“a controlling stake (50.1%) in SUFC [in return for] the new partner investor committing to provide appropriate sums to efficiently run the business with an emphasis on permitting a higher than budgeted player wage bill in order to aid promotion(s) back to the Premier League within a 3-5 year term”
“we need a formula to ascertain how the rent will be reviewed upon promotion to Championship and Premiership (and relegation)”
“It has been the highlight of my career to serve with you, Kevin, in the chairmanship of the Blades. My departure to serve my country is but for a season. When my duty has been fulfilled, it is my intention to return. Meanwhile, it is my desire to see the Club achieve the goals you and I have set for it. I know you share this intention. I thank you and your sons, Scott and Simon,… for introducing and welcoming me and my family to the Blades family. In the year we have spent together as partners, I have caught the Sheffield United bug and have become a Blade and, as you well know, once a Blade, always a Blade!”
“on so many occasions over the course of the last six months or more, either Scott or myself have made it clear that Scarborough/the Family simply do not have further financial resources available to invest in SUFC. This statement has also been made to Mal to ensure that there is no confusion between the Joint Owners and Management.”
“Now that KM has to inject money into the club it is absolutely clear that he will be actively involved at every level of the club and that he will seek to direct the club in every area in order to protect his investment and to reduce the amount of cash contribution going forward.”
“provided that it was postponed until1st November 2017 ”
“if we don’t agree on the end, will you stick to your promise in Bad Ragaz about accepting to this even if you Don’t agree? [sic]”
“between now and November I will adhere to our debate in Zurich but at the same time do my utmost to convince you that there’s no benefit in spending needless sums in employing so called ‘Experts’ to tell us how to run an English Football Club”
“How much time are you prepared to lose with these awful partners?”
“I suggest Stephen writes to Prince Abdullah and myself confirming that he wishes to step down as CEO as from 31st October but of course retain his position as a Director on the Boards of BLL/SUFC representing SUL.”
“as I believe you’re aware Steve B steps down as an assumed CEO of SUFC as from close of play today. This accords with sensible discussions that Steve and myself have held over a good few weeks/months… Now you’ve settled in very well to your COO duties and responsibilities then as in past months where you need guidance and direction then I’m always to hand and am available in an ‘untitled CEO type role’ to help. So please request Neal Barber to remove him from the payroll as from the end of October.” ii)The following day, Mr Birks replied: “… In order to stop his pay, technically HR need a letter or an email confirming his resignation or otherwise we can be accused of constructive (not that he would) dismissal. Is this possible?” iii) Kevin McCabe responded: “not needed. Speak tomorrow” iv) On6 November 2017 , Mr Tutton emailed Mr Birks, on Kevin McCabe’s instruction, copying in no one else: “further to your telephone request please accept this email, in my capacity as Director of SUFC, and remove Stephen Bettis from the SUFC payroll as from31 October 2017 .”
“I am perplexed by this, why are you dealing with Stephen Bettis since he has stepped down from his CEO role which he has clearly been unable to fulfil since he moved abroad?”
“… should not be triggered at this particularly busy period of the year and critical time for first-team football. Logic says that once the mandate is understood and approved then February would seem to be more appropriate giving Andy and his key people time to prepare.”
“I have to be frank with you, if after what we agreed on our last meeting in London regarding Jan and Deloitte doesn’t start this week, I see it very difficult that we can work on any thing together, I hope both of these things move forward this week.”
“I like Jan… However at SUFC we have a very ‘British cultured’ + ‘Sheffield centric’ football management team… Let matters rest until the end of this season and then we can sensibly readdress.”
“in order for Catherine [Frost] to send out the offer letter to Simon Ratcliffe, we need confirmation of the reporting line please. I have attached the new starter authorisation form but need this information to complete the form…”
“regarding the reporting lines, Simon will have a solid line to UTB (Prince Abdullah) and a dotted line to the CEO. The Investment Agreement mandates only the solid line but I think a dotted line to the CEO is good corporate governance and UTB agrees.”
“you’re a gentleman who certainly lacks grace and has of yet learnt so little as to understanding the business of Sheffield United FC. This in part is emphasised by sending your email to Catherine an employee of the club creating confusion and at the same time besmirching myself… My direction and leadership is always to benefit SUFC and my partner and does not waver as Prince Abdullah recognises.”
