Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, R (on the application of) v Police Misconduct Panel [2025] EWHC 3018 (Admin)

[2025] EWHC 3018 (Admin)

Case No AC-2025-MAN-000040

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Venue SITTING AT THE MANCHESTER CIVIL JUSTICE CENTRE, 1 Bridge Street West, Manchester M60 9DJ, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 17/11/2025

Before

MR JUSTICE SWIFT

Between

CHIEF CONSTABLE OF GREATER MANCHESTER POLICEClaimant

POLICE MISCONDUCT PANELDefendant

INSPECTOR ALEX TAYLOR Interested Party

Mr Mark Ley-Morgan (instructed by Capsticks LLP) for Claimant

for The Defendant did not appear and was not represented.

Mr Sam Green KC (instructed by Gorvins Solicitors) for Interested Party

Hearing Hearing date: 30 October 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down at The Manchester Civil Justice Centre at11:00am on 17 November and circulated to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Introduction

[1]The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (“the Chief Constable”) challenges a decision of the Police Misconduct Panel (“the Panel”) made on 4 November 2024. The decision followed a hearing that took place on 30 and 31 October 2024. The misconduct proceedings concerned the conduct of Inspector Alex Taylor (who is the Interested Party to these proceedings). The Panel concluded that Inspector Taylor had acted in a way that amounted to gross misconduct. The Panel decided to impose a final written warning, to remain on Inspector Taylor’s record for 4 years. In these proceedings the Chief Constable challenges that latter conclusion as unlawful. He contends that Inspector Taylor should have been dismissed. I have heard submissions on behalf of the Chief Constable and on behalf of Inspector Taylor. As is often the case in claims such as this one, the Panel has not appeared or otherwise participated in the proceedings.

[2]The conduct that led to the disciplinary proceedings occurred in the early months of 2020. The notice given to Inspector Taylor under regulation 30 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (“the Regulation 30 notice” and “the 2020 Regulations”, respectively) when the matter was referred to a misconduct hearing described the misconduct as follows:

“In January 2020 you were a uniformed Inspector on the ... Neighbourhood Team based in Cheadle Heath police station. You had line management responsibility for 3 sergeants, 11 PCs and 16 PCSOs. ... Around January/February 2020 you joined a work WhatsApp group. From that group you and [the PCSO] began to message each other privately. The messages began as jokey and friendly but very quickly progressed to being flirty and then overtly sexual. This continued for several weeks. On Monday 20 April 2020, you worked an 0700-1600 shift. You arrived at ... police station and booked on at 0701 and you exchanged further messages with [the PCSO] who was off duty, but at ... Police Post. Whilst on duty you agreed to meet her at [the Police Post]. You drove there ... and she let you in, whereupon you had sex on the sofa in the police premises. You left and ... carried on your shift as normal. Following this sexual encounter you decided to end your liaison with [the PCSO]. She was upset and unhappy about this. Over the next few weeks and months she confided in colleagues about what had happened. She was distressed and emotional which caused problems in the wider team. On 1 May 2020 [the PCSO] confided in PS Lowe and on 2 May 2020 you too told PS Lowe you had “fucked up royal” in messaging [the PCSO], although you denied any sexual encounter. PS Lowe had to act as mediator and support you and [the PCSO] as he tried to manage the fallout from your liaison. In July 2020 PS Lowe reported the matter to CI Smith. You admitted to her you had had a liaison with [the PCSO], but you did not disclose you had had sex on police premises or that it took place whilst you were on duty. You also told your welfare officer the liaison was confined to “foolish messaging”

. Only once the matter was referred to PSB did you admit the sexual encounter. To date you continue to deny that the sexual encounter took place whilst you were on duty.” Thus, as the Regulation 30 notice explained, Inspector Taylor and a PCSO had an affair which led to one sexual encounter, but then came to a rapid end. In this judgment I will not refer to the PCSO by name since it is not necessary to do so in order to decide any of the issues raised in the proceedings. The PCSO was part of a neighbourhood policing team. That team was managed by a police sergeant who was one of three who reported to Inspector Taylor. The Regulation 30 notice then continued as follows:

