‘[Name of father], give my consent to the issuance of the United States passport to the minor child named on this application. My consent is unconditional with regards to validity and travel.’
“[C] is currently receiving statutory support from [the local authority] under a Child in Need plan… An assessment was completed which identified concerns about the family dynamics between the adults in [C]’s and his sister’s lives, and the impact of this on the children. In particular, worries have been raised by the professional network about a dysfunctional and potentially controlling dynamic between [the mother] and her in-laws, and between [Mr X’s father] and [the mother].”
“we are concerned about how much [C] discloses to us about his family situation, speaking as an adult. We feel he knows too much information about his Mum’s difficulties and needs”
“When I mentioned that one possible outcome was for [C] to return to the USA, [the mother] immediately put her arm around [C] and said “shh, its ok, its ok’’. I had not observed any difference in [C]’s presentation at the mention of his father and America and was concerned about the impact of his mother’s somewhat pre-emptive reassurance. To me, this appeared to give [C] the impression that the subjects of his father and the USA, are ones which he should feel distressed about and require comfort from.” father and America and was concerned about the impact of his mother’s somewhat pre-emptive reassurance. To me, this appeared to give [C] the impression that the subjects of his father and the USA, are ones which he should feel distressed about and require comfort from.”
‘I am told because I have to know for a reason. So I am prepared in case it does happen’
‘I just know, they don't like each other. When [the father] comes around [the mother] doesn't go near him’
“Presuming that Father’s proposed undertakings were included in an order or other decree issued by your family court that is otherwise valid under U.K. law, it is my opinion that the [Ohio Family Court] would likely recognize such an order as an enforceable foreign judgment under the principle of comity. The proposed undertakings would be consistent with interim or temporary orders issued in a juvenile child custody matter pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure, and do not purport to make any final resolution of the underlying question of custody. Recognizing such orders would be harmonious with Ohio public policy. There is no suggestion of any denial of due process of law nor that such orders would be obtained by fraud, nor that your family court lacks jurisdiction to make such orders. The specific proposals included in Father’s proposed undertakings are in the nature of interim or temporary orders – that he obtain one-way tickets for Mother and the minor child to return to Ohio, that he not be present at the airport upon their arrival and that a particular location be used for exchange of the minor child, that the parties communicate via a particular communications platform, that he would not harass Mother, and that the underlying order granting him custody would not be enforced pending further hearing(s) in Ohio. Each presumes that the Ohio court would have the opportunity to make further amendments or modifications to such orders in the future, if necessary. Father’s promise or representation that he would not “institute or support any criminal proceedings brought to punish” would not necessarily bind an Ohio court from independently pursuing such claims or charges, but as noted below, I think it extremely unlikely that Mother would face such criminal action under these circumstances. Such an action would almost certainly be dependent on Father’s participation, and Father’s failure to abide by his own representations in that event would potentially open him to civil liability in the custody proceedings before the Juvenile Court. To the extent that these representations remain only that and are not otherwise incorporated into an order or decree issued by your family court, Ohio courts would not generally consider them to be binding or enforceable in their current form, and they would simply be treated as Father’s position. It would still require independent court action before any legal requirement or obligation would attach. An Ohio court could adopt the proposed undertakings as its own order and incorporate them into a temporary order which would bind the parties, either by agreement or in a process under Ohio Juv.R. 13. While the specifics of that process would be up to the court, such temporary orders are often issued by a juvenile court after consideration of the parties’ respective positions as submitted to the court upon written affidavits regarding their respective positions and requests.”
“More specifically, if Father’s proposed undertakings are adopted in an order issued by either your family court or an Ohio court (particularly his representation not to support any criminal proceedings against Mother or to enforce the custody order on an interim basis), I believe that there is virtually no chance that Mother would be subject to arrest upon her return. The Ohio court would likely treat such an order as a temporary suspension of the contempt sentence and reserve any further action or revision for a further, future hearing.”
"The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where: (a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and (b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State."
"(1) The terms of Article 13(b) are by their very nature restricted in their scope. The defence has a high threshold, demonstrated by the use of the words "grave" and "intolerable". (2) The focus is on the child. The issue is the risk to the child in the event of his or her return. (3) The separation of the child from the abducting parent can establish the required grave risk. (4) When the allegations on which the abducting parent relies to establish grave risk are disputed, the court should first establish whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. If so, the court must then establish how the child can be protected from the risk. (5) In assessing these matters, the court must be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Article 13(b) and so neither the allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination. (6) That does not mean, however, that no evaluative assessment of the allegations should be undertaken by the court. The court must examine in concrete terms the situation in which the child would be on return. In analysing whether the allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk, the judge will have to consider whether the evidence enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that they do. (7) If the judge concludes that the allegations would potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, he or she must then carefully consider whether and how the risk can be addressed or sufficiently ameliorated so that the child will not be exposed to the risk. (8) In many cases, sufficient protection will be afforded by extracting undertakings from the applicant as to the conditions in which the child will live when he returns and by relying on the courts of the requesting State to protect him once he is there. (9) In deciding what weight can be placed on undertakings, the court has to take into account the extent to which they are likely to be effective, both in terms of compliance and in terms of the consequences, including remedies for enforcement in the requesting State, in the absence of compliance. (10) As has been made clear by the Practice Guidance on "
‘I do not accept that a judge is bound to take this approach if the evidence before the court enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that the allegations give rise to an Article 13(b) risk.’
‘I would emphasise that Black LJ was referring to discounting the possibility that the allegations would give rise to an Art 13(b) risk. She was not otherwise diverging from the approach set out in Re E. It is also clear that she was referring to the end of the spectrum, namely when the court was able confidently to discount the possibility that the allegations gave rise to an Art 13(b) risk.’
"if the court does not follow the approach referred to above, it would create the inevitable prospect of the court's evaluation falling between two stools. The court's "process of reasoning", to adopt the expression used by Lord Wilson in Re S, at [22], would not include either (a) considering the risks to the child or children if the allegations were true; nor (b) confidently discounting the possibility that the allegations gave rise to an Article 13(b) risk. The court would, rather, by adopting something of a middle course, be likely to be distracted from considering the second element of the Re E approach, namely "how the child can be protected against the risk" which the allegations, if true, would potentially establish."
“the operation of immigration and asylum law no longer prevents the High Court from implementing a decision to return a child to another State before their asylum claim here has been determined by the SSHD, provided that the general principle of non-refoulement is upheld. That general principle permits return to either the country of nationality, if there is no risk of persecution, or a safe third country. In exercise of its 1980 Hague Convention or inherent welfare jurisdiction, the High Court can make those determinations of risk and safety when considering holistically, as it must, whether to order a return.”