Cosmin Liviu Vulpie v Office of The Prosecutor of The Republic at the Court of Florence, Italy [2025] EWHC 1714 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 1714 (Admin)

Case No AC-2024-LON-002423

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 8 July 2025

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PEPPERALL

Between

COSMIN LIVIU VULPIEAppellant

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE REPUBLIC AT THE COURT OF FLORENCE, ITALYRespondent

Rebecca Hill (instructed by Paytons Solicitors LLP) for Appellant

Stefan Hyman (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Extradition Unit) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing date: 1 July 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30 am on 8 July 2025

by circulation to the parties by email and by release to the National Archives.

[1]On 10 July 2024, District Judge Pilling sitting at Westminster Magistrates’ Court ordered the extradition of Cosmin Vulpie to Italy pursuant to a warrant issued by the Office of the Prosecutor in Florence in order to serve a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment for an offence of credit card fraud committed on 1 August 2011. Mr Vulpie now appeals against his extradition on the single ground that his extradition would not be compatible with his rights under

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms.

[2]While s.21 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires the court to decide whether extradition would be compatible with a convicted offender’s Convention rights, it must be recognised that any sentence of imprisonment – whether imposed domestically by our courts or internationally by the courts of a foreign sovereign state – necessarily restricts the offender’s ability to enjoy his or her private and family life. Indeed, the restriction of liberty inherent in the sentence is the very point since prison sentences are intended to punish criminals and to deter others from crime. Extradition often involves some dislocation to family life and impacts harshly on dependants. Article 8 is, however, a qualified right which expressly recognises the legitimacy of the interference with an offender’s private and family life where it is in accordance with the law and is necessary for, among other things, the prevention of disorder or crime. Further, there is a very real public interest in effective and reciprocal arrangements for the extradition of criminals, and in ensuring that England & Wales is not a safe haven for those seeking to evade justice.

[3]Accordingly, extradition to serve a prison sentence abroad will almost inevitably interfere drastically with private and family life, but the courts are very slow to find that extradition is incompatible with a convicted offender’s Article 8 rights: 3.1 In Norris v. Government of the USA (No. 2)

[2010] UKSC 9

, [2010] 2 A.C. 487, Lord Phillips said, at [56]:

“The reality is that it is only if some quite exceptionally compelling feature, or combination of features, is present that interference with family life consequent upon extradition will be other than proportionate to the objective that extradition serves … Instead of saying that interference with Article 8 rights can only outweigh the importance of extradition in exceptional circumstances it is more accurate and more helpful to say that the consequences of interference with Article 8 rights must be exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance of extradition.” 3.2 In H(H) v. Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25, [2013] 1 A.C. 338, Baroness Hale summarised the key principles at [8]: “(1) There may be a closer analogy between extradition and the domestic criminal process than between extradition and deportation or expulsion, but the court has still to examine carefully the way in which it will interfere with family life. (2) There is no test of exceptionality in either context. (3) The question is always whether the interference with the private and family lives of the extraditee and other members of his family is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. (4) There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition: that people accused of crimes should be brought to trial; that people convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; that the United Kingdom should honour its treaty obligations to other countries; and that there should be no ‘safe havens’ to which either can flee in the belief that they will not be sent back. (5) That public interest will always carry great weight, but the weight to be attached to it in the particular case does vary according to the nature and seriousness of the crime or crimes involved. (6) The delay since the crimes were committed may both diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest and increase the impact upon private and family life. (7) Hence it is likely that the public interest in extradition will outweigh the Article 8 rights of the family unless the consequences of the interference with family life will be exceptionally severe.” 3.3 In Polish Judicial Authority v. Celinski [2015] EWHC 1272 (Admin), [2016] 1 W.L.R. 551, Lord Thomas CJ stressed the “very high” public interest in honouring extradition arrangements and that decisions of the judicial authority of a member state making a request should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. He added, at [39]: “The important public interests in upholding extradition arrangements, and in preventing the UK being a safe haven for a fugitive ... would require very strong counter-balancing factors before extradition could be disproportionate.” 3.4 Bringing matters right up to date, last month the Supreme Court expressed concern in Andrysiewicz v. Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23, [2025] 1 W.L.R. 2733 that, despite these authoritative statements of principle, Article 8 is argued to resist extradition in virtually every case. Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Stephens stressed, at [43]: “Cases in which a submission founded on Article 8 ECHR may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. It is most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life. Even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an Article 8 ECHR ‘defence’ will have any prospect of success.”

