepping up of the group’s attacks in Mogadishu and elsewhere in southern Somalia. It also resulted, in my view, in the recent complex terror attack in Nairobi, Kenya. Most probably, Al Shabaab will continue to be active in Mogadishu… and will be able to create considerable insecurity in the city and beyond for the time being. It may even “divide labour” and split in an inner – Somali terror cell and a “global jihad” branch that is concerned with terror attacks in the neighbouring countries. “ Dr Hoehne detects evidence of significant changes in the structure and ideology of Al Shabaab since their withdrawal from Mogadishu. He explained how, since May or June 2013 it has purged from its ranks those that stood in the way of its version of jihad, including some senior commanders. “Pragmatists” have given way to “radical purists”
“were those standing for a less extreme course; at least they were not so much in favour of international or “global jihad” but were rather concerned about Somali (national) issues.”
“This again frees capacities and resources to engage in more complex and vicious attacks inside Somalia and in the neighbouring countries…”
“… to interpret divisions within Al Shabaab in binary terms – between nationalists and internationalists – is misleading and simplistic…”
“The findings of the joint mission indicate that Al-Shabaab has deliberately shifted tactics since May 2013, from conventional to asymmetrical warfare, in recovered areas, including the Somali capital. They target particularly the Government, State institutions and the international presence working in Somalia, including the United Nations.”
“Between November 2011 the time when the most recent country guidance case was concluded, and October 2013 the security situation in Mogadishu has changed considerably on several occasions. In fact, as indicated by table 1 below on security related incidents in Mogadishu January 2012 to September 2013 there was a sharp decline in security related incidents between the end of 2012 and early 2013, and an equally sharp rise of such incidents again in the first half of 2013 regarding most forms of security incidents. Only the intensity of armed clashes inside Mogadishu between Al Shabaab and its enemy forces has durably declined since May 2012. This demonstrates that Al Shabaab lost ground in the city since its withdrawal in August 2012… However, the fact that hand grenade attacks, attacks with improvised explosive devices and assassinations/assassination attempts are on the increase again since April or May 2013 shows that Al Shabaab retained a clandestine presence in Mogadishu and actually reorganised its operations in the city.”
“For many years, data on IEDs has lacked proper categorisation and a systematic approach to information gathering, leading to poor quality statistics. Since 2012, IED data categorised and processed has improved leading to a higher number of reported incidents.”
“Somali news reports from December 2012 and January 2013 show that government and army officials in Mogadishu were the main targets of assassinations and bomb attacks and occasional shoot outs. But since around May 2013 many civilians are again falling victim to Al Shabaab attacks. Particularly damaging in this regard were larger scale (suicide) bombings that are on the increase in Mogadishu over the past months. The details on the worst incidents are (set out below).”
“The intensification of Al Shabaab attacks led to many civilian casualties in Mogadishu in recent months,” quoting, in support, the most recent report available at the time by the UN Secretary General on the situation in Somalia, dated3 September 2013 : “There was a surge in violent attacks in the capital. In May and June, hand grenade attacks in Mogadishu doubled compared to the start of the year. There were three times as many bombings in June as in January. Targeted killings occurred almost daily. There were at least four mortar attacks, including two against Villa Somalia on 20 May and 17 June. On 12 July, an improvised explosive device attack against an AMISOM convoy on the airport road in Mogadishu resulted in more than 17 civilian casualties. On 27 July, a complex attack by Al-Shabaab against a facility adjacent to the Turkish Embassy resulted in the death of one Turkish security officer and one civilian, and injured at least eight others. (emphasis added).”
“Al Shabaab are staging increasingly complex attacks in Mogadishu involving a combination of car/truck bombs, suicide bombers, and gunmen […] there are no truly secure districts in Mogadishu. This is particularly the case now. There are now as many, if not more, assassinations and grenade attacks in the city as there were when the city was held by Shabaab. All trends -- grenades, IEDs, running street battles, assassinations, etc -- indicate that security is deteriorating . Some thought that this is just down to the “Ramadan offensive”, but the statistics suggest that this is an ongoing trend from about March this year and that there is no reason to believe it will subside now that Ramadan is over .”
“In a press communiqué dated18 April 2013 , the so called Press Office of Harakat Al- Shabaab Al- Mujahideen claimed responsibility for the killing of “127 Somali intelligence agents, officials and spies in Mogadishu” …”
“However, the high casualty figure appears to be propaganda, since, according to UN statistics, only 22 individuals were assassinated by Al-Shabaab between January and March 2013”
“The use of IEDs as part of Al Shabaab’s tactics aim at fixing AMISOM forces on all their fronts as they expand the area and scope of their military operations. This has both a physical and psychological effect. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM at its vulnerable points while projecting the image that Al Shabaab has a more pervasive presence in Somalia than it does”
“That’s an interpretation of what Al Shabaab thinks. I disagree with that presumption.”
“The Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari, dated16 August 2013 , indicated the continuing massive human rights problems in much of Somalia. In paragraph 40 of his report he stressed that "[…] Before the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu in August 2011, the major concern was civilians caught in crossfire; the new environment [in the reporting period until August 2013] has resulted in displacement due to military operations, increased incidence of sexual violence against women as well of sexual exploitation and abuse, conflict related-detention, targeted assassinations, unlawful killings and the use of improvised explosive devices. He added in paragraph 42 that "[…] available reports indicate that civilian casualties have continued, resulting mostly from aerial attacks, as well as naval and ground engagements by pro-Government forces, including international forces”
“Some reflections on the situation in Somalia After more than 20 tortuous years of armed hostilities, which still continue in some areas, Somalia has reached a turning point. While there is still a long way to go to return to normalcy, there are visible signs of change all around. The palpable improvements in the security situation in Mogadishu and in an increasing number of areas in the country is reflected in the return of an impressive number of people from the diaspora, including businessmen lured by the promises that have been made. Both international and United Nations flights to and from Mogadishu are full. Business activities and construction of buildings are on the rise. Though serious concerns remain about the security situation as a result, for example, of clan infighting in Kismayo and Jubaland, there are clear signs of hope in the air.”
“For the international community Since there is a more committed and popular Government in Mogadishu now, it would be prudent for the international community to provide it with the support it genuinely needs to re-establish Somalia as a normal, cohesive and stable State. The opportunity to break the back of the insurgents is clearly in sight. This can best be achieved if popular backing for the Government and its efforts is enhanced through, among other things, specific support to the Government’s human rights road map. States and other donors may wish to select specific areas likely to be articulated in the road map for priority support and implementation. Somalia should not be allowed to slip back to lawlessness and chaos.”
“In Mogadishu, you have to have a guard. They consider you as a foreigner [coming from abroad and by clan not belonging to the local majority group called Hawiye]. The situation is a little better than three years ago [when Al Shabaab was fully in control]. But still, Al Shabaab is around. They plant bombs, some people get killed. I know myself two Somali women from the diaspora in the UK who visited Mogadishu for summer holidays and got killed in bomb blasts.”
“I do not think everyone would have to pay that. It was a land dispute.”
“… There are reports of Shabaab operatives acting as “guns for hire” by individuals bearing a grudge against people….. Land disputes are also on the rise…. Following the departure of Al-Shabaab from the city many of the Sharia court systems are not operating effectively. So people are taking the law into their own hands.”
“… it is my opinion that upon return to Mogadishu MOJ, who lacks orientation in Mogadishu due to his absence from Somalia for over ten years and who belongs to a clan (Gadabursi) that has no strong presence in Mogadishu and who personally lacks an active and powerful and rich support network (as one diaspora Somali who recently travelled to Mogadishu stated he needed (Mr A) about 15,000 USD for 2 months protection…. will most probably be seriously disoriented and vulnerable in the complex environment of conflict and violence that in this form – involving Al Shabaab attacks – did not exist in the early 2000s when he and his family left Somalia. Without basic orientation and effective protection in Mogadishu, MOJ would be at a very high risk of getting caught in cross fire or being otherwise hurt through bomb attacks or explosives along the way.”
“You are considered to be westernised. It depends very much on your individual behaviour. People who know what has been expected of them on return do not run around inappropriately dressed. It is self-protection. You can do things to avoid problems. But, diaspora returnees are identified by the way they walk etc. The way they dress. Local people can identify diaspera members. Some things are out of your hands. You need to be up to date with language. There has been considerable dialectical change. Somalia and dialects of Somalia. All know a form of Somali in southern version vocabulary -- too many English words. You would not find the right words immediately.”
“Mogadishu — Somalis who have returned to their homeland from abroad have shrugged off al-Shabaab's recent threats that it would target them because they "have been taught garbage and sins, and have lost [their] religion and are being used [to spread evil]." Al-Shabaab commander Ali Mohamed Hussein, known as Ali Jesto, made the announcement December 29th, saying the returnees "will be killed and fought against in the same manner" that al-Shabaab fights against the Somali government. "They are working for the infidels, and since they are working for the infidels, they are the same as the infidels they are working for as far as we are concerned," he said. Hussein also warned Somalis to stay away from government buildings, public venues frequented by government officials, and from foreign aid agencies and their workers as they all would be targeted in the group's attacks. Days later, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a New Year's Day twin bombing at the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu that killed at least 10 people and injured many more. Returnees unshaken by al-Shabaab threats: Khadija Ali, a 38-year-old mother who returned from England in 2013 to visit her sick mother in Mogadishu, told Sabahi she does not think much of the threats, and says the terrorism brought about by al-Shabaab cannot chase returnees away. "I am advising every diaspora returnee to persevere through any threat that comes from the terrorist groups so that they are defeated," she said. "We should not be demoralised. What they want is for us to become demoralised and flee our country, and we will never accept that." "Al-Shabaab will end up fleeing the country if we persevere," Ali said. Ahmed Salad Kulmiye, a 60-year-old who returned to Somalia in 2013 from England to collaborate with local youth-based organisations in capacity building projects, said al-Shabaab's threats against the diaspora will not change their commitment to work in their country. "They want to isolate the government from the people, but I do not think that is possible," Kulmiye said, commenting on the warning the militants issued against citizens who seek services at government buildings. Kulmiye challenged al-Shabaab's claims that returning Somalis are engaging in sinful acts and said those statements were excuses for the group to justify their unlawful actions. "There are no [night] clubs to dance or do other bad things [in Somalia], and I also have not seen any places to drink alcohol," he said, adding that Somalis will turn a deaf ear to the militants' threats. Rowda Abdi, a 55-year-old returnee from England who opened an electrical appliances store in Mogadishu's Hamar Weyne district, told Sabahi the country's progress should not be hampered by the threats from al-Shabaab or the explosions that take place in Mogadishu.”
“SOMALIA: Mogadishu on the up MOGADISHU ,18 May 2012 (IRIN) - It is Friday morning in Mogadishu and Lido beach presents a scene reminiscent of seaside towns around the world. At the top of the beach, women sit with their wares, selling water and ice-lollies from cool-boxes. The middle-beach is dominated by young men playing football using driftwood as goalposts. At the water's edge, boys and girls, the latter heedless of their long flowing garments, hurl themselves into the waves or bob on the surface like apples. "We're on holiday", says Ibrahim, a Londoner in his twenties who was born in northern Somalia. Ibrahim is travelling in a group of 20, all from the UK. "We came here for the beaches", he said. On the road behind him, blue lettering advertises the Indian Ocean Star, a new beach-front restaurant and bar. Bashir Osman has facilitated journalist visits for years and now plans to capitalize on the swelling ranks of visitors like Ibrahim who are choosing, for both business and personal reasons, to come to bullet-ridden Mogadishu. Osman has purchased 500-metres of beachfront land a few kilometres south of the international airport compound, where he hopes to open a restaurant and eventually a hotel. His infectious fondness for Mogadishu belies a strong philanthropic streak. People are returning and reconstruction is under way. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 3,800 people returned to Mogadishu in March alone. From afar the city glints with shiny new tin roofs dotted among dust-covered ruins and camps. Private operators are offering electricity in the old town for US$30 a month. Fishermen are enjoying a healthy demand for shark-fins from Dubai and the Middle East, with a shark fetching as much as$500 . Building materials lie in piles on street corners, where camel's milk and cappuccino vendors ply their wares. International NGO and diplomatic missions are also coming back - according to a UN source, Britain has already identified the plot for its permanent diplomatic base on the airport compound - and property prices have spiked. According to Osman, a 100-square metre plot near K4 in the city centre sold recently for$2million . "The key is security", said Abdullahi Godah Barre, minister for planning and international cooperation, of the city's renovation. While African Union troops have largely taken Mogadishu and continue to push beyond the city limits to secure outlying areas where Al-Shabab operatives remain obdurately in place, the Somali capital is still in counter-terrorism mode, and kidnap and ransom, improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombers remain an everyday threat.”