“i have had the pleasure of knowing Yusuf for over 20 years, I can honestly from experience say that he has more grace than most of the people I met all my life, he is also a man of his word, classy, intelligent and educated, above all he is a good Muslim, as for our partnership, it is obviously deteriorating to the point I’m afraid it is very difficult to fix, he is only communicating with you via email because meetings as I tried many times is not working, i got your ok in Bad ragaz for Deloitte a few months ago, i met you with you again in London three weeks ago and you gave your word and agreed to Deloitte and Jan and that didn’t happen yet, please be sure that things will not continue as they were before and time will prove that, i will not be writing to you anymore.”
“when a person has integrity, when his word is his bond, a handshake is enough. This is how Prince Abdullah usually operates and it usually serves him quite well. Regrettably, it is no longer how we can do business with you. When a person manipulates facts to serve his purpose, promises one thing and then does another and in general, openly and notoriously flouts the truth, then those around him would be foolish not to put things in writing. We are not foolish people and you have only your own weak grasp on honesty to blame for the fact that we want everything in writing… In short, if you cannot act as a constructive and co-operative partner, we shall likewise stop indulging you in what has proven to be a misguided effort at achieving informal consensus and require that all directions to management be given through formal board processes. If, on reconsideration, you wish to preserve a more harmonious and co-operative working relationship, you will withdraw any objections to the Deloitte mandate and will allow Prince Abdullah to manage Jan [van Winckel]’s retention as a consultant. We do not need you to ‘promote’ anything or be otherwise involved … While I am under no illusion that this will be seen as a welcome or friendly communication, let me close by emphasising that despite your disruptive and frequently malignant behaviour, we, as your partners, have no such instincts. We respect the people you have around you, including Jeremy, Stephen and Martin, while accepting their duty of loyalty to SUL. We bear no animus and seek nothing but the best interests of the Club and the benefit of our bargain for rights under the [ISA]. While we are neither petty nor vindictive, please do not underestimate our resolve. We will take counsel given in good faith from all quarters but we shall no longer tolerate your version of business as usual. ”
“by the way I’m not ‘interfering or meddling’ - my remarks are always meant to help as SUFC’s business is in Sheffield, England not Riyadh, Saudi Arabia where managing people is not best achieved via ‘edicts and resolutions’ produced as if the recipients are subservient. It’s accomplished by adapting to our culture and being present, talking and explaining. To my knowledge Yusuf has only been to Sheffield twice so he cannot possibly have an affiliation with SUFC personnel.”
“the partnership between Prince Abdullah and myself relates to a Football Club that has for 162 years been situated in Sheffield, England. The culture of individuals from the North of England is naturally far different from those based and living in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. We are not subservient people who respond to ‘edicts demands and resolutions’ in a fearful way. The ‘need for change’ rests with you as should always have been apparent to an experienced professional businessman. ”
“… There’s only one issue that for the moment needs to be firmly addressed and thus confirmed by you as Directors of SUFC namely to confirm that Jan van Winckel does not have our approval to sit as a member of the clubs Technical Committee or in any shape or form be employed - directly or as a consultant - by the club. Can I assume you’re all in agreement?”
“if they say they can match we know we should just go for the Texas shoot out at our higher end of£10m – If they cannot match we go in at a much lower price”
“I don’t have instructions from my client. You’ll be notified if and when I do.”
“please be advised that Jones Day will be writing to the directors tomorrow on behalf of UTB LLC responding to Shepherd and Wedderburn’s letter. The position as set out in the Shepherd and Wedderburn letter is not accepted. In the meantime, I am advised that no action should be taken by the board or any individual director on behalf of the board to execute and serve the option notices to which Shepherd and Wedderburn refer in their letter nor should any other precipitous action be taken in this regard. If any such action were to be taken, particularly without the agreement of a majority of the board, I am advised that this would constitute a breach of the duties we have as directors.”