[4]Thus, Mr Vulpie has an uphill task in persuading the court that this is one of those rare cases in which the interference with his private and family life is so exceptionally severe that the judge ought to have ordered his discharge. BACKGROUND

[5]Mr Vulpie was born on 19 June 1982. Between 2001 and 2020 he was convicted of multiple offences in his native Romania and in Italy, Belgium and Croatia. While this case is concerned with a single 2011 conviction, it is appropriate to set that in its proper context. Prior to that case, Mr Vulpie had been convicted of sixteen offences in Romania and Italy:5.1 On 13 September 2001, he was convicted in Romania of seven offences of larceny and aggravated larceny, and sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment.

5.2 On 5 December 2005, he was convicted in Italy of an offence of using a false identity.

5.3 On 21 November 2006, he was convicted in Italy of theft, resisting a public official and causing grievous bodily harm.

5.4 By a subsequent decision made on 24 November 2007, the court passed an overall sentence for the 2005 and 2006 convictions of 2 years 7 months and 10 days’ imprisonment.

5.5 On 14 March 2007, he was convicted in Romania of illegally crossing the state border and sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment.

5.6 On 14 October 2008, he was convicted in Italy of further offences of theft and sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment.

5.7 On 23 October 2008, he was convicted in Romania of robbery and sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment.

5.8 On 23 November 2009, he was convicted in Italy of making a false statement about his identity and imprisoned for 20 days.

[6]On 1 August 2011, Mr Vulpie acted with others in using cloned credit cards to obtain jewellery by deception. Nine days later he was convicted of that offence and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. As he explained in evidence, the sentence was not then finalised and accordingly he was not taken into custody. The conviction became final on 22 June 2012. Subsequently by a sentencing decision made on 22 May 2013, the sentence was suspended. As I set out below, the suspended sentence was later activated upon his conviction for a further offence.

[7]On 18 June 2013, Mr Vulpie was extradited by Italy to serve the seven-year sentence for robbery in Romania. He was released from that sentence in December 2016.

[8]After the credit card offence, Mr Vulpie was convicted of ten further offences across four European countries:8.1 On 28 October 2013, he was convicted in Italy of a further offence of theft that had been committed in October 2011. Initially, Mr Vulpie was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment. By a further sentencing decision taken on 31 March 2014, the sentences for the credit card offence and the theft were amended as part of the formation of an overall penalty. The new total sentence was 1 year 10 months and 10 days’ imprisonment.

8.2 On 19 April 2016, he was again convicted in Romania of theft and sentenced to a further term of imprisonment.

8.3 On 21 December 2018, he was convicted in Italy of an offence of escape that had been committed in January 2012 and sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment.

8.4 On 28 December 2018, he was convicted in Belgium of two burglaries and involvement in a criminal conspiracy between November 2017 and October 2018. He was sentenced to a partially suspended sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment.

8.5 On 17 January 2020, he was convicted in Italy of resisting a public official and of making and using false identity documents in October 2012. He was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment.

8.6 Finally, on 15 May 2020, he was convicted of an immigration offence committed in Croatia in May 2019. He was sentenced to a partially suspended sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment.

[9]On 28 May 2021, the Court at Florence issued an “order of enforcement of concurring sentences” in respect of a number of convictions comprising a total period of imprisonment of 6 years 8 months and 10 days. It appears from the warrant that the final sentence for the August 2011 offence was one of 18 months’ imprisonment.

[10]On 6 November 2023, the Office of the Prosecutor at the Court in Florence issued five arrest warrants relating to this outstanding total Italian sentence.

