“The extent of the risk in Sri Lanka to individuals on the basis of sur place political activities in the United Kingdom which are (or are perceived to be) in opposition to the government in Sri Lanka.”
“12.2 A reported determination of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT bearing the letters ‘CG’ shall be treated as an authoritative finding on the country guidance issue identified in the determination, based upon the evidence before the members of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT that determined the appeal. As a result, unless it has been expressly superseded or replaced by any later ‘CG’ determination, or is inconsistent with other authority that is binding on the Tribunal, such a country guidance case is authoritative in any subsequent appeal, so far as that appeal:- (a) relates to the country guidance issue in question; and (b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.” (a) relates to the country guidance issue in question; and (b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.”
“71. The proposition that a country guidance case should provide the “starting point” for a subsequent case that relates to the country guidance issue is inherent in the Practice Direction (and its AIT predecessor). Whether the subsequent case is being “set down to review existing country guidance” or not, the effect ofPractice Direction 12 andsection 107(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is to require the existing country guidance case to be authoritative, to the extent that the requirements inPractice Direction 12 .2(a) and (b) are met. This is fully in accord with what the House of Lords (per Lord Brown) held in R (Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator[2005] UKHL 19 . If the existing country guidance is such as to favour appellants (to a greater or lesser extent), it will in practice be for the respondent to adduce before a subsequent Tribunal “sufficient material to satisfy them” that the position has changed” (Paragraph 66).”
“…where a previous assessment has resulted in the conclusion that the population generally or certain sections of it may be at risk, any assessment that the material circumstances have changed would need to demonstrate that such changes are well established evidentially and durable.”
“356. Having considered and reviewed all the evidence, including the latest UNHCR guidance, we consider that the change in the GOSL’s approach is so significant that it is preferable to reframe the risk analysis for the present political situation in Sri Lanka. We give the following country guidance: (1) This determination replaces all existing country guidance on Sri Lanka. (2) The focus of the Sri Lankan government’s concern has changed since the civil war ended in May 2009. The LTTE in Sri Lanka itself is a spent force and there have been no terrorist incidents since the end of the civil war. (3) The government’s present objective is to identify Tamil activists in the diaspora who are working for Tamil separatism and to destabilise the unitary Sri Lankan state enshrined in Amendment 6(1) to the Sri Lankan Constitution in 1983, which prohibits the ‘violation of territorial integrity’ of Sri Lanka. Its focus is on preventing both (a) the resurgence of the LTTE or any similar Tamil separatist organisation and (b) the revival of the civil war within Sri Lanka. (4) If a person is detained by the Sri Lankan security services there remains a real risk of ill-treatment or harm requiring international protection. (5) Internal relocation is not an option within Sri Lanka for a person at real risk from the Sri Lankan authorities, since the government now controls the whole of Sri Lanka and Tamils are required to return to a named address after passing through the airport. (6) There are no detention facilities at the airport. Only those whose names appear on a “stop” list will be detained from the airport. Any risk for those in whom the Sri Lankan authorities are or become interested exists not at the airport, but after arrival in their home area, where their arrival will be verified by the CID or police within a few days. (7) The current categories of persons at real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Sri Lanka, whether in detention or otherwise, are: (a) Individuals who are, or are perceived to be, a threat to the integrity of Sri Lanka as a single state because they are, or are perceived to have a significant role in relation to post-conflict Tamil separatism within the diaspora and/or a renewal of hostilities within Sri Lanka. (b) Journalists (whether in print or other media) or human rights activists, who, in either case, have criticised the Sri Lankan government, in particular its human rights record, or who are associated with publications critical of the Sri Lankan government. (c) Individuals who have given evidence to the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission implicating the Sri Lankan security forces, armed forces or the Sri Lankan authorities in alleged war crimes. Among those who may have witnessed war crimes during the conflict, particularly in the No-Fire Zones in May 2009, only those who have already identified themselves by giving such evidence would be known to the Sri Lankan authorities and therefore only they are at real risk of adverse attention or persecution on return as potential or actual war crimes witnesses. (d) A person whose name appears on a computerised “stop” list accessible at the airport, comprising a list of those against whom there is an extant court order or arrest warrant. Individuals whose name appears on a “stop” list will be stopped at the airport and handed over to the appropriate Sri Lankan authorities, in pursuance of such order or warrant. (8) The Sri Lankan authorities’ approach is based on sophisticated intelligence, both as to activities within Sri Lanka and in the diaspora. The Sri Lankan authorities know that many Sri Lankan Tamils travelled abroad as economic migrants and also that everyone in the Northern Province had some level of involvement with the LTTE during the civil war. In post-conflict Sri Lanka, an individual’s past history will be relevant only to the extent that it is perceived by the Sri Lankan authorities as indicating a present risk to the unitary Sri Lankan state or the Sri Lankan Government. (9) The authorities maintain a computerised intelligence-led “watch” list. A person whose name appears on a “watch” list is not reasonably likely to be detained at the airport but will be monitored by the security services after his or her return. If that monitoring does not indicate that such a person is a Tamil activist working to destabilise the unitary Sri Lankan state or revive the internal armed conflict, the individual in question is not, in general, reasonably likely to be detained by the security forces. That will be a question of fact in each case, dependent on any diaspora activities carried out by such an individual. (10) Consideration must always be given to whether, in the light of an individual’s activities and responsibilities during the civil war, the exclusion clauses are engaged (Article 1F of the Refugee Convention and Article 12(2) of the Qualification Directive). Regard should be had to the categories for exclusion set out in the “Eligibility Guidelines For Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka”, published by UNHCR on21 December 2012 .”
