“31. This is a case where… the matters which are the subject of the amendment could and should have been pleaded very much earlier. ENRC has of course always known that a large proportion of the lending relied upon was made not to it but to its subsidiaries. The claim for increased borrowing costs due to the CI was made in the original 2019 Particulars of Claim. Further, although the CI did not end until 2023, the claim in respect of increased borrowings is in fact limited to the years 2013 to 2016. In reality, ENRC and/or its legal team took their eye off the ball in terms of accurately pleading the increased borrowing costs claim once the parties’ attention had turned to the management of the claim generally and in particular the hiving off of quantum to Phase 2. So it is a late amendment, though not a very late one in the sense of one which jeopardises an already fixed trial date.”
“50. However, all of that is far too speculative. What would have been useful is if ENRC had already checked with the subsidiaries and sought documents relating to the loans, for example by way of keywords, and if documents did emerge, then perhaps ENRC could have argued that the absence of a litigation hold did not matter because there were no responsive documents. However, it has not undertaken that exercise and it is somewhat surprising that it has not. 51. I should add here that in this context ENRC does not argue that it could not have imposed a litigation hold years ago, or could not now seek documents from the subsidiaries, because such documents were not within its control. While ENRC, in the past, has said that it did not have legal control of such documents, Mr Pillow accepted that the position was or may be different in terms of practical control. At any rate, the control argument was not made in the context of the current application.”
“64. As to that point, ENRC's response is essentially to say that this cannot be right. It may be appropriate if one was to start if the ground up, as it were, so as to work out what a hypothetical lender to any given subsidiary, absent the CI, would have charged it in terms of interest. However, the exercise here is different, because it is to ask what difference the CI made to the actual lenders in terms of their deliberations. I follow that, but without more detail I cannot say for sure that at least some of the documents sought might not be relevant and it is difficult to be sure where we have not yet had a hearing on the disputed items in the DRD [Disclosure Review Document]. So what I am being asked to do now by ENRC is effectively to decide that dispute in advance for the purpose of the amendment application, which does seem rather back to front to me.”
“67. In my judgment, and at this stage of the proceedings, and without a detailed debate on DRD issues, I do not think it right to conclude that none of the documents which would have been caught by a litigation hold on subsidiaries could be relevant, nor can I say that, even if they were relevant, they would only be marginally so, or that it would be disproportionate, especially given the amounts claimed here, to have regard to them…”
“69… [I]f, as ENRC says, they are both mere holding companies, the documents which would be relevant are those of their indirect subsidiaries, which of course takes us back to Kazchrome, SSGPO and the rest.”
“73. Indeed…part of the expert input…concerned what would be required for a proper assessment of the diminution in value claim. In that regard, even though ENRC has no alternative diminution in value or other case for loss, if the court is to be persuaded that the dollar-for-dollar method is not the correct one, I can see that, in order to challenge it, the SFO and the Dechert Defendants’ experts will need to consider the particular activities, standing and attributes of each subsidiary in order to explain why the dollar-for-dollar approach does not work. For that reason, the lack of documentation now at subsidiary level constitutes also a real prejudice to the Dechert Defendants and the SFO, which could have been avoided if the claim in respect of the subsidiaries’ borrowing had been made at the outset. This particular prejudice is not one which exists for the claim in respect of ENRC’s own borrowing, since by definition there is no diminution of value claim there. 74. I should add that ENRC somewhat downplays the significance of its amendments on the basis that all the court is doing is making a rough and ready assessment as to whether the CI caused increased borrowing costs and that ENRC’s case here is simple. That, I think, underestimates what in fact would be involved in dealing with these very large claims.”
“76. On the other hand, and by the same token, ENRC will suffer considerable prejudice if the amendment is not allowed because it will be deprived of most of the very substantial increased borrowing costs claimed. However, here it really is the author of its own misfortune, since it could and should have pleaded this claim properly at the outset, namely, around five years ago. That point is given added weight when one recalls that the SFO actually pressed ENRC for further information on the borrowing costs claim in 2019 and 2020, thereby emphasising the need for proper particularisation. There is yet further weight given to the point by the fact that I said on13 May 2020 that any amendment should be made then and not later. Here, all of the material facts must have been known by ENRC in 2019, just as now.”
