Alex Jeremjan v District Court in Jihlava (Czechia) [2026] EWHC 2034 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2034 (Admin)Case No AC-2025-LON-000086
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 31/07/26
Before
MR JUSTICE SHELDON
Between
ALEX JEREMJANAppellantDISTRICT COURT IN JIHLAVA (CZECHIA)RespondentNATIONAL CRIME AGENCYInterested Party
Malcolm Hawkes (instructed by EBR Attridge LLP) for AppellantAdam Squibbs (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for Respondent for The Interested Party was on notice but did not appear.Hearing Hearing dates: 8th July
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 31/07/26 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE SHELDON
[1]Alex Jermejan appeals from the judgment of District Judge Jackson dated 6 January 2025, ordering his extradition to the Czech Republic. Permission to appeal was granted on the papers by Choudhury J. There are three grounds of appeal: i. The extradition was unjust or oppressive by virtue of the passage of time; ii. The extradition would amount to a disproportionate interference with Mr Jermejan’s right to respect for his private and family life (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”)); and iii. The extradition proceedings amount to an abuse of process.[2]At the hearing of the appeal, Mr Malcolm Hawkes appeared on behalf of Mr Jeremjan, and Mr Adam Squibbs appeared on behalf of the Czech judicial authority. I am grateful for their submissions.

Background

[3]On 28 March 2023, the Czech judicial authority issued a conviction arrest warrant for Mr Jermejan. This was certified by the National Crime Agency on 18 December 2023. On 30 March 2024, Mr Jermejan was arrested at Manchester airport following his arrival on a flight from Austria where he had been living.[4]The underlying offence was fraud. This had been committed by Mr Jermejan in the Czech Republic on 17 July 2020, when he borrowed CZK 240,000 (equivalent to £7,929.60) which was supposed to serve as a guarantee for a loan which was due to be repaid once the loan had been secured. Mr Jermejan did not pay back the money and became uncontactable thereafter. The conviction by the District Court in Jihlava was made on 29 November 2021, and became final on 30 November 2021. A sentence of 2 years imprisonment was imposed on Mr Jermejan.[5]Mr Jermejan moved to live in Austria. An extradition request was made by the Czech judicial authority to Austria on 15 November 2022. Mr Jermejan was arrested and held in custody pending a response from the Czech judicial authority to the Austrian Court’s queries as to whether the Czech sentence could be transferred to Austria, where he was a permanent and registered resident, for enforcement; whether Mr Jermejan had been served with a copy of the judgment handed down against him in absentia; and if he would be entitled to a retrial.[6]There was no response from the Czech judicial authorities to these queries, and so Mr Jermejan was released from custody on 4 December 2022, after 18 days. Further enquiries were made by the Austrian Court relating to Mr Jermejan’s awareness of the proceedings in the Czech Republic and as to question of the transfer of the sentence for service in Austria. The Czech judicial authorities did not respond to these queries either. On 6 July 2023, the Austrian Court formally discharged the warrant.[7]On 26 February 2024, Mr Jermejan was arrested in Austria in respect of a different extradition request made by the Czech judicial authorities. That request related to his conviction on 30 September 2000 for the offences of riot and assault, for which it was said that 33 days imprisonment remained to be served by Mr Jermejan. The Austrian Court requested enforcement documents from the Czech authorities, and these were provided outside of the 3 week deadline that had been set. On 9 July 2024, the warrant was formally discharged. Under Austrian law, the sentence that Mr Jermejan was due to serve for the underlying offences of riot and assault fell below the minimum period that qualified for extradition.[8]Following Mr Jermejan’s arrest on arrival at Manchester airport on 30 March 2024, he was detained. By the time of the hearing before the District Judge, which took place on 27 November 2024, he had spent 34 weeks and 2 days in custody. Mr Jermejan remained in custody following that hearing and the District Judge’s decision. He was released on bail by Sweeting J on 8 May 2025.