“If the proposal is to give evidence from abroad, the party seeking permission must be in a position to inform the Tribunal that the relevant foreign government raises no objection to live evidence being given from within its jurisdiction, to a Tribunal or court in the United Kingdom. The vast majority of countries with which immigration appeals (even asylum appeals) are concerned are countries with which the United Kingdom has friendly diplomatic relations, and it is not for an immigration judge to interfere with those relations by not ensuring that enquiries of this sort have been made, and that the outcome was positive. Enquiries of this nature may be addressed to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (International Legal Matters Unit, Consular Division). If evidence is given from abroad, a British Embassy, High Commission or Commonwealth may be able to provide suitable facilities.”
“Both within Sri Lanka and further afield, intelligence gathering is now at the heart of security policy and posture. The primary aim is, without doubt, to identify and thwart any attempt by the LTTE to rebuild its capacity for armed insurgency within Sri Lanka. Thus far, it seems, it has succeeded. However, any attempt to rebuild the LTTE and the networks necessary to support an insurgency revival will require the support of the diaspora. As such, GoSL remains extremely focused on diaspora activities and will likely remain so in the future.”
“The Sri Lankan authorities therefore possess the wherewithal to identify and detain members of the Tamil diaspora who they perceive to be of potential or existing adverse interest. Once identified they have the legal right under the PTA to detain almost whomsoever they wish. Once detained, Tamils associated with the diaspora are vulnerable and at risk of extreme ill-treatment that will violate their civil liberties and their human rights.”
“people overseas who are of existing adverse interest, people affiliated to organisations that support the LTTE are bound to be included.”
“… while the Tamil separatist cause is seen to advance through the activities of specific Tamil diaspora organisations, their members and supporters, the capabilities of the transnational Tamil independence movement and thus its potency as a threat to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and national security is seen to derive from the breadth and depth of Tamil nationalist sentiments (“separatist ideology”) in the Tamil Diaspora community.”
“… Tamils who participate, or are suspected to have participated, in a range of Tamil diaspora political activities that are perceived by the Sri Lankan authorities as working to advance the cause of Tamil separatism, and, therefore, as supporting or facilitating the LTTE’s terrorism against the country, are at real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Sri Lanka, whether in detention or otherwise.”
“… Tamils with links or suspected links with the LTTE and former and suspected former LTTE members continue to be subject to surveillance and harassment by the Sri Lankan authorities; to be detained and sometimes prosecuted under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA); and to be subject to torture and ill-treatment in security forces’ custody.”
“it is their involvement in activities seen as promoting Tamil separatism, on the view of the Sri Lankan authorities, that leaves the authorities to view them as terrorists (“LTTE fronts”).”
“the Tiger does not change its stripes”
“any person” associated with “any terrorist organisation” and activities including, but not limited to, the dissemination of propaganda, lobbying, participation in demonstrations, and the raising of funds, would fall within its ambit. “Anyone belonging to the TGTE or perceived to be associated with the TGTE will be arrested, detained and investigated.”