“Your conduct as described above is a breach of the following standards: Authority, Respect and Courtesy You failed to act with self-control or professionalism in pursuing an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate colleague for several weeks through sexual messaging and a sexual encounter that was both on police premises and took place whilst you were on duty. [the PCSO] was junior to you in rank and was under your line management and therefore vulnerable to an abuse of power. You ignored those risks and pursued the liaison for your own sexual gratification. Duties and Responsibilities You failed to fulfil your professional duties and responsibilities by ignoring professional standards and guidance and having sex on police premises. Furthermore, by having sex whilst you were on duty you also failed to carry out your duties and obligations to the best of your ability. You did not take responsibility for your actions, failing to report the liaison, even when it became clear to you that it was known to junior colleagues and was causing problems in the workplace. You further failed to live up to the leadership and managerial responsibilities expected of an officer of your rank, leaving a junior colleague to manage [the PCSO’s] turmoil and the impact of your own actions. Discreditable Conduct If known to the public, the fact that an inspector pursued an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate colleague through sexual messaging and a sexual encounter on police premises would undoubtedly bring discredit on the police service and undermine public confidence in policing. It is particularly discreditable that this sexual encounter took place whilst you were on duty and should have been serving the public. Furthermore, that an officer in a leadership role acted in this way which then caused a toxic working environment for junior colleagues that was only addressed when a junior colleague reported the issue. Your conduct as described above is so serious that dismissal would be justified for it, and it has been assessed as gross misconduct.”

The “standards” referred to are the Standards of Professional Behaviour referred to at regulation 5 of the 2020 Regulations and set out in Schedule 2 to the 2020 Regulations. Authority, Respect and Courtesy Duties and Responsibilities

Discreditable Conduct

[3]Under the 2020 Regulations when a regulation 30 notice has been served, the officer concerned is required to reply (see regulation 31). In this case, Inspector Taylor replied as follows:

“1. Inspector Taylor admits to having sex with [the PCSO] on one occasion in 2020. Neither were on duty at the time, but it took place on police premises. On that basis, the officer accepts that be breached the standards as alleged and accepts misconduct. 2. For the avoidance of doubt, he does not accept that the sex took place on Monday 20th April 2020. Nor does he accept that the account given by [the PCSO] is a truthful account of his interactions with her. As such, her credibility is in issue and specific disclosure is sought of any material that would assist the Inspector. 3. The AA is invited to confirm whether they rely on [the PCSO] as a witness of truth and whether she has confirmed her attendance at the hearing or willingness to participate in it. 4. As is perhaps clear from the bundle, the officer will rely on his poor mental health at the material time. Combined with problems he was experiencing with medication, he will assert that he acted impulsively and out of character. 5. There appears on the face of the papers a significant delay in this otherwise simple case. In order to consider the officer’s options, we ask for a chronology of the investigation and decision-making process. 6. A pre-hearing would be beneficial in this case in order to consider the issues raised in this response. The officer invites the LQC to order [the PCSO’s] attendance at the final hearing.”

LQC to order [the PCSO’s] attendance at the final hearing.”

[4]The misconduct hearing was conducted by the Panel pursuant to the provisions of the 2020 Regulations. By the time the misconduct hearing took place, Inspector Taylor’s position on some of the allegations had changed. By this time, he accepted that he and the PCSO had had sex on 20 April 2020, and he accepted that he had been on duty at the time.