The District Judge’s decision

[9]The District Judge set out the history of the various warrants and the requests for information made by the Austrian Court. At paragraph 19 of her judgment, the District Judge listed Mr Jermejan’s previous convictions as follows:
“06.02.1992- Theft-waiver of punishment 16.02.1992-Theft-7 months imprisonment 12.09.1994-Avoidance of civil service duty-6 months imprisonment 07.02.00-Fraud-12 months imprisonment suspended until 22.05.02 26.01.01-Blackmail and cause minor injury-2 years suspended until 07.06.04 14.02.02-Theft-2 years suspended. Suspension was cancelled on 11.05.05 04.04.02-Bodily harm and disorderly conduct-2 years imprisonment 08.04.10-Fraud-14 months imprisonment 29.11.21-Fraud-2 years imprisonment (current Arrest Warrant offence).”
[10]The District Judge accepted that section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) was satisfied. Mr Jermejan was not present during the trial, conviction and sentence, and the Czech judicial authorities did not say that he was deliberately absent, and did not advance that he was a fugitive. The Czech judicial authorities had confirmed that Mr Jermejan has appeal and retrial rights.[11]The District Judge recounted the evidence of Mr Jermejan. This included a previous arrest and period in custody for 3 months in the United Kingdom in 2016 in connection with an extradition request for the offences of actual bodily harm and blackmail for which he had been convicted in the Czech Republic. That warrant was discharged, but he was arrested for the same warrant in Slovakia a couple of years later and was extradited to the Czech Republic. He said that although he told the judge in the Czech Republic about his custody in the United Kingdom, that period was not deducted from his sentence.[12]Mr Jermejan explained that he was single, and that he had a 20 year old son living in the Czech Republic. He disputed the factual basis for the fraud conviction and gave an explanation as to what had actually happened. Mr Jermejan said that he had been hoping to settle in the United Kingdom and work in a car rental business in Halifax.[13]Mr Jermejan accepted that he could be arrested twice on the same warrant, as that had happened previously. He also accepted that he knew that he had been convicted of the offence of fraud and had been sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment. He accepted that he had requested that he serve the sentence for the fraud in an Austrian prison. He said in evidence that he understood the warrant had been discharged and did not know that the warrant for the fraud would be reissued.[14]The District Judge rejected the argument that it would be oppressive or unjust to extradite Mr Jeremjan owing to the passage of time: section 14 of the 2003 Act.[15]With respect to “injustice”, the District Judge said that the only point raised was the period of time that Mr Jeremjan said that he had spent in custody in the United Kingdom in 2016 which was not credited to time served when he went back to the Czech Republic to serve his sentence. The District Judge observed that there was no evidence of this:
“It is not clear if written representations were made, or any reason given if this request was refused. This relates to a different offence than the offence for this current Arrest Warrant.”
[16]With respect to “oppression”, the District Judge said that even if Mr Jeremjan was not aware that he had been convicted and sentenced in his absence on 29 November 2021, he was aware of this when he was arrested on 15 November 2022. He also knew that the case was ongoing and that he was required to serve the sentence as he had requested to serve that sentence in Austria. When Austria decided not to do that on 6 July 2023, he cannot have thought that he would successfully appeal the conviction as he had not appealed it at that point. The District Judge found that Mr Jeremjan could not rely on “culpable delay” by the Czech Republic from when the warrant was discharged on 5 December 2022 until it was issued again on 18 December 2023: that time period was not lengthy, and the inactivity from the judicial authority cannot have engendered a false sense of security in Mr Jeremjan. The time of any inactivity was actually only 5 months and 12 days as it was only on 6 July 2023 that Austria refused the request to serve the sentence in that country.[17]The District

Judge went on to say that:

“The only period of time which may result in any delay was when Mr Jeremjan was arrested in Austria and questioned by an Austrian Judge on 26th February 2024 about the warrant to serve the remaining 33 days. It is unclear why the Austrian Authorities did not arrest Mr Jeremjan for the current Arrest Warrant which is dealt with now, as the warrant was issued on 28th March 2023, and certified by the National Crime Agency on 18th December 2023, and was in existence. There cannot be any criticism of any delay by the Czech Republic Authorities as according to Mr Jeremjan he was arrested and questioned by an Austrian Judge the same day, which would be 26th February 2024, and then discharged on that warrant to serve remaining 33 days. There would not be any time for the Czech Republic Authorities to instruct Austrian Authorities to arrest Mr Jeremjam on the current Warrant, as he was released the same day.”