“This Agreement, the documents in the Agreed Form and all agreements entered, or to be entered into, pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or entered into between the parties in writing and expressly referring to this Agreement: 26.1.1 together constitute the entire agreement and understanding between the parties with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement; and 26.1.2 (in relation to such subject matter) supersede all prior discussions, understandings and agreements between the parties and their agents (or any of them) and all prior representations and expressions of opinion by any party (or its agent) to any other party (or its agent). ”
“The Shareholders acknowledge that, in addition to the subscription monies referred to in clause 2.2, the Company may require further finance to fund its and SUFC’s projected cash requirements under the Business Plan. The parties agree that each of [SUL] and [UTB] has the right to subscribe for further shares in the Company for cash at any time, subject to preemption rights on the issue of new shares in the share capital of the Company, provided that the right to do so shall cease for so long as: (i) either Shareholder holds, or will following the issue of such shares hold, 75% or more of the fully diluted share capital; or (ii) Sheffield United football club is in the English Premier League (or any successor thereof).”
“… typically [they] may include one, or probably more, of the following elements: (i) an association formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual confidence – this element will often be found where a preexisting partnership has been converted into a limited company; (ii) an agreement, or understanding, that all, or some (for there may be ‘sleeping’ members), of the shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the business; (iii) restriction upon the transfer of the members’ interest in the company – so that if confidence is lost, or one member is removed from management, he cannot take out his stake and go elsewhere. It is these, and analogous, factors which may bring into play the just and equitable clause… ”
“the just and equitable provision nevertheless comes to his assistance if he can point to, and prove, some special underlying obligation of his fellow member(s) in good faith, or confidence, that so long as the business continues he shall be entitled to management participation, an obligation so basic that, if broken, the conclusion must be that the association must be dissolved”
“ … in order to give rise to an equitable constraint based on ‘legitimate expectation’ what is required is a personal relationship or personal dealings of some kind between the parties seeking to exercise the legal right and the party seeking to restrain such exercise, such as will affect the conscience of the former.”
“… I think that one useful cross-check in a case like this is to ask whether the exercise of the power in question would be contrary to what the parties, by words or conduct, have actually agreed. Would it conflict with the promises which they appear to have exchanged? In Blisset v Daniel the limits were found in the ‘general meaning’ of the partnership articles themselves. In a quasi-partnership company, they will usually be found in the understandings between the members at the time they entered into association. But there may be later promises, by words or conduct, which it would be unfair to allow a member to ignore. Nor is it necessary that such promises should be independently enforceable as a matter of contract. A promise may be binding as a matter of justice and equity although for one reason or another (for example, because in favour of a third party) it would not be enforceable in law.”
“Entire agreement clauses generally provide that they ‘set out the entire agreement between the parties and supersede all proposals and prior agreements, arrangements and understandings between the parties.’ An abbreviated form of the clause is contained in the first two sentences of clause 7.6 of the agreement in issue in this case. Such clauses are commonly coupled (as they are here) with No Oral Modification clauses addressing the position after the contract is made. Both are intended to achieve contractual certainty about the terms agreed, in the case of entire agreement clauses by nullifying prior collateral agreements relating to the same subject-matter. As Lightman J put it in Inntrepreneur Pub Co (GL) v East Crown Ltd[2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 , para 7: ‘The purpose of an entire agreement clause is to preclude a party to a written agreement from threshing through the undergrowth and finding in the course of negotiations some (chance) remark or statement (often long forgotten or difficult to recall or explain) on which to found a claim such as the present to the existence of a collateral warranty. The entire agreement clause obviates the occasion for any such search and the peril to the contracting parties posed by the need which may arise in its absence to conduct such a search. For such a clause constitutes a binding agreement between the parties that the full contractual terms are to be found in the document containing the clause and not elsewhere, and that accordingly any promises or assurances made in the course of the negotiations (which in the absence of such a clause might have effect as a collateral warranty) shall have no contractual force, save insofar as they are reflected and given effect in that document. The operation of the clause is not to render evidence of the collateral warranty inadmissible in evidence as is suggested in Chitty on Contract 28th ed Vol 1 para 12-102: it is to denude what would otherwise constitute a collateral warranty of legal effect.’ 193. ‘if the parties agree that the written contract is to be the entire contract, it is no business of the courts to tell them that they do not mean what they have said.’ Thus in McGrath v Shah(1989) 57 P&CR 452 , 459, John Chadwick QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division) applied an entire agreement clause in a contract for the sale of land, where the clause served the important function of ensuring that the contract was not avoided undersection 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 on the ground that the terms were not all contained in one document. Outside the domain, in some ways rather special, of contracts for the sale of land, in Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemical Corpn v ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd[1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 139 , 168 (Rix J) and(1999) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 387 , para 34 (CA), both Rix J and the Court of Appeal treated the question as one of construction and gave effect to the clause according to its terms. Lightman J did the same in the Inntrepreneur case. Since then, entire agreement clauses have been routinely applied…”