“16…On an application by a party to amend its pleading, where there are potential issues of lateness or adverse impact on the trial date, the following principles are applicable, as set out in CIP Properties (AIPT) Ltd v Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd[2015] EWHC 1345 (TCC) per Coulson J (as he then was) at [19] and Quah Su-Ling v Goldman Sachs International[2015] EWHC 759 per Carr J (as she then was) at [36]-[38]: (i) In exercising the court’s discretion whether to allow an amendment, the overriding objective is of the greatest importance. Although the court will have regard to the desirability of determining the real dispute between the parties, it must also deal with the case justly and at proportionate cost, which includes (amongst other things) saving expense, ensuring that the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly, and allocating to it no more than a fair share of the court’s limited resources. (ii) Therefore, such applications always involve the court striking a balance between injustice to the applicant if the amendment is refused, and injustice to the opposing party and other litigants in general, if the amendment is permitted. (iii) The starting point is that the proposed amendment must be arguable, coherent and properly particularised. An application to amend will be refused if it is clear that the proposed amendment has no real prospect of success. (iv) An amendment is late if it could have been advanced earlier, or involves duplication of steps in the litigation, costs and effort. Lateness is not an absolute, but a relative concept. It depends on a review of the nature of the proposed amendment, the quality of the explanation for its timing, and a fair appreciation of the consequences in terms of work wasted and consequential work to be done. (v) It is incumbent on a party seeking the indulgence of the court to be allowed to raise a late claim to provide a good explanation for the delay. (vi) A very late amendment is one made when the trial date has been fixed and where permitting the amendment would cause the trial date to be lost. Parties and the court have a legitimate expectation that trial fixtures will be kept. (vii) Where a very late application to amend is made the correct approach is not that the amendments ought, in general, to be allowed so that the real dispute between the parties can be adjudicated upon. Rather, a heavy burden lies on a party seeking a very late amendment to show the strength of the new case and why justice to him, his opponent and other court users requires him to be able to pursue it. The risk to a trial date may mean that the lateness of the application to amend will of itself cause the balance to be loaded heavily against the grant of permission.”
“23. When considering whether to exercise the discretion to permit an amendment provided by Part 17.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, there are several factors to bear in mind. One of these factors is lateness. Coulson J (as he then was) summarised the relevant authorities on ‘lateness’ in CIP Properties v Galliford Try[2015] EWHC 1345 (TCC) and, for the purposes of this case, explained the following key principles at paragraph 19: “(a) The lateness by which an amendment is produced is a relative concept… An amendment is late if it could have been advanced earlier, or involves the duplication of cost and effort, or if it requires the resisting party to revisit any of the significant steps in the litigation (such as disclosure or the provision of witness statements and expert's reports) which have been completed by the time of the amendment. … (c) The history of the amendment, together with an explanation for its lateness, is a matter for the amending party and is an important factor in the necessary balancing exercise…. In essence, there must be a good reason for the delay. … (f) Prejudice to the amending party if the amendments are not allowed will, obviously, include its inability to advance its amended case, but that is just one factor to be considered... Moreover, if that prejudice has come about by the amending party’s own conduct, then it is a much less important element of the balancing exercise.” (my emphasis) 24. The simple point about lateness is that it calls for an explanation justifying the lateness. That is because an amendment which might otherwise be allowed, could well be refused if its lateness has caused unjustifiable prejudice to the other party. Therefore an explanation is needed in order for the court to work out whether or not it is a case in which, despite the prejudice caused by the lateness, nevertheless the balance comes down in favour of allowing the amendment. 25. Examples of the kinds of prejudice a late amendment might cause were given by Coulson J in CIP Properties at paragraph 19(e): “at one end of the spectrum, the simple fact of being ‘mucked around’ … to the disruption of and additional pressure on their lawyers in the run-up to trial.…, and the duplication of cost and effort…at the other. If allowing the amendments would necessitate the adjournment of the trial, that may be an overwhelming reason to refuse the amendments….”
“50. An appellate court will only interfere with a discretionary evaluation where an appellant can identify one or more of the follows errors: (i) a misdirection in law; (ii) some procedural unfairness or irregularity; (iii) that the Judge took into account irrelevant matters; (iv) that the Judge failed to take account of relevant matters; or (v) that the Judge made a decision which was "plainly wrong". 51. Error type (v)… means a decision which has exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. 52. ...The appellate court’s role is to police a very wide perimeter and it will be rare that a judge who has exercised a discretion having regard to relevant considerations will have come to a conclusion outside that perimeter... It needs to be underlined that an appellate court in an appeal such as the present is exercising aCPR 52.21 (1) “review” power. It is also well-established that the weight to be given to specific factors is a matter for the trial judge and absent some wholly unjustifiable attribution of weight, an appellate court must defer to the trial judge.”