Vince Bogdan v Győr Regional Court (Hungary) [2026] EWHC 2017 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2017 (Admin)Case No AC-2024-LON-002824
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 27 th July 2026
Before
MRS JUSTICE FOSTER
Between
VINCE BOGDANClaimantGYOR REGIONAL COURT (HUNGARY)Defendant
Georgia Beatty (instructed by GT Stewart Solicitors & Advocates) for appellantHannah Burton (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 30th October 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 3.00 pm on 30/07/2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MRS JUSTICE FOSTER DBE

Introduction

[1]This is an appeal against the decision of DJ (“the DJ”) Curtis dated 16 August 2024 ordering the extradition of the appellant Mr Victor Bogdan to Hungary pursuant to a conviction Warrant issued by Győr Regional Court on 24/05/2022 and certified by the NCA on 22/11/2022. The Warrant seeks the surrender of the appellant to enforce the remainder of a total sentence of 3 years and 15 days’ imprisonment, imposed in respect of a number of offences in Hungary between August 2009 and July 2015.[2]This appeal raised three points, one of which was granted permission by Collins Rice J, the other two were listed on a rolled-up basis to be considered on appeal. There are applications for the admission of new evidence by both appellant and respondent. By agreement all matters were argued together, and the proposed new evidence on both sides considered de bene esse.

The Issues before this court

[3]The three issues before the Court are(i) Dual criminality (on which permission was granted).(ii) Right to a retrial (on which permission is sought)(iii) Article 8 ECHR (on which permission is sought)[4]In brief the appellant submits as to Issue (i), dual criminality, that the DJ erred in finding that offence 2 of Judgment No. B.141/2012/25 of the Sopron District Court, regarding the registration of individuals at an address, satisfies the requirements of sections 10 and 65 of the Act. As to Issue (ii) it is argued that properly read the Warrant and Further Information are ambiguous and the court could not be satisfied that a right to retrial existed. On Issue (iii) it is said that the DJ made errors of approach particularly with regard to the children of the appellant and failed properly to acknowledge the features that made extradition disproportionate in the circumstances.[5]The appellant seeks to adduce medical evidence and two fresh statements, one from him and one from his wife. The respondent seeks to adduce Further Information dated 30 June 2025 concerning the public registry of residence in Hungary relevant to dual criminality under ground (i) above.

Statement of Conclusion

[6]I say at the outset that the appellant succeeds on the grounds of dual criminality. I cannot be sure that conduct outlined in the Warrant constitutes an offence under the Fraud Act 2006 as argued by the Judicial Authority. The applications for permission to argue the retrial point and the Article 8 point must fail.

Background

[7]The history of the proceedings is somewhat complicated in thatthe appellant was the subject of two previous Warrants (“AW1” and “AW2”). One was an accusation Warrant relating to the offence that now appears in a new Warrant, AW3, called “matter 1”. AW3 contains 2 matters in total. The appellant was arrested on AW1 and AW2 on 31 March 2018 and granted conditional bail. Extradition was ordered on 26 November 2018 and the appellant appealed. The appeal proceedings were stayed awaiting the result of other litigation in this jurisdiction concerning Hungary. Ultimately, AW1 and AW2 were withdrawn. The High Court discharged the appellant in respect of AW1 and AW2 on 28 November 2022. He was then arrested on 20 December 2022 following his voluntary surrender. Various hearing dates were vacated over the next year for a variety of reasons, the matter being finally heard on 24 July 2024 and judgment delivered on 16 August 2024.[8]Two sets of Further Information were before the court below, FI 1 dated 27 November 2023, and FI 2 dated 14 December 2023.[9]The appellant is sought on AW3 to serve a sentence of 3 years imprisonment, originally suspended for 5 years, but subsequently activated when the Judicial Authority (“JA”) became aware that the appellant had been convicted of offences in the UK.[10]AW3 refers to two judgments of the court summarised as follows. Matter 1 is in fact the later incident in time. (i). On 25 July 2015, the appellant and his nephew broke into a warehouse in the grounds of a homeless shelter where the nephew was staying at the time, and stole alcohol to a total value of 112,700 HUF (approximately £280 at the time of the offence) which they subsequently sold for 14,000 HUF (approximately £30 at the time of the offence). The sentence imposed was 2 years, 4 months and 15 days imprisonment. The remaining sentence to be served is 2 years, 4 months and 13 days imprisonment. This was finalised on 9 July 2021. Matter 2: Judgment B.141/2012/25 of the Sopron District Court (i). During March 2010, (between 1st and 14th) the appellant removed various second-hand items of furniture from the storage room at the apartment that he rented and threw them in the rubbish without permission. The items belonged to his landlord, and he did not have his landlord’s permission to dispose of them. The total value of the items was 80,200 HUF (approximately £275 at time of the offence). (ii). Between 13 August 2009 and 17 May 2010, the appellant registered eight individuals at the apartment without his landlord’s permission. The appellant signed the address registration forms/declaration forms “as if he were the landlord”. These forms were submitted to the Sopron Document Office. These forms corresponded to the real situation at the time – meaning the individuals named in the forms were in fact living at the apartment – so no false data was entered in the public register. These actions are described as 8 offences. This offence is the subject of the challenge for which permission was granted and forms ground (i) – dual criminality. (iii). On 18 December 2011, the appellant fixed incorrect registration plates to his car (a Fiat Punto). The plates were from another car, a Skoda, which had also belonged to the appellant), which had been withdrawn from circulation the previous month. Later that day, the appellant was stopped by police while driving the Fiat Punto; they confiscated the plates. (iv). On 05 August 2012, the appellant again fixed incorrect registration plates to his car (an Opel Astra from another car which had broken down a Renault Laguna, which also belonged to him). The following day, he was stopped by police in the Astra; they took the car and the plates later returning the car. This incident is described as two offences.[11]He was originally sentenced to 8 months imprisonment suspended in respect of this offending, but this was later activated due to a further offence in the probation period. The entire sentence remains to be served.[12]The appellant has 4 convictions of some age in Hungary, one for embezzlement on 5 September 2003, for which he received 8 months imprisonment, and 3 offences of theft on 27 September 2005 for which he received 2 years 6 months (the two sentences were merged in 2006 into 2 years 8 months total). He also has a conviction in Austria for handling stolen goods and taking part in criminal activities of a criminal organisation for which he received a suspended sentence.[13]The appellant is on conditional bail.[14]The DJ rejected each of a number of challenges, three of which are raised before this court. He concluded the appellant was a fugitive and whether a fugitive or not, Article 8 considerations of public policy in extradition outweighed his interests in remaining in the United Kingdom, and those of his family here.