“Equitable considerations, affecting the manner in which legal rights can be exercised, will arise only in those cases where there exist considerations of a personal character between the shareholders which makes it unjust or inequitable to insist on legal rights or to exercise them in a particular way. Typically that will be in the case of a company formed by a small number of individuals on the basis of participation by all or some of them in the management of the company. In my judgment, there is no room for equitable considerations of this kind in the present case. The company was formed by a group of highly sophisticated and experienced business people and investors with a view to the purchase of a well-known group of hotels for a price running into many hundreds of millions of pounds, and to retaining and managing some of those hotels. There was little prior relationship between many of the investors and some were unknown to each other until a few days before the company was formed. More importantly, Articles of Association and a shareholders’ agreement were negotiated and drafted, containing lengthy and complex provisions governing their relations with each other with the company. I find it hard to imagine a case where it would be more inappropriate to overlay on those arrangements equitable considerations of the sort discussed by Lord Wilberforce and Lord Hoffmann.”
“Any variation of this Agreement is valid only if it is in writing and signed by all the parties hereto”
“Under English law a duty of good faith is implied by law as an incident of certain categories of contract, for example contracts of employment and contracts between partners or others whose relationship is characterised as a fiduciary one. I doubt that English law has reached the stage, however, where it is ready to recognise a requirement of good faith as a duty implied by law, even as a default rule, into all commercial contracts. Nevertheless, there seems to me to be no difficulty, following the established methodology of English law for the implication of terms in fact, in implying such a duty in any ordinary commercial contract based on the presumed intention of the parties [131] …. In some commercial contexts the relevant background expectations may extend further to an expectation that the parties will share information relevant to the performance of the contract such that a deliberate omission to disclose such information may amount to bad faith English law has traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between certain relationships – such as partnership, trusteeship and other fiduciary relationships – on the one hand, in which the parties owe owner’s obligations of disclosure to each other, and other contractual relationships in which no duty of disclosure is supposed to operate. Arguably at least, that dichotomy is too simplistic. While it seems unlikely that any duty to disclose information in performance of the contract would be implied where the contract involves a simple exchange, many contracts do not fit this model and involve a longer term relationship between the parties in which they make a substantial commitment. Such ‘relational’ contracts, as they are sometimes called, may require a high degree of communication, cooperation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties’ understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements. Examples of such relational contracts might include some joint venture agreements, franchise agreements and long-term distributorship agreements. [142]”
“[167] It does not follow from the conclusion that he did not owe any fiduciary duties to Mr Kent that the Sheikh’s entitlement to pursue his own self-interest was untrammelled. I have previously suggested in [Yam Seng], at para 142, that it is a mistake to draw a simple dichotomy between relationships which give rise to fiduciary duties and other contractual relationships and to treat the latter as all alike. In particular, I drew attention to a category of contract in which the parties are committed to collaborating with each other, typically on a longterm basis, in ways which respect the spirit and objectives of their venture which they have not tried to specify, and which it may be impossible to specify, exhaustively, in a written contract. Such ‘relational’ contracts involve trust and confidence but of a different kind from that involved in fiduciary relationships. The trust is not in the loyal subordination by one party of its own interests to those of another. It is trust that the other party will act with integrity and in a spirit of cooperation. The legitimate expectations which the law should protect in relationships of this kind are embodied in the normative standard of good faith. [174] In the circumstances the contract made between these parties seems to me to be a classic instance of a relational contract. In my view, the implication of a duty of good faith in the contract is essential to give effect to the parties’ reasonable expectations and satisfies the business necessity test which Lord Neuberger in [Marks and Spencer] at paras 16 to 31 reiterated as the relevant standard for the implication of a term into a contract. I would also reach the same conclusion by applying the test adumbrated by Lord Wilberforce in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1976] A.C. 239 at 254 for the implication of a term in law, on the basis that the nature of the contract as a relational contract implicitly requires (in the absence of a contrary indication) treating it as involving an obligation of good faith.”