“Mogadishu — Twin explosions have rocked a restaurant near the Lido resort beach in Mogadishu, Friday killing two people including the suicide bomber and wounding seven others. According to witnesses, the first attack was by a suicide bomber wearing a vest packed with explosives that blew up inside the restaurant but only killing the perpetrator. The second explosion was a car packed full of explosives which killed one person and wounded seven others and destroyed the perimeter walls. Ahmed Hassan, who was at the restaurant, says that the situation turned quickly to chaos after huge explosion with smoke and dust filling the whole restaurant. The attack is the second in the area in less than three weeks. The restaurants along the Lido beach are usually crowded on Muslim weekends with families enjoying the beach, playing football or swimming .”
“But people here are sensing the moment and seizing it. More than 300,000 residents have come back to the city in the last six months….. The economic boom, fuelled by an infusion of tens of millions of dollars, much of it from Somalis flocking home from overseas, is spawning thousands of jobs that are beginning to absorb young militiamen eager to get out of the killing business…”
“Two suicide bombers in Somalia appear to have targeted a second restaurant owned by a British-Somali businessman. Witnesses say that four people, including the two alleged bombers were killed on Saturday in twin explosions near the Village Restaurant in Mogadishu. A guard who stopped the bombers from entering the building was killed in the attack, along with a civilian. A total of 10 people were wounded. The restaurant is popular with government officials, journalists and politicians. In September, two suicide bombers attacked another co-owned Village Restaurant in the capital, killing 15 people. At least three journalists were among those killed, including the Somali National Television director. The African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia (AMISOM) said it suspected al-Shabab militants were behind the September attack. The al-Qaida-linked group controlled parts of the capital until last year when it was driven out by Somali and AMISOM forces. However, the militant group has continued to launch attacks in the region.”
“Al Shabaab may well get economic returnees who try to make a difference. Al Shabaab said they potentially see returnees as opponents. All those documents show that Al Shabaab has a clear strategy of targeting dispora returnees who try to make a difference. These attacks all carry high risk of killing targeted at returnees who identify themselves as visible by opening restaurants -- encouraging women to swim with men which makes much anger for Al Shabaab.”
“Popular hang outs for the Somali diaspora are one of the main targets in Mogadishu at the moment. There have been a number of attacks on restaurants. I was in Mogadishu when the last attack occurred on the Maka Al-Mukarama Hotel…. The Village chain of restaurants have been attacked three times now!”
“Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for the blast. "The target of the attack was apostate security forces and officials. The attack was successful," the group's spokesman for military operations, Sheikh Abulaziz Abu Muscab, told Al Jazeera. … Al-Shabab have said that they will keep up their campaign against the new government…”
“… it features statements by the head of the Somali military court and the minister of defence that clearly indicate that looting and abuses of civilians by Somali soldiers is a serious problem.”
“They saw the need to set up the court. How I interpreted this was that there must have been sufficient cases so they had to act.”
“Moreover, clan protection does not function automatically. In the face of ideological confrontations the “clan front” tends to get porous and sometimes crumbles. This means that if confronted with Al Shabab, for instance, clan support often does not really help or even materialise, since the ideology of the group in many ways opposes clan belonging and divisions. It emphasises the unity of all (true) Muslims. Clans support and protection is also sometimes dependent on the "value" a clan members has for the community. If a person is, for instance, very poor, a drug addict, a notorious criminal or a prostitute, relatives will not or only unwillingly offer support and protection.”
“Clan identity in Mogadishu and the surroundings has been cemented in the past 20 -- 30 years. It is the most important social construct in the city and is therefore one of the most important factors to consider when arranging security.”
“It depends upon your profile. You may be able to have just good friends or relations to protect you. If you are high profile or involved in a high value legal case you may want additional security.”
“Most clans and sub-clans have their own neighbourhoods in Mogadishu. Bigger clans have their own districts with District Commissioners representing that clan. Mogadishu is heavily dominated by the Hawiye clan. Non-Hawiye clans – such as the Gadabursi – will often be confined to smaller neighbourhoods where they can rely on the support of their fellow clansmen.”
“I think they remain IDPs. If they stay for years and marry a local girl and sell their other property it is possible, but my thinking is that they are IDPs.”
“A tiny proportion. 89% are poor. The remaining 20% will be a bit better than being poor. A little better than “barely surviving”
“In south central Somalia 89 percent of people are poor across several dimensions, compared to 75 percent in Puntland and 72 percent in Somaliland.”
“The divide between urban and rural populations is significant – 61 percent and 94 percent respectively.”
“A very tiny fraction of the elite. The vast majority of people are struggling to survive…”
“I do not think so. What is a definition of durable? The government was formed in second half of 2012. There were large financial pledges in 2013 and substantial development construction started in 2012 and early 2013. All this could be undone within weeks if Al Shabaab mounted -- if they established a larger force -- managed to recruit more fighters. If they get more support from Al Qaeda -- more finance.”
“ Maybe that is a speculative answer by me.”
“I speak on an almost daily basis to contacts in South Central Somalia, including members of central and regional governments, think tanks, non-governmental organisations, the security forces and other armed groups, including the Islamist group, Al-Shabaab.”
“When the tribunal looked at the situation in Mogadishu for the last Somali Country Guidance Case (November 2011), it found that “there remains a real risk of Article 15(c) harm for the majority of those returning to that city after a significant period of time abroad” unless that person is “connected with powerful actors or belonging to a category of middle class or professional persons, who can live to a reasonable standard in circumstances where the Article 15(c) risk, which exists for the great majority of the population, does not apply”
“By withdrawing from most towns and cities, Al Shabaab no longer has to concentrate its resources on conventional battles and holding frontlines. This change of tactics has helped the group cope with the loss of some of its key sources of revenue, especially Mogadishu’s Bakara market…” … “The security situation in Mogadishu has changed significantly since Al Shabaab’s abrupt withdrawal from the city in August 2011. There are no longer running battles involving heavy weaponry between Al Shabaab and government troops, backed by African Union forces and Western security advisors. But the city remains dangerous, with regular acts of violence carried out by Al Shabaab, the Somali security services and other armed groups and individuals. Civilians are often caught up in the violence. …. The violence has become more unpredictable because a conventional war is no longer being fought. Mogadishu is no longer a city of frontlines; attacks can happen almost anywhere at any time. …. Al Shabaab has changed tactics in Mogadishu, in some ways reverting to what it does best, which is asymmetrical, insurgent style warfare. It carries out regular attacks, using suicide bombers, car bombs, grenades and improvised explosive devices. The scale, sophistication and regularity of these attacks has increased in Mogadishu in 2013. … According to the lawyer […] who works for a Mogadishu-based think tank, “there are only a few areas in Mogadishu that are considered safe”
“Civilians often bear the brunt of the violence, as many of the attacks occur in public places, including restaurants, hotels, roads and roundabouts. Civilian casualties have also been high in attacks on government and foreign targets, or on specific individuals…”
“It is now ramming cars packed with explosives into public buildings, government offices and the premises of international organisations. Armed men, often wearing suicide vests, then storm the buildings, shooting and throwing grenades before blowing themselves up. An example of this type of assault occurred on7 September 2013 , when Al Shabaab attacked The Village restaurant in central Mogadishu. First, a car bomb exploded outside the premises, then a suicide bomber blew himself up in the crowd of civilians who had rushed to help. About 30 people were killed.”
“The Mogadishu-based Lawyer […] said “It is a well known fact that Bakara is controlled by Al Shabaab, and that many explosions and killings happen there on a daily basis.”
“Although Al Shabaab does not control Bakara market in the sense of having fighters openly patrolling the area by day, it retains a powerful influence there, and in a number of other districts, not only because it continues to carry out acts of violence there, but because it still to some extent controls people’s minds, and therefore the way they behave. However, it does not control the economy of Bakara market in the same way it did when it occupied most of Mogadishu.”
“It is difficult to know who is an Al Shabaab sympathiser. From my own experience in 2012 walking around Bakara market surrounded by five or six security guards, people showing me around who were very familiar with the area would sometimes point out people who were Al Shabaab. I witnessed the police roughing up a young boy who was carrying plastic bags. I was angry – why are you beating him? They showed me in the bag – stuff to make an explosive device.”
“Deportees and returnees would also be vulnerable to recruitment by Al Shabaab, either by force or voluntarily. It is very difficult to find employment in Mogadishu and elsewhere in South Central Somalia, especially for those who are stigmatised such as people with criminal records deported from the West. Such people might gravitate towards Al Shabaab because it offers an occupation and a monthly wage.”
“Members of the diaspora have often been used as suicide bombers by Al Shabaab, which has established special training camps for this purpose.”
“explained how his brother joined Al Shabaab, how minorities such as the Jareer join Al Shabaab because it enables them to seek revenge, how Al Shabaab gets people to join by saying they have relatives in the group …”
“It depends how you define forced recruitment. Al Shabaab does not now go into schools and public places and forcibly recruit. But members of the security forces and others have described ways in which Al Shabaab recruits informants or people who can carry out activities for them in Mogadishu. For example, Al Shabaab recruits from the security forces. They go to a house or the place where they stay and say in front of their family to the person: we will not hurt you or your family if you provide information. Assistance through intimidation. How would Al Shabaab do what it does without getting good information?”
“… If a member of a minority clan they are told – Al Shabaab does not discriminate in terms of clan – everyone is equal in the eyes of Allah - so one way to elevate social status or even to get revenge for violence to the family in the past when minority clans suffered- was to join Al Shabaab. Also, people are offered financial rewards for doing particular things for Al Shabaab.”
“According to the Home Office Operational Guidance Note of September 2013 “There are about 10,000 militiamen in Mogadishu who are not formally integrated into government forces”
“That is not their role. In the current context that is not what they do…”
“I really do not know who these people would include. Some might be Al Shabaab members with access to arms. Militiamen includes bodyguards.”
“Clanism has made a vigorous return and today is the most powerful driver of political calculations and group behaviour”
“Is there any evidence of armed conflict between clans in Mogadishu?”
“Not in Mogadishu. You hear exchanges of gunfire and you are told: sub-clan; sub-clan. But documented examples are elusive. In Mogadishu, apart from incidents that are quite minor, I have not seen evidence of inter-clan violence.”
“A majority of respondents said that disputes arising from clan based conflicts “never or almost never occur”.”
“The security forces are frequently accused of abusing civilians”: (pages 34-38 COIR Aug 2013”) But it should be noted, which her report did not, that the following sentence is found in the same section of that source material: “Abuses by undisciplined elements of the Somali National Security Forces against civilians were also reported during the period, although these are said to have decreased in recent times.”
“…it is impossible to obtain accurate casualty figures for Mogadishu…”
“If extrapolated for the whole year, the casualty figures for 2013 would be 4667, which is less than the previous year but still high. …. It is important to stress that these figures are incomplete and do not give a reliable picture of the situation in Mogadishu”
“ We can’t know how many people killed or injured are not taken to hospital – there are few ambulances; nature of injury-not worth it; long queues at hospital; the need to pay. I don’t know what proportion of those injured in Mogadishu appear in these statistics. … “All figures coming out of Somalia about people injured and killed are unreliable and incomplete.”
“A person who is returned or deported to Somalia, especially one with no known family, would in all likelihood end up living in one of the 500 camps for the internally displaced in Mogadishu. Some squat in damaged buildings, but this is becoming more difficult as the Somali government and others start to re-claim property they see as rightfully theirs. A person with limited family without political, social and financial resources would be in a similar position.”
“Economic recovery is slow and barely reaching the most vulnerable communities in Somalia. The cost of living is soaring. Infrastructure is in shambles. Land disputes are common and often violent. The Somali government and private landlords are now forcefully evicting IDPS in Mogadishu, many of whom recently arrived and have nowhere else to go.”
“Bulk of the city? Even by the standards of African cities of countries affected by conflict, Mogadishu, of cities I have visited, is on another level. … In 2012 what struck me is that almost every patch of spare ground had “igloos” where displaced people live. Made of sticks, cloth, plastic, metal. Not tents. Dwellings. Crammed into patches of spare ground, closely together. Inside there is just sand or cardboard or plastic on the ground. … Off the main roads the road disappears into sand and it is easy to get lost and many panic when into a dead end. It’s like being in a video game about a city devastated by war. Except for the glamorous parts and Bakara Market that are rebuilt.”
