“This notice is to advise you that, for VAT periods starting on or after 1Aapril 2010, you must file VAT returns online and pay any VAT due on the returns electronically…… If you do not agree that you must file online/pay electronically, because: · You think our calculation of your turnover is wrong, or · You fall into one of the (very limited) categories of VAT customers who, by law, are not obliged to file online you can ask for our decision to be reviewed by an HMRC officer……”
“If you do not agree that you must file online/pay electronically…you can appeal to an independent tribunal…”
“where a return is …required to be made….using an electronic return system, the relevant payment .. shall be made solely by means of electronic communications….”
“[68] I do not think it is a valid objection to this straightforward interpretation of s 83(1)(c) according to its natural meaning that it has the effect that sometimes the tribunal will have to apply public law concepts in order to determine cases before it. It happens regularly elsewhere in the legal system that courts or tribunals with jurisdiction defined in statute by general words have jurisdiction to decide issues of public law which may be relevant to determination of questions falling within their statutorily defined jurisdiction. No special language is required to achieve that effect…. [70] ...there is clear public benefit in construing s 83 by reference to its ordinary and natural meaning which strongly supports that construction. It is desirable for the tribunal to hear all matters relevant to determination of a question under s 83 … because (a) it is a specialist tribunal which is particularly well positioned to make judgments about the fair treatment of taxpayers by HMRC and (b) it avoids the cost, delay and potential injustice and confusion associated with proliferation of proceedings and ensures that all issues relevant to determine the one think that HMRC and the taxpayer are interested in…are resolved on one occasion in one place. It seems plausible to suppose that Parliament would have had these public benefits in mind when legislating in the wide terms of s 83.”
“the arguments for protecting public authorities against unmeritorious or dilatory challenges to their decisions have to be set against the arguments for preserving the ordinary rights of private citizens to defend themselves against unfounded claims… It would in my opinion be a very strange use of language to describe the respondent’s behaviour in relation to this litigation as an abuse or misuse by him of the process of the court. He did not select the procedure to be adopted. He is merely seeking to defend proceedings brought against him by the appellants. In so doing he is seeking only to exercise the ordinary right of any individual to defend an action against him on the ground that he is not liable for the whole sum claimed by the plaintiff. Moreover he puts forward his defence as a matter of right, whereas in an application for judicial review, success would require an exercise of the court’s discretion in his favour.”
“the central question …[is whether]…the defendant to collection proceedings of this kind [is] entitled to raise a public law defence which puts in issue the legality of directions underlying the assessment…there is no true distinction to be made between this case and Winder …the taxpayer is entitled to advance his public law defence in the county court.”
“there can be no abuse of process by a party who seeks a remedy by the very process which statute requires him to pursue…”
“[31] I will not decide either way, even if I could on this appeal, whether in principle the analogy of Pawlowski v Dunnington could be applied in defence to a claim for payment of tax under an assessment under s 591C. However I agree with the special commissioner and, so far as he said anything about it with the judge, that the point is not open to be taken on this statutory appeal.”
“It has been argued on behalf of the Respondents that the Appellant’s conduct in November and December 1998 and, in particular, his expressed intention to remove the Pensioneer Trustee (without any intention of appointing a replacement) and his expressed intention to terminate the trust and to transfer the trust property to himself, were sufficient grounds to warrant the discontinuance of approval of the Scheme. That may well be so. It is not, however, a matter that I have jurisdiction to determine. I am satisfied that there exists no right to appeal the decision to withdraw approval under section 591B(1) ICTA. The Appellant has not sought to challenge the decision to withdraw approval by way of judicial review, which would have been the appropriate remedy for him to seek if he felt that the apparent exercise of the statutory discretion was unreasonable or otherwise ultra vires . In the circumstances, therefore, I must proceed on the assumption that the decision to withdraw approval was valid and effective from2 December 1998 .”
“The law lords were concerned to dispel reliance by the prosecution upon the (then) championed ‘exclusivity rule’ in public law cases following O’Reilly v Mackman[1983] 2 AC 237 . That rule, now fallen out of favour, was even then of no application where the challenge to the public law decision was raised as a defence (whether in a civil or criminal context) as it is difficult to sustain the argument that a defendant has abused the court’s process (the jurisprudential basis for O’Reilly) where he has not initiated the procedure (see Wandsworth LBC v Winder) and the cases referred to in Lord Steyn’s speech above.) Of course, proceedings before the Tribunal are brought by the claimant and so the abuse of process argument might have some potential application here: but it does not. An appeal to the Tribunal is a statutory procedure specifically set up to allow challenge to an immigration decision. We do not see how in these circumstances initiating that procedure where part of the claim is that a statutory instrument is ultra vires can be properly described as an abuse of process ….”