Approach on Appeal

[15]There was no issue as to the correct approach of this court.[16]As to appeal, in Love v USA [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin), [2018] 1 W.L.R. 2889 at para 25 Burnett LCJ put the test thus: The true approach is more simply expressed by requiring the appellate court to decide whether the decision of the district judge was wrong.What was said in Celinski and Re B (A Child) are apposite, even if decided in the context of article 8. In effect, the test is the same here. The appellate court is entitled to stand back and say that a question ought to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong: crucial factors should have been weighed so significantly differently as to make the decision wrong, such that the appeal in consequence should be allowed.[17]There are two matters which have not yet been the subject of permission- for which in the first place the test is of course reasonable arguability.

Ground (i) dual criminality Section 10 and section 65

(i) dual criminality Section 10 and section 65 Framework

[18]Section 10 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires the Court to determine whether the extradition request pertains to an ‘extradition offence’. Under section 206 of the Act, the Respondent must prove compliance with section 10 to the criminal standard.[19]Section 65 of the Act sets out the meaning of an ‘extradition offence’ in a conviction case. By section 65(3)(b) the offence of which the requested person has been convicted must also ‘constitute an offence under the law of the relevant part of the United Kingdom’.[20]By section 66(1) subsections (1A) to (4) apply for the purposes of sections 64 and 65. References to “conduct” … are to the conduct specified in the Part 1 warrant.” Subsection (1A) was added by amendment in 2014, and reflected an earlier decision in Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1 to the effect that “conduct” in section 65 means the conduct complained of or relied upon in the Warrant.[21]This conduct test (per Lord Bingham at [16]), “obviates the need for an undesirable inquiry into the niceties of a foreign law”. The judge “need not concern himself with the criminal law of the requesting state” per Lord Hope at paragraph [30] ibid. Thus this court is not involved in a comparison of the extradition offence with its UK equivalent to see if they have the same elements. Instead, the court asks whether the conduct specified in the Warrant makes out an offence in this jurisdiction.[22]See for example Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 16 at [91] where the House said:
“In short, the conduct test should be applied consistently throughout the 2003 Act, the conduct relevant under Part 2 of the Act being that described in the documents constituting the request … , ignoring … mere narrative background but taking account of such allegations as are relevant to the description of the corresponding United Kingdom offence.”
[23]The case of Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) considered the approach to be taken in establishing dual criminality where there is a discrepancy between the elements of the offence as defined by the issuing State and the elements of an equivalent offence in this jurisdiction. It was held at [57] that:
‘… the facts set out in the [Part 1 warrant] must not merely enable the inference to be drawn that the Defendant did the acts alleged with the necessary mens rea. They must be such as to impel the inference that he did so; it must be the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts alleged. Otherwise, a Defendant could be convicted on a basis which did not constitute an offence under the law of England and Wales and thus did not satisfy the dual criminality requirement.’
[24]In El Khouri v Government of the United States of America [2023] UKSC 3 the Supreme Court reemphasised at paragraph [83] that the task is characterised by “ignoring… mere narrative background and focusing on the substance of the alleged criminality”[25]The JA relies upon an offence under the Fraud Act 2006 as being constituted by the conduct in question here. Before the District judge they pointed to what they said was the dishonest loss to the landlord, but have, since the hearing below broadened the argument somewhat and the nub of the issue is now whether the act of registration constituted dishonest gain or loss of property.[26]Section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 provides: 2 Fraud by false representation[1]A person is in breach of this section if he–(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and(b) intends, by making the representation– (i) to make a gain for himself or another, or (ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.[27]This must be read with section 5 which provides as follows: 1). The references to gain and loss in sections 2 to 4 are to be read in accordance with this section. 2). “Gain” and “loss”—(a) extend only to gain or loss in money or other property;(b) include any such gain or loss whether temporary or permanent; and “property” means any property whether real or personal (including things in action and other intangible property). 3). “Gain” includes a gain by keeping what one has, as well as a gain by getting what one does not have. 4). “Loss” includes a loss by not getting what one might get, as well as a loss by parting with what one has.

