“The exercise to date has clearly been one of scale and challenge. I take close account of the difference there will be between the systems available to the Republic for the purposes of public administration, including information retention and record keeping and retrieval, and those available in other States enjoying the good fortune of greater resources or more developed arrangements.”
“2. The Republic, by Peters & Peters Solicitors LLP (“Peters & Peters”) (in its capacity as the Republic’s solicitors and as officers of the Court), shall by31 March 2023 prepare and file with the Court a plan addressed to the Court (the “Plan”), and copied to the Participating Parties, for giving disclosure of relevant documents from the OOP, SISE, the Council of State and the Republic’s Navy. 3. The Plan shall be prepared on the basis that the approach to disclosure contained therein will be a fresh exercise, as though the Republic were starting its disclosure exercise at the entities listed in Paragraph 1 and 2 from the beginning. 4. The Plan may include any request to the Court to preserve the confidentiality of any disclosable document, or for the Court to consider exempting a document from disclosure including where it is not of central relevance to the Proceedings but is categorised as State Secret. 5. Where a request in accordance with paragraph 4 above is made, the Court shall discuss with the Participating Parties how to determine such a request. 6. The Plan, and any disclosure provided by the Republic in accordance with it, shall be considered at the April 2023 CMC.”
“22. The Republic and Peters & Peters are not able to put forward a disclosure plan for the OOP. 23. The PGR, represented by Deputy Attorney General Vasco Matusse, has met with both … the Minister for the Presidency, as well as … the Director of the OOP. The judgment and order … were explained to them. The importance of a further disclosure exercise involving Peters & Peters as much as possible was communicated to the OOP. The OOP indicated that it would consider this request. 24. Thereafter, it was communicated to the PGR that following the meeting referred to in paragraph 23 above, the OOP had, again, searched for relevant hard copy and electronic documents, strictly following the guidance by the PGR. The search benefited from IT technical staff and specialised officials responsible for the Office’s archives and classified material. As a result of this new search no additional documents were found. As a result, it is the position of the OOP that there is no need for further searches to be carried out.”
"The plan itself, which I read the moment I receivedit, was, again, I will be completely open, fullydisappointing in relation to the Office of the President, and I wasn't impressed with the treatment inrelation to SISE."
“1. … On the face of things and as I see it at the moment - which means I am open to further understanding and also matters may develop - although I required a plan there is no plan for the OOP. Further, on the face of things, although I required a plan, there is no plan in relation to SISE that would achieve compliance with the objectives that the plan was designed to serve. 2. I am asked to make a declaration of breach or continuing breach in relation to disclosure duties and in relation to the order for a plan. I am not going to take that formal step. I have said what I have said just now and that is sufficient for the moment. Credit Suisse and others couple a request for declarations with a request to move on to a full hearing about strike-out. That hearing I will make arrangements to enable. 3. I need to say something to each of the two sides about such a hearing. 4. To the Republic, the importance of every day from here to the hearing should be evident. Every day is an opportunity to try and achieve a position in which the Republic can say that matters have moved on and the application is no longer needed, or is less powerfully needed. 5. On the other hand, I need to say to the Credit Suisse team and others that, as I know that they too will have in mind, amongst the points the court will consider at such a hearing is the question whether, even if some aspect of sanction is or may be necessary, that is the right point in time or whether a point in time that is closer to or at trial is more appropriate. Those points may come into the equation if one reaches a question of consequence or sanction or possible consequence or sanction. And strike-out is not the only matter that would fall for consideration, all other things being equal. 6. That said, I am persuaded that further court time should be allowed for the hearing and in reasonably short order. I adhere to that view, notwithstanding the further work it is going to put onto all sides when there is a lot else to be done as well.”