“27. To my knowledge there have not be [sic] any TGTE members or supporters returning to Sri Lanka without problems. 28. I have heard of a small number of TGTE members of [sic] supporters being forcibly removed from the UK who I did not hear from since, they would not make contact anyway as that would increase the risk to them.”
“(i) to provide information and express opinions independently, uninfluenced by the litigation; (ii) to consider all material facts, including those which might detract from the expert witness' opinion; (iii) to be objective and unbiased; (iv) to avoid trespass into the prohibited territory of advocacy; (v) to be fully informed; (vi) to act within the confines of the witness's area of expertise; and (vii) to modify, or abandon one's view, where appropriate.”
“38. As Collins J said in Slimani, experts can vary in their independence and expertise to a very large degree. Some are well known as reliable, others perhaps equally well known as unreliable. In the centre ground comes the majority. It is the task of the Tribunal to decide what evidence they accept and what weight they can put upon the evidence they receive. We do not entirely agree with Miss Richard's analysis of the difference between an expert in this jurisdiction and an expert elsewhere. She argued that experts in this jurisdiction are the providers of raw data whereas those in the civil courts tend to be the interpreters of such data. In fact, in this jurisdiction, experts are not merely the providers of raw data but they can be the interpreters of it as well. Their interpretation, and any opinion based on that interpretation, can only be as good as the raw data itself. By that we mean not only the quality of the data, but the selection or filtering, of it. 39. We agree with the concept of the expert as a filter of evidence. A real problem arises in this jurisdiction from the use of the word "expert". In this context an "expert" is merely a witness giving factual, hearsay and opinion evidence. No witness is prohibited from doing that. The question is not therefore the admissibility of the evidence (as it would be in the criminal and civil courts) but the weight to be given to it. The task for us is therefore to decide, simply, how much weight is to be put on the conclusions and/or the filtered evidence that is put before us. The fact that it is demonstrably wrong may help to assess it. However, the fact that it is not demonstrably wrong does not engender reliance upon it, whether or not the person giving the evidence is, or claims to be an "expert". Additionally, in order to accept an expert as a competent and reliable filter mechanism it is necessary to trust the expert and to have confidence that he or she has filtered the evidence objectively and independently, not partially. The extent to which that trust can be established may depend on a number of factors including the reputation of the expert, and any established track record. It may also depend on the quality of the sources and whether there is a variety of sources. For example, a report on Sri Lanka that relied only on LTTE sources, without countervailing evidence from sources that did not support the LTTE, would be likely to carry little weight. The age of the source material and the number of sources is also important. An expert may not have any track record with the Tribunal, in which case particular care is needed in assessing the weight to be put on the evidence, and any opinion said to be derived from it.”
“Where Mr Henderson is on stronger ground, we find, is in relation to the executive summary at the beginning of the FFM report. The existence of this summary is hard to reconcile with the claim in the introduction that “No attempt has been made to provide any analysis of the material”
“(4) If a person is detained by the Sri Lankan security services there remains a real risk of ill-treatment or harm requiring international protection.”
“157A. (1) No person shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka. (2) No political party or other association or organisation shall have as one of its aims or objectives the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka.”
“… It must be further realised that there are groups even within the democratic mainstream in Sri Lanka that obtain funding from the LTTE’s international network and pro-LTTE elements overseas, which more or less openly talk about achieving the very same objectives that the LTTE had. Though they appear to have a democratic face, their extremist separatist ideology has not yet disappeared. Their ultimate objective is achieving the division of Sri Lanka. As a result of their actions and statements, it is very much a possibility that certain radical elements will feel empowered to once again attempt to take up arms in the name of separation. This is a major national security threat that needs to be taken with the utmost seriousness.”
“Despite the military defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka its front organisations and structures continues to remain active overseas promoting LTTE ideology of creating a mono ethnic separate state of Tamil Eelam through terrorist means. Three clear resurgence attempts within the country with assistance from pro LTTE groups operating overseas (Year 2012-2014).”
“While the effect of proscription is to forbid and make it an offence to have any contact or links with members of those proscribed organisations, the Sri Lankan Government does not limit its focus on those organisations proscribed. … Those in opposition of the Sri Lankan State are not defined by whether they are listed, delisted or unlisted, but by the activities the organisation is involved in.”
“Terrorism related activities and Financing Terrorism.”
“[The TGTE] was formed with assistance of an advisory committee comprising prominent pro-LTTE activists, including foreigners who have been helping the LTTE for many years.”