District judge’s findings on dual criminality

[28]The DJ set out the submission of the JA that dishonesty, gain and loss were made out and that that amounted to an offence of Fraud contrary to sections 1 and section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. In other words that he had dishonestly made a representation and intended by making it to make a gain of property for himself or for another or to cause or expose to the risk of loss another person.[29]He recorded that the appellants had submitted that the court cannot be satisfied to the criminal standard of dishonesty, as required by section 2(1)(a) of the Fraud Act 2006, or that there has been gain or loss as required by section 2(1)(b) and defined by section 5 of the Fraud Act 2006.[30]The offences were described in the Warrant relevantly as follows; ‘2. Between 13th August 2009 and 17th May 2010, BOGDAN Vince registered 8 different persons in the apartment let by the Injured Party without the permission of MOLNÁR György Injured Party, in such a way that he signed the address registration form as the owner of the apartment at the signature of the landlord. He registered PENTI Katalin and MOLNÁR Boglárka Sarolta on two occasions, and MOLNÁR László, MOLNÁR Katalin, CSÁSZTVAINÉ VERBA Térez and SALEKOVICS János once each. In each case, BOGDÁN Vince submitted the false declaration forms to the Sopron Document Office, on the basis of which the authority registered the above address as the address of the persons concerned, which, incidentally, corresponded to the real situation at the time, so that no false data were entered in the public register.’[31]The totality of the DJs consideration is as follows S10/S65 52. Miss Beatty in her skeleton argument sets out in some more detail her submissions contained within paras 11-15. This is submitted that the conduct described in the warrant does not fulfil the requisite elements of this offence. It is submitted that the court cannot be satisfied to the criminal standard of dishonesty, as required by section 2(1)(a) of the Fraud Act 2006, or that there has been gain or loss as required by section 2(1)(b) and defined by section 5 of the Fraud Act 2006. “53… I understand the submission, the false registration appears to be undermined by the fact that the individuals registered were in fact residing at the address but that submission to my mind misses the impact of that registration on the Landlord of the property. The RP had no authority to register the individuals concerned it allowed them to reside at the Landlords property to a loss to him and I have to take the view that dishonesty is made out here. Whilst there is no clear evidence here that the RP made any profit from this exercise [ I suspect he will have done] there is a loss to the Landlord in terms of rent payable. 54. I am therefore satisfied to the requisite standard that s10 and s65 are satisfied. No issue was taken with s 2.”