[18]With respect to the argument under section 21 of the 2003 Act – Article 8 – the contention by Mr Jeremjan was that there was an overlap between the delay and the right to private and family life. The District Judge directed himself that the balancing exercise needed to be carried out in accordance with Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), and concluded that extradition was a proportionate interference with Mr Jeremjan’s right to respect for private and family life. The basis for this conclusion was that: i. A significant sentence had been imposed and had to be served: there was still 1 year and 12 weeks to serve once time spent on remand in the United Kingdom and time served in Austria was taken into account. That was a “long time to serve”. Any early release provisions would be a matter for the Czech judicial authorities. The District Judge’s own researches had revealed that early release was “discretionary after serving half the sentence”, and he could not guess what they would do. In any event, there was still a lengthy period to serve. ii. There is a strong and weighty public interest in those required to serve sentences having to return to the country where that sentence had been imposed. iii. There was some delay between the discharge of the first warrant on 14 December 2022 and the second warrant being issued on 28 March 2023. That was not so significant, however, to tip the balance the other way. Mr Jeremjan had been questioned on 26 February 2024 in respect of a different warrant, and any delay in him not being arrested on the current warrant by the Austrian authorities was unexplained and the Czech judicial authorities could not be accountable for this. In any event, the delay was not a long period of time. iv. Mr Jeremjan was aware that the conviction and custodial sentence had not been overturned, and once the Austrian authorities had turned down his request to serve the sentence there he did not make any contact with the Czech judicial authorities to appeal, or to arrange when he should return to serve the sentence. v. The Czech judicial authority should be afforded mutual respect and confidence that any judicial decision made was “correct and fair”. Mr Jeremjan would have the right to appeal when he is returned. The lack of response by the Czech judicial authority to the requests from Austria did not undermine or reduce the respect that should be had. It was not known if they ever responded to the Austrian authorities or did so out of time. Neither the Czech judicial authority, nor Mr Jeremjan knew the answer to that. vi. Mr Jeremjan had not been living in the Czech Republic since 2008-2018 and then from 2020-2024. He had made efforts to avoid being returned there since being aware of the conviction, and the Czech judicial authority did not know where he was until his arrest in Austria. vii. In spite of there being some delay in the Czech judicial authority reissuing the warrant on 28 March 2023, there has not been any real delay to render the extradition disproportionate. Furthermore, during this time, Mr Jeremjan was not subject to any restrictions and resumed life in Austria until he travelled to the United Kingdom. viii. Mr Jeremjan did not have any established life in the United Kingdom currently: he had no family here, only friends. He had no ties to the United Kingdom, not having lived here since 2018. He has no convictions in the United Kingdom and there was a long gap between the offence on the arrest warrant and his last conviction in 2010, but there was not a long gap between the offence of July 2010 and now.[19]The District Judge concluded that: “although there is a delay of 3 months in reissuing the Arrest Warrant, and although there is some delay in executing the Arrest Warrant, this delay is not such that would render extradition disproportionate to Mr Jeremjan’s ECHR rights to respect for private and family life”.[20]With respect to the contention that there had been an abuse of process, the District

Judge held as follows:

