“a. whether Re W assessments should be directed in respect of either / both of the older non-subject siblings for participation in the fact-finding hearing; b. which allegations made by both parties should proceed to be determined at the fact-finding hearing; c. which witnesses proposed by both parties should give evidence at the fact-finding hearing; d. the time estimate of the fact-finding hearing; and e. any participation directions for the fact-finding hearing, including as it relates to prevention of cross-examination in person.”
“...the fact that one is in a family case sailing under the comforting colours of child protection is not a reason to afford to unsatisfactory evidence a weight greater than it can properly bear. That is in nobody's interests, least of all the children.”
"The credibility of a witness depends on his knowledge of the facts, his intelligence, his disinterestedness, his integrity, his veracity. Proportionate to these is the degree of credit his testimony deserves from the court or jury. Amongst the more obvious matters affecting the weight of a witness's evidence may be classed his means of knowledge, opportunities of observation, reasons for recollection or belief, experience, powers of memory and perception, and any special circumstances affecting his competency to speak to the particular case—all of which may be inquired into either in direct examination to enhance, or in cross-examination to impeach the value of his testimony."
“[100] One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the ‘lie’ is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane's judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is "capable of amounting to a corroboration". In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.”
“To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a reation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.”
“It is of course elementary that one should put to one side any notion that an unwillingness to place reliance on a child’s evidence of sexual abuse necessarily imputes bad faith to the child, its parents or any other interrogator. What the research has thrown into stark relief is quite simply that very young children do not appear to have the Same clear boundaries between fact and fantasy as that which adults have learned to draw”
“…Painful past experience has taught that the greatest care needs to be taken if the risk of obtaining unreliable evidence is to be minimised. Children are often poor historians. They are likely to view interviewers as authority figures. Many are suggestible. Many more wish to please. They do not express themselves clearly or in adult terms, so that what they say can easily be misinterpreted if the listeners are not scrupulous to avoid jumping to conclusions. They may not have understood what was said or done to them or in their presence.”
“[16] While everyone knows that memory is fallible, I do not believe that the legal system has sufficiently absorbed the lessons of a century of psychological research into the nature of memory and the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. One of the most important lessons of such research is that in everyday life we are not aware of the extent to which our own and other people's memories are unreliable and believe our memories to be more faithful than they are. Two common (and related) errors are to suppose: (1) that the stronger and more vivid is our feeling or experience of recollection, the more likely the recollection is to be accurate; and (2) that the more confident another person is in their recollection, the more likely their recollection is to be accurate. [17] Underlying both these errors is a faulty model of memory as a mental record which is fixed at the time of experience of an event and then fades (more or less slowly) over time. In fact, psychological research has demonstrated that memories are fluid and malleable, being constantly rewritten whenever they are retrieved. This is true even of so-called 'flashbulb' memories, that is memories of experiencing or learning of a particularly shocking or traumatic event. (The very description 'flashbulb' memory is in fact misleading, reflecting as it does the misconception that memory operates like a camera or other device that makes a fixed record of an experience.) External information can intrude into a witness's memory, as can his or her own thoughts and beliefs, and both can cause dramatic changes in recollection. Events can come to be recalled as memories which did not happen at all, or which happened to someone else (referred to in the literature as a failure of source memory).”
“A mere lawyer has to approach such matters with care, conscious that nothing is certain, and to pay close regard to the evidence in the specific case or cases, without being drawn into taking sides on the more general debate.”
“The signs of child abuse might not always be obvious, and a child might not tell anyone what is happening to them. You should therefore question behaviours if something seems unusual and try to speak to the child, alone, if appropriate, to seek further information”
“If a child reports, following a conversation you have initiated or otherwise, that they are being abused and neglected, you should listen to them, take their allegation seriously, and reassure them that you will take action to keep them safe.”
“We would emphasise the importance of listening carefully to the initial presentation of information and taking careful notes”
“There is no question of this evidence being inadmissible for failure to comply with the ABE guidelines, and that has not been suggested in argument for either parent. In a family case evidence of this kind falls to be assessed, however unsatisfactory its origin. To hold otherwise would be to invest the guidelines with the status of the law of evidence and it would invite the question: which failures have the consequence of inadmissibility? Clearly some failures to follow the guidelines will reduce, but by no means eliminate, value of the evidence. Others may reduce the value almost to vanishing point.”
“215. I want at this stage to say a further word about fact-finding. It is an art, not a technique. Like every worthwhile art, it is, of course, underpinned by technique and science. …Reliability is and remains the lodestar of fact-finding, and that, as we have seen, is underpinned by techniques of investigation and the science of reasoning. The art, however, goes further. A lack of reliability may obscure truth, but it does not altogether eliminate its perception. So long as the judge remains alert to the dangers arising from unreliability and exercises the caution due to that, it may be possible to discern flashes of truth or incidents that have about them the ring of truth. Where the judge meets that, and having exercised all due caution, is convinced of it, then the court has not only the right but the duty to act upon it. I make this comment because these allegations of sexual assault, coming uncorroborated from very damaged young people, as is the case here, are just those where what I have described may indeed occur… The court, of course, can only travel where in conscience the evidence leads. Quite often the evidence does not, indeed cannot, answer every question in the case. That of itself is not unusual, even if the starkness of the unknowing is not usually quite so evident as it is here.”