“324. President Rajapaksa has stated, and the press reports and experts confirm, that the government has sophisticated intelligence concerning who is contacting the diaspora or seeking to revive the quest for a Tamil homeland. The government's intelligence includes monitoring of activities online, on mobile phones, and in the diaspora in the four hotspots: London, Paris, Oslo and Toronto. It has informers throughout the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and in the diaspora. It intercepts electronic and telephone communications and closes down websites. Photographs are taken of demonstrations and the GOSL sponsors an image recognition project at Colombo University. … 336. The former Tamil areas and the diaspora are heavily penetrated by the security forces. Photographs are taken of public demonstrations and the GOSL may be using face recognition technology: it is sponsoring a face recognition technology project at the University of Colombo. However, the question which concerns the GOSL is the identification of Tamil activists working for Tamil separatism and to destabilise the unitary Sri Lankan state. We do not consider that attendance at demonstrations in the diaspora alone is sufficient to create a real risk or a reasonable degree of likelihood that a person will attract adverse attention on return to Sri Lanka.”
“307. Sri Lankans returning without a Sri Lankan passport will require an Emergency Travel Document for which they need to apply at the SLHC in London. Full disclosure of all relevant identity information is given in the process of obtaining a TTD. An applicant completes a lengthy disclosure form and is then interviewed at the Sri Lankan High Commission in London; the information received is sent to the Ministry of External Affairs and the Department of Immigration and Emigration in Colombo. Files are created and records verified; if the authorities agree to issue a TTD, the MEA in Colombo emails the document to the Sri Lankan High Commission in London where the TTD is stamped, a photograph added, and issued to the applicant. ... 308. During the re-documentation process in the United Kingdom, or at the airport on return, a forced returnee can expect to be asked about his own and his family’s LTTE corrections and sympathies. ... 352. The evidence before us indicates that any Tamil who seeks a travel document from the SLHC in London or another diaspora hotspot will have a file created in Colombo and will be interviewed in London before a decision is made to issue a TTD. By the time the DIE in Colombo emails a TTD to London to be issued to such an individual, the Sri Lankan authorities will know all they need to know about what activities an individual has undertaken outside Sri Lanka and, in particular, whether the returnee poses a real risk to the unitary Sri Lankan state or the GOSL on return.”
“(a) Individuals who are, or are perceived to be, a threat to the integrity of Sri Lanka as a single state because they are, or are perceived to have a significant role in relation to post-conflict Tamil separatism within the diaspora and/or a renewal of hostilities within Sri Lanka.”
“268. We consider that Dr Smith's factor (c) [attendance at anti-government demonstrations in the United Kingdom] has relevance, in circumstances where the GOSL has reason to consider that a person has significant involvement in diaspora activities which may unsettle the situation in Sri Lanka and lead either to the resurgence of the LTTE or a similar militia, or to the revival of the internal conflict. … 272…We do not consider, therefore, that this risk [the lack of a national identity card] is distinct from the new risk of being perceived as a person seeking to destabilise the GOSL by actively working for resurgence of the Tamil conflict. … 326. Many of the witnesses stated that despite official pronouncements that all returning asylum seekers were traitors, the GOSL was aware that many of them were economic migrants. Such returnees would be interviewed at the airport and unless it was established that they had significant diaspora activities, were likely to be allowed to continue to their home areas. … 336. … However, the question which concerns the GOSL is the identification of Tamil activists working for Tamil separatism and to destabilise the unitary Sri Lankan state. We do not consider that attendance at demonstrations in the diaspora alone is sufficient to create a real risk or a reasonable degree of likelihood that a person will attract adverse attention on return to Sri Lanka. … 351. Our overall conclusion regarding diaspora activities is that the GOSL has sophisticated intelligence enabling it to distinguish those who are actively involved in seeking to revive and re-fund the separatist movement within the diaspora, with a view to destabilising the unitary Sri Lankan state. Attendance at one, or even several demonstrations in the diaspora is not of itself evidence that a person is a committed Tamil activist seeking to promote Tamil separatism within Sri Lanka. That will be a question of fact in each case, dependent on any diaspora activities carried out by such an individual.”
“[t]he key question is always whether the activity is or might be perceived as indicative of a significant role in Tamil separatism. Beyond that, there is little utility in the [Upper Tribunal] seeking to enumerate types of activities.”
“Sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention; noteworthy; consequential, influential. In weakened sense: noticeable, substantial, considerable, large.”
“…status assigned to or assumed by a person.”
“2.4.33 Decision makers should consider a range of factors when assessing someone’s sur place activities, these include (but are not limited to); • The diaspora groups they are involved with; whether this groups is on the proscribed list of organisations (see Proscribed/de-proscribed groups); • the nature of the demonstrations attended/nature of diaspora activities involved in; • a person’s role in any demonstration- are they a leader/organiser; • how many demonstrations have they attended; • have the demonstrations attracted media attention; …”
“…It is also clear that the Tribunal believed that “diaspora activism”, actual or perceived, is the principal basis on which the Government of Sri Lanka is likely to treat returning Tamils as posing a current or future threat; and I agree that that too was a conclusion which it was entitled to reach. But I do not read para. 356 (7) (a) of its determination as prescribing that diaspora activism is the only basis on which a returning Tamil might be regarded as posing such a threat and thus of being at risk on return. Even apart from cases falling under heads (b)-(d) in para. 356 (7), there may, though untypically, be other cases (of which NT may be an example) where the evidence shows particular grounds for concluding that the Government might regard the applicant as posing a current threat to the integrity of Sri Lanka as a single state even in the absence of evidence that he or she has been involved in diaspora activism.”
“[I]f the authorities have an adverse interest in an individual, he will be picked up at home, not at the airport, unless there is a “stop” notice on the airport computer system.” (Emphasis added)
“316. The "rehabilitation" programme was designed by the Sri Lankan government to re-educate former LTTE cadres, who may never have known peace, and enable them to return to the community as ordinary citizens. The best evidence on this should have been that of Professor Gunaratna, who helped design the programme, but in fact, very little information was provided by him or anyone else about the operation of the programme.” 317. Those who have been rehabilitated are monitored and are required to report regularly and live in their home areas; the GOSL has confidence that those who have been through rehabilitation are unlikely to return to combat but monitors them closely. 318. Professor Gunaratna's opinion, which we accept, is that there has been a qualitative change in the purpose of the rehabilitation programme between 2009 and now. The government's concern now relates to those who may be associated with attempts to destabilise the unitary Sri Lanka by reviving the LTTE within the diaspora. His evidence explained how the Sri Lankan authorities would approach selection of individuals for rehabilitation now: he told us that those within Sri Lanka who undertake high profile separatist activity (such as the Jaffna students trying to celebrate Maaveerar Naal in November 2011) or who are known or perceived (while still in Sri Lanka) to be seeking contact with the leaders or activists of the resurgence movement in the diaspora hotspots, risk detention or "rehabilitation".”
“82. When an applicant applies for asylum on the ground of a well-founded fear of persecution because he is gay, the tribunal must first ask itself whether it is satisfied on the evidence that he is gay, or that he would be treated as gay by potential persecutors in his country of nationality. If so, the tribunal must then ask itself whether it is satisfied on the available evidence that gay people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in the applicant's country of nationality. If so, the tribunal must go on to consider what the individual applicant would do if he were returned to that country. If the applicant would in fact live openly and thereby be exposed to a real risk of persecution, then he has a well-founded fear of persecution - even if he could avoid the risk by living "discreetly". If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that the applicant would in fact live discreetly and so avoid persecution, it must go on to ask itself why he would do so. If the tribunal concludes that the applicant would choose to live discreetly simply because that was how he himself would wish to live, or because of social pressures, e g, not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his friends, then his application should be rejected. Social pressures of that kind do not amount to persecution and the Convention does not offer protection against them. Such a person has no well-founded fear of persecution because, for reasons that have nothing to do with any fear of persecution, he himself chooses to adopt a way of life which means that he is not in fact liable to be persecuted because he is gay. If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that a material reason for the applicant living discreetly on his return would be a fear of the persecution which would follow if he were to live openly as a gay man, then, other things being equal, his application should be accepted. Such a person has a well-founded fear of persecution. To reject his application on the ground that he could avoid the persecution by living discreetly would be to defeat the very right which the Convention exists to protect – his right to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution. By admitting him to asylum and allowing him to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution, the receiving state gives effect to that right by affording the applicant a surrogate for the protection from persecution which his country of nationality should have afforded him.”