“66. The offence occurred on 17th July 2020. The conviction and sentence of 2 years immediate custody was determined on 29th November 2021. The original arrest warrant was issued on 22nd August 2022 when it became clear that Mr Jeremjan was not in Czech Republic. He was arrested on this warrant on 22nd November 2022 in Austria. He was discharged on this warrant on 14th December 2022 as the Czech Republic Authorities did not respond to Austrian Authorities in time and provide appeal rights guarantee. An application to serve the 2 years sentence in Austria was made and was refused on 6th July 2023. A second warrant had already been issued on 28th March 2023 by Czech Republic Judicial Authorities. The second warrant was certified by National Crime Agency on 18th December 2023. Mr Jeremjan was arrested in Austria in respect of a different warrant in February 2024, and questioned by a Judge on 26th February 2024 and released on that different warrant the same day. He was arrested on the second warrant on 30th March 2024. 67. There has not been any significant delay by the Czech Republic Authorities in issuing the first warrant, or between that being discharged on 14th December 2022 and issuing the second warrant on 28th March 2023. 68. There is not any attempt to usurp the decision of the Austrian Authorities when the first warrant was discharged, by issuing the second warrant with the retrial and appeal rights. 69. Considering the facts carefully and the timeline referred to in paragraph 65 above the overall merits-based assessment of public interests and careful evaluation of the facts, the issuing of the second warrant does not result in unjust oppression to Mr Jeremjan. 70. The second warrant was not issued in bad faith. 71. It is regrettable that the Czech Republic Judicial Authorities did not respond to Austrian Authorities in time concerning guaranteed appeal rights in December 2022, but this does not render the issuing of the second warrant an abuse of the courts process. 72. I do not find that there has been an abuse of the courts process such that a stay of proceedings should be ordered.”

The Appeal to this Court

[21]Mr Jeremjan seeks to impugn the District Judge’s decision on a number of grounds. I shall examine them in the following[22]Mr Hawkes contended, on behalf of Mr Jeremjan, that the reissuing of the extradition request to the United Kingdom was an attempt usurp the proper, measured consideration of that same request by the Austrian court, without good or any reason being advanced. This, it was said, constituted an abuse of process of the Court.[23]Mr Hawkes submitted that the District Judge erred in rejecting this argument, noting wrongly that the Austrian authorities discharged the warrant on the basis that the response of the Czech judicial authorities to the Austrian requests for further information as not “timely”, when in fact there had never been a response from the Czech authorities to their Austrian counterparts including while Mr Jeremjan was in Austrian custody for 3 weeks in December 2022. There was, Mr Hawkes submitted, no reason for the Czech authorities to refuse to provide the resentencing information to the Austrian authorities where it has been provided in the index warrant to the United Kingdom authorities.[24]Mr Hawkes reminded the Court that a requested person could seek a stay of extradition proceedings on the grounds of an abuse of process. Mr Hawkes acknowledged that the abuse of process by the Czech authorities had taken place in a different jurisdiction, but he submitted that the point of principle should be the same as if the errant conduct had taken place in this jurisdiction. It was incumbent on the requesting judicial authority to act with openness and integrity, but that had not occurred here.[25]Mr Hawkes referred the Court to the observations of Ouseley J in Camaras v Baia Mare Local Court Romania [2016] EWHC 1766 (Admin), where he said at [32]:
“It would be neither fair nor consonant with that public interest for the issuing judicial authority, failing to comply with the district judge’s directions, or unable to produce the further evidence it wanted, simply to issue a further EAW, to reverse the effect of its non-compliance with court orders, or its failure to put its case forward. This is not an option open to defendants, though they have some more constricted routes to the same end. A court must be able to give effect to its own procedural directions, and to prevent their being circumvented on appeal or by a further EAW. That furthers rather than undermines the statutory scheme. Whether the attempted enforcement of a further EAW, in circumstances falling short of Belbin abuse of process, so undermines the interest of the statutory scheme in speedy finality, and in upholding the decisions and orders of the courts, that enforcement should be denied, cannot be answered without consideration of all the circumstances.”