[11]On the judge’s findings, Mr Vulpie moved to the UK in May 2020. He lives with his wife and two sons in Blackpool. The boys were born in February 2012 and November 2013, and so were aged 12 and 10 at the time of the judge’s extradition order. They are settled at a local school in Blackpool. Mr Vulpie works as a delivery driver. Mrs Vulpie worked part-time for Amazon at the time of the hearing but was planning to start work as a taxi driver.

[12]Mr Vulpie has not been convicted of any offences in this jurisdiction. It is his case that he has put his former criminality behind him. THE JUDGMENT

[13]Judge Pilling was faced with five different warrants and issues as to dual criminality, delay, Mr Vulpie’s absence from a number of hearings in Italy and his right to seek a retrial as well as the Article 8 argument. The judge ordered Mr Vulpie’s discharge in respect of four warrants on the grounds that he had been convicted of those offences in his absence in circumstances where the judicial authority had not established that he had been deliberately absent from his trial and where he would not be entitled to a retrial on surrendering to the Italian courts. Further, in one case the judge was not satisfied as to dual criminality. Mr Vulpie’s extradition was, however, ordered in respect of the remaining conviction warrant to serve the sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment imposed for the credit card fraud committed in August 2011.

[14]The judge recorded the Respondent’s concession that Mr Vulpie was not a fugitive but noted that he was convicted and aware that the sentence had been imposed in August 2011. She noted that the sentence was not finalised until June 2012 and later became part of a cumulative sentence in 2021. She added that it was not clear why there had been such delay. She noted that the Italian authorities knew that Mr Vulpie was in Romania between 2013 and 2016. She said that Mr Vulpie was under no obligation to return to Italy and had no restrictions on his movements when released from custody in Romania.

[15]Rejecting any extradition defence under s.14 of the Act, she said:

“However, the Requested Person was aware that this sentence, at the very least, was outstanding in Italy and he moved several times which he knew would make tracing him very difficult if not impossible.”

[16]The judge then turned to consider the Article 8 issues. She directed herself in accordance with Norris, H(H), and Celinski. She then set about the usual balance sheet exercise of weighing the pros and cons of extradition:

“79. In favour of extradition, I find that there are the following factors: (i) The constant and weighty public interest in extradition. (ii) The very high public interest in ensuring that the UK honours its treaty obligations to other countries. (iii) The decision of the Judicial Authority to make an extradition request should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. (iv) The Requested Person is a repeat offender with convictions for offences committed in many countries, and there is public interest in seeing justice being done. (v) Although the Requested Person is not a fugitive, it is important that the UK is not seen as a ‘safe haven’ for those seeking to avoid being prosecuted or serving their lawfully imposed punishment. The Requested Person’s previous convictions include offences of providing false information to the authorities and escaping (or attempting to escape) lawful detention. (i) The constant and weighty public interest in extradition. (ii) The very high public interest in ensuring that the UK honours its treaty obligations to other countries. (iii) The decision of the Judicial Authority to make an extradition request should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. (iv) The Requested Person is a repeat offender with convictions for offences committed in many countries, and there is public interest in seeing justice being done. (v) Although the Requested Person is not a fugitive, it is important that the UK is not seen as a ‘safe haven’ for those seeking to avoid being prosecuted or serving their lawfully imposed punishment. The Requested Person’s previous convictions include offences of providing false information to the authorities and escaping (or attempting to escape) lawful detention. 80. Against extradition, I find the following factors: (i) The Requested Person has a settled private life in the UK. (ii) The offence is old, having been committed in 2011 and not of the most serious nature. (iii) There will be interference with the protected rights of the Requested Person’s wife and sons. (iv) The Requested Person has committed no offences on the UK and has established a productive life here.”

[17]The judge noted that the family were well settled in the UK and that the boys were at a particularly sensitive time of their lives and education as they developed into teenagers and that they needed their father. She said that while they had spent time apart in the past, if Mr Vulpie were to be extradited to serve his sentence in Italy, there would be particular logistical challenges in visiting him and with language difficulties. She added that the sentence could have been served following Mr Vulpie’s release from custody in Romania in 2016 and that the family had spent many years establishing a life in the UK.