Submissions on Dual Criminality

[32]The appellant submits it is not possible to infer on the evidence, as the DJ did, that there was a monetary loss to the landlord, rather it must be ascertained whether or not the judicial authority can make the court sure that the representation in the register constitutes “other property” and he submits they cannot.[33]Subsection (2)(b) specifies that property may be ‘temporary or permanent’ and that ‘property’ includes ‘things in action and other intangible property’ but Ms Beatty for the appellant submits that the entry in the register here does not bear the characteristics of property as recognised by the case law, and certainly not so as the court could be sure as it must be.[34]In analysing the notion of property Ms Beatty refers to the well-known decision in the civil context in National Provincial Bank v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1965] 1 AC 1175 at 1247-1248 to the effect that ‘… Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category of property, or of a right affecting property, it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability.”[35]That case concerned the right of a deserted wife to continue to live in her husband’s property, the matrimonial home. The rights of the wife did not satisfy the definition of property; they were personal, and not capable of assumption by third parties, so were not “property” and could not bind the third-party purchaser.[36]In another context the case of AA v Persons Unknown [2020] 4 WLR 35 considered the question as to whether cryptocurrency was a form of property capable of being subject to a proprietary injunction. It was held that crypto assets such as Bitcoin did not fit neatly into either choses in possession or choses in action, but it was definable, identifiable by third parties and capable of assumption by a third party and had a degree of permanence. Bitcoin could therefore be the subject of a proprietary injunctions; they met the four criteria set out by Lord Wilberforce in National Provincial Bank.[37]In the case of AA reference was made to other cases in which crypto currencies had been found to be subject to proprietary injunctions. The court in AA recognised that they were not choses in possession, because they were virtual, not tangible, and could not be possessed. They were not choses in action because they did not embody any right capable of being enforced by action. Bryan J in AA referred to earlier case law developing the notion of property such that it was not limited to falling within one or other of those two categories. Importantly, he noted that mere information does not fall within this definition.[38]Ms Beatty referred to Oxford v Moss [1979] Cr. App. R. 183 a decision of the Lord Chief Justice in respect of section 1 of the Theft Act 1968. This was a case in which an undergraduate dishonestly obtained the proof of an examination paper for an exam to be held in the next month at his university. He returned the paper after he had read the contents. He was charged with the theft of confidential information contrary to section 1 of the 1968 Act. The information was dismissed by the magistrate on the grounds that there had been no appropriation of property within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Act. Property was defined there as including money and “all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property”.[39]Confidential information of that sort was held not to be property, there was no property in the information that could be the subject of a charge of theft: confidential information was not intangible property.[40]The appellant also submitted, following Assange, that here, the element of dishonesty required for the domestic offence (but agreed to be missing from the Hungarian offence), was not the only reasonable deduction from the conduct on which the JA relied.[41]The JA agrees that there is a discrepancy between the elements of the Hungarian offence and the purported domestic offence, and that accordingly the Assange test applies: the court must look to the conduct. Ms Burton relied upon dishonesty in a representation that the requested person was the landlord when he was not. The JA accepts there was no evidence from which the district judge could infer dishonesty in the manner he sought to do.[42]As to the question of property, they argue that the registration in question has permanency and is stable, it is in effect a status, and it grants or may grant access to services; that, they submit, is sufficient for it to have the characteristics of property. It is capable of conferring a right although it is accepted that there is no evidence that any such right was conferred in the current case. They argue it is capable of identification by third parties and has a degree of permanence. It is the registration of that person until they move out and register elsewhere.[43]Ms Burton for the JA referred to the explanatory note to the Fraud Act 2006 where it states:
“Section 5 defines the meaning of ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ for the purposes of sections 2 to 4. The definitions are essentially the same as those in section 34(2)(a) of the Theft Act 1968 and section 32(2)(b) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969. Under these definitions, ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ are limited to gain and loss in money or other property. The definition of ‘property’ which applies in this context is based on section 4(1) of the Theft Act 1968 (read with section 34(1) of that Act) and section 4(1) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 (read with section 32(1) of that Act). The definition of ‘property’ covers all forms of property, including intellectual property, although in practice intellectual property is rarely ‘gained’ or ‘lost’.”
[44]This imports an expansive understanding of the concept of property she submits and includes what is in issue here. She submitted that the decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Dixon v The Queen [2015] NZSC 147 supported a broader notion of property than was advanced by the appellant. That was a case about selling the CCTV footage of Mike Tindall’s socialising during a Rugby World Cup in New Zealand. A security man had obtained CCTV footage of him and tried to sell it abroad. The issue before the Supreme Court “property” was defined in Section 2 as “including … real and personal property, and any estate or interest in real or personal property, money, electricity, and any debt, and any thing in action, and any other right or interest[.][45]The New Zealand Supreme Court expressly did not (see paragraph [24]) revisit the orthodox view that information, even confidential information, is not property. On the basis that certain digital files in that case could be identified, had a value and were capable of being transferred to others, whether tangible or intangible in classification, they were property for the purposes of sections 249(1)(a) of the New Zealand statute, the Crimes Act 2003 as amended.[46]The JA seeks also to rely upon later, Further Information dated 30 June 2025 which gives details they say of the benefits and rights conferred on an individual in Hungary by virtue of having a registered address.[47]In order to persuade the court to consider the material they point to FK v Germany [2017] EWHC 2160 (Admin) in which it was noted that the conditions applying to appellants adducing evidence on appeal did not apply to respondents, and there is no restriction on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to admit further evidence from a respondent in support of an extradition decision, noting that the Fenyvesi criteria do not apply to a case in which one party seeks to put in new evidence with a view to defeating an appeal. Allowing a respondent to submit further evidence in support of the district judge's findings, usually expedites rather than delays a case, avoiding the discharge of a Warrant on the basis of a curable defect just for it to be later reissued with the Further Information included. The statutory provisions do however avoid a party that loses before the district judge having a second bite of the cherry.[48]They note it is not a general freedom to admit but the overriding factor was the interests of justice.[49]The court in FK at paragraph 38 said:
“The court will assess such an application to admit further evidence against the measure of whether it in the interests of justice to admit it. There is no other restriction on the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction in this regard. Although whether admission of the evidence is in the interests of justice will be quintessentially dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case involving an exercise of judgment by the court”
[50]The appellant observes, correctly, it was served at an extremely late stage in these proceedings – approximately 2 and a half years after the appellant’s arrest in connection with this Warrant, almost a year after the decision of the District Judge, over three months after the original appeal listing.[51]I refuse formal permission for this material to be admitted: it does not answer a question in the appeal decisively. As appears below, I accept the submissions of the appellant as to its effect.