[26]I disagree with Mr Hawke’s submissions. I do not consider that the District Judge erred in deciding that there had not been an abuse of process by the Czech judicial authorities in requesting Mr Jeremjan’s extradition from the United Kingdom, even though they had also requested his extradition from Austria and had not responded to the Austrian judicial authorities’ request for information.[27]The jurisprudence in this area, as it has been developed so far, has been directed at a requesting authority purporting to circumvent the processes of the Courts in this jurisdiction. Thus, in Jasvins v General Prosecutor’s Office Latvia [2020] EWHC 602 (Admin), the Divisional Court in Jasvins observed that an abuse of process argument might be available where there were successive warrants or successive extradition requests which can properly be characterized as “a collateral attack on a decision in proceedings in the first warrant” (at [20]), or where there was a failure to comply with a court order in earlier proceedings (at [19], referring to Giese v Government of the United States of America [2018] 4 WLR 103).[28]At [21], the Divisional Court stated that:
“There is a particularly important public interest that the system of enforcement of EAWs is not undermined. That public interest covers a number of objectives. One objective, plainly, is that those who are charged with criminal offences overseas or have been convicted overseas and are wanted for punishment are provided to requesting authorities. But maintaining the integrity of the EAW system includes ensuring that decisions can be made expeditiously and that courts are able to exercise effective case management powers. Put bluntly, if such orders are made, the starting presumption is that they will be complied with. Where, as in this appeal, the claim of abuse of process arises from a failure in earlier proceedings to comply with a court order, the court in the later proceedings must assess the significance of permitting the Requesting Authority to avoid the consequences of the earlier decision, while also taking account of the public interest in that particular extradition. This will also include considering the gravity of the alleged or actual offending, and the prejudice (if any) to the requested person arising from pursuit of the further warrant. In other words, a Giese-style broad, merits-based judgment taking account of the public and private interests as they are manifest on the facts of the particular case.”
[29]The rationale for the abuse of process jurisdiction is, therefore, to protect the integrity of the processes of the Courts in this country. I cannot rule out as a possibility that conduct in another jurisdiction might on its particular facts (likely to be an extreme case) impact on the integrity of the Courts in this country. In the instant case, however, there is no evidence, let alone cogent evidence, of such conduct or impact.[30]As Mr Hawkes acknowledged in oral submissions, there was no obvious advantage to the Czech judicial authorities in failing to provide the information requested to the Austrian authorities, especially as that information was provided to the authorities in this country. Even though the Czech judicial authorities had not provided a formal explanation for the failure to respond to the requests for information from the Austrian judicial authorities, Mr Hawkes suspected that the failure to provide the information was probably administrative error, rather than something intentional. I agree.[31]I concur, therefore, with the decision of the District Judge who stated at [71] that “the Czech Republic Judicial Authorities did not respond to Austrian Authorities in time concerning guaranteed appeal rights in December 2022, but this does not render the issuing of the second warrant an abuse of the courts process.”[32]I also note that the mere fact that surrender requests were made in multiple jurisdictions was not of itself an indication of abuse of process. Nor was the Court provided with any rule in Austria that the failure to provide information requested in one set of proceedings would have precluded a warrant to succeed in a subsequent set of proceedings. ii. Passage of Time[33]Mr Hawkes contended that extradition of Mr Jermejan would be oppressive and unjust due to the passage of time. In this regard, Mr Hawkes submitted that the delay in dealing with Mr Jermejan was the fault of the Czech judicial authorities: they could and should have responded to the information requests from the Austrian judicial authorities such that Mr Jermejan could have been dealt with in that country, where he was a permanent resident and may well have been able to serve his sentence of imprisonment in that country.