[18]The judge also noted the submission that Mr Vulpie had then been subject to an electronically monitored curfew for over 6 months and that he had “not escaped without impunity”.

Judge Pilling concluded:

“84. I do accept that the extradition of the Requested Person would have a detrimental impact on the family. There is, however, no real evidence that the Requested Person’s wife would not be able to manage financially with a combination of work and state support. It is clear that she has been able to provide for the family in the past in the absence of the Requested Person and there are fewer childcare restrictions now that the two boys are older. 85. I agree that the two children will suffer if the Requested Person is extradited. This is unfortunately common in many criminal and extradition cases where a parent is sentenced to imprisonment in respect of a criminal offence they have committed. The Requested Person did not commit just the one offence in Arrest Warrant 1 in 2011, but a series of offences in various countries, including an immigration offence in Croatia while on his way to live in the UK. 86. Having discharged Arrest Warrants 2, 3, 4 and 5, the Requested Person would not be serving the lengthy cumulative sentence of 6 years 8 months and 10 days, which would have a much more damaging impact on the children who might not see him again until they are adults, but to serve the much shorter sentence relating to Arrest Warrant 1 only; a maximum of 11 months’ imprisonment. Having conducted the balancing exercise, these factors do not, in my assessment, outweigh the weighty public interest factors identified in favour of extradition. 87. In all the circumstances, the extradition of the Requested Person would not disproportionately interfere with any person’s right to respect for private and family life and is compatible with the Convention rights.”

[20]In argument, counsel could not explain upon the materials currently before me the judge’s reference to there being only 11 months to serve. The judge may be right but neither counsel suggested that anything turned on whether it was 11 or 18 months. THE ARGUMENT

[21]Rebecca Hill, who appears for Mr Vulpie, accepts that the court will only rarely discharge a requested person on the basis of Article 8 but submits that there are exceptionally compelling features of this case:21.1 First, citing the case of Rybak v. District Court in Lublin, Poland

[2021] EWHC 712 (Admin)

, [2021] 1 W.L.R. 3993, she relies on delay. Although convicted just nine days after the credit card offence, the Italian judicial authority did not order the enforcement of the sentence until May 2021, almost ten years after the offence was committed, and did not issue the arrest warrant for a further 2½ years. Noting that Mr Vulpie was extradited to Romania in June 2013, she submits that Italy could have refused to extradite him until Mr Vulpie had served this sentence or extradited him on terms that he should be returned to Italy on completion of his sentence in Romania. Alternatively, it could have sought his extradition when he was nearing the end of his sentence in Romania. While accepting that the judge referred to the delay in this case, Ms Hill submits that the chronology was exceptional and that the delay was a weighty and important factor that should have played a more significant role in the judge’s analysis. Relying on Baroness Hale’s judgment in H(H) she argues that the delay both lessens the apparent importance attached to the enforcement of its sentence by the Italian courts and increases the impact of his extradition upon Mr Vulpie and his family.

21.2 Secondly, she criticises the judge’s finding that Mr Vulpie was aware that the sentence was outstanding and that he had moved several times “which he knew would make tracing him very difficult if not impossible”. She asserts that such finding was not based on any evidence and the issue was not put to her client in cross examination.

21.3 Thirdly, she submits that Mr Vulpie has completely transformed his life. Accepting that he had an appalling record of criminal offences before he came to the UK, she argues that he now leads a hardworking and productive life.

21.4 Fourthly, she argues that his wife and sons are dependent upon Mr Vulpie financially, emotionally and practically. Although his wife works, he is the principal breadwinner. Furthermore, she stresses that his sons are at a formative age and will be deeply affected by the loss of their father to serve a sentence for an offence committed before they were born.