“26. The HJ (Iran) principle applies to any person who has political beliefs and is obliged to conceal them in order to avoid the persecution that he would suffer if he were to reveal them. Mr Swift accepted that such a person would have a "strong" case for Convention protection, but he stopped short of an unqualified acceptance of the point. In my view, there is no basis for such reticence. The joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Appellant S395/2002 contains a passage under the heading "'Discretion' and 'being discreet'" which includes the following at para 80: "If an applicant holds political or religious beliefs that are not favoured in the country of nationality, the chance of adverse consequences befalling that applicant on return to that country would ordinarily increase if, on return, the applicant were to draw attention to the holding of the relevant belief. But it is no answer to a claim for protection as a refugee to say to an applicant that those adverse consequences could be avoided if the applicant were to hide the fact that he or she holds the beliefs in question. And to say to an applicant that he or she should be 'discreet' about such matters is simply to use gentler terms to convey the same meaning. The question to be considered in assessing whether the applicant's fear of persecution is well founded is what may happen if the applicant returns to the country of nationality; it is not, could the applicant live in that country without attracting adverse consequences." 27. I made much the same point in HJ (Iran) at para 110: "If the price that a person must pay in order to avoid persecution is that he must conceal his race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion, then he is being required to surrender the very protection that the Convention is intended to secure for him. The Convention would be failing in its purpose if it were to mean that a gay man does not have a well-founded fear of persecution because he would conceal the fact that he is a gay man in order to avoid persecution on return to his home country."” "If an applicant holds political or religious beliefs that are not favoured in the country of nationality, the chance of adverse consequences befalling that applicant on return to that country would ordinarily increase if, on return, the applicant were to draw attention to the holding of the relevant belief. But it is no answer to a claim for protection as a refugee to say to an applicant that those adverse consequences could be avoided if the applicant were to hide the fact that he or she holds the beliefs in question. And to say to an applicant that he or she should be 'discreet' about such matters is simply to use gentler terms to convey the same meaning. The question to be considered in assessing whether the applicant's fear of persecution is well founded is what may happen if the applicant returns to the country of nationality; it is not, could the applicant live in that country without attracting adverse consequences." "If the price that a person must pay in order to avoid persecution is that he must conceal his race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion, then he is being required to surrender the very protection that the Convention is intended to secure for him. The Convention would be failing in its purpose if it were to mean that a gay man does not have a well-founded fear of persecution because he would conceal the fact that he is a gay man in order to avoid persecution on return to his home country."”
“They have a genuine belief in Tamil separatism which has manifested in a significant role within Tamil separatism in the diaspora.”
“If returned, they would manifest their belief similarly [i.e. at a level disclosing a “significant role” within the diaspora] and GoSL would be reasonably likely to detect at the same.”
‘Locked Away: Sri Lanka’s security detainees’
‘Sri Lanka: Free Prominent Rights Defenders’17 March 2014 23. Sri Lankan Government: Gazette, Government Notification21 March 2014 24. The Economist, ‘Never a Good Time: Sri Lanka and Human Rights’21 March 2014 25. Tamil Guardian, ‘Diaspora organisations proscriptions should not be used to stifle free speech and legitimate criticism UK tells Sri Lanka’1 April 2014 26. The Hindu, ‘Sri Lanka bans 15 Tamil diaspora organisations’2 April 2014 27. BBC, ‘Suspected Tamil rebels shot dead in Sri Lanka’11 April 2014 28. New.LK, ‘Terrorist-Political-Human Rights Nexus in Canada’16 April 2014 29. Daily Mirror, ‘Third abortive Diaspora-backed attempt to revive the LTTE’25 April 2014 30. Tamil Guardian, ‘Sri Lanka’s diaspora ban has ‘no legal effect in Canada’ says Foreign Affairs Minister’29 April 2014 31. The Sunday Leader, ‘TGTE Losing Lustre Among Tamils’11 May 2014 32. The Sunday Leader, ‘The LTTE revives its US network’13 July 2014 33. The Sunday Leader, ‘LTTE reaches out to Scottish separatists’27 July 2014 34. Home Office Country Information and Guidance Note, ‘Sri Lanka: Tamil Separatism’28 August 2014 35. UN: Oral update of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka22 September 2014 36. Huffington Post, ‘Why Sri Lanka’s Detention of Mrs