[34]Mr Hawkes submitted that the alleged offence took place on 17 July 2020 and Mr Jermejan was convicted on 29 November 2021. The period between then and now is 5–6, years, and is manifestly not short. The District Judge is said to have erred in considering the period of inactivity of the Czech Authorities to be merely 5 months and 12 days.[35]Mr Hawkes criticised the District Judge’s finding that ‘Any delay that can be attributable to the Judicial Authority since the first Arrest Warrant being issued on 22nd August 2022 and second Arrest Warrant issued 28th March 2023 is small …’. Mr Hawkes submitted that had the Czech authorities responded promptly to a request for further information in November 2022, the matter would have been resolved around that time, and the actual period of inactivity in respect of Austria is in fact significantly longer.[36]Mr Hawkes also sought to impugn the District Judge’s conclusion that ‘There cannot be any false sense of security given to Mr Jeremjan as he was not ever informed that he was not required to serve the sentence.’ Mr Hawkes contends that this missed the point that Mr Jeremjan was entitled to serve the sentence in his country of permanent residence and thereby benefit from any early release provisions in that country. In any case, he was never notified of any further intention to seek his extradition following his discharge in Austria.[37]The relevant legal principles applying to section 14 of the 2003 Act (extradition is barred by reason of the passage of time if it appears that it would be “unjust to oppressive to extradited him by reason of the passage of time”) were set out by Bean LJ in Scott v Government of the Commonwealth of Australia [2020] EWHC 2924 (Admin), referring at [68] to the judgment of the Divisional Court (Aikens LJ and Popplewell J) in Loncar v Croatia [2015] EWHC (Admin) 548 at [29]:
“(3) Where the delay is not brought about by the requested person himself, the essential question underlying the ground that the passage of time has made it unjust to extradite him is whether, by reason of that passage of time, a fair trial is impossible. Nevertheless prejudice in the conduct of his defence at a trial or retrial may be a factor contributing to a conclusion that a return would be oppressive, notwithstanding that it will not of itself satisfy the injustice criterion. (4) The test of oppression "by reason of the passage of time" will not easily be satisfied; hardship, a comparatively commonplace consequence of an order for extradition, is not enough. (5) The gravity of the offence is relevant to whether changes in the circumstances of the accused which have occurred during the relevant period are such as would render his return to stand trial oppressive. The more serious the offence, the less easy it will be to satisfy the test of oppression. (6) The length of time is itself an important consideration in whether a return would be oppressive. (7) Where the delay is not brought about by the requested person himself, it is a relevant factor if the delay has engendered in the requested person a legitimate sense of security from prosecution or punishment. (8) Where the delay is not brought about by the requested person himself, the culpability of the delay by the judicial authority may contribute to establishing the oppressiveness of making an order for his return, and may be decisive in what is otherwise a marginal case.” (I have removed the citations from this quote). At [69], Bean LJ said as follows: “In Kila v Governor of HMP Brixton [2004] EWHC 2824 (Admin) Collins J said that "the mere fact of delay is unlikely in most cases, indeed the vast majority of cases, to justify a decision that to return would be oppressive. There must be something more than mere delay." In this case the "something more" can be summarised as being: (a) the enormous delay, now 48 years since the first of these and 44 years since the last, a period which includes nearly 20 years which the judge found to be culpable delay; (b) the fact that the Appellant is now 88 years old and in less than robust physical or mental health.”
