“The LTTE is now a spent force within Sri Lanka and considered unlikely to rise again from within the unitary Sri Lanka, which is tightly controlled by the Sri Lankan security forces. The perceived risk against which the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) works now concerns the possibility of LTTE resurgence and efforts to restart the internal armed conflict, from outside Sri Lanka, led by diaspora activists. The GOSL no longer relies principally on checkpoints and searches; its approach is intelligence-led and it has sophisticated extensive intelligence as to those who are seeking to destabilise the unitary state, within the diaspora and in Sri Lanka itself. ”
“43…The Court must assess all the evidence affording such weight to different pieces of evidence as it thinks fit. No principle of international or domestic law dictates any different approach. The authorities which demonstrate the considerable respect which the Court affords to UNHCR material are entirely consistent with the conventional view that questions of weight are for the Court… 44. There is, in my view, no justification for conferring… presumptively binding status on UNHCR reports merely because of their source.”
“All claims…need to be considered on their individual merits…More specifically, the possible risks facing individuals with the profiles outlined below require particularly careful examination. UNHCR considers that individuals with these profiles – though this list is not exhaustive – may be, and in some cases are likely to be in need of international refugee protection, depending on the individual circumstances of this case.”
“(i) persons suspected of certain links with the …LTTE; (ii) certain opposition politicians and political activists; (iii) certain journalists and other media professionals; (iv) certain human rights activists; (v) certain witnesses of human rights violations and victims of human rights violations seeking justice.”
“the effect of that passage is that these categories remain fact-specific. We shall set out later, in the light of the wide-ranging expertise we have heard and read, what we consider to be the fact-specific risk groups, some of which overlap with the general categories set out in the UNHCR guidelines…”
“396. Given the close connections the appellant’s family had with Prabhakaran, and his irregular exit from Sri Lanka, we are satisfied that he is a person with what the UNHCR Guidelines describe as ‘more elaborate links with the LTTE’ and that there remains a real risk that he would be of interest on return…. 397. The authorities within Sri Lanka have knowledge of the appellant’s previous role within the LTTE, and in particularly his significant involvement in the LTTE’s finance wing and its fuel supply. This, coupled with his sister’s close connections to the former leader of the LTTE, his pro-Tamil separatist activities in the United Kingdom, and the nature of the enquiry made by the Sri Lankan authorities with the appellant’s family since his departure from his homeland, lead us to conclude that it is reasonably likely that the Sri Lankan authorities perceive the appellant as having a significant role in relation to post-conflict Tamil separatism within the diaspora.”
“430….We must ask ourselves…whether, having regard to his known low-level activities during the conflict (bunker digging and transporting the wounded), there is a real risk that [he] will be perceived as a diaspora activist with a significant role in diaspora activities designed to destabilize the unitary Sri Lankan state and revive the internal armed conflict.”
“447. [He] is a person with an LTTE history and with what the UNHCR Guidelines refer to as “more elaborate links” to the LTTE (if the account of his missing brother is accepted). He has another brother who is a successful asylum seeker on LTTE and suicidality grounds. He bears both combat and torture marks on his body, but he was released in 2002 and seems to have been of no further interest to the authorities in Sri Lanka thereafter. 448. Since arriving in the United Kingdom, this appellant has taken no part, still less a significant role, in United Kingdom diaspora activities: he is not reasonably likely to be perceived as a person seeking to destabilise the single Sri Lankan state or revive the internal armed conflict. We remind ourselves that the GOSL has sophisticated sources of intelligence and would be aware of this lack of involvement, certainly by the time a travel document is issued. There is no real risk that this appellant falls within the new country guidance set out in this determination. ”
“Previous (real or perceived) links that go beyond prior residency within an area controlled by the LTTE continue to expose individuals to treatment which may give rise to a need for international refugee protection, depending on the specifics of the individual case. The nature of those more elaborate links to the LTTE can vary, but may include people with the following profiles…”
“303. The GOSL is reasonably confident that there is a low risk of resurgence of the internal armed conflict from within Sri Lanka. Its concern is with the risk of resurgence coming from the diaspora, of which London, Paris, Toronto and Oslo are major centres (‘the diaspora hotspots’). There are approximately one million Tamils outside Sri Lanka, mostly in the diaspora hotspots. … 311…. The majority of the examples which the parties produced of those who were ill-treated on return, were of persons who had significant LTTE links (whether direct or familial). The evidence is that although LTTE cadres were screened out and rehabilitated in May 2009, the government’s concern now is not with past membership or sympathy, but with whether a person is a destabilising threat in post-conflict Sri Lanka. … 318. Professor Gunaratna’s opinion, which we accept, is that there has been a qualitative change in the purpose of the rehabilitation programme between 2009 and now. The government’s concern now relates to those who may be associated with attempts to destabilise the unitary Sri Lanka by reviving the LTTE within the diaspora. 325. It is not established that previous LTTE connections or sympathies (whether direct or familial), are perceived by the GOSL as indicating now that an individual poses a destabilising threat in post-conflict Sri Lanka… 342…The risk of LTTE resurgence does not come from within Sri Lanka now… 345…In practice, all of those who lived in areas where the LTTE was the de facto government during certain periods of the civil war will have LTTE connections… … 349. The rehabilitation process was applied to all identified LTTE cadres at the end of the civil war. That is not its purpose now: it is used where a person is considered to be involved in possible resurgence of the LTTE or contacting the active diaspora. Sri Lankan Tamils returning from the diaspora who did not undergo rehabilitation during 2009-11 are not for that reason at risk now, unless they can be shown to come within the risk factors presently identified.”
“…where a previous assessment has resulted in the conclusion that the population generally or certain sections of it may be at risk, any assessment that the material circumstances have changed would need to demonstrate that such changes are well established evidentially and durable.”
