“In the early hours of Sunday26 October 2008 PC Ian Morton was killed in a road traffic accident. No other vehicle was involved. Mr Salter was appointed as the Deputy Senior Investigating Officer under Inspector Wilcox. PC Mesher was appointed as Family Liaison Officer. It soon became apparent that PC Morton had a long-term partner but was also involved with a member of another force with whom he had spent the night before his death. His partner was unaware of the relationship. Two mobile telephones were recovered from the crashed vehicle. It became known to Mr Salter that one of those telephones contained stored text messages which evidenced the relationship. On 27 October Mr Salter met PC Mesher. He instructed him to go to the Vehicle Recovery Centre, find the telephone and destroy it. The death was the subject of a Coroner’s Investigation. PC Mesher was not prepared to destroy evidence and raised the matter with senior colleagues. Other officers attended the Recovery Centre and seized the two telephones that had been in the car at the time of the crash. The matter was reported to the Professional Standards Department of the Dorset Police. Mr Salter was arrested and questioned under caution. He admitted using the words ‘Destroy the phone’ to PC Mesher. He said that he was thinking out loud. His intention was to protect PC Morton’s family from discovering the other relationship. He was aware that the Coroner would require all the evidence to be produced. He said that he had been in touch with the officer with whom PC Morton had spent the night before his death and that he had spoken to her before meeting PC Mesher.”
“That your conduct on27 October 2008 did not meet the appropriate standard as set out in Regulation 3(1), Schedule 1,Paragraph 1 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004 in that as a Police Sergeant with Dorset Police you did not behave with honesty or integrity in relation to the investigation into the death of Detective Constable Ian Morton. Particulars On27 October 2008 , you were the Deputy Senior Investigating Officer, in relation to the death of Detective Constable Morton. You instructed the appointed Family Liaison Officer, Constable 1845 Scott Mesher to attend the Ibsley Recovery Centre and to locate and destroy the mobile telephone belonging to the deceased officer, even though you knew it would be required as evidence at the Inquest into the officer’s death.”
“Honesty and Integrity It is of paramount importance that the public has faith in the honesty and integrity of police officers. Officers should therefore be open and truthful in their dealings; avoid being improperly beholden to any person or institution; and discharge their duties with integrity.”
“In our judgment your actions amounted to a very serious breach of integrity. You are an officer with 22 years service with significant experience of road traffic collisions and their investigation. You are also an experienced Family Liaison Officer who is used to dealing with families involved in road traffic collisions. In your role as a sergeant you are expected to set high standards to those under your supervision, particularly with regard to honesty and integrity. The Panel accepts that on the balance of probability you made a decision to have the mobile phone belonging to Ian Morton removed and destroyed as you were concerned about the feelings of his family. However, the decision to remove the mobile phone had serious implications in relation to subsequent investigation of the road traffic collision. It is very clear that information that may have been held on the mobile phone could have provided important evidence in relation to the collision and therefore its removal and destruction would have had serious implications in relation to any subsequent judicial proceedings. The Panel also consider that your direction to PC Scott Mesher to remove and destroy the mobile phone is an aggravating factor and could have led to another officer compromising their integrity. PC Mesher took the courageous decision to consult another supervisor which prevented this situation from escalating any further. We acknowledge that when presented with the facts you took responsibility for your actions. We also acknowledge that the mitigation presented to the Panel highlights the fact that you have been a hardworking and competent police officer throughout your service. However, it is our judgment that your behaviour has seriously breached the values of the Force. The public expect the very highest standards of honesty and integrity from police officers. In this case your standard of behaviour has fallen well short and therefore I am requiring you to resign from the Force forthwith.”
“29. Those holding the office of Constable, which carries with it not only significant responsibilities but also enormous powers, are expected to have the personal strength of character to make sound judgements under pressure and in the face of ethical dilemma. The behaviour of police officers when they are not under direct supervision or scrutiny is just as important as when they are. Given my own regular contact with the public and Independent Police Complaints Commission in relation to matters of police performance and conduct I cannot accept Mr Wilson’s argument that were the public to know the details of this case they would take a view more lenient than that taken by the panel. 30. Mr Salter’s application for this Review argued that the decision to require an officer to resign calls for a ‘careful and proper analysis of the facts and mitigation in any particular case’. I judge that this is precisely what happened in this particular case. 31. During my Review I have identified no clear errors or inconsistencies in process or determination at the Misconduct Hearing. Neither was I able to conclude that the sanction imposed by the panel was so plainly excessive that it could be properly characterised as unfair. I conclude that the panel took very careful account of all the issues in this case before deciding that Mr Salter should be required to resign. In my view the fact that Mr Salter has been allowed the dignity of resignation rather than being dismissed from the service demonstrates how fully the mitigation, his previous good record and the character evidence has been taken into account. Conversely, any lesser sanction, such as reduction in rank or a financial penalty would, in my view, be wholly inadequate to mark the seriousness of Mr Salter’s misconduct. The misconduct admitted is not an issue solely in relation to rank but also to Mr Salter’s honesty and integrity as a police officer, which as a result of his own actions has been irreparably damaged. 32. Furthermore I do not believe that Mr Salter could ever again become a good and efficient police officer due to the entire question of an ongoing lack of trust. For example, the nature of Mr Salter’s misconduct would mean that he would be able to undertake only a very limited range of police duties because he simply could not be put forward to the Crown Prosecution Service or the courts as a witness of truth. 33. I therefore conclude that the sanction imposed at the Misconduct Hearing on27 August 2009 ie a requirement to resign from the police service was both justified and appropriate in the circumstances.”