S10/S65

[52]The Further Information which I agreed to consider in any event although it was not before the judge but could have been if the JA had chosen to put it forward. It states as follows:
“The public registry of residence is a certified public registry, containing data which have the effect of public credibility. The legal effect of public credibility is that it endows the registered data with a legal and legal protection effect and evidentiary force. Having a registered Hungarian residence has several legal affects, - among others – in connection with public service, social and health care and benefits. Having a registered Hungarian residence is a legal condition for the access of several forms[sic] public, social and health care services. Place of residence is also important for the authorities, as it might be the basis of jurisdiction. Therefore, it is in the public interest that the public registry contains real data. Anyone who submits a residence declaration that does not correspond to the actual situation may be held liable for the crime of intellectual forgery of public documents, as they contribute to the inclusion of false data or facts regarding the existence, change or termination of a right or obligation in a public document, here, the public registry of residence.”
[53]It is submitted by the JA that this shows that having a registered Hungarian residence is a legal condition for accessing various forms of public and healthcare services and can form the basis of jurisdiction over a person. Somebody who submits a resident declaration that does not correspond with the actual position can be held liable in Hungary for the “crime of intellectual forgery of public documents.”[54]It is also submitted that the concept of property particularly in the case of Dixon was inclusive and wide: it included both tangible and intangible property - the word property is not a term of art. Registration itself was definable, it provided a registered address which, it could be seen from the Further Information could have legal effect not just a record; the form on a register does have a degree of permanence. It was stable and always kept in the same place, it was therefore property. It confers rights on an individual specifically, access to social services - like registering for a doctor and taking along one’s utility bills that would be information used in order to get registered; in Hungary one needs an officially registered address. Rights were thus conferred by having an address; they were definable and they were identifiable by third parties.[55]The dishonesty it is said was representing oneself as a landlord when one is not - this is equivalent to the dishonesty test for the 2006 Act, and the requirement for mens rea - alternatively, registering eight people without the permission of the landlord of the property as the landlord was dishonest: being registered as tenants at the address amounts to a gain of intangible property to them.[56]The JA accepts that dishonesty is not an essential ingredient of the Hungarian offence, but, applying Assange, submits the only reasonable inference from the conduct here is dishonesty.

