“(a) all of [GHI’s] bank, building society or similar accounts with a balance exceeding US$50,000 , wherever they may be in the world, whether in its own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the name(s) in which such account is held, the name of the bank, building society or other entity, the address of the branch at which the account is held, the number of the account, and the balance of the account; (b) all other assets located outside Morocco exceeding US$50,000 in value whether in its own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets; (c) all other assets located in Morocco exceeding US$75,000 in value whether in its own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and, details of all such assets.”
“The mental element required of a contemnor is not that he either intends to breach or knows that he is breaching the court order or undertaking, but only that he intended the act or omission in question, and knew the facts which made it a breach of the order.”
“Committal proceedings are an appropriate way, albeit as a last resort, of seeking to obtain the compliance by a party with the court’s order (including undertakings contained in orders), and they are also an appropriate means of bringing to the court’s attention serious rather than technical, still less involuntary, breaches of them. In my judgment the court should, in the exercise of its case management powers be astute to detect cases in which contempt proceedings are not being pursued for those legitimate ends. Indications that contempt proceedings are not so being pursued include applications relating to purely technical contempt, applications not directed at the obtaining of compliance with the order in question, and applications which, on the face of the documentary evidence, have no real prospect of success. Committal proceedings of that type are properly to be regarded as an abuse of process, and the court should lose no time in putting an end to them, so that the parties may concentrate their time and resources on the resolution of the underlying dispute between them.”
“I cannot say I think that the undertakings contained in the order were clearly drawn and I cannot say I regard the questions of construction involved in them as entirely easy questions, but, in my judgment, a Defendant cannot be committed for contempt on the ground that upon one of two possible constructions of an undertaking being given he has broken his undertaking. For the purpose of relief of this character I think the undertaking must be clear and the breach must be clear beyond all question.”
“Even if Mr. Hadkinson had committed breaches of the freezing order, was it correct in all the circumstances to treat him as in contempt of court? This is a question of mixed law and fact. The basic principle in the civil law of contempt is that, although there is an obligation to comply strictly with the terms of an order, the court will only punish a person for contempt of court upon adequate proof that the terms of the order are clear and unambiguous and that he has broken those terms: Iberian Trust Ltd. v. Founders Trust and Investment Co. Ltd. [1932] 2 K.B. 87, 95, recently applied in Reg. v. City of London Magistrates' Court, Ex parte Green [1997] 3 All E.R. 551, 558G.”
“An interlocutory injunction, like any other injunction, must be expressed in terms which are clear and certain. The injunction must define precisely what acts are prohibited. The court must ensure that the language of its order makes plain what is permitted and what is prohibited. This is a well-established, soundly-based principle. A person should not be put at risk of being in contempt of court by an ambiguous prohibition, or a prohibition the scope of which is obviously open to dispute.”
“…if it is clear as a matter of law that the particulars of the offence specified in the indictment cannot, even if established, support a conviction for the offence of which the defendant is accused, a conviction of such an offence must be regarded as unsafe.”
“XXXIII Mode of enforcing Writs of Injunction against Corporations. Writs of Injunction against a Corporation may be enforced either by Attachment against the Directors or Other Officers thereof, as in the Case of a mandamus, or by a writ of Sequestration against their Property and Effects, to be issued in such Form and tested and returnable in like Manner as Writs of Sequestration issuing out of the Court of Chancery.”
“The inherent power of the judges of the High Court to commit for contempt of court has existed from time immemorial.”
“My Lords, the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts of record to ensure the effective administration of justice by punishing contempt of court has been developed by the common law over centuries. It is as essential as it is ancient, for unless litigants can be assured that the rights which it is the duty of the courts to protect can be fairly determined and effectively protected and enforced the system of justice necessarily ceases to command confidence and an essential foundation of the structure of civilised society is undermined.”
“With respect to enforcing a peremptory mandamus against a corporation aggregate, the law seems to be to the following effect. Where the corporation at large have the power and duty to perform the act in question, the writ is directed against the corporation by its name of incorporation, and may be enforced by attachment against those members who actually, at a corporate meeting, voted against obeying the writ; or, who having been duly summoned, stayed away from such meeting without adequate excuse.”
“7. A judgment requiring any person to do any act other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing anything, may be enforced by writ of attachment, or by committal. 31. Any judgment or order against a Corporation wilfully disobeyed may, by leave of the Court or a Judge, be enforced by sequestration against the corporate property, or by attachment against the directors or other officers thereof, or by writ of sequestration against their property.”
“(4) There must be indorsed on the copy of an order served under this rule a notice informing the person on whom the copy is served—(a) in the case of service under paragraph (2), that if he neglects to obey the order within the time specified therein, or, if the order is to abstain from doing an act, that if he disobeys the order, he is liable to process of execution to compel him to obey it, and (b) in the case of service under paragraph (3), that if the body corporate neglects to obey the order within the time so specified or, if the order is to abstain from doing an act, that if the body corporate disobeys the order, he is liable to process of execution to compel the body to obey it.”
“In our view where a company is ordered not to do certain acts or gives an undertaking to like effect and a director of that company is aware of the order or undertaking he is under a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the order or undertaking is obeyed, and if he wilfully fails to take those steps and the order or undertaking is breached he can be punished for contempt. We use the word "wilful" to distinguish the situation where the director can reasonably believe some other director or officer is taking those steps.”
“There must however be some culpable conduct on the part of the director before he will be liable to be subject to an order of committal under Ord. 45, r. 5; mere inactivity is not sufficient.”