[5]The Panel’s written decision recorded the following findings of fact. “The panel accept the admissions as framed and find these matters proved on the balance of probabilities. Breaches of the standards of professional behaviour In relation to these allegations, the AA says the officer’s behaviour has breached the standards of professional behaviour in relation to the following: Authority, respect and courtesy On the balance of probabilities, the panel do find that the officer has breached this standard, and they accept his admission. This is because they failed to act with self-control by pursuing an inappropriate relationship with a junior colleague and by having sex on police premises. The officer has abused his position of authority in relation to his and [the PCSO’s] rank and failed to treat [the PCSO] with courtesy and respect. We do however find as a matter of fact that the messaging and engagement between the officer and [the PCSO] was mutual and there is no evidence of manipulation of [the PCSO] by the officer. Duties and Responsibilities On the balance of probabilities, the panel do find that the officer has breached this standard, and they accept his admission. This is because, he has not been diligent in the exercise of his duties and responsibilities because he engaged in sexual activity when he should have been attending to his duties. He has failed to notify his line manager that he was engaging in sexualised conduct with [the PCSO]. He has failed to comply with his leadership and managerial responsibilities and has caused problems for his colleagues who had to deal with the ‘fall out’ from his relationship with [the PCSO]. Conduct On the balance of probabilities, the panel do find that the officer has breached this standard, and they accept his admission. This is because, his conduct is likely to undermine public confidence and the reputation of the police.” Breaches of the standards of professional behaviour Authority, respect and courtesy Duties and Responsibilities

Conduct

[6]By regulation 41(15) the Panel was required to decide whether the conduct found to have occurred amounted to misconduct, gross misconduct, or neither. By reference to paragraph 29 of Schedule 3 to the 2020 Act a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour amounts to “misconduct”, and “gross misconduct” means a breach of those standards “that is so serious as to justify dismissal”.

[7]When the Panel considered the level of misconduct in this case it noted that Inspector Taylor had admitted that his conduct amounted to gross misconduct. The Panel’s decision then continued as follows:

“Level of Misconduct It is alleged by the Appropriate Authority that the breaches amount to gross misconduct. The officer admits that his conduct amounts to gross misconduct. Gross misconduct means a breach of the standards of professional behaviour which is so serious that dismissal would be justified. Misconduct means a breach of the standards of professional behaviour. Having regard to the above and all the matters we have heard and considered we do find that this is a matter that falls within the definition gross misconduct, due to the impact and potential impact on public confidence and on the reputation of policing. The officer was aware of his duties as a senior police officer. This finding does fulfil the purpose of the misconduct regime.”

This finding does fulfil the purpose of the misconduct regime.”