“It seems to me that when Parliament confers a right of appeal to a specialist tribunal such as the Police Appeals Tribunal, it is inherent in that that the powers of the tribunal are to consider all matters put before it, in the form of fresh evidence or fresh submissions or whatever, and to reach its own conclusions upon the matter. Of course, it will have regard to the decision of the body from whom the appeal is brought. It will have regard to the views of the Chief Constable, and will no doubt be slow to differ from those views unless it is persuaded that they were, in its view, wrong, but if it is so persuaded then it has an obligation to apply what it believes to be the correct result.”
“Equally, this case should not be seen as any kind of endorsement of what the Appellant did. Our decision is limited entirely to the facts of this case and should not be seen as any kind of precedent.”
“Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal … the most serious (type of case) involves proven dishonesty … in such cases the Tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced for the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the Rolls of Solicitors … The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors’ profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth. To maintain its reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied readmission … otherwise, the whole profession, and the public as a whole, is injured. A profession’s most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires … It follows that considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of this jurisdiction than on the ordinary run of sentences imposed in criminal cases. … all these matters (of personal mitigation) are relevant and should be considered. But none of them touches the essential issue, which is the need to maintain amongst members of the public a well-founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness.”
“The correct analysis is that the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal comprises an expert and informed Tribunal, which is particularly well placed in any case to assess what measures are required to deal with defaulting solicitors and to protect the public interest. Absent any error of law, the High Court must pay considerable respect to the sentencing decisions of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, if the High Court, despite paying such respect, is satisfied that the sentencing decision was clearly inappropriate, then the court will interfere.”
“… in my judgment, the correct approach to the question of sanction on a finding of serious impropriety by a police officer in the course of his duty is reflected in the principles articulated in Bolton and Salisbury. The reasons which underpin the strict approach applied to solicitors and barristers apply with equal force to police officers. Honesty and integrity in the conduct of police officers in any investigation are fundamental to the proper workings of the criminal justice system. … The public should be able unquestionably to accept the honesty and integrity of a police officer. The damage done by a lack of integrity in connection with the investigation of an alleged offence may be enormous. The guilty may go free. The innocent may be convicted. Large sums of public money may be wasted. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system may be undermined. The conduct of a few may have a corrosive effect on the reputation of the police service in general.”
“… that the most important purpose of disciplinary sanctions, particularly in cases involving dishonesty or impropriety in connection with an investigation, is to maintain public confidence in the police service and maintain its collective reputation.”
“One consequence of the fact that sanctions imposed in the disciplinary process are not primarily punitive is that personal mitigation is likely to have a limited impact on the outcome. Cases of proven dishonesty and lack of integrity in an operational environment, of which the destruction, suppression or fabrication of evidence, or attempts to do so, would be clear examples, are the most serious breaches of the Code of Conduct. In such cases the sanction of dismissal or requirement to resign would, to use the language of Sir Thomas Bingham in Bolton, ‘almost invariably’ be appropriate but there exists ‘a very small residual category’ where a lesser sanction may be available, as Jackson LJ put it in Salisbury.”
“Rather than concluding that there is a two-stage test, the correct approach for a decision-maker is to recognise that a sanction which results in the officer concerned leaving the force would be the almost inevitable outcome in cases involving operational dishonesty. That terminology itself recognises that there may be exceptions. In concluding that the case is exceptional, the decision-maker must identify the features of the circumstances of the misconduct which support a different conclusion, recognising that the number of such cases would be very small. The decision-maker would take account of personal mitigation, but must recognise its limited impact in this area.”
“The language of the Tribunal suggests that it did not approach its decision-making on the basis that a finding of operational dishonesty normally called for dismissal or a requirement to resign from the force. Furthermore, it is clear from the way in which it discussed the question of mitigation that it gave very great weight to personal mitigation in circumstances where it was not appropriate to do so.”
“Mr Beggs advances a powerful argument that the features of Mr Salter’s misconduct when viewed through the correct legal lens, and in particular if mitigation were given the correct weight, could deliver only one lawful outcome, namely dismissal or requirement to resign. There is no doubt that the Tribunal’s approach to the question of personal mitigation resulted in its attaching more weight to it than was justified. Having accorded more weight to that mitigation than the proper legal approach justified, the Tribunal concluded in its epilogue that the appeal before it was ‘a finely balanced case’. It follows as a result of irresistible logic that it would have dismissed the appeal had it followed the correct legal approach, both as to mitigation and the starting point being dismissal or requirement to resign for operational dishonesty. When taking account of those factors this was not a finely balanced case. The misconduct was very serious, for the reasons given by the Panel and the Chief Constable. Those reasons were accepted by the Tribunal. It is true that the mitigation advanced by Mr Salter concerning the misconduct itself shows that the destruction of evidence can arise in circumstances that are worse. But his personal mitigation could not, in my judgment, tip the scales against the sanction that resulted in his leaving the Police Force.”
“While I would certainly accept that not every untruth or half truth told by a police officer, however trivial and whatever the circumstances, would necessarily constitute misconduct justifying dismissal, the misconduct found by the Panel … constituted deliberate dishonesty in an operational context. As para 1 of the Code rightly emphasises, integrity is a fundamental requirement for a police officer. I should, frankly, be dismayed to think that such conduct was not of a kind which was normally thought to merit dismissal.”
“… the position of disclosure of an officer’s disciplinary record is never far from the surface. [Mr Salter]’s finding would always need to be disclosed in (criminal) proceedings. Our experience, however, is that the facts and circumstances behind the finding which are of importance and not merely their ‘title’ The fact that the Appellant admitted the charge would count in his favour. We feel, therefore, that the Chief Constable is overly pessimistic in is assessment of [Mr Salter]’s likely future deployment.”