“7. Any decision made by the Tribunal under the Act (‘decision’ includes an exercise of discretion) can be appealed. An appeal seeks to have the Tribunal’s decision reversed, set aside or varied. A party who files an appeal will become the ‘appellant’ in the ensuing appeal and the other party becomes the ‘respondent’ to that appeal. If both parties file appeals, this will give rise to cross-appeals in which each party becomes the appellant in relation to their own appeal and the respondent in relation to the appeal of the other party. There are two possible routes of appeal which are: - to the ‘Appointed Person’ (a person appointed by the Lord Chancellor to hear and decide appeals, and who meets the eligibility set out in the Act) or - to the High Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Court of Session in Scotland If a decision of the Tribunal is appealed, the implementation of the decision will be suspended until the appeal process has been concluded (POINT FOUR Trade Mark BL O/373/02).” (Emphasis supplied. The reference to “POINT FOUR” is explained below.)
“Thank you for your e-mail. We write further to the below for Shenzhen SKE Technology Co Limited. Please kindly note that the judge’s order, which we attach again for ease, includes a deadline of 25 July 2025to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal at paragraph 4. We therefore respectfully request that no registry updates are effected at present. We will update the Tribunal in due course at that deadline. Please let us know if you have any questions.”
“On behalf of Shenzhen SKE, we respectfully disagree. Our client presently intends to appeal the Order to which Brandsmiths refer. Paragraph 4 of the order specifies a deadline of 25 July 2025to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal. Consequently, trade mark application No. 3786148 CRYSTAL BAR should not be registered until after either permission to appeal is refused, or, if it is granted, the final determination of any appeal. As the UKIPO Tribunal is aware and both parties shall agree, the fundamental issue is the status of the UK trade mark application No. 3786148 CRYSTAL BAR. The UKIPO hearing decision (decision no. BL O/1063/24) found the mark should be registered. The appeal to the High Court was only to challenge this finding. Although the High Court decision ([2025] EWHC 1629 (Ch) ) dismissed the challenge, the High Court order in paragraph 4 has provided a period of 21 days for the parties to challenge both the High Court’s dismissal and the UKIPO’s decision on the status of the UK trade mark application No. 3786148 CRYSTAL BAR. Allowing the UK trade mark application No. 3786148 CRYSTAL BAR to be registered effectively deprives the parties’ legal rights to appeal under paragraph 4 of the court order. The status of the UK trade mark application No. 3786148 CRYSTAL BAR is not confirmed full or final. The UKIPO is under a public duty to maintain the register of trade marks ensuring they are as accurate as possible. Should the UKIPO proceed to register this mark but later the court decides that the mark should not be registered and the UKIPO has to cancel the registration, it will be wasting the UKIPO’s time. Innocent third parties who rely on the UKIPO’ register during that period may also be misled by the status of the UK trade mark application No. 3786148 CRYSTAL BAR. This will cause significant injustice to the parties involved and the general public.”
“The wording of the Order was agreed by the parties in advance of it being finalised and handed down by the High Court. If SKE/Stobbs wanted the registration of the mark to be dependent or contingent “until after either permission to appeal is refused, or, if it is granted, the final determination of any appeal”, they should have made this clear at the appropriate time and suggested amendments to the wording of the Order to be agreed and finalised in advance of it being handed down, but this did not happen. Paragraph 2 of the Order states that “UK trade mark application no. 3786148 shall proceed to registration”
“On a final point, we are extremely concerned that Stobbs is attempting to mislead the Tribunal and interfere with the due administration of justice by seeking to call into question a mandatory Order from a High Court judge (and in doing so ignoring the express provisions of the CPR which it has not brought to the IPO’s / Tribunal’s attention). We will be writing to Stobbs regarding this under separate cover.”
“The central question to the UKIPO is whether the mark is registered or not. It is our position that the mark is not registered because the decision is pending for appeal. Brandsmiths’ submissions are also alluding to this point. It states ‘Should a court later decide that the mark should not be registered, the UKIPO can rectify the register, as in any other case’. They agree that the court could still decide that the mark should not be registered. We note that Brandsmiths will write to us separately on this issue. We welcome it, so the UKIPO does not need to be involved until the Order is clarified. We will seek Brandsmiths’ agreement to vary the Order, and if not given, apply to the court to vary the Order.”