“[112] Consequently, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion as a result of Foster that if a decision-maker (or lower tribunal) in the social security context errs in law by applying "law" derived from an ultra vires statutory instrument, so too, it would seem, the decision-maker acts "not in accordance with the law" in applying ultra vires "law" in the immigration or asylum context. We recognise the significance of this if correct. It would not, however, be our view unless we were driven to reach it by Foster . For the reasons we are about to develop, it is not necessary for us to reach any concluded view in this appeal on the impact of Foster to the AIT's jurisdiction because we have concluded that the 2004 Order is not in fact ultra vires the enabling power in s.72 of the 2002 Act. ”
“[75] It is clear that s 83 … does not confer any general supervisory jurisdiction on the tribunal, but it seems to be to be a non sequitur to say that the tribunal has no power to apply public law principles if they are relevant to an appeal against … a decision of HMRC which falls within the terms of one of the headings of jurisdiction set out in s 83”
“[54] …. the issue in [the Oxfam case] and the issue here are quite different. There, the tribunal was required to decide the amount of input tax which Oxfam could recover, a question which as Sales J said at [63], comes four-square within the ambit of s 83(1)(c) of VATA. Here, the question is not the amount of a penalty, or even whether one is due as a matter of law – there is no dispute that s 98A was engaged, and that it imposed a liability for five monthly penalties of£100 each – but whether HMRC should be precluded from imposing the penalties prescribed by that section, or from collecting them if imposed. That, in our judgment, is a quite separate question of administration, one which, in accordance with the authorities to which we have already referred, is capable of determination only by way of judicial review and therefore not by the First-tier Tribunal.”
“[52] What was in issue in both of those cases [ Winder and a similar case] was not whether the councils’ actions were fair or reasonable, or indeed an general principle of the common law, but whether the actions they had taken had the effect for which they argued – that is, whether the rent had been validly increased, and whether the compulsory purchase order had been vitiated by a subsequent change of mind. Those questions may well have given rise to issues of public law, but they did not give rise to matters for which the only possible remedy is by way of judicial review; and they went, in each case, to the core of the individual’s defence of the claims made against him.”
“[31] It does not follow from the analysis above that the F-tT can never take account of or give effect to matters of public law, and in particular legitimate expectation….It would, however, be open to the F-tT to consider public law issues only if it was necessary to do so in the context of deciding issues clearly falling within its jurisdiction. The central question in the present case is whether it was open to the Tribunal to consider Mr Noor’s case based on his legitimate expectation in decision an issue within its jurisdiction. The answer to that question turns on the extent of the jurisdiction which is conferred by section 83(1)(c) VATA 1994, which comes down to a point of statutory construction.”
“[47] The commissioners reposte by arguing that this complaint of unfair treatment is essentially one about their conduct. It is not a point involving the facts of Lombard’s individual case or the law applicable to those facts. The proper remedy for unfair treatment is judicial review, not an appeal to the tribunal. The tribunal is not a body entrusted with a supervisory, public law, jurisdiction. Here there is a question of discretion involved. [48] I think that the commissioners are right. The actual decision impugned is that to invoke unjust enrichment in the case of Lombard. It is not a decision to invoke unjust enrichment in the case of Lombard but not others. That is what happened in fact but there never was a decision to that effect.”
“These are the conditions for submitting returns electronically. The wording in bold is a direction for this purpose having the force of law. …. If you have appealed against a mandation notice issued under regulation 25A(7) or have requested a formal review, you are not required to submit VAT returns electronically while the issue is being determined. NOTES The legal basis for these conditions is in theValue Added Tax Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/2518).”
“[28] I can deal briefly with [the Judge’s] conclusion as to the powers of a judge sitting in the county court. He was wrong to say that he had no alternative but to apply the Regulations even if they were incompatible with the convention. Unless the primary legislation dictates the contents of the Regulations…, any judge can strike down subordinate legislation: seesection 4(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 .”
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charges against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
“ Article 47 Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial Everyone … has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal…. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal ….”