Conclusions on Ground (i) dual criminality

(i) dual criminality

[57]I have come to the clear conclusion that the appellant is correct about the absence of dual criminality.[58]I am unable to be sure, from the conduct which is the subject of the Warrant, even read with the Further Information, either that the requisite element of dishonesty is the only reasonable inference from the facts, or that even if that were so, what was lost by the landlord or gained by another is properly to be described as “property”.[59]It seems to me that what was related by the Warrant and the Further Information in this case does not require the inference of dishonesty.[60]As the DJ recognised, the falsity of the registration appeared to be undermined by the fact that the individuals were in fact residing at the address. But more importantly, there is no information to compel the deduction that the appellant acted dishonestly when signing rather than negligently, or in ignorance. There is no evidence that he received any benefit for what he is said to have done nor that he was signing “as the landlord” knowingly representing his status to be that of landlord. This requires too much work to be done by the words “signed the address registration form as the owner of the apartment at the signature of the landlord”. It is not clear to me that he signed anyone else’s name but his own, in the space required for the landlord to sign – absent further materials it cannot be said to the criminal standard that this was dishonestly done. I am prepared to take “at the signature of the landlord” as meaning in the space where the landlord was required to sign but the actions are consistent with a strict liability offence or with a negligent act. It is consistent with a dishonest intent such that it may be the case, but I cannot be sure and Assange requires that I must be.[61]As to property, both sides agree that it was wrong of the district judge to infer a loss to the landlord he “allowed them to reside at the Landlords property to a loss to him”. Nor was a suspicion that he might have gained something sufficient. The JA’s case made on appeal based on deprivation or gain of property fails also in my judgement.[62]I am not persuaded on the case law cited to me that the appellant deprived the landlord or anybody else of property as that word is to be construed in the criminal context, nor has he conferred a gain upon himself or anybody else. I cannot see that the name of the occupiers in the register is something one can properly describe in such a way, especially where the very people who live in the accommodation are the ones whose names appear on the register. There is no extrinsic value to others (those who do not live there) of this registration, and the landlord has on the evidence, lost nothing. There is insufficient material, even with the very late Further Information to show to the appropriate standard the required conduct to make out the offence, whether as to the mens rea or the actus reus.[63]It is trite law as set out in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) at paragraph [57] that ‘… the facts set out in the [Part 1 warrant] must not merely enable the inference to be drawn that the Defendant did the acts alleged with the necessary mens rea. They must be such as to impel the inference that he did so; it must be the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts alleged. Otherwise, a Defendant could be convicted on a basis which did not constitute an offence under the law of England and Wales, and thus did not satisfy the dual criminality requirement.’[64]It is still the law that pure information does not amount to property for these purposes, and certainly under the 2006 Act. Accepting that following AA property may extend to things which are neither choses in action in the accepted sense nor other intangible property, there was nevertheless no evidence before the court to the effect that the fact of registration had the characteristics of being “capable in its nature of assumption by third parties” even if, which I doubt, it could be described as sufficiently certain or “definable” to fulfil the other characteristics of property. I accept the appellant’s submission on the latest Further Information to the effect that it does not state that having a registered address in itself creates any legal right to access to services. It is not expressed as the only condition for enabling access which, must surely be dependent upon a range of factors including that access to financial benefits is likely to be conditional on income, employment status and other matters. The quality of permanence necessary is also in my view questionable, it reflects residence at one place, whilst you are there, and no more. In pure criminal law terms it does not appear to me to capable of being stolen in the way for example, that crypto assets clearly could be.[65]The case of Dixon, whilst of interest does not take the matter further: it does not seek to extend the law to encompass mere information within the concept of property. The concept of information, even personal information is however closer in my judgement to the true character of a name on a public register than to crypto assets. Crypto assets are a clear proxy for value and have sufficient permanence to be plainly transferrable to third parties. This is not a case either like, for example, AG of Hong Kong v Nai-Keung [1987]1WLR 1339 where something could be described as the subject of dishonest dealing and could be freely bought and sold and so thought of as property. There is no suggestion that this registration is somehow tradeable.[66]In this case the JA cannot make out their case to the appropriate standard.[67]I can deal shortly with the other grounds that were raised.

Ground (ii) Right to a retrial

[68]The appellant argues that the JA cannot prove compliance with section 20(5) of the 2003 Act due to the language used in the Further Information documentation. It is submitted that the language is rogatory, that is to say that this appellant may ask for orrequest for a retrial and has the possibility to ask for a legal remedy.[69]The material before the DJ was supplemented by several sets of Further Information in addition to the Warrants.