“From information I obtained from a journalist in Mogadishu those only left Somalia 1-3 years ago and they had families in Mogadishu and a lot were doing all they could to get back to Saudi.”
“It does not mean they are coming back for good – many leave after one or two years. I do not know of any members of the diaspora who came back to live in Mogadishu. They may come for holidays or to have their children circumcised if they are girls.”
“A returnee from Europe or the US would be presumed to have money or access to money, and so would therefore be at risk of being robbed, or abducted or subjected to threats of violence for the purpose of extortion.”
“Mohamed Mahamoud Sheik decided to start it when he returned home recently to Mogadishu after years abroad. He told the BBC the city's security had improved in the last 10 months, since Islamist militants were pushed out by African Union and government forces. ... The Islamist al-Shabab militia, which is fighting the UN-backed interim government, still controls much of the south of the country, but since it was forced from Mogadishu, the city is coming back to life. People are going to the beach, opening restaurants, hotels and other businesses. … "Because the city is more peaceful now, everybody is running to find a place to open a business. Getting a building is really hard in Mogadishu these days because there is so much competition for space." Although most al-Shabab fighters have been driven out of Mogadishu, the city is by no means safe. Suicide and other attacks are common. Government officials have provided Mr Sheik with one guard at night and two during the day”
“Such reports may give the court the impression that conditions are safe for all Somalis to return. I would caution against this interpretation since the conditions for these returnees and a potential removal or deportee are very different. The situation in Mogadishu… is by no means safe, especially for those without significant resources, both in terms of financial means, and in terms of having wealthy and powerful relatives and other contacts.”
“Somalis deported from the United Kingdom face possible violence from Al Shabaab which considers as a spy anyone returning from a Western Country. The group considers returnees from the West to be in a state of apostasy, and therefore subject to punishment. It executes some of those it suspects of spying”
“According to the Norwegian Landinfo and Danish Immigration Service’s report of 2013 “It would be extremely difficult to return to Mogadishu if you have no one to rely on return to Mogadishu if you have no one to rely on when you come back”.”
“Diaspora returning from abroad According to UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, many people from the diaspora have returned to Mogadishu also, because they see business opportunities. In general, there is no discrimination for the sole reason of belonging to the returning Diaspora. Regarding returns from the Diaspora, an international agency, Nairobi, explained that ordinary people returning to Mogadishu and other locations in S/C Somalia are citing improvements in the security situation as some of the reasons for returns. Others have also been shocked by what they see when they come back, especially those who have been abroad for many years. An international agency, Nairobi, explained that Mogadishu is now a “buzz”, people are going around minding their own business and there is an increasing freedom of movement for everyone. Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Mogadishu, explained that there is an increasing number of Somalis retuning to Mogadishu from abroad as compared to October 2012. However, the 14 April [2013] attack may result in a slight decrease for the time being as many will give it a second thought before going back to Mogadishu. A representative of a Diaspora organisation in Mogadishu explained that those who are returning to Mogadishu and other locations in S/C Somalia are mostly resourceful people who see opportunities, have business to do and/or seek political influence and positions. It would be extremely difficult to return to Mogadishu if you have no one to rely on when you come back. The representative stated that an increasing number of Somalis are returning. Safety and security are issues to consider before you return as there are frictions between those who stayed behind and those who are now returning from their refuge abroad. The Diaspora is being perceived as competitors as they may take up jobs from the locals and their increasing presence in Mogadishu has resulted in price increases in goods as well as on properties. … The representative of a Diaspora organisation in Mogadishu explained that the first three months in Mogadishu are the hardest for a returned member of the Diaspora. However, most people from the Diaspora are staying despite the difficulties they may face during the first few months. On the other hand, a number of returnees are going back to their country of asylum because they could not find a job in Mogadishu. Males as well as females are returning to Mogadishu.”
“I only saw one person who had set up a tailoring business. I did not see other economic activity.”
“Civilians returning to Mogadishu after a significant period of absence would be at increased risk of serious harm because they would not know how to navigate their way around the city, which has been in a state of conflict for 23 years. This is partly because the conflict has dramatically altered the physical geography of the city, but also because the nature of clan, politics and risk has changed, and continues to change, often at a rapid rate. An individual who has been absent for a significant period of time would not be familiar with the current workings of clan and politics, and would not know how to assess risk. Such a person would also not know how to behave in such a way as to possibly reduce their risk of harm.”
“A person with no recent experience of Mogadishu would not be aware that it is not a good idea to speak about Al Shabaab in public, and that it is best to avoid government buildings, and restaurants, hotels and other places frequented by government workers, security officials, members of the diaspora and foreigners. As one former politician and powerful business man said “I survive in Mogadishu because I don’t go to government buildings, I don’t talk about A l Shabaab and I don ’ t write about Al Shabaab. ”
“It would be unwise to speak of AS or the government. Best to avoid being close to AMISOM or soldiers as they are at risk of attack. Avoid being near certain hotels and restaurants. Avoid giving “attitude” or speaking in a rude way to soldiers. If a woman, should dress in a particular way, covered up. If a man should not be so casual in dress. Should not listen to certain types of music. So many subtle forms of behaviour that could invite aggression …”
“Somalis who have returned from the diaspora tell me they are recognised as returnees for many different reasons. They say their dress is different, with men wearing Western-style shirts, shoes and trousers instead of the traditional Somali sarong and flip flops….”
“If the family unit is there in Mogadishu, if that person was involved with criminal activities in the UK they may reject them. Some families live in igloos or smashed up buildings. The immediate family would I believe receive that person.”
“But people here are sensing the moment and seizing it. More than 300,000 residents have come back to the city in the past six months, local aid groups say, and many are cheerfully carting away chunks of rubble and resurrecting their bullet riddled homes. The economic boom, fuelled by an infusion of tens of millions of dollars, much of it from Somalis flocking from overseas, is spawning thousands of jobs that are beginning to absorb young militiamen eager to get out of the killing business. Given Mogadishu’s importance to the country, it all adds up to a huge opportunity. And though Somalia has self-destructed numerous times before, Augustine Mahiga, the head of the United Nations political office for Somalia, along with so many others here insisted that this time really is different. Somalia, they contend, is finally turning around…”
“Conclusion 27. In light of the overall situation in South Central Somalia (outside Mogadishu) , UNHCR considers that, on the whole, an IFA or IRA would not be relevant or reasonable given, in particular, the existence of widespread violence and prevalent human rights violations, the physical risks and legal or physical barriers encountered in reaching other areas, as well as the serious difficulties faced in accessing basic services and ensuring economic survival in a situation of displacement. 28. With regard to Mogadishu , the personal circumstances of an individual need to be carefully assessed. UNHCR considers an IFA/IRA as reasonable only where the individual can expect to benefit from meaningful nuclear and/or extended family support and clan protection mechanisms in the area of prospective relocation. When assessing the reasonableness of an IFA/IRA in Mogadishu in an individual case, it should be kept in mind that the traditional extended family and community structures of Somali society no longer constitute as strong a protection and coping mechanism in Mogadishu as they did in the past. Additionally, whether the members of the traditional networks are able to genuinely offer support to the applicant in practice also needs to be evaluated, especially given the fragile and complex situation in Mogadishu at present. 29. For the following categories of Somalis, UNHCR would consider that an IFA/IRA will not be reasonably available in the absence of meaningful nuclear and/or extended family support and functioning clan protection: unaccompanied children or adolescents at risk of forced recruitment and other grave violations; young males at risk of being considered Al Shabaab sympathizers and therefore facing harassment from government security forces; elderly people; people with physical or mental disabilities; single women and female single heads of households with no male protection and especially originating from minority clans. In any other exceptional cases, in which the application of an IFA/IRA in Mogadishu is considered even in the absence of meaningful family or clan support to the individual, the person would need to have access to infrastructure and livelihood opportunities and to other meaningful protection and support mechanisms, taking into account the state institutions’ limited ability to provide security and meaningful protection.”
“Civilians still bear the brunt of continued fighting in Somalia. While the number of civilian casualties treated in referral hospitals in Mogadishu decreased by 33%, compared with the same period in 2012, as many as 1,500 weapon-related injuries were treated in those hospitals during the reporting period.”
“… having regard to the available figures and the change in tactics of both sides since AMM (which crucially includes the demise of large scale shelling), the SSHD submits that there is no evidence that ordinary civilians are being deliberately targeted by suicide attacks. None of the three experts cited documentary evidence to the contrary. For example, Dr Mullen’s examples, given in evidence in chief, focussed on attacks on politicians, police officers, international aid workers, etc., i.e. individuals who can legitimately be described as having a profile higher than that of the ordinary civilian. Dr Mullen’s use of “indiscriminate” must therefore be put in context; he appears to be speaking of directed attacks by AS which, in some cases, resulted in collateral injury to ordinary civilians.”
“Hamar Weyne is the old part of town, but today most of its original fair-skinned inhabitants have left to safer areas, and it is largely inhabited by wealthy IDPs.”
“Diversion of funds by gatekeepers is endemic. For example, the Monitoring Group has obtained evidence showing the existence of “ghost camps” that are operated by gatekeepers and supported by international assistance. One such camp in the Karaan District of Mogadishu was supposedly home to 3200 families and supported since 2011 by UN agencies. In April 2012, UN officials visited the camp and found in addition to the gatekeeper only a few women present with 20 to 30 shelters occupied by watchmen…”
“Potential Risk Profiles: 1. Individuals associated with, or (perceived as) supportive of the SFG and the international community, including the AMISOM forces; 2. Individuals (perceived as) contravening Islamic Sharia and decrees imposed by Al-Shabaab, including converts from Islam, other “apostates” and moderate Islamic scholars who have criticized Al-Shabaab extremism; 3. Individuals (perceived as) opposing the SFG and related interests and individuals (suspected of) supporting armed anti-Government groups; 4. Individuals in certain professions such as journalists, members of the judiciary, humanitarian workers and human rights activists, teachers and staff of educational facilities, business people and other people (perceived to be) of means; 5. Individuals (at risk of being) forcibly recruited; 6. Members of minority groups such as members of the Christian religious minority and members of minority clans; 7. Individuals belonging to a clan engaged in a blood feud; 8. Women and girls; 9. Children; 10. Victims and persons at risk of trafficking; 11. Sexual and/or gender non-conforming persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals); 12. Persons with a mental disability or suffering from mental illness.”
“[they] have been taught garbage and sins, and have lost [their] religion and are being used to [spread evil]; and because Commander Hussein of Al Shabaab is reported to have said that returnees “will be killed and fought against in the same manner that Al Shabaab fights against the Somali Government.”
“[The Benadir National Security Agency Commander] said 3,000 people were released after police investigations determined they were innocent. “We will continue with the investigations we are conducting in the city until we secure the city” he said.” … “The operations also led to the confiscation of landmines, bombs and ammunition for heavy weapons such as bazookas, AK47s and other automatic machineguns…”
“We were about 20 people and they took us to the headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID)…. They did not harm us. They asked us questions like where we lived and what our occupations were. We were detained for about five hours in the CID jail, and finally they released 16 of us.” “Benadir Deputy Governor for security Affairs… said security forces have made a concerted effort to protect Mogadishu. “The city of Mogadishu is the heart of the country. If it becomes peaceful, all the regions of the country will be peaceful… Security in Mogadishu has been improving day by day since Al-Shabaab was expelled from the city in August 2011. Security forces are ready to eliminate the remnants.”
“Freedom of movement in Mogadishu has improved considerably since February 2012 according to Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA. There are no longer visible checkpoints in the city centre of Mogadishu. However, there are a lot of invisible checkpoints, but even these do not affect the freedom of movement for UN agencies. Today there are only checkpoints in the outlying areas of Mogadishu… … Ayaki Ito, UNHCR, confirms that the number of checkpoints in Mogadishu has been reduced considerably [since February 2012]. However, it is common to see a person from the local militia at important street corners for him to check if someone unknown is passing by. These are the so-called invisible check checkpoints. A representative of an international organisation explains that there are checkpoints in Mogadishu and one cannot exclude the possibility that al-Shabaab disguised as soldiers are manning them… An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (B) explained that there are still checkpoints in Mogadishu, but these are mainly in place to tax the trucks going into the city… … An international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) stated that today people are moving more freely around Mogadishu than during the previous five to six years. People are now going to the Bakara market… … There are far less checkpoints in Mogadishu than in February 2012, and the existing ones tend to be government checkpoints according to Tony Burns.