“… to look at ways of increasing take-up of online services for income tax self assessment, VAT, corporation tax and PAYE, and maximising benefits for customers whilst ensuring that the department continues to deliver a sustainable and efficient service that supports compliance”
“HMRC have assured us that they take security and taxpayer confidentiality very seriously, and all their online filing services for tax incorporate industry best practices to ensure that transaction online with these systems is both safe and secure”
“HMRC did want to check that no-one would be adversely affected by the proposals, so undertook an Equality Impact Assessment (EQIA) which it published in July 2008, entering into public consultation for three months. The assessment concluded that, in the vast majority of cases, there was no diversity impact. However, HMRC have been in regular discussion with the voluntary sector organisations ‘Tax Aid’ and ‘Tax Help for Older People’ and the representative organisation LITRG (Low Income Tax Reform Group) to decide how best to achieve support for our most vulnerable customers, with particular focus on the elderly and those who are unfamiliar with computers.” “We have identified no negative impacts in terms of age, gender, race (except language), sexual orientation, marital status, political opinion or those with dependants from the proposals for compulsory online filing of company tax, VAT and PAYE returns and forms. However, our early consultation and later research have identified some possible issues and impacts with regards to language, religion and disability. This EQIA sets out these impacts, along with the arrangements that have been applied (or are planned) to mitigate them, where appropriate.”
“An …EQIA…has indicated that the main diversity issues surrounding this package of measures have been addressed by not making online filing of SA returns mandatory for any individuals…A small number of very small employers may choose to use an agent to file where they have not before. Special rules will be in place for businesses run entirely by individuals that have a religious conscience objection to using IT. The regulations will also be drafted to include a direction-making power which will enable us to exempt specific customer groups. This will be used should we find that there are some customers who, despite the measures we are taking to support those filing online, are still unable to use the service or face significant difficulties in doing so.”
“Government remains of the view that mandation should go ahead, as planned, in April 2012; and that the draft regulations putting mandation into effect will not create further exemptions from online filing, since Government policy remains to encourage businesses to go online wherever possible, providing customers with the necessary support (ie assistance into digital) to do so.”
“The internet is vital for the UK’s economic prosperity, national security and for our way of life. It brings many opportunities for businesses and people, but also threats from crime, espionage, terrorism and warfare which must be addressed. … Cyber attacks threaten our economy and our national security. This threat is real and increasingly important. However, it is very difficult to give an accurate figure to the cost of cyber crime to the UK economy. What we do know is that the costs are high, and they are increasing. To take the latest Action Fraud figures, over the past 12 months the centre has taken over 46,000 reports from the public of cyber enabled crime. This amounted to attempted levels of fraud of£292million . And we know that is only a fraction of all crimes committed. The most serious threats are real and present and highly organised….”
“HMRC will never send notifications of a tax rebate by email, or ask you to disclose personal or payment information by email….”
“Help available to you if you feel you will have real difficulty in going online (for example, because you live in an area without reliable internet access, or have a disability which makes it very difficult or impossible for you to use a computer). If you are in this position, you should call [telephone number given] (open 8am to 6pm, Mondays to Fridays, except bank holidays) and explain your circumstances. The helpline staff will explain what support options HMRC can provide.”
“the essence of the agent’s position is that he is only an intermediary between two other parties, and it is therefore essential to an agency in this sense that a third party should be in existence or contemplated.”
“Mere administrative practices, which by their nature were alterable at will by the authorities, could not be regarded as constituting proper fulfilment of a member state’s obligations under the Treaty, since they maintained a state of uncertainty as regards the extent of the rights of the persons concerned as guaranteed by the Treaty.”
“(4) In any case where an electronic return system is not used, a return must be made using a paper return system.”
“As to the merits of the pleas, the Court would make at the outset the general observation that Pine Valley and Healy Holdings were no more than vehicles through which Mr Healy proposed to implement the development for which outline planning permission had been granted. On this ground alone it would be artificial to draw distinctions between the three appellants as regards their entitlement to claim to be ‘victims’ of a violation.”
“[41] The Court reiterates that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. As regards the rights secured to companies by the Convention, it should be pointed out that the Court has already recognised a company’s right under Art 41 to compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of violation ofArt 6(1) of the Convention . Building on its dynamic interpretation of the convention, the Court considers that the time has come to hold that in certain circumstances the rights guaranteed byArt 8 of the Convention may be construed as including the right to respect for a company’s registered office, branches or other business premises.”