[38]In the instant case, it is possible to find some errors in the District Judge’s analysis of the circumstances of Mr Jermejan’s case. Nevertheless, looking at the situation in the round, and standing back, there is no proper basis for disagreeing with the District Judge’s overall view that extradition would not be oppressive or unjust.[39]The period of delay which is attributable to the Czech judicial authorities is not especially lengthy: even if one takes the entire period from when Mr Jermejan was arrested in Austria pursuant to an arrest warrant on 15 November 2022 and his subsequent arrest in the United Kingdom on 30 March 2024. I do not consider that the starting point for delay can be taken as the date of commission of the offence in July 2020, as it would appear that the Czech judicial authorities were trying to find Mr Jeremjan between that time and the issuing of the initial arrest warrant. The period of so-called culpable delay, taken at its highest, is a period of one year and 5 months, which is of a totally different period to the 20 years of culpable delay in the case of Kila.[40]Furthermore, I consider that the District Judge did not err in finding that for much of this period Mr Jeremjan could not have had a real sense of security. He knew from November 2022, when he was arrested in Austria, that the Czech authorities were seeking his extradition for his offending. At no point thereafter was Mr Jeremjan informed that he was no longer required to serve his sentence. Indeed, Mr Jeremjan had had previous experience that a warrant which had been discharged in one country could be executed in a different country, so he could have had no sense of security that the discharge of the warrant by the Austrian authorities on 6 July 2023 would mean that a further warrant could not be issued in respect of his offending.[41]In addition, there is no evidence of changes in Mr Jermejan’s circumstances (including any evidence of any real family life in the United Kingdom and/or Austria) that amount to “oppression” rather than “hardship”. iii. Article 8: a disproportionate interference with Mr Jermejan’s right to respect of his private and family life[42]Mr Hawkes submitted that the District Judge erred in the approach to Article 8. First, it is submitted that the cumulative effect of the failure to act on the part of the Czech judicial authorities, the passage of time and the consequences of Mr Jeremjan’s imprisonment on this extradition request is that extradition in 2025, and now 2026, would be disproportionate for an alleged financial offence, allegedly committed in 2020.[43]Second, it is submitted that the Applicant has spent a considerable amount of time in custody with respect to the underlying fraud offence:(a) 3 weeks in Austria (15 November – 4 December 2022).(b) 14 months in the United Kingdom (30 March 2024 – 8 May 2025), on the index offence at the time of the hearing before the District Judge and now 14 months.[44]Further, it is contended that if he is extradited Mr Jeremjan would have 10 months only remaining to be served of the entirety of his 2-year sentence. Had the sentence been imposed in the United Kingdom, he would now be eligible for release. Furthermore, it is submitted that the time spent in custody in HMP Wandsworth was especially difficult for Mr Jeremjan given the allegedly “shocking” conditions that he experienced there, and that must form part of the proportionality analysis. Mr Hawkes also referred to the fact that Mr Jeremjan has been subject to a curfew when on bail (between the hours of 23:00 and 07:00 daily, monitored electronically) and this needs to be taken into account when conducting the proportionality assessment. In addition, Mr Hawkes contended that there is every chance that the period in which Mr Jeremjan spent in custody in Austria for the fraud offence (a period of 3 weeks) will not be discounted by the Czech judicial authorities. Support for this proposition comes from the fact that the three months that he spent in custody in the United Kingdom in 2015-2016, when he was subsequently extradited from Slovakia to the Czech Republic for the offence of actual bodily harm was not discounted by the Czech authorities.[45]I do not consider that the District Judge erred in the approach to proportionality and/or Article 8. The District Judge set out the relevant principles from the leading cases of Norris v Government of United States of America [2010] UKSC 9, HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25 and Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin). Further, the findings made by the District Judge and the overall balancing exercise that she conducted were entirely open to her. I also reach the same conclusion taking into account the additional period of detention from the date of the District Judge’s decision until Mr Jeremjan’s release on bail in May 2025.[46]It is well accepted that it is not for the courts in this country to answer the question whether someone has “sufficiently been punished”: see Dobrowolski v Poland [2023] EWHC 763 (Admin), at [5]. Thus, the fact that Mr Jeremjan has served more than one year of the sentence of the offence for which his extradition is served, and has served that sentence in HMP Wandsworth where he alleges that he has experienced harsh conditions, is not determinative of the outcome of the balancing exercise.