“…The UNHCR estimates that 184,400 IDPs are in settlements in Mogadishu as of July 2012. The majority of the IDPs surveyed (55%) arrived in the city between 6 and 12 months prior to the April survey, which coincides with the peak of the famine crisis that hit southern Somalia between June and October 2011. … …the large majority of IDPs originating from the nearby famine stricken regions. However, the proportion of people displaced inside the city seems to have decreased (20% to 12%), which can be attributed to the improved security situation in Mogadishu.”
“This report is based on more than a year’s research, including 70 interviews with newly arrived persons displaced from South Central Somalia by the 2011 2012 famine and fighting in some of the main IDP camps and settlements in Mogadishu. It examines the situation of displaced people in Mogadishu from the height of the famine in July 2011 through November 2012 and it describes the abuses faced by these people who are often silenced by those bent on exploiting their vulnerability. Throughout this period members of displaced communities in Mogadishu faced serious human rights abuses including rape, beatings, ethnic discrimination, restricted access to food and shelter, restrictions on movement, and reprisals when they dared to protest their mistreatment. The most serious abuses were committed by the various militias and security forces, often affiliated with the government, operating within or near camps and settlements for the displaced. Frequently these militias were linked or controlled by managers, or “gatekeepers” as they are known, of the IDP camp.”
“UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, confirmed that someone in Mogadishu will not be at risk today solely because he/she is of a different clan, although clan dynamics in combination with other factors are an important element when considering risk, including for the IDP population. It is obvious that one is safer when he or she is residing in an area dominated by his or her own clan or if one has good relations with a dominating clan.”
“Regarding access to livelihood in Mogadishu, UNHCR-Somalia explained that the presence of nuclear family is a requirement for livelihood support, as the clan will not help with livelihood.”
“To address this issue, WHO-Somalia in collaboration with the local health authorities provided medicines to mental health care services and expanded the charge free initiative. This initiative that addresses the rights of the mentally ill by advocating for charge free hospitals, chain free homes and charge free environment is well-established in Mogadishu and Hargeisa and will start in Bossaso in 2011.”
“The position is, therefore, that whilst AS has shifted its tactics away from conventional warfare, its use of symmetrical warfare has evolved and become more sophisticated over time. The consequence of this has been an increase in the number and complexity of asymmetrical attacks with a corresponding increase in the number of civilian casualties in proportion to the overall number of casualties…”
“…In areas which were soon-to-be seized from the group by Federal Government forces, attacks on civilians accused of spying appear to have increased…. Similarly, in many areas which were recently seized from the group remained vulnerable to indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations such as bombings in marketplaces”
“… the intensity of conflict appears to have reduced somewhat, with reported fatalities dropping slightly over the course of the year. While event levels reached a historic peak in 2013, reported fatalities have remained relatively low and stable over the course of the year…”
“where a previous assessment has resulted in a conclusion that the population generally or certain sections of it may be at risk, any assessment that the material circumstances have changed would need to demonstrate that such changes are well-established evidentially and durable.”
“Somalia‘s long-running armed conflict continues to leave civilians dead, wounded, and displaced in large numbers. Although the Islamist armed group al-Shabaab lost ground in 2012, abandoning control of key towns such as Beletweyne, Baidoa, and the strategic port city of Kismayo, it continues to carry out attacks and targeted killings, including in the capital, Mogadishu.…Civilians continue to be killed and wounded by crossfire, particularly during infighting between TFG forces over control of roadblocks, and by improvised explosive devices and grenade attacks primarily by al-Shabaab fighters. Al-Shabaab carried out several high-profile suicide attacks in Mogadishu including one on September 20 that killed at least 18 people, including three journalists.‘ The UN Security Council‘s Report of the Secretary General, published on31 May 2013 and covering events of16 January 2013 to15 May 2013 , (UNSC Report May 2013) stated that the security situation remained fragile during the reporting period. Despite some improvements in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab continued to launch asymmetrical attacks on soft targets using terrorist tactics that often resulted in civilian casualties. Targeted killings and attacks were routinely reported. The number of incidents involving improvised explosive devices rose in 2013 in comparison with 2012.”
“Al Shabaab terrorists attacks remained constant” but should have completed the sentence to put it into its intended context: “In the Mogadishu area, Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained constant, though many were prevented or failed as pressure mounted from reinforced Government and AMISOM forces.”
“While Somali forces and AMISOM continue to make territorial gains, asymmetrical insurgent attacks pose a substantial threat ….I remain deeply concerned about grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.”
“I remain deeply concerned about grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, especially against women and children. I urge all parties to ensure that the protection of civilians is integrated into all military operations. … I am encouraged by the Transitional Federal Government’s continued commitment to prevent the recruitment and use of children by its armed forces…”
“… On 24 January, for example, a device hit a convoy carrying two United Nations personnel, who were unharmed.”
“The political, security and development gains made so far in Somalia are still reversible…” and: “The mission concluded that the political progress made over the past year and the military gains against Al Shabaab that have been achieved in recent years are at serious risk of being reversed. The findings of the joint mission indicate that AS has deliberately shifted tactics since May 2013 from convention to asymmetrical warfare, in recovered areas, including the Somali capital. They target particularly the Government, State institutions and the international presence working in Somalia, including the UN…. In addition to causing the death of many innocent civilians, including women and children, the deterioration in the security situation threatens to undermine the fragile Somali political process…”
“The security situation in Mogadishu remained relatively unstable during the reporting period…”
“The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali national security forces continued to thwart Al-Shabaab attacks almost daily in and around Mogadishu.”
“An increase in criminal activities was observed during the reporting period, including the establishment of illegal check points, robberies and extortion of drivers and owners of public transportation vehicles. In addition, abuses against civilians by undisciplined elements of the Somali national security forces were reported, mainly on the outskirts of Mogadishu and Kismayo.”
“According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia (D) there are areas of Mogadishu which are more or less controlled by al-Shabaab, but only during night-time. Al-Shabaab is not visible at daytime.. This is especially the case in Deynile district…”
“However, people in general find that other areas of Mogadishu are safer than ever since the civil war began in 1991.”
“Al-Shabaab continues to cause significant harm to civilians through its indiscriminate use of weapons. According to available data for 2012, Al-Shabaab increased the use of victim-activated pressure-plate improvised explosive devices, while the reported number of civilian casualties resulting from suicide attacks in Somalia also rose sharply. In addition, Al-Shabaab persistently practices targeted assassinations of civilians accused of spying or as a punishment for their apparent allegiances, and systematic intimidation of local communities through restrictions on movement, imposition of taxation and strict application of sharia law.”
“… According to UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) data, 28 IEDs detonated in Mogadishu during the course of 2011, resulting in 116 deaths out of 378 casualties. Between 1 January and24 September 2012 the number of IEDs detonated in Mogadishu increased to 32, resulting in 62 deaths out of 235 casualties.”
“The traditional extended family and community structures of Somali society no longer constitute as strong a protection and coping mechanisms they did in the past, particularly in locations such as Mogadishu… In Mogadishu in particular the nuclear family has reportedly become the main protection mechanism.”
“Al-Shabaab believes returnees from the West to be in a state of apostasy, and therefore subject to punishment,”
“ the fact of having come from the United Kingdom is, as a general matter, likely to elevate the risk to a person of being branded a spy, which carries the very real risk of serious ill-treatment or death. The only exception we would make is where the returnee is seeking out Al-Shabab in order to join its ranks as a fighter for international jihad…”
“When asked if there are reports of returnees from abroad being harassed or kidnapped for ransom on arrival in Mogadishu a local NGO(C) in Mogadishu stated that people see those returning [from] abroad as a peace sign and no one abducts them, … An international NGO (B) stated that in general terms there is no negative attitude towards returnees in Mogadishu… Kidnappings used to happen in the past but these days it’s threats in order to get money. These threats would not be made in areas controlled by the TFG but local militias might demand so called protection money from a returnee. Especially returning persons perceived to be wealthy would be at risk of receiving threats and they would often need to buy protection from armed groups.”
“Regarding the security situation on Mogadishu Kilian Kleinschmidt, OCHA, Mogadishu, stated that a dramatic improvement has taken place since February 2012. Today there are less gunfire and no artillery. These are simple indicators which demonstrate a process from war to tremendous improvements in security. However, there are still many security challenges as there are incidents, including grenade attacks every night…”
“terrorist attacks remained constant … asymmetrical insurgent attacks pose a substantial threat”
“In the Mogadishu area, Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained constant, though many were prevented or failed as pressure mounted from reinforced Government and AMISOM forces.”
“the target of the attack was apostate security forces and officials”
“We attacked this particular place because it is a base for government”
“The group said it had attacked the Village restaurant because it is frequented by Somali MPs.” and that: “The Village, about 1 km from the Presidential Palace… is popular with journalists and those in political circles.” this being confirmed by another BBC News report, also dated7 September 2013 : “the restaurant was popular with government workers and journalists and has been targeted before.”
“We are behind today’s blasts”, al Shabaab’s spokesman for military operations, Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, told Reuters. “Government officials, military forces, workers and their security always meet there. We had targeted it even before today and we shall continue targeting it.”
“It is true also that Al Shabaab and other agents of serious harm target high profile individuals and they target venues that are not usually frequented by civilians…”
“Though violence remains a daily reality, Saferworld’s Mogadishu-wide survey in July 2012 found that an overwhelming 93 per cent of respondents reported an improvement in the security situation in the past 12 months, with 4.5 per cent saying it had remained the same and only one per cent reporting a deterioration. Fifteen per cent said that security had improved in the past three months, 33 per cent noted improvement in the last six months and 22 per cent said the last nine months were improved.”
“An increase in African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop levels to more than 17,000 as of July 2012, along with better coordination between AMISOM and TGF officials, has contributed to the decline of the militant movement al-Shabaab in the Somali capital.”
“…It does not matter whether you belong to a strong or a weak clan, or an ethnic minority group… The clan has now become a social structure rather than a protective structure.” “Clan protection is no longer important as there are no clan based militias in Mogadishu. Persons returning from abroad are not at particular risk because of their clan affiliation”; “…it is a huge step forward that clan affiliation is no longer a concern. Even marginalized groups such as the IDPs and minority groups are no longer marginalized, harassed or intimidated only because of their clan affiliations. Thus, the security situation for members of small, weak clans and ethnic minority groups has increased considerably during the last year. It is not important which clan or group you belong to.”; “The representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, agreed that the clan is no longer a main issue in Mogadishu… According to Mohamed Farah Siad, Mogadishu, clan is ‘zero’ today in Mogadishu; clans do not offer any protection as there are no clan militias threatening people. Clanism is only common among “primitive clans in the bush.”
“On the other hand, whenever a person is planning to settle in Mogadishu he or she will most likely consider his or her clan affiliation before deciding where to settle down.”
“… clans are only relevant when it comes to business, marriage, respect and work, and stated that “clans should not be involved in politics”
“The clan has now become a social structure rather than a protective structure. This could be due to lessons learned during the previous clan conflicts and the civil war. People are now relating to government structures rather than clans, especially when it comes to business.”
“Regarding access to livelihood in Mogadishu, UNHCR-Somalia explained that the presence of a nuclear family is a requirement for livelihood support, as clan will not help with livelihood.”
“UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, confirmed that someone in Mogadishu will not be at risk today solely because he/she is of a different clan, although clan dynamics in combination with other factors are an important element when considering risk, including for the IDP population. It is obvious that one is safer when he or she is residing in an area dominated by his or her own clan or if one has good relations with a dominating clan.”
“UNHCR-Somalia, Mogadishu, confirmed that someone in Mogadishu will not be at risk today solely because he/she is of a different clan, although clan dynamics in combination with other factors are an important element when considering risk, including for the IDP population. It is obvious that one is safer when he or she is residing in an area dominated by his or her own clan or if one has good relations with a dominating clan.”
“Persons belonging to minority clans… remain at particular disadvantage in Mogadishu… There remains a low sense of Somali social and ethical obligation to assist individuals from weak lineages and social groups. This stands in stark contrast to the powerful and non-negotiable obligation Somalis have to assist members of their own lineage.”
“But people here are sensing the moment and seizing it. More than 300,000 residents have come back to the city in the last six months….. The economic boom, fuelled by an infusion of tens of millions of dollars, much of it from Somalis flocking home from overseas, is spawning thousands of jobs that are beginning to absorb young militiamen eager to get out of the killing business…”
“Mogadishu is now a ‘buzz’, people are going around minding their own business and there is an increasing freedom of movement for everyone.”