“… as seen from the Carewatch Care Services case, an implication of a duty of good faith will only be possible where the language of the contract, viewed against its context, permits it. It is thus not a reflection of a special rule of interpretation for this category of contract.”
“If any Shares held by [UTB] or [SUL] shall at any time be transferred in accordance with the Articles their rights and benefits under this Agreement may be assigned in whole or in part to the transferee of such Shares (without prejudice to the continuing rights and benefits of the transferor under this Agreement, for as long as it continues to hold any Shares, provided always that the transferee shall have executed a deed of adherence in a form agreed between the Shareholders (acting reasonably) and provided further that no party to this Agreement shall have any greater liability to such transferee than it would have had to the transferor as a party to this Agreement. ”
“Q. Did you know anything about that transaction? A. I know that Yusuf [Giansiracusa] will – or, like, my lawyers will find another company or, like, another company, something like this. … Q. Did you apply your mind at all to that transaction? A. No, I know, I trust Yusuf that he will do a good job and he will not fool me or steal money from me anything. Q. No, not the sale to Yusuf; the sale to UTB 2018. A. No, I know he would not, like, whatever number you call the company, he will not make me do something that is not in my interest. Q. No, he said he didn’t know anything about that transaction. I asked him about this. He said he didn’t know anything about that one. A. So how would I know then? Q. Well, who is running this show, Prince Abdullah? Who is making the decision to transfer 40% of Blades from UTB to UTB 2018? Whose decision was that? A. Did you ask Yusuf? Q. Yes. A. Okay, so I’m sure you gave a better answer – Q. No, he didn’t know about that transaction. A. Okay. Q. Whose decision was that? A. If Yusuf does not know, how would I know? … So I’m sure it was, that if I have to guess, it will be Jones Day. Q. Jones day made the decision? A. No, I mean, if you… I leave all things to yourself, so I don’t remember at the time I have another lawyer, I’m sure I did not have any other lawyer to consult. Q. So all that you can say is that you don’t know anything about this transaction? A. No, I left everything to Yusuf and I did not have any lawyer that I was – like, to lawyers representing me; it was only Yusuf.”
“Q. … Finally, the transfer from UTB to UTB 2018, the shares that were being transferred had an implied value of£4 million did they not?£3 million for 30%,£4 million for 40%? A. Okay. Q. On that basis. Was there any contract drawn up to govern that transfer? A. I didn’t handle that part of the transaction. Q. The consideration on the face of the stock transfer form is£1 . Do you know whether that£1 was ever paid? A. No, I wasn’t involved. Q. So you don’t have any evidence about that transaction at all? A. I wasn’t involved, I have nothing – ”
“Under existing law a resulting trust arises in two sets of circumstances: (A) where A makes a voluntary payment to B or pays (wholly or in part) for the purchase of property which is vested either in B alone or in the joint names of A and B, there is a presumption that A did not intend to make a gift to B: the money or property is held on trust for A (if he is the sole provider of the money) or in the case of a joint purchase by A and B in shares proportionate to their contributions. It is important to stress that this is only a presumption, which presumption is easily rebutted either by the counterpresumption of advancement or by direct evidence of A’s intention to make an outright transfer… ”
“For property other than land, the general law about the presumption of resulting trust applies unmodified. On a voluntary transfer of personal property the transferee is presumed to hold on a resulting trust for the transferor unless the presumption of advancement applies or the transferor is proved to have had an actual intention to make the transferee the beneficial owner of the property. Where the voluntary transfer is made by a husband, father or other person in loco parentis the presumption of advancement will apply.”