“[contribute] to our view that now is the time for the [UT] to revise its guidance on Sri Lanka.” (paragraph 47). It added (at paragraph 48): “We considered that it was appropriate, in the light of the perceived changes and new UNHCR guidance, for the [UT] to reassess its own guidance on Sri Lanka. We wanted to consider whether the situation remained as it had been in TK, that is to say that the country is settling down into a peaceful recovery from a long and brutal civil war, or whether the situation in Sri Lanka was indeed deteriorating as suggested and new guidance was needed. For the reasons we have set out in this determination, we have concluded that the guidance needs to be replaced on the basis of the situation now.”
“We do not consider that attendance at demonstrations in the diaspora alone is sufficient to create a real risk or a reasonable degree of likelihood that a person will attract adverse attention on return to Sri Lanka.”
“Attendance at one, or even several demonstrations in the diaspora is not of itself evidence that a person is a committed Tamil activist seeking to promote Tamil separatism within Sri Lanka.”
“27….Given that the contents of the …analysis are not in dispute, we have had regard to the information there summarised. 28. The weight that we give to this evidence is shaped by our conclusion that the underlying determinations are not admissible. At best this data is reliable as evidence that a number of appeals by Sri Lankan nationals have been allowed in the light of country guidance which we are reconsidering. 29. The fact of the appeals having been allowed indicates that certain past ill-treatment by the Sri Lankan authorities was accepted by Tribunal judges in individual cases. The data is part of a wide range of evidence that we have heard and read; this assists us in examining the situation today. However, had there been any dispute as to the contents of the tabular analysis, we would have excluded it for the same reasons as we have excluded the determinations from which that material was drawn.”
“Between 40,000 and 100,000 Tamil civilians died in government-designated NFZs [No-Fire Zones] in the final days of the civil war in May 2009. There were three successive NFZs, progressively smaller and moving further east. Supplies of both food and water in NFZs were inadequate. Shelling of the field hospital at Mullaivaikkal caused many deaths. The GOSL has consistently blamed the LTTE for the deaths; the Tamil community attributes the deaths to the action of the GOSL. The GOSL continues to describe this [as] a period when they were seeking ‘humanitarian’ protection of those in the NFZs, but its account is overwhelmingly rejected in the material we have seen…”
“Individuals who have given evidence to the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission [which reported in November 2011] implicating the Sri Lankan authorities in alleged war crimes.”
“those who have already identified themselves by giving such evidence,” 36. because only they would be known to the Sri Lankan authorities “and therefore only they are at real risk of adverse attention or persecution on return as potential or actual war crime witnesses.”
“(i) This appellant was rounded up with others including his parents and taken to Chettikulam Camp, where he was rapidly identified as an LTTE cadre and moved to Anuradhapura Camp, where conditions were worse. His parents were not moved and were released quickly. … (ii) [He] was not ill-treated while at Chettikulam Camp; if it was there that he signed the Sinhalese document or documents, we consider that indicates that it (or they) was probably a benign document (perhaps a release or transfer to Anuradhapura Camp), not a confession; (iii) [His] evidence that he signed such a document both on his arrival and after his release indicates to us that it is reasonably likely that this was a form of record keeping of his entry and exit from the camp; (iv) [He] did not sign any confession or adverse document in Anuradhapura Detention Camp; (v) He was released informally after payment of a huge bribe to the CID at Anuradhapura and left Sri Lanka on a passport to which he was not entitled.”
“We have considered what interest the authorities might have in this appellant today. It is not suggested that [he] is among those in the London diaspora who are actively seeking to destabilise the single Sri Lankan state. The appellant was not a fighter; his activities for the LTTE did not include weapon training; he was a bunker digger and transporter of the wounded. One of [his] brothers is among those who disappeared in the closing days of the civil war and is presumed dead. ”
“Given the sophisticated intelligence available to the Sri Lankan authorities, within and without Sri Lanka, we consider that they will know what separatist activities he undertook in Sri Lanka and what his activities have been in the United Kingdom. We must ask ourselves, therefore, whether having regard to his known low level activities during the conflict (bunker digging and transporting the wounded), there is a real risk that [he] will be perceived to be a diaspora activist with a significant role in diaspora activities designed to destabilise the unitary Sri Lankan state and revive the internal armed conflict.” 43. The UT considered it possible that his name may appear on a “watch” as opposed to the “stop” list on the airport computers. It also referred to the fact that he had not taken “any part, still less a significant part, in Tamil separatist activity in the United Kingdom”
“We do not consider, on the facts we have found, that [he] has established that there is a real risk, or that it is reasonably likely, that the Sri Lankan authorities would now regard him as a threat to the integrity of Sri Lanka as a single state. We do not consider that he would be perceived as having a significant role in relation to post conflict Tamil separatism within the diaspora and/or a renewal of hostilities within Sri lanka.”
“it appears from the evidence that [he] was not of sufficient concern in 2009 to be one of the 11,000 active LTTE cadres who were considered to require re-education through the ‘rehabilitation’ programme before being reintroduced into Sri Lankan civil society.”
“ ‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ means a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds had been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15…and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of protection of that country.”
“ ‘serious harm’ consists of: (a). Death penalty or execution; or (b). Torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c). Serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.”
“Those third country nationals or stateless persons who are allowed to remain in the territories of the Member States for reasons not due to a need for international protection but on a discretionary basis on compassionate or humanitarian grounds, fall outside the scope of this Directive.”
“…in such cases the alleged future harm would emanate not from the intentional acts or omissions of public authorities or non-state bodies, but instead from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of sufficient resources to deal with it in the receiving country.”