“A tiny proportion. 89% are poor. The remaining 20% will be a bit better than being poor. A little better than “barely surviving”
“A very tiny fraction of the elite. The vast majority of people are struggling to survive…”
“The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali national security forces continued to thwart Al-Shabaab attacks almost daily in and around Mogadishu.”
“Where the risk falls to be judged by the sufficiency of state protection, that sufficiency is judged, not according to whether it would eradicate the real risk of the relevant harm, but according to whether it is a reasonable provision in the circumstances; Osman”
“… a much more sinister form of targeting geared towards peacemakers…”
“were those standing for a less extreme course; at least they were not so much in favour of international or “global jihad” but were rather concerned about Somali (national) issues.”
“The international NGO (B), Mogadishu, stated that al-Shabaab does not kill civilians indiscriminately. On the other hand, when it is staging large scale attacks it does not mind if civilians are killed.” “UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that there are no recent reports of al-Shabaab having attacked or killed civilians deliberately through armed attacks…. … Regarding IED attacks UNDSS, Mogadishu, explained that remote controlled IED attacks or roadside bombs tend to target AMISOM, SNAF and convoys and such attacks sometimes result in the killing of civilians, i.e. collateral damage.”
“… have nothing to do with… stopping Somalis coming back to their country.”
“After two decades of anarchy and misery, Mogadishu is enjoying something of a renaissance. The spectacular ruins are being patched up. Hotels are being built. There are even streetlights in some places. And everywhere you hear accents: Texan, Geordie, Minnesotan, south London, Scandinavian. Somalia’s far-flung Diaspora is coming back – in big numbers – to visit, to help out, to make money, and to find out if this renaissance has any chance of lasting. The jury is still out on that one.”
“There are on average several targeted killings per week in Mogadishu, four to five weekly hand grenade attacks in Mogadishu and usually more.”
“… there is a decrease in the number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu, relative to the last few years. This decrease is due to front-line fighting having moved out of Mogadishu. There are now fewer mass-casualty attacks and killings, in particular due to the cessation of shelling in Mogadishu…” the report continued: “Still civilian casualties remain a daily occurrence, principally due to assassinations, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks, and reactions to these attacks by the armed forces. Recent grenade and suicide bomb attacks on theatres and cafes, such as the August 2012 attack on the Jezira Hotel, cause numerous civilian casualties.”
“According to an international NGO working in S/C Somalia the number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu has decreased considerably compared to February 2012 and today civilian casualties are at a minimum. In July 2011 two thirds of Mogadishu was under al-Shabaab control. Bombardment and shelling killed many, but this is no longer taking place. Today you have targeted attacks and sometimes by-passers get killed. It’s a question of being at the wrong place at the wrong time.”
“… a “severe” violation” of religious freedom having a significant effect on the person concerned for it to be possible for the acts in question to be regarded as acts of persecution.”
“… would not know how to behave in such a way as to possibly reduce their risk of harm.”
“… it is not a good idea to speak about Al Shabaab in public, and it is best to avoid government buildings, and restaurants, hotels and other places frequented by government workers, security officials, members of the diaspora and foreigners…”
“No life solution in Mogadishu is without some degree of risk”
“With regard to Mogadishu , the personal circumstances of an individual need to be carefully assessed. UNHCR considers an IFA/IRA as reasonable only where the individual can expect to benefit from meaningful nuclear and/or extended family support and clan protection mechanisms in the area of prospective relocation. When assessing the reasonableness of an IFA/IRA in Mogadishu in an individual case, it should be kept in mind that the traditional extended family and community structures of Somali society no longer constitute as strong a protection and coping mechanism in Mogadishu as they did in the past. Additionally, whether the members of the traditional networks are able to genuinely offer support to the applicant in practice also needs to be evaluated, especially given the fragile and complex situation in Mogadishu at present. For the following categories of Somalis, UNHCR would consider that an IFA/IRA will not be reasonably available in the absence of meaningful nuclear and/or extended family support and functioning clan protection: unaccompanied children or adolescents at risk of forced recruitment and other grave violations; young males at risk of being considered Al Shabaab sympathizers and therefore facing harassment from government security forces; elderly people; people with physical or mental disabilities; single women and female single heads of households with no male protection and especially originating from minority clans. In any other exceptional cases, in which the application of an IFA/IRA in Mogadishu is considered even in the absence of meaningful family or clan support to the individual, the person would need to have access to infrastructure and livelihood opportunities and to other meaningful protection and support mechanisms, taking into account the state institutions’ limited ability to provide security and meaningful protection.”
“Humanitarian law and human rights abuses were committed by all parties. They have reportedly attacked IDP camps. Perpetrated widespread sexual and other gender-based violence, forcibly recruited internally displaced children and fought each other near civilian settlements. IDP’s health situation remained critical with most outbreaks of contagious diseases coming in areas hosting displaced people. Developments such as increased security, an improving economy and urban migration led to an increase in forced evictions of IDPs in urban centres across the country such as Mogadishu…. A number of the most vulnerable victims were unable to seek refuge elsewhere because of their limited resources.”
“The issue of the humanitarian dimension of the IDP problem is highlighted in the Amnesty Report. The situation is quite dire. IDPs have been living in overcrowded and unsafe settlements and remain extremely vulnerable to various forms of human rights abuses, including widespread sexual violence…”
“I think they remain IDPs. If they stay for years and marry a local girl and sell their other property it is possible, but my thinking is that they are IDPs.”
“Hamar Weyne is the old part of town, but today most of its original fair-skinned inhabitants have left to safer areas, and it is largely inhabited by wealthy IDPs.”
“Aligned to this risk ofArticle 3 ECHR breach would also be anArticle 8 ECHR breach in relation to MOJ’s physical and moral integrity. In addition, the fear and stress which the general situation in Mogadishu is likely to cause would be at such a level as to impact on the physical and moral integrity in contravention ofArticle 8 ECHR .”
“Amongst other things the report refers to the appellant stating that he originated from Somalia and where most of his family still lives.”
“We do not accept [MOJ’s] evidence that there are no contacts or family left in Somalia. His first language is Somali as such we consider he would be able to return there without any risk to his life, safety or welfare.”
'Suicide attack' in Somali capital BBC News8 November 2013 94 Car bomb outside Somalia hotel kills at least 4, injures 5 UPI8 November 2013 95 6 killed at Mogadishu hotel bombing Garowe Online8 November 2013 96 Somalia ’s Shabaab ‘still far from defeat’ Al Shahid Network7 November 2013 97 When Push Comes to Shove: Displaced Somalis under Threat Refugees International7 November 2013 98 Somalia : Somali Poor Leadership Crisis Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)7 November 2013 99 Somalia 's future relies on an army that does not yet exist Garowe Online4 November 2013 100 Somalia : Amid internal divisions, Al Shabaab pledges more attacks Garowe Online3 November 2013 101 Somalia : How Mogadishu Soldiers Harass Civilians Dalsan Radio (Mogadishu)2 November 2013 102 Federal Register, Vol 78, No 212, November 2013, 65692 US Department of Homeland Security1 November 2013 103 Key actors mapping: Somalia Browne and Fisher1 November 2013 104 Repatriation Pact: Insufficient Progress The Heritage Institute1 November 2013 105 Somalia : Humanitarian Dashboard (as of30 October 2013 ) UNOCHA30 October 2013 106 US 'drone strike' kills senior Shabab members Aljazeera29 October 2013 107 Somalia : Roadside Bomb Hits On Gov't Soldiers in Mogadishu Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)29 October 2013 108 Somalia : Al Shabaab Ambushes On AMISON Vehicle in Dhoobley Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)29 October 2013 109 Al Shabaab rebuilds forces in Somalia as African Union campaign stalls The Guardian28 October 2013 110 Drone strike kills at least two in Somalia - residents Reuters28 October 2013 111 Kenya calls for Somalis to leave world's largest refugee camp Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)26 October 2013 112 Somalia : Heavy Explosion Rocks Janale Town Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)24 October 2013 113 Somalia : Heavy Fighting Between Government Troops and Alshabab in Bakol Region Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)23 October 2013 114 Somalia : Grenade Bombs Thrown to a House Belonging to the Mayor of Marka Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)20 October 2013 115 Somalia : Al-Shabab Claims the Responsibility for the Baladweyn Suicide Dalsan Radio (Mogadishu)20 October 2013 116 Suicide bomber kills 16 in Somali café attack aimed at foreign troops Reuters19 October 2013 117 Somalia : Suicide Bomber Kills Dozens in Beledweyne Town Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)19 October 2013 118 Somalia : Suicide Bomber Kills 13 At Restaurant in Central Somalia Dalsan Radio (Mogadishu)19 October 2013 119 Somalia : Over Dozen Die In Beledweyne Suicide Bombing Garowe Online19 October 2013 120 Somali suicide bombing kills AU soldiers in Beledweyne BBC News19 October 2013 121 Al Shabab bombing in Somalia kills 16 UPI19 October 2013 122 Suicide bomber kills at least 12 at restaurant in Somalia Radio Free Europe19 October 2013 123 At Least 15 Killed in Somalia Attack VOA News18 October 2013 124 Somalia : Heavy Explosions Occur in Lower Shabelle Region Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)17 October 2013 125 Al Shahid Network ‘Thousands of additional troops urged for force in Somalia’ Al Shahid Network16 October 2013 126 Alshabab called Westgate attack as massage to Kenya, no war Al Shahid Network16 October 2013 127 Somalia : Government Soldiers Spray Bullets to Poor Civilians At an Aid Distribution Camp in Mogadishu Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)16 October 2013 128 Letter dated14 October 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council United Nations Secretary-General14 October 2013 129 Somalia : Ten killed in fighting near Mogadishu Garowe Online14 October 2013 130 Letter dated14 October 2013 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council United Nations Security Council14 October 2013 131 Somalia : PM vows to eliminate terror attacks, 3 killed in Mogadishu Garowe Online13 October 2013 132 African Union calls for more African troops in Somalia Reuters12 October 2013 133 Somalia : Gun Fire Kills Civilian in Mogadishu Dalsan Radio (Mogadishu)12 October 2013 134 Freedom of the Press 2013 Freedom House10 October 2013 135 Somalia : Al Shabaab remains dangerous presence says Ambassador Linda-Thomas Greenfield Garowe Online10 October 2013 136 How the US raid on al-Shabaab in Somalia went wrong The Guardian9 October 2013 137 Somalia : Al-Shabab Arrests a Business Man in Connection to Barawe's Attack in Lower Shabelle Region Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)9 October 2013 138 Al-shabab abducts welfare worker in middle Juba region Al Shahid8 October 2013 139 US raid on Somalia: Al-Shabab bolsters presence in Barawe BBC News7 October 2013 140 Somalia : Federal Govt seeks confidence from public amid reports of torture by soldiers Garowe Online6 October 2013 141 Somalia 's Al-Shabab said still benefit from Charcoal trade through 'connections'
'Illegal Roadblocks Are On Increase' in Lower Shabelle Region Garowe Online28 August 2013 222 Somalia : Security operations continue in Mogadishu as insecurity looms Garowe Online28 August 2013 223 Somalia ’s Al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out Homeland Security Policy Institute27 August 2013 224 Somalia : Alshabab Accused of Killing Civilians in Mustahil, Hiran Region Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)27 August 2013 225 Somalia : Mogadishu explosions target Federal Govt soldiers Garowe Online27 August 2013 226 Somalia : Heavy Fighting in Kismayu,Lower Juba Region Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)26 August 2013 227 Somalia : Somali Olympic official gunned down in Mogadishu Garowe Online24 August 2013 228 Somalia : Raskamboni Militia Evicting Civilians From Their Residencies Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)23 August 2013 229 Somalia : Heavy Confrontations Between Alshabab and Government Soldiers in Lower Shabelle Region Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)23 August 2013 230 Somalia : The Administration of Afgoye Town Complain About Escalating Insecurity Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)22 August 2013 231 Swedish politician attacked in Somalia's Mogadishu BBC News21 August 2013 232 Why Doctors Without Borders Left Somalia: Interview with Sophie Delaunay International Peace Institute20 August 2013 233 Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government Bryden, Matt19 August 2013 234 Why MSF decided to leave Somalia Medecins Sans Frontiers19 August 2013 235 Somalia : Land Mine Explosions Target Amisom Troops in Kismayu,Lower Juba Region Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)19 August 2013 236 Explosion in kismayo kills pro-Jubbaland clan elder Dalsan Radio (Mogadishu)16 August 2013 237 UN humanitarian wing warns of pervasive sexual violence in Somalia UN News Service16 August 2013 238 Polio in Somalia: UN warns of 'explosive' outbreak BBC News16 August 2013 239 Somalia : A Well-Known Business Man Injured in Mogadishu Blast Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)15 August 2013 240 Somalia : Car bomb explosion kills one at Mogadishu's Bakara market Garowe Online15 August 2013 241 UPDATE 1 - Deadly attacks force Doctors Without Borders to quit Somalia Reuters14 August 2013 242 Somalia : Mogadishu residents complain about violent activities by Federal Govt Soldiers Garowe Online14 August 2013 243 Somalia : Grenade Attacks Targets Government Troops in the Middle Shabelle Region Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu)14 August 2013 244 MSF closes operations in Somalia over 'extreme attacks'