"'domestic abuse' includes any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality. This can encompass, but is not limited to, psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or emotional abuse. Domestic abuse also includes culturally specific forms of abuse including, but not limited to, forced marriage, honour-based violence, dowry-related abuse and transnational marriage abandonment; 'coercive behaviour' means an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim; 'controlling behaviour' means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by soliciting them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour." …………………………………….. “29. As can be seen at paragraph 27 above, central to the modern definitions of domestic abuse is the concept of coercive and/or controlling behaviour. Shortly before the hearing of these appeals, Mr Justice Hayden handed down judgment in F v M[2021] EWFC 4 . The judgment followed a two-week fact-finding hearing of domestic abuse allegations centred on coercive and/or controlling behaviour. The arrival of Hayden J's judgment was timely. All parties commended it to the court for its comprehensive and lucid analysis, and for the plea contained within it urging greater prominence to be given to coercive and controlling behaviour in Family Court proceedings. The parties' endorsement of the judgment in F v M is, in our view, fully justified. It is helpful to set out one of the central paragraphs from Hayden J's judgment here: "4. In November 2017, M [the mother] applied for and was granted a non-molestation order against F [the father]. That order has been renewed and remains effective. The nature of the allegations included in support of the application can succinctly and accurately be summarised as involving complaints of 'coercive and controlling behaviour' on F's part. In the Family Court, that expression is given no legal definition. In my judgement, it requires none. The term is unambiguous and needs no embellishment. Understanding the scope and ambit of the behaviour however, requires a recognition that 'coercion' will usually involve a pattern of acts encompassing, for example, assault, intimidation, humiliation and threats. 'Controlling behaviour' really involves a range of acts designed to render an individual subordinate and to corrode their sense of personal autonomy. Key to both behaviours is an appreciation of a 'pattern' or 'a series of acts', the impact of which must be assessed cumulatively and rarely in isolation. There has been very little reported case law in the Family Court considering coercive and controlling behaviour. I have taken the opportunity below, to highlight the insidious reach of this facet of domestic abuse. My strong impression, having heard the disturbing evidence in this case, is that it requires greater awareness and, I strongly suspect, more focused training for the relevant professionals." 30. Whilst the facts found in F v M may be towards the higher end of the spectrum of coercive or controlling behaviour, their essential character is not, and will be all too familiar to those who have been the victim of this form of domestic abuse, albeit to a lesser degree or for a shorter time. The judgment of Hayden J in F v M (which should be essential reading for the Family judiciary) is of value both because of the illustration that its facts provide of what is meant by coercive and controlling behaviour, but also because of the valuable exercise that the judge has undertaken in highlighting at paragraph 60 the statutory guidance published by the Home Office pursuant toSection 77 (1) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 which identified paradigm behaviours of controlling and coercive behaviour. That guidance is relevant to the evaluation of evidence in the Family Court. 31. The circumstances encompassed by the definition of 'domestic abuse' inPD12J fully recognise that coercive and/or controlling behaviour by one party may cause serious emotional and psychological harm to the other members of the family unit, whether or not there has been any actual episode of violence or sexual abuse. In short, a pattern of coercive and/or controlling behaviour can be as abusive as or more abusive than any particular factual incident that might be written down and included in a schedule in court proceedings (see 'Scott Schedules' at paragraph 42 -50). It follows that the harm to a child in an abusive household is not limited to cases of actual violence to the child or to the parent. A pattern of abusive behaviour is as relevant to the child as to the adult victim. The child can be harmed in any one or a combination of ways for example where the abusive behaviour: i) Is directed against, or witnessed by, the child; ii) Causes the victim of the abuse to be so frightened of provoking an outburst or reaction from the perpetrator that she/he is unable to give priority to the needs of her/his child; iii) Creates an atmosphere of fear and anxiety in the home which is inimical to the welfare of the child; iv) Risks inculcating, particularly in boys, a set of values which involve treating women as being inferior to men. 32. It is equally important to be clear that not all directive, assertive, stubborn or selfish behaviour, will be 'abuse' in the context of proceedings concerning the welfare of a child; much will turn on the intention of the perpetrator of the alleged abuse and on the harmful impact of the behaviour. We would endorse the approach taken by Peter Jackson LJ in Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal)[2017] EWCA Civ 2121 (paragraph 61) : "
“The Mother spoke about the recent updates regarding D’s funeral her Solicitors shared the information of this with The Father and a separate ceremony has been arranged for The Father and his family on the morning of redacted date . The Mother spoke of “feeling guilty and like I have failed D by allowing this to happen”
“I have deliberately forgotten some of my childhood, I’ve blocked it out…” and “C said his mother has helped him remember things as he has grown older.”
“I asked D about the current pattern of time she spent with each parent, she said “I am happy, it works well, I know I don’t want to spend any less time with dad, but also an extra night, like the Wednesday night on the alternate week would be a good idea.”…”
“I wonder if you have time to chat with me about this case. I am very worried about the children’s emotional wellbeing, and increasingly concerned about mother’s actions. I think the father may withdraw his application due to the pressure he is feeling and the worries his has about D’s mental health (it is reported she is self harming). But this will leave the children without a relationship with their father and paternal family, which up to a few weeks ago they were telling me they wanted. D in her CDA assessment dated10 May 2022 stated “Mum and dad divorced 2 years ago, dad “wasn’t nice to mum physically and emotionally”