“10. In its Statement of Case HMRC sets out that it runs a ‘structured programme to enable penalties to be issued regularly throughout the year, 10 rather than waiting for the late return to be submitted and then issue a final penalty. These penalties, although aimed at encouraging compliance and having the effect of reminding are not designed to be reminders for the outstanding return.’ Thus, HMRC deliberately waits until four months have gone by and 15 does not issue the first interim penalty notice until, as in this case, September of the year of default. By that time a penalty of£400 , being four times£100 per month, is said to be due. In fact, if the penalty notice operates as a reminder and the taxpayer undertakes the necessary filing forthwith, a further one month penalty arises because the de facto reminder is received 20 only after it is too late to avoid a further£100 penalty. Thus, the effect of HMRC desisting from sending out a penalty liability notice very soon after 19 May of the relevant year, and choosing deliberately to delay that penalty notice until four months has gone by, is to result in the taxpayer facing a minimum penalty of£500 . We appreciate that HMRC takes the stance that it 25 is the responsibility of the taxpayer to make the necessary filing and that it is its stance that it has no obligation to issue any reminder. However, we have no doubt that any right thinking member of society would consider that to be unfair and falling very far below the standard of fair dealing and conscionable conduct to be expected of an organ of the State.” 30 12. The Tribunal observed that the penalty system was not to be used as a “cash generating scheme” and that it was “inexplicable why HMRC deliberately delays sending out a penalty notice for four months”
“(1) An appeal may be brought against the determination of a penalty under section 100 above … 5 (2) On an appeal against the determination of a penalty under section 100 above section 50(6) to (8) of this Act shall not apply but— (a) in the case of a penalty which is required to be of a particular amount, the First-tier Tribunal may— (i) if it appears that no penalty has been incurred, set the 10 determination aside, (ii) if the amount determined appears to be correct, confirm the determination, or (iii) if the amount determined appears to be incorrect, increase or reduce it to the correct amount … 15 (b) in the case of any other penalty, the First-tier Tribunal may— (i) if it appears that no penalty has been incurred, set the determination aside, (ii) if the amount determined appears to be appropriate, confirm the determination, 20 (iii) if the amount determined appears to be excessive, reduce it to such other amount (including nil) as it considers appropriate, or (iv) if the amount determined appears to be insufficient, increase it to such amount not exceeding the permitted 25 maximum as it considers appropriate.”
“(1) … an appeal shall lie to the tribunal with respect to any of the following matters— … 5 (c) the amount of any input tax which may be credited to a person ….”
“On the ordinary meaning of the language of that provision, it appears that it covers all the issues between Oxfam and HMRC regarding the question whether HMRC should have allowed Oxfam credit for a higher amount of 10 input tax under the approved method formula, including both the contract issue and the legitimate expectation issue. The words, ‘with respect to’, in s 83(1) appear clearly to be wide enough to cover any legal question capable of being determinative of the issue of the amount of input tax which should be credited to a taxpayer. The tribunal’s jurisdiction is defined by reference 15 to the subject matter specified in the section, not by reference to the particular legal regime or type of law to be applied in resolving issues arising in respect of that subject matter.”
“[66] However, the parties thought that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider Oxfam’s alternative legitimate expectation argument. In my view, this is not correct. By the same construction of s 83(1)(c) and the same 25 reasoning which led to the conclusion that Oxfam’s contract claim was within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, Oxfam’s legitimate expectation argument also fell within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. I can see no sensible basis in the language of that provision for differentiating between Oxfam’s contract claim and its legitimate expectation claim. In both cases, if 30 Oxfam’s claim had been made out, an error of law on the part of HMRC in arriving at its decision on the amount of input tax to be credited to Oxfam would have been established (either a failure to respect Oxfam’s contractual rights or a failure to treat Oxfam fairly, in breach of Oxfam’s legitimate expectation) which would, on the face of it, be a proper basis for an appeal to 35 the tribunal against HMRC’s decision within the terms of s 83(1)(c). [67] Usually, of course, an appeal under one of the sub-paragraphs of s 83(1) will be on the merits of [a] decision taken by HMRC, and questions of private law or public law (such as whether HMRC took into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take account of relevant considerations) 40 will simply not be relevant to the tribunal’s task on the appeal. But in my view it does not follow from this that the tribunal will never have jurisdiction to consider issues of general private law and general public law where that is necessary for it to determine the outcome of an appeal against a decision of HMRC whose subject matter falls within one of the sub-paragraphs of s 45 83(1). [68] I do not think that it is a valid objection to this straightforward interpretation of s 83(1)(c) according to its natural meaning that it has the effect that sometimes the tribunal will have to apply public law concepts in 14 order to determine cases before it. It happens regularly elsewhere in the legal system that courts or tribunals with jurisdiction defined in statute by general words have jurisdiction to decide issues of public law which may be relevant to determination of questions falling within their statutorily defined 5 jurisdiction. No special language is required to achieve that effect. Where they are themselves independent and impartial courts or tribunals (as the tribunal is) there is no presumption that public law issues are reserved to the High Court in the exercise of its judicial review jurisdiction. So, for example, a county court may have to consider whether possession 10 proceedings issued by a local authority have been issued in breach of its public law obligations (Wandsworth London BC v Winder[1994] 3 All ER 976 ,[1985] AC 461 ); magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court may have to decide issues of public law in so far as they arise in relation to criminal proceedings (eg to determine if a byelaw is a valid and proper foundation for 15 a criminal charge: Boddington v British Transport Police[1998] 2 All ER 203 ,[1999] 2 AC 143 or to determine the validity of a formal instrument which is in some way a necessary foundation for the criminal charge: DPP v Head[1958] 1 All ER 679 ,[1959] AC 83 ); and employment tribunals may have to decide issues of public law in employment proceedings (eg to 20 determine whether a contract of employment with a public authority is vitiated as having been made ultra vires). [69] I cannot see any good reason for adopting a different approach to the interpretation of the jurisdiction of the tribunal in s 83 of VATA. The tribunal is used to dealing with complex issues of tax law. There is no reason 25 to think that it would not be competent to deal with issues of public law, in so far as they might be relevant to determine the outcome of any appeal. That view is reinforced by the fact that the tribunal may have to deal with complex public law arguments in relation to Convention rights when construing legislation unders 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 , and is 30 recognised by Parliament as being competent to do so. [70] Moreover, there is a clear public benefit in construing s 83 by reference to its ordinary and natural meaning which strongly supports that construction. It is desirable for the tribunal to hear all matters relevant to determination of a question under s 83 (here, the amount of input tax to be 35 credited to a taxpayer) because (a) it is a specialist tribunal which is particularly well positioned to make judgments about the fair treatment of taxpayers by HMRC and (b) it avoids the cost, delay and potential injustice and confusion associated with proliferation of proceedings and ensures that all issues relevant to determine the one thing the HMRC and taxpayer are 40 interested in (in this case, the amount of input tax to be recovered) are resolved on one occasion in one place. It seems plausible to suppose that Parliament would have had these public benefits in mind when legislating in the wide terms of s 83. [71] Therefore, apart from any authority on this question, I would hold that 45 s 83(1)(c) bears its ordinary and natural meaning, so that resolution of the issue of legitimate expectation which arose between Oxfam and HMRC fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.”
“Although the agreement of HMRC to the use of the approved method formula by Oxfam did not constitute a binding contract, it clearly did amount 25 to an express assurance by HMRC that Oxfam’s recoverable input tax would be calculated by reference to that formula.”
Showing the 50 most senior of 347.