“… The importance of litigants obeying orders of court is self-evident. Once a court order is disobeyed, the imposition of a sanction is almost always inevitable if court orders are to continue to enjoy the respect which they ought to have. And, if persistence in the disobedience would lead to an unfair trial, it seems, at least in the absence of special circumstances, hard to quarrel with a sanction which prevents the party in breach from presenting (in the case of a claimant) or resisting (in the case of a defendant) the claim. And, if the disobedience continues notwithstanding the imposition of a sanction, the enforcement of the sanction is almost inevitable, essentially for the same reasons…”
“… The authorities demonstrate that it is vital for the court, in the interests of justice, to have effective powers, and effective sanctions. Without these, it would be possible for a defendant (or, in a different situation, a claimant) to flout the orders of the court, which are the court’s considered means by which to keep the scales of justice for the parties even. If once it became known that the court was unable or unwilling to maintain the effectiveness of its orders, then it would lose all control over litigation of this kind, with terrible consequences for the administration of justice. …”
“… the test in every case must be what is just and proportionate”
“54. … I adopt, as a general principle, the observations of Mr Justice Millett in Logicrose Ltd v Southend United Football Club Limited (The Times,5 March 1988 ) that the object of the rules as to discovery is to secure the fair trial of the action in accordance with the due process of the Court; and that, accordingly, a party is not to be deprived of his right to a proper trial as a penalty for disobedience of those rules - even if such disobedience amounts to contempt for or defiance of the court - if that object is ultimately secured, by (for example) the late production of a document which has been withheld. But where a litigant's conduct puts the fairness of the trial in jeopardy, where it is such that any judgment in favour of the litigant would have to be regarded as unsafe, or where it amounts to such an abuse of the process of the court as to render further proceedings unsatisfactory and to prevent the court from doing justice, the court is entitled - indeed, I would hold bound - to refuse to allow that litigant to take further part in the proceedings and (where appropriate) to determine the proceedings against him. The reason, as it seems to me, is that it is no part of the court's function to proceed to trial if to do so would give rise to a substantial risk of injustice. The function of the court is to do justice between the parties; not to allow its process to be used as a means of achieving injustice. A litigant who has demonstrated that he is determined to pursue proceedings with the object of preventing a fair trial has forfeited his right to take part in a trial. His object is inimical to the process which he purports to invoke. 55. Further, in this context, a fair trial is a trial which is conducted without an undue expenditure of time and money; and with a proper regard to the demands of other litigants upon the finite resources of the court. The court does not do justice to the other parties to the proceedings in question if it allows its process to be abused so that the real point in issue becomes subordinated to an investigation into the effect which the admittedly fraudulent conduct of one party in connection with the process of litigation has had on the fairness of the trial itself. That, as it seems to me, is what happened in the present case. The trial was "hijacked" by the need to investigate what documents were false and what documents had been destroyed. The need to do that arose from the facts (i) that the petitioners had sought to rely on documents which Nigel Tobias had forged with the object of frustrating a fair trial and (ii) that, as the judge found, Nigel Tobias was unwilling to make a frank disclosure of the extent of his fraudulent conduct, but persisted in his attempts to deceive. The result was that the petitioners' case occupied far more of the court's time than was necessary for the purpose of deciding the real points in issue on the petition. That was unfair to the Blackledge respondents; and it was unfair to other litigants who needed to have their disputes tried by the court. 56. In my view, having heard and disbelieved the evidence of Nigel Tobias as to the extent of his fraudulent conduct, and having reached the conclusion (as he did) that Nigel Tobias was persisting in his object of frustrating a fair trial, the judge ought to have considered whether it was fair to the respondents - and in the interests of the administration of justice generally - to allow the trial to continue. If he had considered that question, then - as it seems to me - he should have come to the conclusion that it must be answered in the negative. A decision to stop the trial in those circumstances is not based on the court's desire (or any perceived need) to punish the party concerned; rather, it is a proper and necessary response where a party has shown that his object is not to have the fair trial which it is the court's function to conduct, but to have a trial the fairness of which he has attempted (and continues to attempt) to compromise.”