“I found Signs of Hope in Somalia”, Says Bishop Bertin Catholic Information Service for Africa12 April 2013 98 Mogadishu Music Festival Somalisunrise.org10 April 2013 99 Somalia : Immigration Officials Order All Foreigners in the Country to Register Themselves Shabelle Media Network10 April 2013 100 Somalia : Govt Troops Conduct Operations in Darkeenley, Mogadishu Shabelle Media Network8 April 2013 101 Somalia : Somali Officials Vow to Improve Human Rights Following Rape report Sabahi3 April 2013 102 Somalia : Amisom Opens the Last Section of the Mogadishu to Baidoa Road Government of Ethiopia2 April 2013 103 Somalia : Humanitarian Snapshot (April 2013) UNCHA April 2013 104 Somalia : Relative Peace Belies Rocky Road Ahead IRIN26 March 2013 105 Allafrica: Somalia: Intelligence Official Targeted in Suicide Car Bomb Attack Garowe Online18 March 2013 106 Somalia frees journalist in ‘rape case’ Sabahi17 March 2013 107 Allafrica: Somalia: Somalis seek government jobs without fear of Al-Shabaab Sabahi4 March 2013 108 Donors step up ties with Somalia; praise rebuilding efforts Reuters1 March 2013 109 Somalia : Mogadishu-Baidoa highway now safe, Shirdon says Sabahi28 February 2013 110 UNSC S/2013/6931 January 2013 111 Gatekeepers in Mogadishu The Somalis Cash Consortium31 January 2013 112 Somalia beginning ‘profound transformation’, UN official says during visit UN News Service30 January 2013 113 Suicide blast by offices of Somalia president and PM BBC News29 January 2013 114 Somalia : Somali forces tighten security in Mogadishu Sabahi22 January 2013 115 Somalia : return of Somali refugees “a positive indicator”: UN envoy UN Radio7 January 2013 116 Somalia : Mogadishu and government-controlled regions secure, AMISOM spokesman says Sabahi6 January 2013 117 Somalia Emergency Weekly health Update WHO January 2013 118 Somalia : Security and human rights issues in S-C Somalia, including Mogadishu (October 2012) Danish/Norwegian Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu January 2013 119 Somalia : Humanitarian snapshot – Jan 2013 UNOCHA January 2013 120 Mogadishu – Health Facilities and Implementing Partners – January 2013 UNOCHA January 2013 121 Mogadishu – Health Facilities and Implementing Partners Somali Health Cluster January 2013 122 Keeping the Lifeline Open Oxfam 2013 123 Somalia Emergency Health Update 13/05/13 – 02/06/13 WHO 2013 124 Somalia Situation Report August - October 2013 WHO 2013 125 Hostages of the Gatekeepers HRW 2013 126 South Central Dashboard 01/01/13 - 28/03/13 UNHCR 2013 127 Mogadishu residents welcome removal of illegal roadblocks Sabahi5 December 2012 128 Humanitarian Bulletin (Somalia) UNOCHA December 2012 129 SAACID: Community-Based Therapeutic Care [CTC] Mogadishu SAACID December 2012 130 PMT Quarterly Dashboard (October 2011 – September 2012) UNHCR30 October 2012 131 Allafrica: Somalia: govt arrests over 300 suspected Al-Shebab RFI13 October 2012 132 Allafrica: Somalia has made a ‘quantum leap’ in its progress but security threats remain, UN envoy warns UN News Service4 October 2012 133 The Shelter Bulletin - Emergency Shelter/NFI Cluster, Somalia (Issue 3) UNHCR October 2012 134 Allafrica: Somalia: Hizbul Islam group withdraws allegiance, says ‘Al Shabaab is weakened’ Garowe Online25 September 2012 135 Somalia : 200 former Al Shabaab agents Surrender to Allied Forces Garowe Online23 September 2012 136 Somalia : Suicide bomb attack targets popular Mogadishu restaurant Globalpost20 September 2012 137 Tri-cluster (Zona K mapping) REACH19 September 2012 138 Kismayo Population Movements & Protection Monitoring (01/09/12 – 26/09/12) UNHCR September 2012 139 Somalia successfully concludes first elections in over 20 years Sabahi29 August 2012 140 Tri-Cluster (Camp 77 mapping) REACH22 August 2012 141 Population Movement Tracking Monthly Report (August 2012) UNHCR August 2012 142 Saferworld – Mogadishu Rising August 2012 143 One Million return to Mogadishu IRIN18 July 2012 144 Population Movement Tracking Monthly Report (July 2012) UNHCR July 2012 145 Violence waning, Mogadishu experiences building boom UPI23 June 2012 146 Mogadishu boom turns famine victims into urban labourers Reuters20 June 2012 147 Small businesses a sign improving economy, security in Mogadishu Sabahi15 June 2012 148 Can Somalia’s cheap peacekeeping defeat al-Shabab? BBC News11 June 2012 149 ICRC: Mogadishu IDP survey – June 2012 ICRC June 2012 150 Population Movement Tracking Monthly Report (June 2012) UNHCR June 2012 151 IDP settlement changes as of2 April 2012 : Afgoye Corridor, Somalia UNOSAT30 May 2012 152 Update 4: continued expansion of Somali IDP shelter concentrations in Mogadishu, Somalia (18/10/11 – 02/05/12) UNOSAT22 May 2012 153 Somalia : Mogadishu on the Up IRIN18 May 2012 154 UNSC S/2012/2831 May 2012 155 Population Movement Tracking Monthly Report (May 2012) UNHCR May 2012 156 Somalia : AU troops in Somalia report gains against rebels Agence France-Presse20 April 2012 157 A taste of hope in Somalia’s battered capital New York Times3 April 2012 158 Security and human rights issues in South-Central Somalia, including Mogadishu (30/01/12 – 19/02/12) DIS April 2012 159 Protection Cluster Update – weekly report IASC10 February 2012 160 UN says Somalia famine is over al jazeera4 February 2012 161 UNSC S/2012/7431 January 2012 162 UN GASC A/66/657 – S/2012/3313 January 2012 163 ICRC Annual report (excerpt) 2012 ICRC 2012 164 Somalia Common Humanitarian Fund – Annual report 2012 UNOCHA 2012 165 SPC Protection Cluster Annual Report - Jan-Dec 2012 UNHCR 2012 166 Mogadishu EFP II Post-Programme Participant Tracer Survey SAACID November 2011 167 Protection Cluster Update IASC Somalia9 September 2011 168 Somalia : Security and conflict in the south Landinfo29 August 2011 169 Terrorism Monitor Volume IX, Issue 33 The Jamestown Foundation19 August 2011 170 Safety and Security: Mogadishu Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) August 2011 171 AU force closing in on Mogadishu’s prized market in tricky urban warfare Daily Nation22 June 2011 172 Somalia Helath Cluster Bulletin #471 May 2011 173 Terrorism Monitor Volume IX, Issue 15 The Jamestown Foundation14 April 2011 174 UNPOS Quarterly, March 2011, Issue No.1 UNPOS March 2011 175 ICRC Annual Report (excerpt) 2011 ICRC 2011 176 Mogadishu EFP II Socio-Economic Survey SAACID 2011 177 WHO’s support to hospital care for conflict-related communities in Somalia in 2011 WHO November 2010 178 Terrorism Monitor Volume VIII, Issue 38 The Jamestown Foundation21 October 2010 179 Somalia : Report of Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi (8-15 September 2010 ) UKBA8 October 2010 180 Mogadishu Periphery – IDP Population Assessment UNOCHA September 2010 181 Policy Briefing - Somalia’s Divided Islamists International Crisis Group18 May 2010 182 ORB/BBC: The View From Mogadishu: Opinion Poll Results April 2010 Opinion Research Business (ORB) April 2010 183 Whose Peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking (issue 21) Accord 2010 184 ICRC Annual Report (excerpt) 2010 ICRC 2010 185 Somalia : Reer Hamar Landinfo17 December 2009 186 Clans in Somalia - Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna,15 May 2009 (Revised Edition) Austrian Red Cross and Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) December 2009 187 ICRC Annual Report (excerpt) 2009 ICRC 2009 188 Somalia – Afgooye Corridor – IDP Settlements UNOCHR30 April 2008 189 Report on Key Local Leader Informants For Rapid Assessment of IDPs in Mogadishu and Afgoye District, Lower Shabelle SAACID June 2007 190 U.N. Urges Attention to Somalia Associated Press22 May 2007 191 Report on Profiling of Internally Displaced Persons (Mogadishu) Final Draft Danish Refugee Council and UNHCR18 May 2007 192 Dialogue for Peace Somali Programme - Pioneers of Peace Advancing the Involvement of Women in Peace-building in South-Central Somalia Centre for Research and Dialogue - Somalia January 2007 193 SAACID: results of the “Rapid Population Assessment of IDP settlements in Mogadishu SAACID 2007 194 Stateless Justice in Somalia: formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives Dr Andre Le Sage, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue July 2005 195 Benadir-Watch letter to IGAD26 August 2004 APPENDIX C Summary of written expert evidence MOJ, MAA AND SSM v SECRETARY OF STATE Expert Written Evidence There were three expert witnesses who prepared reports on the security position in South-Central Somalia, specifically Mogadishu, and its impact on returnees to that area. Each expert prepared an initial or primary report that was supplemented with written responses to questions posed by the Secretary of State. The reports issued were as follows: Appellant Expert Date of initial report Date of supplemental responses MOJ Dr Mullen18 Nov 2013 20 Dec 2013 &19 Jan 2014 Dr Hoehne18 Nov 2013 23 Dec 2013 &23 Jan 2014 Ms Harper3 Dec 2013 6 Jan 2014 &21 Jan 2014 MAA Ms Harper23 Jan 2014 Dr Mullen26 Jan 2014 SSM Dr Hoehne11 Aug 2013 (updated on11 Oct 2013 ) Ms Harper18 Jan 2014 29 Jan 2014 Summary of reports Dr Mullen In his report for the first appellant, Dr Mullen wrote the following: Al-Shabaab The Al-Shabaab movement had deep roots in Mogadishu as it was the offshoot of the Union of Islamic Courts which confronted the warlords that had plagued and undermined security in Mogadishu since 1991. Since the fall of the government in 1991, the country had fragmented into a mosaic of clan and sub-clan based conflicts which led to famine, internal displacement of populations (IDP), and a collapse of formal judicial structures, rape and looting. Mogadishu became the crucible of conflict between two Hawiye sub-clans. With the splintering off of a radical youth wing known as Al-Shabaab, a phenomenon of jihadist armed struggle was created, as it was a major departure from previous Islamic movements in Somalia. Its fighting force was estimated originally at 7,500 men, but more recently 5,000, with as many as 1,000 being foreign nationals. They had become engaged in a variety of bombings, suicide killings and murders and had been denounced for such by the UN Security Council. As of July 2011, Al-Shabaab controlled eight of the sixteen districts of the capital with a strategy to intimidate people and infiltrate the city. With the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in August 2011, the security situation had unquestionably improved but in a rather eclectic manner. There had been substantive changes of governance for the better underpinning the improved security situation. However, reports suggested that the situation of security was temporary and fragile, falling short of the standard of durability required. It was further reported that towards the end of 2013, the overall security situation had actually deteriorated due to significantly increased clan tension, which was partly due to the fact that the government was slow to fill the space vacated by Al-Shabaab in and around Mogadishu. Mogadishu Clans The major clan controlling Mogadishu was the Hawiye and its two main sub-clans: the Abgal and the Habr Gedir. The Ayr and the Murusade were also influential actors. The sixteen districts of Mogadishu were shaped by their clan configurations which reflected itself in the choice of District Commissioners and their militia support. A corollary of clan control was that they had a shared interest in maintaining a degree of peace as the peace dividend was prosperity and an enabling economic environment. The approach was inclusive and offered opportunities to the select few with services to offer or resources to invest, but excluded the vulnerable minority clan member. Clanship may be partly replaced by wealth but at the individual level, clanship was an important survival attribute or conversely, in the case of minority clans, could be a negative and require resources to rectify. A Gadabursi which was a majority clan but numerically minor in Mogadishu, would require cross-clan alliances and the resources to fund them to survive. Therefore, low income migrants, or failed asylum seekers, were unlikely to be able to achieve the level of security acceptable under the ECHR. Recruitment Al-Shabaab was known for forcibly recruiting young males into jihadi activities. Children were especially recruited to Al-Shabaab as fighters. There was considerable evidence to indicate that the recruitment of child soldiers continued in and around Mogadishu. Population Movement There has always been a degree of mobility between the sixteen districts of Mogadishu depending upon security, clan cohesion and food security. The movement of populations peaked in 2011 but between 2011 and 2013 there had been a 45-50% decline in the level of movements, year on year. This greater stabilisation of population could have been indicative of a greater degree of normalisation of residential patterns within the city. The outward migration from Mogadishu to other districts also showed a decline of about 70% per year. IDPs The level of IDPs on the city perimeter and the violence in the IDP camps remained a major factor of risk for returning failed asylum seekers and a fortiori to vulnerable groups. The driving force behind the population movement into IDP camps had been insecurity. IDPs have been living in overcrowded and unsafe settlements and remain extremely vulnerable to various forms of human rights abuses, including widespread sexual violence. Protection The ability to access protection in Mogadishu would be contingent on three significant factors: financial wealth, social status and clan protection. Returning migrant citizens without a minimal combination of these attributes would mean they would be unlikely to gain access to livelihoods or safety and were likely to end up in an IDP camp. The Security Situation There were clearly differing perceptions of the security situation in the city of Mogadishu and it may also have been viewed differently by different actors in the light of their institutional perspectives. There was a certain coalition of interests between the Government, who desperately sought international funding, and the key international donors. The geopolitical aspect of security in Somalia was locked into an international perception of internal security in terms