“If there has been a failure to supervise or investigate or wilful blindness on the part of a director of a company his conduct can be regarded as being wilful and Ord. 45, r. 5 can apply.”
“he failed to take adequate and continuing steps to ensure that those to whom he delegated the handling of matters which fell within the scope of the order and undertaking had not forgotten or misunderstood or overlooked the obligations imposed upon them.”
“This Part sets out the procedure in respect of – (a) contempt of court…”
“This Part is concerned only with procedure and does not itself confer upon the court the power to make an order for- (a) committal; (b) sequestration; or (c) the imposition of a fine for contempt of court”
“81.4-(1) If a person- (a) required by a judgment or order to do an act does not do it by the time fixed by the judgment or order; or (b) disobeys a judgment or order not to do an act then, subject to the debtors Act 1869 and 1876 and to the provisions of these Rules, the judgment or order may be enforced by an order for committal …. (3) If the person referred to in paragraph (1) is a company or other corporation, the committal order may be made against any director or other officer of that company or corporation.”
“81.20 (1)-If- (a) a person required by a judgment or order to do an act does not do it by the time fixed by the judgment or order; or (b) Disobeys a judgment or order not to do an act then, subject to the provisions of these Rules, and if the court permits, the judgment or order may be enforced by a writ of sequestration against the property of that person made against any director or other officer of that company or corporation. (3) If the person referred to in paragraph (1) is a company or other corporation, the writ of sequestration may be made against any director or other officer of that company or corporation.”
“32. …….CPR rr 81.3 and 81.4(1)(3) are not provisions in a criminal statute or Regulation but are a vehicle and a mechanism for the court’s disciplinary powers over corporate contemnors which are undoubtedly subject to its jurisdiction, in this case because they have instituted proceedings in it. Although a corporation is a legal entity distinct from its members, it is only capable of acting by its agents. … 33. It was because, absent a power over the directors and officers of companies which disobey orders of the court, the court’s disciplinary powers over them would be significantly weakened, that a policy decision was taken to, in the words of Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt, 4th ed (2011), para 12-116, “exert pressure” on those who have accepted responsibility by virtue of their offices in the company. For a director or officer to be liable, it is necessary to show that he or she knew of and was responsible for the company’s breach of the court order, undertaking to the court, or other contempt: see Attorney General for Tuvalu v Philatelic Distribution Corpn Ltd[1990] 1 WLR 926 , 938; Sectorguard plc v Dienne plc[2009] EWHC 2693 (Ch) at [42]; Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Co SAL [2011] Bus LR D55, para 40(2); and Westminster City Council v Addbins Ltd [2013] JPL 654, paras 50-54.”
“(2) This Part does not alter the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of courts determining contempt proceedings, whether inherent, statutory or at common law. (3) This Part has effect subject to and to the extent that it is consistent with the substantive law of contempt of court.”
“penal notice means a prominent notice on the front of the order warning that if the person against whom the order is made (and in the case of a corporate body, a director or officer of that body) disobeys the court’s order, the person (director or officer) may be held in contempt of court and punished by a fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets or other punishment under the law.”
“Part 81 as it was in force immediately before1 October 2020 continues to have effect for the purposes of rule 83.2A, but only insofar as rule 83.2A provides for enforcement by means of a writ of sequestration in cases where no proceedings for contempt of court are brought.”
“……an application for permission to issue a writ of sequestration must be made in accordance with Part 81 and in particular Section 7 of that Part.”
“Rules of Court setting out procedures for contempt of court proceedings are drafted against the background of substantive law relating to liability for contempt, to the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain contempt applications, and to the power of the courts to punish for contempt (both for punitive and coercive purposes). Such relevant law is found in case law and statute, which together form an extensive and complicated body of law, and not in rules of court, which are confined to matters of practice and procedure. Frequently, for purposes of exposition, it is convenient if not necessary for rules of court to declare, recite or acknowledge (expressly or impliedly) aspects of the relevant substantive law. By so doing, the erroneous impression can be created that the legal basis for the substantive law is the rule … Rule 81.2.(1) issues the necessary corrective.”
“the true issue, and the only material issue, is whether the Court’s jurisdiction to make orders for committal in respect of breaches of court orders by companies against the companies’ directors, is inherent, and/or is based on pre-existing statutory or common law, independently of the formerCPR 81.4 . In which case the purpose ofCPR 81.4 was merely to serve as a reminder of the existing law. If so, the repeal ofCPR 81.4 would leave that jurisdiction unaffected. But if it is not, the repeal ofCPR 81.4 will have removed the sole basis in law for that jurisdiction.”
“37. In deciding what sentence to impose for a contempt of court, the judge has to weigh and assess a number of factors. This court is reluctant to interfere with decisions of that nature, and will generally only do so if the judge: (i) made an error of principle; (ii) took into account immaterial factors or failed to take into account material factors; or (iii) reached a decision which was plainly wrong in that it was outside the range of decisions reasonably open to the judge. See Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd[2007] EWCA Civ 101 , at paras 35–36, Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc[2007] EWCA Civ 1260 ;[2008] 1 WLR 748 , at para 16, Stuart v Goldberg Linde[2008] EWCA Civ 2 ;[2008] 1 WLR 823 , at paras 76 and 81 and the very recent decision of this court in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Zafar[2019] EWCA 392 (Civ), at para 44. 38. It follows from that approach that there will be few cases in which a contemnor will be able successfully to challenge a sentence as being excessive. If however this court is satisfied that the sentence was “wrong” on one of the above grounds, it will reverse the decision below and either remit the case to the judge for further consideration of sanction or substitute its own decision.”