“120. An order striking out a defence and debarring a defendant from defending (or striking out a claim) is the ultimate sanction that the court can impose for a breach of its order that does not amount to a contempt of court. It therefore must be a sanction of last resort and is likely only to be imposed for a serious and deliberate breach. The sanction must be necessary and proportionate in the circumstances. Lord Clarke said in Summers v Fairclough Homes Ltd[2012] UKSC 26 ;[2012] 1 WLR 2004 at [61], giving the judgment of the Supreme Court that: "the test in every case must be what is just and proportionate", and he emphasised the draconian nature of the strike out sanction and the flexibility of remedies available to the court to fashion a proportionate remedy. Rix LJ similarly emphasised in Aktas v Adepta[2010] EWCA Civ 1170 ;[2011] QB 894 at [92] the flexible remedies that the court had at its disposal to make the sanction fit the breach. If a breach, though serious, is excusable, an order striking out a party's case and debarring it from proceeding further may well be disproportionate, at least if another sanction is sufficient to achieve the ends of justice notwithstanding the breach. 121. I have refused to vary or revoke the order for standard disclosure. I did so on the basis that the Bank's disclosure was and remains necessary for a fair trial of the action, and because the importance of disclosure substantially outweighs the existence of a risk to the Bank in complying with the order. The Bank is now in serious breach of the order and will remain in breach: I have formed the view that the Bank will not give disclosure while SAMA's ruling remains in place and that it is unwilling to approach SAMA to change it. In those circumstances, there is little real alternative available to the court but to strike out the Defence and debar it from defending at the very least those issues that are fact sensitive and to which the Defendant's disclosure documents could be relevant. The question that I have to decide is whether the breach is so serious and inexcusable that the Bank must be taken to have forfeited its right to a trial even of issues of law or foreign law, where documents of the Bank will be irrelevant to the outcome of those issues. 122. There was an interesting argument at the Bar as to whether a full debarring order is a "normal" or "usual" response of the court to serious non-compliance with its orders. The Claimants relied on Caven-Atack v Church of Scientology Religious Education College Inc (unrep, 31.10.94, C.A.), cited in Matthews and Malek on Disclosure (5th ed., 2016), the dicta of Christopher Clarke J in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (No.3)[2010] EWHC 2219 (QB) ; [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 1093 at [38] and the dicta of Soole J in Michael v Phillips[2017] EWHC 1084 (QB) in support of that proposition. I do not consider that those decisions establish that under the Civil Procedure Rules an order striking out the whole of a claim or defence, as the case may be, is the standard or expected order in the case of a serious breach of a court's order. In many cases of serious breach such an order may be the only effective and proportionate sanction, but – at least where the breach is not contumacious – it would be surprising if there were a standard approach under the flexible approach mandated by the Civil Procedure Rules. 123. I prefer the approach described by Lord Clarke and Rix LJ to which I have referred. The court must have regard to the circumstances of the individual case and do what is necessary and proportionate to mark the seriousness of the breach of its order in a way that is consistent with the interests of justice and the overriding objective. The seriousness of the breach, the extent if at all to which it is excusable and the consequences of the breach will be very important factors, but the overriding criterion is the requirement for the sanction to be proportionate and just. 124. The choice for the Court now is to strike out the Defence and debar the Bank entirely from defending the claim, or to strike out and debar save as regards those issues that can fairly be tried without disclosure by the Bank. It clearly would not be just to allow the Bank to defend any factual issue where it might have relevant documents that it should have disclosed. The risk of whether the Bank's documents might be relevant to such issues would clearly have to fall on the side of the Bank. In my judgment, the Court can properly except certain issues from a debarring order if it is satisfied, first, that such issues can fairly be tried without the Bank's disclosure; second, that such an exception would be in the interests of justice and fair to both parties; third that the conduct of the Bank is not so inexcusable that a full debarring order is deserved and is proportionate, and fourth that making exceptions from the debarring order in that way does not undermine the authority of the Court. There must clearly also be some sensible purpose served by having a trial of certain issues only.”
“As PIFSS points out, whilst the court is empowered to strike out a defence, the case law indicates that responses to non-compliance can be carefully calibrated to do justice in the case (an example being Fancourt J’s decision in Byers v Samba[2020] EWHC 853 (Ch) §§ 120-123 and 129-130, where he disbarred the defaulting party from defending only on the particular issues where disclosure was required for a fair trial). …”
“No penalty by way of committal or fine shall be imposed in respect of any failure or refusal by or on behalf of a State to disclose or produce any document or other information for the purposes of proceedings to which it is a party.”
“… [i]n some cases the trial itself, rather than a point before trial, will be the point at which there is greatest clarity and where precision is possible…”
“A litigant who has demonstrated that he is determined to pursue proceedings with the object of preventing a fair trial …” or “… where a party has shown that his object is not to have the fair trial which it is the court's function to conduct, but to have a trial the fairness of which he has attempted (and continues to attempt) to compromise.”