“ First article of the first protocol (“A1P1”) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
“[42]…an interference, including one resulting from a measure to secure payment of taxes, must strike a ‘fair balance’ between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights…there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims pursued….”
“[114] The concept of ‘possessions’ has been interpreted by that court as including a wide range of economic interests and assets, but one paradigm example of a possession is a person’s financial resources…In the case of an insurance company the fund out of which it meets claims must therefore constitute a possession within the meaning of the article. Legislation which has the object and effect of establishing a new category of claims, and which in consequence diminishes the fund, can accordingly be regarded as an interference with that possession.”
“The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
“the Court will respect the legislature’s assessment in such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation”
“[59] ‘sense of social justice of the population’ in combination with the interest to protect the public purse and to distribute the public burden satisfies the Convention requirement of a legitimate aim….no convincing evidence on which to conclude that the reasons referred to by the Government were manifestly devoid of any reasonable basis….”
“…the measure complained of entailed an excessive and individual burden on the applicant’s side. This is all the more evident when considering the fact that the measure targeted only a certain group of individuals, who were apparently singled out by the public administration in its capacity as employer……[75] Therefore the measure cannot be held reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.”
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
“[29] The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of ‘private life’. However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude there from entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings. There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this understanding of the notion of ‘private life’ should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world. This view is supported by the fact that, as was rightly pointed out by the Commission, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an individual’s activities form part of his professional or business life and which do not. Thus, especially in the case of a person exercising a liberal profession, his work in that context may form part and parcel of his life to such a degree that it becomes impossible to know in what capacity he is acting at a given moment in time. To deny the protection of Art 8 on the ground that the measure complained of related only to professional activities – as the Government suggested should be done in the present case – could moreover lead to an inequality of treatment, in that such protection would remain available to a person whose professional and non-professional activities were so intermingled that there was no means of distinguishing between them. In fact, the Court has not heretofore drawn such distinctions: it concluded that there had been an interference with private life even where telephone tapping covered both business and private calls (see the Huvig v France ….); and, where a search was directed solely against business activities, it did not rely on that fact as a ground for excluding the applicability of Article 8 under the head of ‘private life’ (see the Chappell v the UK … )”
“[private life] can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity…Beyond a person’s name, his or her private life may include other means of personal identification and of linking to a family….[67] The mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Art 8…The subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding...However, in determining whether the personal information retained by the authorities involves any of the private-life aspects mentioned above, the Court will have due regard to the specific context in which the information at issue has been recorded and retained…..”
“…the engagement of article 8 depended upon an affirmative answer to two questions, namely whether there had been or would be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of a person’s right to respect for his private or family life and, if so, whether it had had, or would have, consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of the article….”
“[86] the retention by the police of photographs of a person must be justified….[90] It is for the police to justify as proportionate the interference with the claimant’s Art 8 rights….”
“to those features which are integral to a person’s identity or ability to function socially as a person.”
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, natural or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
“…a general policy or measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be considered discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that group.”
“[44] … The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.”
“Different treatment of persons in analogous situations and same treatment of persons in significantly different situations are both prima facie discriminatory under Art 14 where it is disability that is the reason for the different treatment or the feature that makes the situations significantly different.”
“The traditional concept of indirect discrimination is not the same concept as treating different cases differently. In the latter, the core of the applicant’s complaint is not that a rule is imposing a barrier and cannot be justified: rather, the complaint is that even accepting that the rule can be justified in its application to others, it ought not to be applied to the applicant because his or her situation is materially different, and that difference ought to be recognised by the adoption of a different rule, which may take the form of an exception from the general rule. The complaint is not that the single rule adopted is inappropriate because discriminatory and unjustified: it is that the circumstances require that there should be more than one rule.”
“As applicants might have difficulty in proving discriminatory treatment, in order to guarantee those concerned the effective protection of their rights, less strict evidential rules would apply in cases of alleged indirect discrimination. Thus where an applicant alleging indirect discrimination established a rebuttable presumption that the effect of a measure or practice was discriminatory, the burden then shifted to the respondent state, which had to show that the difference in treatment was not discriminatory.”