of it containing a major jihadist movement with ramifications to the stability of neighbouring countries. Dr Mullen highlighted that according to a UN monitoring report, Al-Shabaab had built up a powerful secret service under the direct command of the insurgent’s chief and even if international efforts to dismantle the group’s fighting forces succeeded, there was still a high chance that the cells under his leadership would continue to operate. In many frontline zones, territory patrolled during the day by AMISOM, was controlled at night by Al-Shabaab. Many aid agencies had down-scaled their operations or stopped work completely due to the deteriorating security situation. Dr Mullen stated that the UNHCR were cautious about the situation, commenting that although there had been some encouraging developments in Somalia, it did not mean that large numbers of Somali refugees could all go home as it would take time before conditions in general, regarding security as well as law and order, were restored throughout Somalia and local administrations were rebuilt. Overall there appeared to be a reluctance to sanction a planned return of refugees because of the unacceptable level of risk in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia. The environment of Mogadishu was circumscribed by credible and real security threats as identified by national and international agencies, both from a military perspective and a human rights dimension. There was an under-estimation of the influence of Al-Shabaab and the dynamics of local politics at the level of localities/districts within Mogadishu. The evidence pointed to the overt and covert presence of Al-Shabaab in both Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia. There appeared to be a marked correlation between Al-Shabaab and individualised targeted assassinations of government officials, journalists and peacemakers. Targeted assassinations affected the morale of Somalis every day returning to the city/other areas of South-Central, in creating a climate of fear, particularly against a background of regular bombings and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The territories held by Al-Shabaab were under a harsh extremist Sharia regime where amputations, stoning, summary executions and exhumations of religious dissenters were commonplace. The consensus of opinion appeared to Dr Mullen to be that the current security situation could not support any large scale returns to urban areas such as Mogadishu. The significance of risk in an Al-Shabaab controlled area had not materially changed since AMM , but the geographical expanse of that risk has somewhat reduced due to the significant swathes of territory being liberated from Al-Shabaab. However it was still thought that 75% of the countryside remained under the jurisdiction of Al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, the change in tactics and the increased use of Iraqi-type asymmetrical warfare had shifted the boundaries of risk from being geographically-bound to being more universal, irrespective of territorial control. In changing their tactic to operate as a clandestine underground movement, driven by a fanatical religious ideology and fully committed to an Islamic Caliphate state, they presented a specific threat to a particular profile of person, such as a westernised Somali citizen. Although there had been an increased international commitment to Somalia with a more credible national government in place; Mogadishu being administered by the Somali Federal Government in its totality; the national security forces being better trained and expanded in numbers; and, Al-Shabaab having been pushed to the margins and acting as an underground force rather than a mainstream administrative authority with revenue raising and security powers, Al-Shabaab continued to constitute a credible risk. There were further threats to good governance and human rights in Somalia: there was the threat of return to neighbouring warlords, clan-based conflict, protective militias and their corollary, the alienation of minority clans who did not have militia protection and general criminal gangs who thrived in a context of weak domestic society. Human Rights Situation It would be disingenuous to argue that the Human Rights situation in Somalia had not improved when the Prime Minister had committed Somalia to an independent Task Force on Human Rights which presented a possibility of positive implications. But it remained to be seen when the legislative reforms would be introduced and what their real impact would be on events on the ground. A new resolution had been adopted at the United Nations guaranteeing a stronger partnership in subsisting good governance and the enforcement of human rights legislation directly correlating to the level of good governance achievable, and resulting in the protection of vulnerable sections of the population being ensured, instead of being victims of human rights abuses by powerful figures, the militias and security forces. Civilian Casualties Although there had been improvements in security, Dr Mullen noted that Amnesty did not consider them adequate enough for governments to consider forcibly returning Somali nationals and suggested that in Mogadishu, the conflict continued to take place, though at a lower level, with civilians persistently facing insecurity and risks, falling victim to grave human rights abuses. Dr Mullen included data of conflict events and reported fatalities between 2009 and 2013, noting that between 2010 and 2011, it was reported that more than 14,700 war-wounded civilians were admitted to hospitals in Mogadishu. Furthermore, there were 1.1 million IDPs on Somali territory and in many respects they were the weathervane of the security status of an area. Conclusion It was therefore the opinion of Dr Mullen that there were cogent evidential facts to support the proposition that Mogadishu remained unsafe for certain vulnerable groups of returning asylum seekers. His recommendation was to adopt a wait-and-see approach that extended the AMM provisions for a further twelve months whilst a new set of differential legal entitlements were refined as the security situation in South-Central Somalia clarified. Response Report In his response reports to the questions raised by the Secretary of State for further information, Dr Mullen added the following points: · In support of the definition of civilians in AMM , as ‘all genuine non-combatants at the time when the serious threat of real harm may have materialised’, Dr Mullen simply identified civilians as non-military personnel. · Al-Shabaab were identified as a fully functioning military and administrative force in the territory south of Merca in the Lower Shabelle to Jibib in Juba, South-Central Somalia. · The ability of Al-Shabaab to kill indiscriminately was linked to two tactics widely used in Mogadishu: one being asymmetrical warfare based on IEDs, mine deployment and assassination of known individuals, such as those associated with the government, defectors from Al-Shabaab ranks, aid agency personnel and journalists; the second being the exertion of moral and religious pressure on individuals at the level of the mosque and of the street. · The tactic of Al-Shabaab was not to engage AMISOM directly in head-on battle confrontations but rather to rely on suicide bombings and guerrilla tactics. When Al-Shabaab occupied large areas of Mogadishu, the tactic was to attack AMISOM from civilian areas whose populations were used as human shields. AMISOM often retaliated with blanket fire and mortars, which often resulted in high levels of civilian casualties. Under the new dispensation of a SNA/AMISOM-controlled Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab had upped its attacking momentum on government and affiliated personnel, with substantial collateral damage among civilians. · Dr Mullen stated that the UNHCR found it difficult to state whether or not civilian casualties had increased or decreased since February 2014, nevertheless, the increased involvement of individuals in disputes may have also meant higher civilian casualty figures. Dr Hoehne In his report for the first appellant, Dr Hoehne wrote the following: Al-Shabaab After the collapse of its government in January 1991, Somalia was in a state of protracted (civil) war. The main actors of violence were clan militias, Islamist militias and foreign intervention forces. In 2007, Al-Shabaab, an Islamist force with ties to Al Qaida, emerged as an important political and military actor. In Al-Shabaab’s battle for power with various transitional governments of Somalia and the governments’ foreign allies, tens of thousand of people (mostly civilians) had been killed and hundreds of thousands had to flee their homes. Until early 2011 Al-Shabaab was in control of much of South-Central Somalia including many parts of Mogadishu. In August 2011, Al-Shabaab officially withdrew from the capital Mogadishu, but retained a strong presence around the city and in much of South-Central Somalia. From 2009 to mid 2011, Al-Shabaab had been the de facto government in most parts of South-Central Somalia and had physically controlled areas including 90 per cent of the capital city. But from mid 2012 onward, a new trend regarding the security situation in Southern Somalia emerged: on the one hand, Al-Shabaab was severely weakened as a military power in Somalia with the security in Mogadishu being strengthened; but on the other hand, they had retained some considerable military capabilities in several regions. In June and July 2013, Al-Shabaab stepped up its operations considerably and conducted dozens of smaller and several big attacks on Somali government troops, AMISOM forces and institutions of governments supporting the government in Mogadishu that resulted in dozens of people, including security forces and civilians, being killed. Heavy fighting erupted in Southern Somalia and in other regions of South-Central Somalia, Al-Shabab retained the capacity to operate, conduct terror attacks and engage its enemy forces in battle. Al-Shabaab, according to Dr Hoehne, became smaller but even more radical over the course of 2013. The evidence suggested that Al-Shabaab recently reorganised itself as a smaller movement. Scores of civilians had been killed between September 2012 and January 2013 by gunmen, through indiscriminate use of force by armed groups or in bomb attacks. The UN Security General mentioned that ‘civilian casualties and extrajudicial killings were frequently reported in conflict areas, with civilians caught in the crossfire between the parties. The preliminary conclusion by Dr Hoehne was that Al-Shabaab in South-Central Somalia was not a spent-force. It had been seriously weakened militarily and lost direct control over main resources bases in Mogadishu and Kismayo. However, it had turned into an effective guerrilla movement operating mostly through hit-and-run attacks. In some areas the movement was still able to engage in more conventional clashes with its enemies. It was reported that despite its setbacks, Al-Shabaab still commanded territory and fighters, remaining a serious threat capable of destabilizing Somalia and the great Horn of Africa region, and potentially inspiring attacks globally. The Security Situation There was a sharp decline in security related incidents between the end of 2012 and early 2013. However, the fact that hand grenade attacks, attacks with IEDs and assassinations/assassination attempts were on the increase again since April/May 2013 showed that Al-Shabaab retained a clandestine presence in Mogadishu and had reorganised its operations in the city. News reports indicated that government and army officials in Mogadishu were the main targets of assassinations and bomb attacks, even occasional shoot-outs. But since around May 2013, many civilians were again falling victim to Al-Shabaab attacks. The security situation had deteriorated due to the lack of capacity, funds and expertise of the Somali government. Al-Shabaab obviously reorganised itself into a smaller, more radical, more flexible guerrilla force that employed tactics of asymmetrical warfare quite successfully. It stepped up operations in Mogadishu and even proved its capacity to conduct complex terror attacks abroad in Kenya in September 2013. Civilian Casualties The Secretary General of the United Nations reported that despite some improvements in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab continued to launch asymmetrical attacks on soft targets using terrorist tactics that often resulted in civilian casualties. The intensification of Al-Shabaab attacks led to many civilian casualties in Mogadishu in recent months. Al-Shabaab even published a list of its operations. In October 2013, Al-Shabaab had a considerable capacity to operate in Mogadishu and to mount attacks on government and military officials, but also on civilians who fell victim to suicide and other bomb attacks, were on the increase. Al-Shabaab still posed a very serious threat to people in Mogadishu and that was corroborated by a statement of the mayor of Mogadishu. Besides Al-Shabaab, undisciplined government soldiers were proving to be a security risk for ordinary civilians. Conclusion Dr Hoehne’s view was that the battle against Al-Shabaab was far from over and Mogadishu was not a safe place where ordinary Somalis would be able to live without a considerable threat to their physical integrity and psychological well-being. He considered an Article 15(c) risk to exist as in AMM. Although there were up to 17,000 AMISOM troops in Sothern Somalia that provided some services to ordinary civilians, it was not a force that would provide protection to individual civilians, apart from its general services such as guarding important public spaces. Therefore, ordinary civilians were extremely unlikely to receive any individual protection from AMISOM. Supplementary Points In his reports for the third appellant, Dr Hoehne added more substance to the security situation in South-Central Somalia and the impact upon returnees as follows: · In early 2013, the situation had been gradually changing for the better but many people still faced severe challenges for survival. Insecurity was still a major issue in Mogadishu and other parts of South Somalia. The new government was struggling to contain lawlessness and establish security in Mogadishu. It was still in no position to prevent Al-Shabaab from operating or in providing a reasonable level of law and order. The security situation declined in 2013, suggesting that Al-Shabaab was not defeated. The evidence suggested Al-Shabaab had reorganised itself as a smaller movement under radical leadership. Even if Al-Shabaab were pushed back, the structural problems of Somalia, including lack of regard for human rights, a culture of violence, massive conflicts even