[8]The Panel then considered the “Outcome”, the penalty that should be imposed in consequence of the misconduct found to have occurred. For this purpose, the Panel was required to act in accordance with regulation 42 of the 2020 Regulations. So far as material (and at the material time), that regulation provides: “42.— Outcome of misconduct proceedings (1) The person conducting or chairing misconduct proceedings may, subject to the provisions of this regulation— (a) impose any disciplinary action mentioned in paragraph (2) or (3) as appropriate; (b) where they find the conduct amounts to neither gross misconduct nor misconduct, direct that the matter is referred to be dealt with under the reflective practice review process. ... (3) The disciplinary action available at a misconduct hearing is— ... (b) where the person conducting or chairing the misconduct proceedings decides the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to gross misconduct, in accordance with regulation 41(15)— (i) a final written warning; (ii) reduction in rank; (iii) dismissal without notice. ... (10) Where a final written warning is given under paragraph (3), the period in paragraph (9)(b) may be extended, by the persons considering the question of disciplinary action, to a maximum period of 5 years. ... (14) Where the question of disciplinary action is being considered, the person or persons considering it— (a) must have regard to the record of police service of the officer concerned as shown on the officer's personal record; (b) may receive evidence from any witness whose evidence would, in their opinion, assist them in determining the question, including evidence of mitigating circumstances disclosed prior to the hearing to— (i) a police force; (ii) a registered medical practitioner, or (iii) a staff association; (c) must give— (i) the officer; (ii) if the officer is legally represented, the officer's relevant lawyer or, if the officer is not legally represented, the officer's police friend; (iii) the appropriate authority or, as the case may be, the originating authority or the person appointed to represent such authority in accordance with regulation 8(5), and (iv) the Director General or the Director General's relevant lawyer, where the Director General made a decision under regulation 24(1) to present the case, an opportunity to make oral or written representations before any such question is determined, including on the appropriate level of disciplinary action, and (d) where representations are received in relation to mitigating circumstances— (i) must consider whether those circumstances have been mentioned at an earlier stage in the proceedings and, if they have not been so mentioned, whether the officer could reasonably have been expected to so mention them, and (ii) in the light of their conclusions under paragraph (i), may determine that it is appropriate to place less weight on those circumstances. ...” (a) impose any disciplinary action mentioned in paragraph (2) or (3) as appropriate; (b) where they find the conduct amounts to neither gross misconduct nor misconduct, direct that the matter is referred to be dealt with under the reflective practice review process. (b) where the person conducting or chairing the misconduct proceedings decides the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to gross misconduct, in accordance with regulation 41(15)— (i) a final written warning; (ii) reduction in rank; (iii) dismissal without notice. (a) must have regard to the record of police service of the officer concerned as shown on the officer's personal record; (b) may receive evidence from any witness whose evidence would, in their opinion, assist them in determining the question, including evidence of mitigating circumstances disclosed prior to the hearing to— (i) a police force; (ii) a registered medical practitioner, or (iii) a staff association; (c) must give— (i) the officer; (ii) if the officer is legally represented, the officer's relevant lawyer or, if the officer is not legally represented, the officer's police friend; (iii) the appropriate authority or, as the case may be, the originating authority or the person appointed to represent such authority in accordance with regulation 8(5), and (iv) the Director General or the Director General's relevant lawyer, where the Director General made a decision under regulation 24(1) to present the case, an opportunity to make oral or written representations before any such question is determined, including on the appropriate level of disciplinary action, and (d) where representations are received in relation to mitigating circumstances— (i) must consider whether those circumstances have been mentioned at an earlier stage in the proceedings and, if they have not been so mentioned, whether the officer could reasonably have been expected to so mention them, and (ii) in the light of their conclusions under paragraph (i), may determine that it is appropriate to place less weight on those circumstances.

[9]Further, the Panel was required to “have regard” to certain matters. By section 87(3) of the Police Act 1996. (“the 1996 Act”) the Panel was required to have regard to guidance issued by the College of Policing under section 87(1B) of the 1996 Act. In 2023 the College of Policing published its “Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings” (“the Outcomes Guidance”). By section 87A(2) the College of Policing may, with the approval of the Home Secretary, issue guidance on matters of conduct, and by section 87A(3) it is the “duty of every person to whom any guidance is issued to have regard to that guidance”. For present purposes it is common ground that the guidance referred to in section 87A(2) includes a document issued by the College of Policing in 2019, “Appropriate personal relationships and behaviour in the workplace” (“the Relationships Guidance”).