21.5 Fifthly, relying on the case of Prusianu v. Braila Court of Law, Romania

[2022] EWHC 1929 (Admin)

, [2023] 1 W.L.R. 495, she argues that the court should take into account the fact that Mr Vulpie was subject to an electronically monitored curfew until July 2024 and has remained subject to a doorstep curfew. She argues that such bail conditions have imposed a real restriction on his liberty and diminish the public interest in his extradition.

[22]Stefan Hyman, who appears for the judicial authority, stresses the high hurdle faced by a convicted offender seeking to resist extradition on the basis of alleged incompatibility with Article 8. He argues that the judge did not make any error and that, even if the court were to repeat the Celinski balancing exercise for itself, it should conclude that she came to the right decision. In resisting this appeal, he emphasises the following features of this case:22.1 First, this is not a case of the extradition of a sole carer or both parents.

22.2 Secondly, while he accepts that delay can be a relevant factor in the Article 8 assessment, he points out that there were multiple cases before the Italian courts. Further, he cautions against any assumption that there was not an earlier European arrest warrant before Italy identified that Mr Vulpie was in the UK.

22.3 Thirdly, he argues that Ms Hill puts matters too highly by claiming that Mr Vulpie has transformed himself. What the evidence comes to is that he has not committed any further offence since the Croatian immigration offence in May 2019.

22.4 Fourthly, he argues that the approach in Prusianu may need to be revisited in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrysiewicz. He argues that bail conditions are imposed to ensure that the UK complies with its international obligation to prevent offenders evading extradition and that a three-hour curfew during nighttime hours was not in any event a substantial restriction on Mr Vulpie’s liberty. DISCUSSION

[23]Section 27(3) of the Act provides that an appeal may be allowed if the judge ought to have decided a question before her differently and, had she done so, would have been required to order Mr Vulpie’s discharge. Although the judge’s reasons for her decision must be considered with care, any errors or omissions do not of themselves necessarily demonstrate that the decision was wrong: Celinski, at [24]. Even where the judge considers the right matters, the appellate court is entitled to stand back and determine whether the question of extradition ought to have been decided differently because the judge’s overall evaluation was wrong: Love v. Government of the United States of America

[2018] EWHC 172 (Admin)

, [2018] 1 W.L.R. 2889, at [26].

[24]In my judgment, Judge Pilling properly directed herself as to the law and undertook an unimpeachable Celinski balance-sheet analysis:24.1 She rightly recognised the constant and weighty public interest in extradition; that there is a very high public interest in ensuring that the UK honours its treaty obligations; that the decision of the judicial authority to make an extradition request should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect; and that it is important that the UK should not be seen as a safe haven from justice. More specifically to this case, she was also right to take account of Mr Vulpie’s previous convictions. He is a man who over a period of two decades committed a substantial number of serious criminal offences across four different European countries and who has served a number of sentences of imprisonment.

24.2 On the other side of the ledger, the judge also properly took into account that Mr Vulpie had a settled private and family life; the impact of extradition on his wife and sons; that this was an old offence and was “not of the most serious nature”; that Mr Vulpie had not committed any offences in the UK; that he had established a productive life in this country; and that he had been subject to bail conditions including an electronically monitored curfew.

[25]This appeal does not assert that the judge was wrong to take into account any of those factors in favour of extradition or that she failed to have regard to any of the counterbalancing factors. Rather it is argued that she failed to give sufficient weight to crucial factors telling against extradition such that she ultimately came to the wrong decision.

[26]Mrs Vulpie works but the family would nevertheless struggle without her husband’s significant financial and emotional support. Further, the boys are at a formative age and would suffer from their father’s imprisonment. This is not, however, an extreme case where extradition would deprive them of their sole or even principal carer. Thus, the fact that Mr Vulpie’s extradition would necessarily cause significant hardship to his wife and children is not of itself an exceptional feature of this case. Nor, in my judgment, is the fact that Mr Vulpie has been required to observe a three-hour curfew during the small hours of the night an exceptional feature that might of itself justify his discharge on Article 8 grounds. Nevertheless, these factors all go into the balance in answering the fundamental question as to whether Mr Vulpie’s extradition would have such an exceptionally severe impact on his private and family life that it would be incompatible with his Article 8 rights and I leave for another case Mr Hyman’s argument as to whether the approach in Prusianu can survive the decision in Andrysiewicz.