within the ‘government’s camp’, corruption and impunity, endemic poverty, and the vulnerability of women and girls to endemic sexual violence, would remain. · According to the September 2013 report of the UN Secretary General on the situation in Somalia, the intensification of Al-Shabaab attacks led to many civilian casualties in Mogadishu, with the security situation remaining volatile. · As of mid-October 2013, insecurity was still a major issue in Mogadishu and other parts of southern Somalia. The Somali government had not managed to increase security permanently or establish itself firmly in the country. It still depended on massive military backing by foreign forces and it could not prevent frequent and devastating Al-Shabaab attacks. · The return of a Somali, who had no strong or active family network or protection, provided great risks for that person’s physical integrity and survival. Ms Harper In her report for the first appellant, Ms Harper wrote the following: Al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab had changed tactics in Mogadishu to asymmetric, insurgent style warfare. It carried out regular attacks using suicide bombers, car bombs, grenades and IEDs. The scale, sophistication and regularity of these attacks had increased in Mogadishu in 2013. Al-Shabaab had a particularly strong presence in outlying districts of Mogadishu with its fighters emerging at night and controlling some of the streets. As well as conducting regular acts of violence, Al-Shabaab continued other activities in Mogadishu: reports mentioning general intimidation and abuse, harassment, forced recruitment and infiltration in the capital’s neighbourhoods and districts. It was not only Al-Shabaab conducting acts of violence and abuse against civilians, members of the Somali security forces, and to a lesser extent AMISOM troops, were also responsible. Somalis in Mogadishu were not able to depend on the police or judicial system for protection. The judiciary was corrupt and virtually non-existent and there were frequent reports of abuse of civilians by the police. In some districts, most civilian males carried weapons and were prepared to use them. The Security Situation The security situation in Mogadishu had changed significantly since Al-Shabaab’s abrupt withdrawal from the city in August 2011. There were no longer running battles involving heavy weaponry between Al-Shabaab fighters and government troops. The city remained dangerous, with regular acts of violence carried out by Al-Shabaab, the Somali security services and other armed groups and individuals. Civilians were often caught up in the violence. The violence had become more unpredictable because a conventional war was no longer being fought. Mogadishu was no longer a city of frontlines; attacks could happen anywhere at anytime. Al-Shabaab maintained a presence and ability to strike in most of the towns in South-Central Somalia from which it had officially withdrawn. Many regions were also politically and militarily unstable with inter-clan violence on the rise. The changes in the security in South-Central Somalia since August 2011, and their durability, were heavily dependent on the continued presence of AMISOM troops. The Somali security forces were unable to take charge, with clashes sometimes erupting between different clan groups within the Somali army and increased tension over land leading to a resurgence of clan violence. Al-Shabaab was likely to maintain a presence in Mogadishu and there was no indication that the number and scale of attacks would diminish. Discord at the centre of power of the Somali administration could further lead to a diminishing focus on security. There were also significant tensions between the federal government and the Somali regional authorities. Civilian Casualties Civilians often bore the brunt of the violence, as many of the attacks occurred in public places, including restaurants, hotels, roads and roundabouts. Civilian casualties had also been high in attacks on government and foreign targets, or on specific individuals, as Al-Shabaab were carrying out more complex assaults with more powerful explosives. Previously, they would conduct targeted assassinations or plant roadside bombs intended for vehicles carrying government officials, members of the Somali security forces or African Union (AMISOM) troops. However, they were now ramming cars packed with explosives into public buildings, government offices and the premises of international organisations. Armed men, often wearing suicide vests, then stormed the buildings, shooting and throwing grenades before blowing themselves up. Many attacks by Al-Shabaab went unreported, with only the more spectacular attacks receiving international media attention. Ongoing violence and instability meant it was impossible to obtain accurate casualty figures for Mogadishu or elsewhere in South-Central Somalia. Ms referred to some figures for weapons related casualties that were available from the World Health Organisation: 5279 in 2010; 9689 in 2011; 6687 in 2012; and 3889 until October 2013. There were discrepancies in casualty figures from different sources but they did illustrate the unpredictability of the violence in the city and the fluctuations in its intensity. Relocation Relocating removed or deported Somalis from Mogadishu to other parts of South-Central Somalia would not be a viable option as sending people to areas within which they had no family or clan connection would leave them isolated and vulnerable to persecution or attack. People also often had to travel through areas controlled by many different and sometimes conflicting armed groups. The situation was by no means safe, especially for those without significant resources, both in terms of financial means and in terms of having wealthy and powerful relatives and other contacts. Further, those persons returning from a Western country would face possible violence from Al-Shabaab and be vulnerable to recruitment. They would also face hostility from other armed groups. Conclusion Somalia remained a dangerous and unpredictable place, with frequent suicide, grenade and other attacks, as well as more conventional warfare between armed groups. Supplementary Points In her reports for the second and third appellants, Ms Harper added more substance to the security situation in South-Central Somalia and the impact upon returnees as follows: · A person who had been absent for several years would probably be more at risk than someone who had been away for a shorter period because of the dramatic ways in which Mogadishu had changed, both in terms of physical geography and in terms of security, clan dynamics, politics and society. A person who had been away for many years would find it harder to navigate and negotiate his way around the dangerous and unpredictable city than would someone who had left more recently. · Civilians in Mogadishu were at risk of serious harm from Al-Shabaab’s regular attacks. Civilians were often killed and injured during regular acts of violence (whether carried out by Al-Shabaab, the security forces or other armed groups) because they were directly targeted or just because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Nobody in Mogadishu can fully protect themselves from such attacks. Civilians were at risk during those incidents because they often occurred in public places. Many civilian males carried weapons mainly to protect them from the Somali police and army, who they said could not be trusted and were responsible for much of the violence in Mogadishu. Female civilians faced the additional risk of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and forced marriage of under-age girls was a growing problem in the city. · There were more than 360,000 IDPs living in makeshift camps in the city. Conditions in most camps were desperate with inadequate, flimsy shelters, limited food, water and sanitation and poor security. · Members of minority clans were at an increased risk of serious harm in Mogadishu because they suffered prejudice, and lacked any residual degree of protection members of majority clans might have. Although an individual’s clan membership was of relevance in Mogadishu, family connections were more important in terms of providing protection, shelter and other basic necessities. However, families were less likely to help with protection and livelihood if a person had brought shame onto that family. APPENDIX D Error of Law decisions 1. MOJ 2. MAA 3. SSM Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: DA/00210/2013 THE IMMIGRATION ACTS Heard at Field House Determination Promulgated On5 July 2013 ………………………………… Before UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STOREY Between MOJ Appellant and THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Respondent Representation : For the Appellant: Mr H Cheng, Legal Representative, instructed by Duncan Lewis & Co Solicitors (Harrow Office) For the Respondent: Mr T Wilding, Home Office Presenting Officer DECISION AND REASONS 1. The appellant, a national of Somalia, has been granted permission to appeal against the determination by the First-tier Tribunal (FtT), Judge Walker and Mr D R Brewster, sent on23 April 2013 dismissing his appeal on all grounds against the decision of the respondent to make a deportation order undersection 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007 and to further certify that his case fell withinsection 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 because he had been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and constituted a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. 2. The grounds do not seek to challenge the panel’s findings that section 72(2) of the 2007 Act applied against the appellant (the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption that the crime he was convicted of was a particularly serious one or the presumption that his continued presence in the UK constituted a danger to the community). The only ground of challenge to the FtT decision is that it failed to give sufficient reasons for its conclusions, contrary to R (Iran)[2005] EWCA Civ 982 in particular because it failed to recognise that there was an “applicable country guidance case… binding on the First-tier Tribunal”
“Country guidance cases are binding on the Tribunal, and a departure can only come about if all the evidence is weighted and properly considered, which, in this case, looking at [42(9)] cannot be said to have been the case. In light of the authorities cited above, and the departure from a binding authority, the FtT should have given more details as to its reasoning in weighing up the evidence”. 3. [42(9)] of the FtT determination stated: “As Section 72 applied then he is precluded from being considered as a refugee. Even if Section 72 did not apply we do not accept the Appellant’s asylum claim and Appeal. The reasons he has put forward for fearing a return to Somalia do not amount to convention reasons. His claim is based upon a general fear for his safety arising from the activities in Mogadishu of Al-Shabab. The objective evidence shows that Al-Shabab have not been in control in Mogadishu since they were expelled in August 2011. The transitional government is now in control in Mogadishu and the security situation there is much improved although there are still incidents of terrorist violence. The Appellant is a young man who is fit and healthy and who is a member of a majority clan. We do not accept his evidence that there are no contacts or family left in Somalia. His first language is Somali and as such we consider he would be able to return there without any risk to his life, safety or welfare.” 4. I heard submissions from Mr Cheng and Mr Wilding and I commend them for the clarity of their presentations, although it will be apparent that I do not think either paid sufficient regard to the guidance given in AMM in respect of Article 3 risk in Mogadishu. 5. I have decided that this ground is in substance made out. 6. There being no challenge raised to the respondent’s section 72 certificate, the challenge is potentially confined to the panel’s assessment of the appellant’s eligibility for either humanitarian protection (under paragraph 339C) or protection under Articles 3 and 2 of the ECHR. 7. As regards the appellant’s claim for humanitarian protection, the only reason the panel gave for rejecting it was that, as set out in [45], that “[b]ased upon our above conclusions, we are satisfied that the Appellant’s claim for humanitarian protection must, similarly, fail, for the reason that we conclude that substantial grounds have not been shown for believing that the Appellant, if returned to Somalia, would face a real risk of sufferings serious harm”
“ I believe that the application does raise a properly arguable issue which may identify an error of law, namely the alleged failure by the First Tier Tribunal Judge to deal adequately with the issue of Article 15c risk on return. ” 5. The Respondent has not filed a Rule 24 response. Error of Law 6. The Appellant’s claim for protection under the Refugee Convention was, in my judgement, given careful and anxious scrutiny by the First-tier Tribunal Judge. It is plain that the Judge had regard to all of the available evidence, and has given clear and sustainable reasons for rejecting the credibility of the Appellant’s account in respect of the events he claims to have experienced in Somalia, and in respect of his claimed clan membership (paragraphs 41–51). The Judge also gave brief, but sustainable, reasons in respect ofArticle 8 of the ECHR (paragraph 54). 7. However, the Judge erred in law in his consideration of humanitarian protection. He addressed the matter with reference to the country guidance case of AMM & others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG[2011] UKUT 445 (IAC) , at paragraph 53 of the determination in the following terms: “ In AMM , the risk of Article 15(c) harm is to those returning to Mogadishu after a significant period of time abroad. The appellant has only been outside of the country for a few months. Further as he has not told the truth, his background is unclear. He may well be from the class of persons who are living to a reasonable standard in Somalia. The armed conflict does not pose a real risk of Article 3 harm, regardless of circumstances. The Upper Tribunal found that it is unlikely that a proposed return to Mogadishu at the present time will raise Refugee Convention issues. I find that the appellant can be removed there and there would not be a breach of the United Kingdom’s obligation under the Refugee Convention or Qualification Directive. ” 8. The Judge misdirects himself in the following respects: (i) The risk of harm identified in AMM is not apparently restricted to “ those returning to Mogadishu after a significant period of time abroad ”