“57 As I have already noted, once SKE had applied to vary the order and had sought leave to appeal, Stobbs wrote to the IPO to request that the status of the trade mark application remain unchanged until the court had decided upon both of those applications. 58 SKE’s request – to leave the register unchanged until routes of appeal have been exhausted – is one that, in broad terms, is very familiar to the IPO Tribunal and to its users. It arises from the long-standing practice set out in Planet Epos Ltd v Nettec Solutions Ltd(“POINT FOUR”) BL O/373/02. [ … ] 62 Paragraph 15 of a witness statement dated19 August 2025 from a Stobbs representative refers to the Registrar’s established practice and to POINT FOUR. It says that ‘It was not understood or appreciated that the wording of paragraph 2 of the Court’s Order would have the effect of overriding this usual practice or was intended to have this effect’. It also contends that the Registrar’s practice ‘would include any subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court’, pointing to section 7 of the Manual of Trade Marks Practice concerning Tribunal appeals. 63 BBL made some submissions on these points in their correspondence to the IPO of 21 and27 August 2025 . They pointed to the qualification made in POINT FOUR that the Registrar’s action was suspended ‘unless there is a direction to the contrary’, and contended that it applied in this case – since the order provided an ‘unequivocal direction for registration’. Second, they said that the Manual and flow chart within it did not support the POINT FOUR practice when it came to orders from the court. Third, they suggested that the POINT FOUR practice was seemingly contrary toCPR rule 52.16 . 64 I deal with the Manual and practice point first. Statements in the Manual or other IPO guidance are of course not binding. Nevertheless, as a statement of current practice section 7 of the Tribunals section of the Manual seems entirely clear. It says that, if a decision of the Tribunal is appealed, ‘the implementation of the decision will be suspended until the appeal process has been concluded’ (my emphasis). The flow chart which follows sets out the two appeal routes, and shows that the court route may not be concluded until the Supreme Court is reached. Thus in my view the Manual gives clear guidance that the Tribunal applies the POINT FOUR practice at all levels of appeal. 65 Even if I am wrong and the Manual is not clear, it is nevertheless the Tribunal’s practice. It took that approach in this case. At first instance, once the hearing officer had decided that the mark could proceed to registration, the Registrar held off from registering the mark, pending any appeal to the High Court, and then did not act to register the mark during the appeal proceedings. The Registrar then enquired about the appeal outcome, continued to leave the register unchanged, and asked SKE to confirm whether permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal had been sought. 66 SKE’s request that the register remain unchanged until the outstanding court applications had been decided was, in my view, consistent with current and longstanding Tribunal practice. I am not aware that the practice has been challenged until now, which I suspect is because one of two situations usually occurs. 67 One is that any court order caters explicitly for the appeal period and any possibility of further appeal. Doing so leaves the parties, the Registrar and the wider public in a welcome position of certainty and transparency, and there is much to be said for it. 68 The other is that, absent any such provision in an order, the parties are nevertheless, out of practicality or pragmatism or for some other reason, content to await the end of the appeal period before seeking to have the register changed. 69 Since neither of those two situations applies in this case, it raises the question of whether the POINT FOUR practice should apply only to an appeal from a decision of the Registrar, or should continue to apply more generally upon any further appeal. 70 The practical issues caused by updating the register based on a decision where an appeal is still possible apply equally at any level of decision and appeal. Those issues go to the points that SKE noted about the duty of the Registrar to maintain an accurate register and the adverse impacts of registering and then potentially reversing a registration. 71 I share those concerns. It is clearly unsatisfactory for rights to come on and off the register, leaving third parties and the wider public in a position of considerable uncertainty. Having rights appear and disappear (or vice versa) may raise significant questions over the status of infringing acts, and third party terms may be needed to regularise the position of parties. It may also lead to considerable uncertainty in proceedings where the existence of earlier registered rights is relied upon. 72 However, despite the practical concerns, I conclude that POINT FOUR does not establish that the Registrar can leave the register unchanged in light of a court order.”
“33 As I explained in my main decision at paragraphs 64 to 66, SKE’s request that the register remain unchanged until the court applications had been decided was consistent with current and long-standing Tribunal practice and with the guidance in the Manual of Trade Marks Practice. I further noted that I was not aware that the practice had been challenged previously. 34 Given this, it seems highly likely that – had BBL not raised the point – the Tribunal would have followed its existing practice. My main decision notes that the Registrar initially took the usual steps. Tribunal staff enquired about the appeal outcome, continued to leave the register unchanged, and asked SKE to confirm whether permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal had been sought. 35 This is the long-standing practice which SKE were, in the event, arguing should be maintained. I do not see how SKE’s submissions to the Tribunal can be characterised as the Tribunal somehow being misled or deceived by SKE and Stobbs. Nor do I agree that they were somehow ‘weaponising’ the court applications in respect of the proceedings before me. The existence of those court applications (combined with the particular wording of the order) raised a legitimate question over the Tribunal’s practice which needed to be resolved.”
“Criminal contempt (intentional interference with the administration of justice) by seeking to prevent or delay the registration of a trademark as directed by the High Court.”