[47]Mr Hawkes was not able to provide the Court with any authority that the detention conditions in England and Wales could be of relevance to the Article 8 balancing exercise. In any event, even if that could have some bearing on the analysis what is of most significance is that Mr Jermejan still has ten months to serve of the sentence imposed by the Czech Court, and that is still a substantial sentence giving rise to a strong public interest in favour of extradition. Indeed in Malar v District Court of Krasny Sud Humane, Slovakia [2018] EWHC 2589 (Admin), it was held by Supperstone J that “there is nothing inherently disproportionate in the surrender of the appellant to serve a sentence that amounts to weeks rather than months”.[48]That strong public interest is not materially diminished by the fact that Mr Jermejan has spent time on curfew since he was bailed. In Dedza v Regional Court in Olsztyn (Poland) [2022] EWHC 838 (Admin), it was stated that “in a marginal case, 25 months spent on curfew might be sufficient to tip the balance”; see also Ene v Alexandria District Court, Romania [2026] EWHC 286 (Admin) (subject to curfew for 2 years; this would only come into focus if the Article 8 case was otherwise finely balanced). The present case is not a marginal one, and in any event the curfew has been for a far lesser period than the period in Dedza.[49]I say that the present case is not a marginal one as the factors favouring extradition clearly outweigh those against extradition. I have set out the District Judge’s weighing of the factors at paragraph 18 above. Whilst I accept that the District Judge’s analysis contained some errors as to dates and understated the period of delay on the part of the Czech judicial authorities, the overall assessment is a sound one, and remains so even looking at matters from the vantage point of the hearing before me and the additional time that Mr Jermejan has spent in custody and his subsequent period of curfew.[50]Of real significance in the balancing exercise is that there is still a significant period to serve for a criminal offence that is not trivial, and is aggravated by Mr Jeremjan’s previous dishonesty offences; there is a strong and weighty public interest in those required to serve their sentences having to return to the requesting country to serve out that sentence (or the remaining part of it); the mutual respect and confidence in the correctness of the Czech Court’s decision is not undermined by the fact that Mr Jeremjan has a right of appeal when he returns, or from the lack of a response to the requests for information from the Austrian authorities, noting in particular that sufficient information was provided to the authorities in this country. Furthermore, the delays in dealing with this matter for which the Czech judicial authorities are culpable did not give Mr Jeremjan a sense of security that there would be no further attempt to extradite him for the fraud offence. Moreover, there was no evidence before the District Judge that Mr Jeremjan had established any life in the United Kingdom: he had no family in this country. Whilst it has been explained to me that Mr Jeremjan now has a partner in this country, that relationship commenced at a time when it was known that he was subject to extradition proceedings.[51]I accept that Mr Jeremjan was not a fugitive in respect of the fraud offence. I also accept that there is no evidence that Mr Jeremjan has committed any offence since July 2020. That period is, however, relatively short and so does not carry much weight. I do not consider that any material weight should be given to the possibility that the period of 20 days when Mr Jeremjan was in custody in Austria for the fraud offence will not be deducted from the time that he has to serve if returned to the Czech Republic. There is no evidence before the Court to substantiate Mr Jeremjan’s own evidence that the Czech authorities knew that he had served time in the United Kingdom before he was returned subsequently from Slovakia to the Czech Republic on the warrant for an earlier offence. As for the possibility that Mr Jeremjan may be entitled to early release in the Czech Republic that is taken into account but cannot carry significant weight in the balancing exercise.[52]Standing back, and taking into account all of these factors, it is clear to me that the extradition of Mr Jeremjan is warranted.[53]During the course of his submissions, Mr Hawkes took issue with the way in which the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz dealt with Lady Hale’s judgment in Norris. It was suggested that the comments in Andrysiewicz – stating that an exceptionally severe consequence for a requested person’s family life would be expected in order for an Article 8 challenge to be successful – were obiter dicta and should be disregarded. It does not seem to me that Mr Hawkes’ submissions have any real purchase in the present case. The District Judge did not base her analysis on the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrysiewicz; unsurprisingly, given that the judgment in that case came out on 11 June 2025, with the hearing taking place on 13 March 2025, after the hearing and judgment in Mr Jermejan’s case. Moreover, it does not seem to me that the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz did anything other than restate the well accepted principles that apply to extradition cases and the relevant Article 8 analysis. Contrary to Mr Hawkes’ submissions, I do not read the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz as saying that private life is irrelevant. It is plainly relevant as “the right to respect to private and family life” (emphasis added) is explicitly referred to in Article 8 of the Convention, and so a domestic Court is obliged to have regard to it pursuant to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Conclusion

[54]For the foregoing reasons, therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

order

abuse of process, passage of time and Article 8. i. Abuse of Process