Balenderan Jayakumari Is so Sinister’1 October 2014 37. Sri Lankan Government: Gazette, Amendments to the United Nations Regulations11 December 2014 38. Stanford University Centre for International Security and Cooperation, ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ 2015 39. UN: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka (OISL)16 February 2015 40. Al Jazeera, ‘Spy cables reveal Sri Lanka hyped up Tiger postwar threat’4 March 2015 41. GroundViews, ‘PTA detainees – Ignored under “Yahapalanaya”?’9 May 2015 42. Sri Lankan Government: The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (revised – as amended up to15 May 2015 )15 May 2015 43. International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP): A Still Unfinished War (with annexes)1 July 2015 44. Freedom from Torture: Tainted peace August 2015 45. International Crisis Group: ‘Sri Lanka between elections’12 August 2015 46. Sunday Times (Sri Lanka), ‘TNA hits out at LTTE, calls on Govt. to accept OISL report’20 September 2015 47. UN: Comprehensive report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Sri Lanka28 September 2015 48. UN Resolution 30/11 October 2015 49. Human Rights Watch: We Live in Constant Fear – Lack of Accountability for Police Abuse in Sri Lanka23 October 2015 50. Sri Lankan Government: The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka20 November 2015 51. Daily FT, ‘Sri Lanka slashes list of ‘terrorists’ in reconciliation bid’23 November 2015 52. Jeevanthie Senanayake, ‘Understanding Separatist Networking in Sri Lanka: Ideology as a concept in network analysis.’
“12. Annexed to the guidance is the text of two letters from the British High Commission in Sri Lanka. This material is authoritative and clearly intended to be read with the guidance. The first letter is dated16 April 2014 : “Proscribed Terrorist Groups On1 April 2014 , the government of Sri Lanka announced the designation of 16 Tamil Diaspora organisations and 424 individuals under the UN Security Council resolution 1373 on counter-terrorism. The order was issued by the Secretary of Defence. The government asserts that this action has been taken to stop attempts to revive the LTTE. The BHC [i.e. British High Commission] has asked the government of Sri Lanka to provide evidence to support this decision. Among the organisations proscribed are the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) and the UK-based Global Tamil Forum (GTF) and British Tamil Forum (BTF). When making the announcement on 1 April, Brigadier Ruwan Wanigasooriya said that individuals belonging to these organisations would face arrest under anti-terrorism laws … [T]o date, there have been no known arrests based on membership of one of the newly proscribed groups.” 13. The later letter is dated25 July 2014 and the relevant text reads: “The spokesperson from the DIE stated that returnees may be questioned on arrival by immigration, CID, SIS and TID. They may be questioned about what they have been doing whilst out of Sri Lanka, including whether they have been involved with one of the Tamil Diaspora groups. He said that it was normal practice for returnees to be asked about their activities in the country they were returning from. The spokesperson from the SIS said that people being “deported” will always be questioned about their overseas activities, including whether they have been involved with one of the proscribed organisations. He said that members of the organisations are not banned from returning to Sri Lanka, they are allowed to return, but will be questioned on arrival and may be detained.”
“29. No evidence of the appellant’s mental state was placed before the Judges who heard her appeal but there is no reliable evidence before this Tribunal that the appellant was suffering from any mental health issues when she left Sri Lankan or indeed for many years after she left Sri Lanka. Her medical records which is before this Tribunal makes no reference to the appellant having any mental health problem before 2016. Prior to August 2016, the appellant’s main contact with her GP was to do with general matters.”
“14.1. MRS [RS’] presentation, in my opinion, is consistent with a diagnosis of severe Depressive Episode, with psychotic symptoms as defined in the international classification of disease 10th Edition, Mental and Behavioural Disorder, ICD10 F 32.3. (Appendix II). 14.2. She also has Post Traumatic Symptoms but her psychotic symptoms are prominent at this stage and it is difficult to assess her PTSD symptoms. In my opinion her traumatic experience, torture at the hands of the authorities in Sri Lanka is the primary cause of her mental health issues. 14.3. Her medical records noted that she was admitted 3 times detained under the provision of the MHA. Her symptoms appears to be a mixture of schizophrenic and affective symptoms (elated and depressed mood), therefore in my opinion she is suffering from Schizoaffective Disorder appendix (III), as stated in the ICD10 ‘A diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder should be made only when both definite schizophrenic and definite affective symptoms are prominent simultaneously.”