“The due administration of justice requires first that all citizens should have unhindered access to the constitutionally established courts of criminal or civil jurisdiction for the determination of disputes as to their legal rights and liabilities; secondly, that they should be able to rely upon obtaining in the courts the arbitrament of a tribunal which is free from bias against any party and whose decision will be based upon those facts only that have been proved in evidence adduced before it in accordance with the procedure adopted in courts of law; and thirdly that, once the dispute has been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely upon there being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to law. Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine the public confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court.”
“49. Drawing the strands together I would state the relevant principles as follow: (1) A criminal contempt involves an interference with the public interest in the administration of justice. Such interference will typically take one of the three forms identified by Lord Diplock in A-G v Times Newspapers. (2) Save in cases where the strict liability rule in the common law is preserved by theContempt of Court Act 1981 , or may continue to apply in exceptional cases, which are not here relevant, it may well be necessary to show that the alleged contemnor intended to interfere with the interests of justice (see A-G v Newspaper Publishing Plc, at pp. 374H, 383B-C), although the point is not free from controversy (see Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt 5th edn at 11-23 to 11-35) and since it does not affect the outcome in this case I would not want to be taken to be deciding it. (3) The conduct need not have the effect of interfering in the administration of justice so long as it gives rise to a sufficient risk that it will do so; it is no answer to a charge of contempt to say that the intended interference has not succeeded: see Attorney General v English[1983] 1 AC 116 at p.141F; Raymond v Honey at p.10; and Attorney General v Crosland at [22]. Witness intimidation is a contempt even if the witness is not in fact deterred from giving evidence. Here, on the Strike Out Application, the IBRAM Claim must be treated as being for the purpose alleged, namely for the purpose of preventing the MCs from pursuing their claims against BHP at all in the TCC proceedings. Had the interim or final relief been granted and complied with, which is what BHP was seeking to achieve, the MCs' claim against BHP in this jurisdiction would have come to an end. That was the intended effect of the conduct alleged to constitute the contempt, of which there was at the lowest a serious risk and substantial possibility. (4) One type of conduct which falls within the scope of the contempt jurisdiction is the taking of steps to hinder or prevent a litigant from pursuing their claim: A-G v Times Newspapers in the passages cited above; Raymond v Honey at p. 10E. So it is a criminal contempt physically to restrain a litigant from attending court to vindicate their right, to take the example given by Lord Simon in A-G v Times Newspapers at p. 317D. So too it is a contempt to do so by threats, intimidation or bribery or other unlawful means (Smith v Lakeman, Re Mulock, A-G v Times Newspapers). The decision of the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Hislop[1991] 1 QB 514 affords a modern example of a case in which conduct of defendants intended to deter the claimant from pursuing her claim against them was held to amount to a criminal contempt. (5) However not all steps aimed at hindering or preventing a claimant from pursuing a claim will amount to a contempt. A defendant or non-party may properly seek to deter a litigant from commencing or pursuing a claim by forms of coercive pressure (A-G v Times Newspapers). Mediation and settlement discussions provide an obvious example of conduct which would not ordinarily amount to contempt, and other aspects of the normal conduct of litigation are given as examples in A-G v Hislop at p. 233G. (6) The dividing line is not to be drawn by a distinction between conduct which is intrinsically lawful and that which is intrinsically unlawful: R v Kellett and A-G v Martin. (7) The dividing line is to be drawn by determining whether the conduct is improper even if it would otherwise be lawful. Conduct which is improper and carries a sufficient risk of interference with the administration of justice is a criminal contempt, and can be rendered a contempt by the purpose being improper even if it would be lawful but for that purpose. The test is best stated by use of a single adjective 'improper', shorn of the language of what is fair, reasonable or moderate. Improper is a word which suits a characterisation of the boundary between what is and is not criminalised, and this was one way in which the test was expressed and applied in A-G v Martin. It is the test ins. 21(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 as to when threats are criminal for the purposes of the law of blackmail, where it is not confined to that which is unlawful: see R v Harvey(1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 139 . It was the word used to characterise the offending conduct in A-G v Hislop at p. 230B. (8) Conduct may be undertaken for mixed motives or purposes. The mens rea of intent to interfere with the administration of justice is made out if that is an intent; it need not be the sole intent. So in determining whether the purpose of conduct is such as to render it sufficiently improper to give rise to a criminal contempt, it is sufficient if one of its purposes does so. It is not necessary that the improper purpose be the sole or dominant purpose or motive for undertaking the conduct in question: Attorney General v Butterworth, R v Kellett and A-G v Newspaper Publishing supra.”
“ … the power to grant [anti-suit injunction] relief has never been treated as something which may be invoked by the Attorney-General or any public authority solely on the grounds that the public interest in the administration of justice is sufficient to justify an injunction. The important distinction is that the law of criminal contempt is solely concerned with the public interest; whereas [anti-suit injunction] relief is only ever granted if justified by reference to the private interests of litigants.”