District judge’s findings

[70]On the re-application for leave on the issue of the right to a re-trial the appellant argues the DJ erred in finding that he could be satisfied to the criminal standard that the appellant would receive a right to a retrial upon surrender as required by section 20(5) of the Act. They emphasise that the Supreme Court observed in Merticariu at [20], there ‘is a fundamental difference between “a right to” and “a right to ask for”, a retrial.’ The appellant asserts this is a similar case, and that there is ambiguity in the subsequent materials from the JA.[71]I set out in extenso what the DJ found because I agree with his conclusions for the reasons he gives64. It was submitted that the further information is not capable of undermining the information conveyed in box 3.4 of point (d). The first piece of further information was provided in response to a question seeking to establish whether the limitation period affects the information within box 3.4 of point (d). Both pieces of further information confirm that the RP may apply for a retrial upon surrender. This is consistent with the information conveyed in box 3.4 of point (d) and suggests nothing more than a procedural step, which is consistent with a right to a retrial, per Merticariu.65. Miss Beatty deals with this issue within her skeleton argument at paras 21-29. She relies on the case referred to [ante] Merticariu v Romania [2024] UKSC 10, that the endorsement on the warrant should be taken at face value but also take into account the further information provided. It was submitted that the language within the further information casts doubt on this right being a purely procedural one an entitlement as opposed to having the right to apply for with a potential contingent finding before such a right can be exercised. The language in the further information is perhaps unhelpful as set out below. The first set of further information dated 27 November 2023 states as follows at point 6. (emphasis added):
‘In case Vince BOGDAN is extradited he is entitled to ask for the court procedure to be repeated - he can submit a request for a retrial.’
The second set of further information dated 14 December 2023 states as follows at the fifth bullet point (emphasis added): ‘Moreover, the convicted person has the possibility to ask for legal remedy (retrial) against the judgments referred to as above.’ 66. I think there are occasions within extradition cases where detail and clarity are lost or muddied by translation but even taking that into account I have to agree with Miss Burtons submissions, the relevant box has been ticked within the warrant and there is nothing within the further information to suggest anything other than a procedural step an application for a re trial if requested by the RP [ he does not of course have to apply if he doesn’t wish to ] involves asking the court or applying to the court. 67.I was in addition properly reminded by Miss Burton that Merticariu the court was dealing with a Romanian case where there is a further step to take before a retrial can be considered.”[72]This analysis is in my view correct – there was no ambiguity as suggested. The Warrant was in any event sufficient on the case law, the relevant box was ticked. The Further Information in fact stated, “he is entitled to ask for the court procedure to be repeated”. This itself is not ambiguous read with the Warrant – and in any event, the approach set out above of the DJ was correct.[73]Further, as the JA submitted, Merticariu v Romania [2024] UKSC 10 upon which the appellant relies was a case where Box 3.4 had not been ticked, as it has here. A proper reading of the Warrant itself as I have said dispels any arguable ambiguity: the Further Information cannot diminish the effect of the Warrant. The DJ referred to Merticariu v Romania [2024] UKSC 10, indicating the importance of taking at face value an endorsement on the Warrant. I agree.[74]This point is not arguable. Ground (iii) Article 8 District judge’s findings