“[13] … I would reject the attempt on behalf of the Secretary of State to criticise the appellant’s case for not being founded on statistical evidence. Whilst such evidence can be important in an art 14 case …it is not a prerequisite. Where, as in the present case, a group recognised as being in need of protection against discrimination – the severely disabled – is significantly disadvantaged by the application of ostensibly neutral criteria, discrimination is established, subject to justification”
“[32]…The Court’s case law shows that, although Article 14 has no independent existence, it may play an important autonomous role by complementing the other normative provisions of the Convention and the Protocols: article 14 safeguards individuals, placed in similar situations, from any discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in those other provisions. A measure which, although in itself in conformity with the requirements of the Article of the Convention of the Protocols enshrining a given right or freedom, is of a discriminatory nature incompatible with Article 14, therefore violates those two articles taken in conjunction. It is as though Article 14 formed an integral part of each of the provisions laying down rights and freedoms.”
“[40] The court recalls that Art 14 has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. However, the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of one or more of such provisions and to this extent it is autonomous. For Art 14 to become applicable it suffices that the facts of a case fall within the ambit of another substantive provision of the Convention or its Protocols.”
“[4] It is not difficult… to identify the core values which the provision [ie A1P1] is intended to protect. But the further a situation is removed from one infringing those core values, the weaker the connection becomes, until a point is reached when there is no meaningful connection at all. At the inner extremity a situation may properly be said to be within the ambit or scope of the right, nebulous those expressions necessarily are. At the outer extremity, it may not… I cannot accept that even a tenuous link is enough….”
“[5] …I regard the application of a rule governing a non-resident’s parent’s liability to contribute to the costs incurred by the parent with care, even if it result in the non-resident parent paying more than she would under a different rule, as altogether remote from the sort of abuse at which A1P1 is directed.”
“The application of art 14 does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive rights guaranteed by the convention. It is necessary bit it is also sufficient for the facts of the case to fall ‘within the ambit’ of one or more of the convention articles (see among many other authorities Burden v UK …) The Court has also explained that art 14 comes into play whenever ‘the subject matter of the disadvantage … constitutes one of the modalities of the exercise of a right guaranteed.’ (see National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium … ) or the measure complained of is ‘linked to the exercise of a right guaranteed’ (see Schmidt v Sweden … )”
“[86] the retention by the police of photographs of a person must be justified….[90] It is for the police to justify as proportionate the interference with the claimant’s Art 8 rights….”
“weighty reasons may well be needed in a case of positive discrimination, but there is no good reason to impose a similarly high standard in cases of indirect discrimination…the proportionality review applicable in the present case must be made by reference to the usual standard….”
“Every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.”
“Under the terms of the [European Communities Act 1972 ] it has always been clear that it is the duty of a UK court, when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law”
“[Art 6 (2)] The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to Member States, as general principles of Community law.”
“In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with the first sub-paragraph of article 6(1) EU, the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter, ‘which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’.”
“… A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods….”
“Any taxable person liable for payment of VAT must pay the net amount of the VAT when submitting the VAT return provided for in Art 250. Member States may, however, set a different date for payment of that amount or may require interim payments to be made.”
“[13] The Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of Community law. By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.”
“[25] ….But in general European law would require them to satisfy the principle of proportionality in its broad sense, which, following German law, is divided into three sub-principles: first, a measure must be suitable for the purpose for which the power has been conferred; secondly, it must be necessary in the sense that the purpose could not have been achieved by some other means less burdensome to the persons affected, and thirdly, it must be proportionate in the narrower sense, that is, the burdens imposed by the exercise of the power must not be disproportionate to the object to be achieved.”
“When Member States are implementing Union Law, eg by enacting legislation pursuant to a Directive, they must exercise whatever discretion they have in compliance with the general principle of Union law, including proportionality…. Furthermore, Member States are also bound by the general principles of Union law, including proportionality, when acting within the field of Union law…. Furthermore, and even though it is for the Member State to decide the penalties imposed for breaches of its rules, the principle of proportionality also applies to criminal and administrative sanctions imposed for breach of rules in any way connected with the exercise of a Union right…”
“[65] the same is true of [what is now Art 273 PVD] pursuant to which the Member States are to take the necessary measures to ensure that taxable persons comply with their obligations relating to declaration and payment or impose other obligations which they deem necessary for the correct collection of the tax and for the prevention of evasion. [66] Although those provisions allow Member States to take certain measures, they must not however go further than is necessary to attain the objectives mentioned in the preceding paragraph.”
“…may impose other obligations which they necessary for the correct levying and collection of the tax and for the prevention of fraud”
“[96] In our judgment, the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence, albeit not the same as mitigation, strikes a fair balance between fairness to the taxpayer and the effective and economical deployment of the State’s resources.”