“[87]…The general rule at common law is that if one party has made a mistake as to the terms of the contract and that mistake is known to the other party, then the contract is not binding. The reasoning is that although the parties appear, objectively, to have agreed terms, it is clear that they are not in agreement. Therefore the normal rule of looking only at the objective agreement of the parties is displaced and the court admits evidence to show what each side subjectively intended to agree by way of terms. If it is clear from such evidence that there was not consensus, then there can be no contract, because the parties have not truly agreed on the terms. Some of the cases talk of such a contract being “void”, but I think it is clearer to say that there was never a contract at all. [88] However, if one party has made a mistake about a fact on which he bases his decision to enter into the contract, but that fact does not form a term of the contract itself then, even if the other party knows that the first is mistaken as to this fact, the contract will be binding. That was the effect of the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench on appeal from the County Court in Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597, see particularly at page 603 per Cockburn CJ, and page 607 per Blackburn J. The correctness of that decision and the analysis in it has never been doubted. ”
“[103] … The Court of Appeal reiterated the rule that a contract would only be held void at common law by reason of common mistake if the mistake of both sides concerned a fundamental assumption of a state of affairs (positive or negative) and the mistake rendered performance of the essence of the obligation impossible. [104] The Court of Appeal also considered whether there was any equitable principle which widened the circumstances in which a court could rescind a contract for common mistake when the common law would hold it was binding. The court declared that there was no jurisdiction to grant rescission of a contract on the ground of common mistake where that contract is valid and enforceable according to ordinary principles of contract law: para 157. [105] With respect to Andrew Smith J, I must disagree with his conclusion that there is an equitable jurisdiction to grant rescission of a contract where one party has made a unilateral mistake as to a fact or state of affairs which is the basis upon which the terms of the contract are agreed, but that assumption does not become a term of the contract. None of the cases he cites… is authority for the existence of that jurisdiction. The Great Peace decision strongly suggests that there is no such jurisdiction in the case of a unilateral mistake. If there is no such jurisdiction in the case of a common mistake, I fear I am unable to see how, in logic, one can devise a rationale for an equitable jurisdiction in the case of a unilateral mistake, at least where there has been no misrepresentation by the other party.”
“We would not have called for their shares at all if we had any knowledge whatsoever that they would seek to perform a purported manoeuvre so as to seek to evade the Property Call Option”
“I think I should sign for Blades and Scott or you sign for SUFC. At this stage I’m not going to bother with asking any questions about who the lender is unless you are particular, but a little KYC is called for I’d hate for Sheffield Star headlines BLades launder money for extremists. Please no.”
“J Get it done! Let’s have them in our cage.”
“it’s abundantly clear that CEO duties are impossible to administer for an organisation – SUFC – that operates only from one location namely Sheffield… Within two months Andy will be fully in the “pound seat” where in the interim he of course receives direct guidance (not interference) from Scott, Simon and myself…”
“Basically, the guy is a bully and a blowhard. I think standing up to him continues to be the best strategy”
“The only question is should we take more calls like this from him? I say we save our time and money and run everything through the board, do you agree?”
“I have to be frank with you, if after what we agreed on our last meeting in London regarding Jan [van Winckel] and Deloitte doesn’t start this week, I see it very difficult that we can work on any thing together, I hope both of these things move forward this week.”
“You’re a gentleman who certainly lacks grace”
“As they say ‘water off a duck’s back’”
“It rests with yourself and not myself to sort out these issues which like it or not are disrupting a Sheffield Institution who’s roots began in 1855”
“Of course HRH will be copied in”
“If the court is satisfied that a petition under this Part is well founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of.”
“It seems to me that it would be wrong for the court to travel outside the allegations in the petition, particularly in a case of this sort where the petition is based on the proposition that the respondents to it have been guilty of some oppression or lack of probity.”
“Many issues were explored in evidence and submissions have been made on them, but the parties’ cases are defined by their pleadings. This is of particular importance to proceedings under s994 of the 2006 Act. The breadth of the jurisdiction means that the petition plays, in my judgment, a vital role in defining the basis of the petitioner’s case. This is not a question of taking technical pleading points. The petition must be read sensibly. But it does mean that the grounds on which the petitioner says the affairs of the company have been conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner should be fairly set out in the petition. Only in this way will the respondents be able properly to meet the case and the court to be able to keep the proceedings within manageable bounds…”
“I better understand the influence HRH has to ‘force’ a possible transaction involving Sela Sports and their prospective investors … all very friendly and the association with HRH excellent – to ‘make it happen’ rests with him using his influence and his position of authority”