Ground (iii) Article 8

[75]The judge considered the submissions under Article 8, beginning by citing the well-known authorities which reflect the very high public interest in ensuring extradition arrangements were honoured and no safe haven for criminals was created, and very strong counterbalancing factors were needed where a Requested Person was a fugitive. He listed the factors in favour as the strong public interest, the sentence of three years, the seriousness of the offending which involved organised criminal activity over a significant period of time and involving considerable amounts of money, and in which the appellant played a leading role.[76]The DJ recorded evidence from the appellant including as follows “11…, since the last hearing another child had been born, Zara. The RP said she was fit and well after changing her diet she had given him energy after the tragic loss of their last baby. He went on to explain he was looking after the children as his wife cannot, he gets up to feed the baby when she is unfit to do so. 13.The RP confirmed his other daughter Fedra still suffers from constipation issues and has recently been diagnosed with asthma and no other positive developments. 14.The RP confirmed his wife was again pregnant (2 months) and has been suffering from medical complications since the last recent birth. He said they had an appointment with a Gynaecologist last week and were awaiting the results together with an update from the Midwife about the current pregnancy issues. 15.The RP described himself as under terrible stress, he described his stomach as “curled up in a ball” he said he couldn’t eat and was vomiting regularly. He was very anxious about the prospects of a new baby as Zara had been good for Fedra as a sibling. 16.The RP was cross examined by Miss Burton. I cannot set out the RPs responses in detail as he was verbose and constantly went off subject in his answers, I have replicated his answers as best as I could in so far as the relevant issues were addressed with his responses. 17.The RP acceptedhe had been interrogated and was aware he was accused of committing the offences. …[77]The appellant‘s partner Ms Berki gave evidence remotely. She said if the RP was extradited, she would be able to claim Universal Credit, but it wouldn’t be sufficient to pay the rent and bills there would be no state support if she returned to Hungary. She confirmed she had applied for settled status and thought she would get benefits if that is granted, the local authority would determine the extent of other support.[78]The DJ directed himself carefully and set out the gist of the court’s findings in Norris v Government of United States of America [2010] UKSC 9 and HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC. He referred also to delay and Article 8 Konecny v Czech Republic [2019] UKSC 8. This element of the case caused reflection and serious thought on his part.[79]He carried out the customary Celinski balancing exercise beginning with the “constant and weighty public interest in extradition”. He reflected that that the time spent on curfew was not in any event deductible seeVidak v Hungary [2023] EWHC 1108 (Admin), nor would he be liable for early release.[80]The DJ recorded the factors against extradition in the following way. “91. The RP has lived in the UK since August 2015. He lives a settled life with his long-term partner Ariella Berki, their 8-year-old daughter Fedra Berki, and their newborn daughter Zahra Berki. There is now the prospect of a further child being born as Miss Berki is pregnant. The RP states at paragraph 24 of his proof of evidence that he initially planned to stay for only a short time in order to make some money and return to Hungary but realised that the UK could offer him a ‘better life’ and decided to make his home in this country. 92.The RP has worked as a car mechanic in his own garage since 2021. He is the sole breadwinner for the family. Miss Beatty described the extradition of the RP as causing financial devastation. The result could be homelessness and destitution for Miss Berki and the children. There is real doubt as to whether Miss Berki would qualify for any state benefits. There is no support for her in the UK and unlikely she would receive any support if she returned to Hungary. 93.Ms Berki is in poor physical and mental health. The family tragically lost their second child during Ms Berki’s pregnancy, and since this event Ms Berki’s mental health has deteriorated significantly. Ms Berki has been assessed by a psychologist, Dr Liliya Korallo, who has provided a report dated 11 September 2023 diagnosing Ms Berki with ‘moderate depression’ and ‘severe anxiety’ (at paragraphs 6 and 7). Dr Korallo concludes that the extradition of the RP would ‘most likely adversely affect [Ms Berki’s] mental health symptoms, perhaps seriously’ and would ‘increase her difficulty in coping with day to day domestic responsibilities’ (at paragraph 14).[81]The DJ was invited to and did set out a number of factors counting in the balance against extradition. The DJ considered the decision “very difficult and finely balanced”; but was in no doubt the RP was a fugitive and noted he had left to evade the sentence leaving his partner and baby behind in Hungary and has built a family knowing of the position in Hungary.[82]Emphasis was laid by the appellant upon those passages in the caselaw which emphasised the primary role played by the interests of the child or children, and especially the principles in Norris v Government of United States of America [2010] UKSC 9 and HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25. Ms Beatty for the appellant alsodrew attention to cases where the relevance of delay was considered, particularly Konecny v Czech Republic [2019] UKSC 8.[83]Both parties relied upon Belbin v Regional Court of Lille, France [2015] EWHC 149 (Admin) where Aikens LJ said:
“…Under section 27(3) of the EA this court can only allow an appeal if it concludes that the "appropriate judge" should have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently. In this context the relevant "question" is whether the extradition of the requested person would be disproportionate to the interference it would have with his (and, if relevant, his family's) Article 8 rights. If, as we believe, the correct approach on appeal is one of review, then we think this court should not interfere simply because it takes a different view overall of the value- judgment that the DJ has made or even the weight that he has attached to one or more individual factors which he took into account in reaching that overall value-judgment. In our judgment, generally speaking and in cases where no question of "fresh evidence" arises on an appeal on "proportionality", a successful challenge can only be mounted if it is demonstrated, on review, that the judge below; (i) misapplied the well-established legal principles, or (ii) made a relevant finding of fact that no reasonable judge could have reached on the evidence, which had a material effect on the value-judgment, or (iii) failed to take into account a relevant fact or factor, or took into account an irrelevant fact or factor, or (iv) reached a conclusion overall that was irrational or perverse.”
[84]I have borne in mind this authority in particular. I share the view that this was a difficult decision in terms of Article 8 but I find it impossible in light of the careful and comprehensive treatment of the issues arising - not all of which consideration is set out here - and the relevant factors which were balanced to say that there was any error of principle that would cause me to grant permission or, on granting permission to conclude to the effect the DJ misapplied principle or found facts that were not rationally open to him. There was a clear recognition of the high significance of the family to the decision to extradite, and the DJ’s decision, admitted to be difficult, did reflect, contrary to submission, the appellant’s case that serious hardship both in terms of finance and well-being would be caused by extradition (see para 120 of the decision of the DJ in particular).[85]Whether or not this court might have made a different decision is irrelevant, absent an arguable error in the DJ’s decision, and I can see none. Collins Rice J said the following when refusing permission on this ground with which I agree:
“The DJ addressed himself correctly to the law and undertook an anxious and painstaking Celinski balancing exercise. He plainly found it a difficult and finely- balanced exercise. That necessarily imports an assessment that he could have reached a different decision. It does not import a conclusion on an appeal application that he had to. It is not in my view arguable that the DJ did anything other than consider the entirety of the relevant considerations, applying the legal exercise to all the available evidence, and reach a conclusion which was within the range open to him on the material before him and for the reasons he gave. The Applicant’s challenge on this ground seeks to take issue with matters of the weighing and evaluation of the different relevant factors. But that was entirely properly a matter for the DJ, acutely so in a difficult, multifactorial case. It is not in these circumstances arguable that the DJ went wrong or reached a wrong decision on this matter.”
[86]Accordingly, this appeal succeeds on the First Ground of section 10 and 65 Extradition Act 2003, dual criminality. No other ground is arguable.