“(2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court – (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim … ” (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim … ”
“242. Marcus Smith J gave three reasons for deciding to dismiss TBD's application. The first was that TBD was relying in support of the application upon material which had been obtained in breach of the Search Order. The second was that, in so far as TBD relied upon material obtained in accordance with the Search Order, the application was a breach of undertaking C(2), because committal proceedings against Mr O'Boyle were separate proceedings. The third was expressed by Marcus Smith J at [84(4)] as follows: ‘I discern a regrettable over-enthusiasm in the Company's pursuit of committal proceedings against Mr O'Boyle, which is evidenced both by the aggressive nature in which such proceedings have been threatened, the fact that the “letter before action” has been sent, not merely to Mr Boyle, but to third-parties, and the fact that it was attempted to gain permission to bring committal proceedings whilst the Proceedings (which involve Mr O'Boyle and traverse the same subject-matter) were on-going’. [ … ] 244. … I consider that Marcus Smith J had the power to raise the matter of his own motion pursuant toCPR rule 3.1 and by analogy withPractice Direction 81 paragraph 16.1 (which provides that the court may strike out a committal application on its own initiative in certain circumstances), provided he did so without evincing an appearance of bias and without procedural unfairness to TBD. Given the rather unusual circumstances of this case, I consider that Marcus Smith J was entitled to raise the matter of his own motion as consequential to his decision that TBD had breached the Search Order … [ … ] 246. As for Marcus Smith J's third reason, this is supported by the recent observations of Andrew Baker J in Navigator Equities Ltd v Deripaska[2020] EWHC 1798 (Comm) , which I would endorse: ‘141. Contempt proceedings have a particular and distinctive character. They are civil proceedings but bear several important hallmarks of criminal proceedings … The hearing is not to be equated with a criminal trial and the process is not to be equated with a private prosecution … But the quasi-criminal character of this particular species of civil litigation process has important consequences. 142. One consequence I have already identified, namely that the court recognises the particular capacity of contempt applications or the threat of contempt applications to be used vexatiously by litigants to further interests that it is not the function of the contempt jurisdiction to serve. That leads to the obvious materiality, at all events if there is some reason to question it on the facts of a given case, of the 'prosecutorial motive' of a claimant / applicant pursuing a contempt charge. … 143. A further consequence is that the claimant / applicant pursues a contempt charge as much as quasi-prosecutor serving the public interest as it does as private litigant pursuing its own interests in the underlying dispute. The claimant / applicant needs to understand that; and if it is legally represented, as here, the legal representatives need to understand that their role as officers of the court is acutely pertinent, even if (to repeat) the process is not to be equated with a private prosecution in a criminal court …’.” ‘I discern a regrettable over-enthusiasm in the Company's pursuit of committal proceedings against Mr O'Boyle, which is evidenced both by the aggressive nature in which such proceedings have been threatened, the fact that the “letter before action” has been sent, not merely to Mr Boyle, but to third-parties, and the fact that it was attempted to gain permission to bring committal proceedings whilst the Proceedings (which involve Mr O'Boyle and traverse the same subject-matter) were on-going’. ‘141. Contempt proceedings have a particular and distinctive character. They are civil proceedings but bear several important hallmarks of criminal proceedings … The hearing is not to be equated with a criminal trial and the process is not to be equated with a private prosecution … But the quasi-criminal character of this particular species of civil litigation process has important consequences. 142. One consequence I have already identified, namely that the court recognises the particular capacity of contempt applications or the threat of contempt applications to be used vexatiously by litigants to further interests that it is not the function of the contempt jurisdiction to serve. That leads to the obvious materiality, at all events if there is some reason to question it on the facts of a given case, of the 'prosecutorial motive' of a claimant / applicant pursuing a contempt charge. … 143. A further consequence is that the claimant / applicant pursues a contempt charge as much as quasi-prosecutor serving the public interest as it does as private litigant pursuing its own interests in the underlying dispute. The claimant / applicant needs to understand that; and if it is legally represented, as here, the legal representatives need to understand that their role as officers of the court is acutely pertinent, even if (to repeat) the process is not to be equated with a private prosecution in a criminal court …’.”
“66. … The court must be careful not to conflate (as [BBL] has done) the court’s civil contempt jurisdiction which can legitimately be invoked in furtherance of [BBL]’s private law interests … and the Court’s criminal contempt jurisdiction which has no concern for such interests, focusing solely on the public interest.”
“This is the long-standing practice which SKE were, in the event, arguing should be maintained. I do not see how SKE’s submissions to the Tribunal can be characterised as the Tribunal somehow being misled or deceived by SKE and Stobbs.”