[10]For the purposes of this judgment it is necessary to set out the part of the Panel’s decision on outcome and penalty, in full. For ease of reference later in this judgment, in the passage set out below I have added a letter to identify each paragraph. “Judgment on outcome Inspector Taylor ... [A] We have also considered our purpose within the misconduct regime which is: 1. to maintain public confidence and the reputation of the police service 2. to uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct 3. to protect the public. [B] We firstly need to determine whether the mental health issues were to such an extent that they are mitigation in relation to the misconduct. [C] In relation to this matter, we have several relevant pieces of information. We have the report by Sgt Lowe prior to the 20th of April which concerned erratic behaviour by Inspector Taylor. We have a couple of examples of erratic behaviour from Inspector Taylor himself, firstly a message on the WhatsApp group enquiring about porn and secondly the meeting he attended online whilst pretending to be a plant. [D] In addition, it is clear on the balance of probabilities, from the evidence before us that Inspector Taylor came off his medication in early January 2020, following the funeral of one of his best friends. This is supported by two entries in the GP records, the medical report from Mr Rogerson and is also referred to by one of his supervisors. Ms A also confirmed in her interview that the officer was off his medication. His own evidence is clear as to the reason he stopped taking his medication after the funeral and we accept his evidence on this point. [E] Finally, we do find on the balance of probabilities that he was spoken to about his performance during the relevant period. Superintendent Noden says the following, in relation to an email enquiry during the investigation, “Prior to the incident for which he is under investigation for, there was the odd occasion when his performance in the workplace (eg TTCG meeting updates for his team) wasn’t at the standard expected of an Inspector and I do recall him telling me on a few occasions about how he’d both changed his medication levels, and at one time stopped taking his medication all together.” [F] In conclusion, we do find that mental health is a matter that can properly be considered in relation to the seriousness of the misconduct. [G] In assessing the seriousness of the misconduct, we have considered: 1. The officer’s culpability. In this matter, the allegations that we have found proven all concerned the direct conduct of the officer in choosing to engage in a relationship and sexual activity with a colleague. It was however as per our findings a mutual relationship as evidenced by the incident itself and the messages between the parties. This is not an abuse of a position of trust or authority as envisaged by the guidance. We do therefore find that culpability is within the medium range of seriousness. [H] 2. The harm caused (and the risk of harm). There is a risk of reputational harm as the public would see this behaviour as unprofessional. There was also clearly some upset caused to Ms A, the officer’s colleagues and the officer himself. The harm we find falls within the medium to high range of seriousness. [I] 3. The aggravating factors. There are multiple proven breaches of the standards in this case. There is an expectation for an Inspector to act as a role model. There was deviation from instructions and orders. He did initially conceal that sexual activity had taken place. The messaging took place over several weeks. [J] 4. Mitigating factors. The misconduct was confined to a single episode in relation to the sexual encounter itself. There were some admissions by the officer. The officer has not sought to blame others for his actions. The officer was dealing with diagnosed mental health conditions and his decision making at the time was impaired. There is evidence of genuine remorse and insight. [K] In conclusion, the panel do find that culpability is at the medium level and the harm and risk of harm is at the medium to high level. Together with the aggravating and mitigating factors, the seriousness overall is at the medium level of seriousness. There are no previous relevant allegations of misconduct brought to the panel’s attention at this stage. Personal mitigation was considered together with the officer’s service record. In line with case law, it is less important than the interests of the profession and the protection of the public. We also considered the impact of delay in this case. [L] Outcome The Appropriate Authority says that only a finding that the officer is dismissed, will fulfil the purposes of the disciplinary process. Counsel for the officer says that a final written warning is sufficient. [M] Having considered all the above matters and the available outcomes, the panel considered the appropriate sanction. We confirm we directed ourselves as to the purpose of the misconduct regime as set out above and that the purpose of misconduct proceedings is not to punish the officer. [N] The panel acknowledge that everyone including police officers can make mistakes. However, there is a point where matters stop being a mistake and become a habit or course of conduct. This is not the case in this particular matter where the misconduct is a one-off incident in respect of the sexual encounter, which was impacted by the impairment of the officer’s decision making at the time. The police are in a privileged position of trust and the public expect them to exercise their position appropriately. [O] This matter concerns multiple breaches of the standards and clearly could have an impact on public confidence in policing. [P] Sanction The panel firstly considered whether a Final Written Warning would be appropriate in this case. The panel took into account the mitigating and aggravating factors identified above and the character references in support of the officer. [Q] Having considered the matter very carefully, we found the following features of this case which we considered to be exceptional: This is not a case of sexual predation or of an abuse of power for sexual purposes and is, based upon the evidence the panel have seen, a mutual interaction between the parties. [R] Having considered the unique features in this case, the panel found a Final Written Warning to be the appropriate outcome in this case. [S] We then turned our mind to the length of the final written warning as per paragraph 3.16 of the guidance on outcomes. Given the factors to be considered which are dealt with above, we consider that the final written warning should be for a period of 4 years. The panel considered that a member of the public knowing the full facts of this case including the mental health issues that impaired the officer’s decision making, would see this decision as fulfilling the purpose of the misconduct regime. The officer has acted inappropriately but the mitigation outweighs the need for a more severe sanction. The panel take no personal pleasure in making findings of this type and do have empathy for any officer who finds themselves facing misconduct. This unfortunately cannot lead us to make a finding that does not fulfil the purpose of the misconduct regime. [T] We hope as no doubt the AA does, that the officer will learn from this and move forward and be a dedicated servant of the community he serves.” [A] We have also considered our purpose within the misconduct regime which is: [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G] In assessing the seriousness of the misconduct, we have considered: [H] [I] [J] [K] [L] Outcome [M] [N] [O] [P] Sanction [Q] [R] [S]