[27]The judge recognised that the credit card offence was not of the most serious nature. Nevertheless, it was obviously made more serious by Mr Vulpie’s appalling record of previous offending and by his continued commission of offences following earlier sentences of imprisonment. The English court should, in my judgment, respect the fact that the offence was deemed sufficiently serious to justify a not insignificant sentence of imprisonment. While not affecting the seriousness of the offence, the public interest in the enforcement of the sentence grew upon his continued commission of further offences.

[28]What does, however, require closer analysis is the long delay in this case coupled with the fact that Mr Vulpie has led a productive life since coming to the UK in 2020.

[29]As Baroness Hale recognised in H(H), delay can both diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest in extradition and increase its impact upon private and family life. Ms Hill is right to submit that the delay in this case is very long. Nevertheless, the delay must be put in its proper context:29.1 First, I reject Ms Hill’s criticism that Italy should either have required Mr Vulpie to serve this sentence before his extradition to Romania or only extradited him on condition that he would be returned to serve his sentence in Italy. On a proper reading of the chronology, the sentence had been suspended in May 2013 just before Mr Vulpie was extradited to Romania. Accordingly, there was no Italian sentence of immediate custody to be served at the time of Mr Vulpie’s extradition.

29.2 Secondly, if Mr Vulpie had not been convicted of further offences in Italy then his suspended sentence would, no doubt, never have been activated. It was only following the court’s decision on 31 March 2014 to impose a total sentence of just over 22 months’ imprisonment upon Mr Vulpie’s conviction for a further offence of theft committed after the credit card offence that his extradition could have been sought. By then, he was of course serving a long sentence in Romania.

29.3 Thirdly, the Italian court’s subsequent decision in 2021 to enforce the sentence followed not just the commission of that further offence of theft but also Mr Vulpie’s convictions in December 2018 for escape and in January 2020 for resisting a public official and identity offences. While themselves old offences dating back to 2011-2012, all of these further offences were also committed after the credit card offence.

29.4 Fourthly, even if his extradition had been sought earlier, there were significant periods of time between March 2014 and May 2020 when Mr Vulpie was serving prison sentences in Romania, Belgium and Croatia.

[30]There is no evidence either way as to any earlier European arrest warrant or as to any difficulties in locating Mr Vulpie in this country, and I decline to speculate as to those issues.

[31]It is to Mr Vulpie’s credit that he has turned away from crime and is finally living an honest and productive life in this country. He does, however, have an appalling criminal record and his transformation is relatively recent. Further offences were committed in Belgium and Croatia in 2017, 2018 and 2019 with his last criminal offence having been committed just over 4 years before the extradition request in this case.

[32]Accordingly, and notwithstanding the age of this conviction, this is very far from being a case where a judicial authority seeks to enforce a custodial sentence imposed in 2011 upon a man of otherwise good character who has not committed any further offences since his conviction and who has been at liberty and so available for immediate extradition throughout.

[33]The judge accepted that Mr Vulpie was not a fugitive. Given the lack of evidence or cross examination on the point, I assume in his favour that the judge ought not to have found that he had moved around in the knowledge that doing so would make it more difficult for justice to catch up with him. Nevertheless, Mr Vulpie was present in court in Florence in August 2011 when he was convicted and initially sentenced, albeit such sentence was not then final. Further, he does have convictions for escape and for the use of false identity documents and has, as a matter of fact, moved around both in Europe and within the UK since his release from his custodial sentence in Romania.

[34]Standing back and balancing all of the factors in this case, I consider that the judge was right to find that this was not one of those rare cases where extradition would have such an exceptionally severe impact on private and family life that it would be incompatible with the offender’s Article 8 rights. For these reasons, the judge was right to order Mr Vulpie’s extradition and this appeal is dismissed.