[T]

[11]The submissions for the Chief Constable in these proceedings may be summarised as follows. The overall contention is that the decision to impose a final written warning rather than dismissal was Wednesbury unreasonable. That overall contention rests on the following submissions. First, there was no evidence, or sufficient evidence, to support the conclusion that Inspector Taylor’s “mental health issues” were relevant to culpability and diminished the seriousness of his misconduct. Second, the Panel’s conclusion that Inspector Taylor’s culpability fell into “the medium range of seriousness” was contrary to the evidence. Third, the conclusion that the harm caused was within the “medium range” was contrary to proper consideration of the Outcome Guidance and rested on a serious misevaluation of the consequences of the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO on other police officers, and how the misconduct would likely be perceived by the public. Fourth, the Panel failed to evaluate sufficiently or at all the matters identified as aggravating factors and mitigating factors. Fifth, the Panel’s choice of a final written warning rather than dismissal lacked a proper factual foundation because(a) it rested on matters the Panel described as “exceptional” but which were not exceptional at all; and

(b) it was irrational because the Panel had incorrectly assessed the seriousness of the misconduct. Sixth, the decision failed to follow the process set out in the Outcomes Guidance. Decision

General approach

[12]This is a claim for judicial review. The focus of each of the Chief Constable’s grounds of challenge is the Panel’s assessment of the evidence before it. As to the approach I should take when assessing the legality of the Panel’s decision, I have been referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Salter v ChiefConstable of Dorset

[2012] EWCA Civ 1047

. In that case a police sergeant was accused of interfering with an investigation by instructing a constable to destroy evidence. He admitted the charge. His case was considered by a misconduct panel and he was required to resign. As the law stood at that time, the route of appeal was, first, by way of application to the Chief Constable for review. In Salter’s case the Chief Constable agreed with the misconduct panel. There was then an appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal. That tribunal allowed Mr Salter’s appeal, substituting a decision that he should be reduced in rank. On an application for judicial review Burnett J quashed the Tribunal’s decision and substituted a decision that the appeal to the Tribunal be dismissed.

[13]The Court of Appeal considered an appeal from Burnett J’s judgment. The Court of Appeal accepted that the tribunal contained expertise, comprising as it did a legally qualified chairman, a retired senior police officer, and a member of a police authority. Nevertheless, when describing the role of the court vis-à-vis the decision of the tribunal, Maurice Kay LJ described an orthodox Wednesbury approach. “22. I turn to the third issue, irrationality. That sometimes misunderstood word means no more here than the reaching of a conclusion which no reasonable Tribunal could have reached on the same material with the consequence that its decision was (in the words of Jackson LJ in Salisbury) “clearly inappropriate”. To my mind, this is the central question in the present case. Did the [tribunal] exceed the limits that were reasonably open to it? ...” The Court of Appeal went on to uphold Burnett J’s conclusion.

[14]What are the “limits reasonably open” will be driven by context. The disciplinary structure in the place at the time of the judgment in Salter was different from the one now in place. In Salter the tribunal was an expert body in the sense that two of its three members had direct experience of the management and operation of a police force. However, that tribunal was itself sitting in appeal over other bodies having a similar level of expertise. When deciding whether the tribunal had exceeded the limits of the judgment available to it, Burnett J had had that well in mind and in consequence the limit applicable was arguably narrower for that reason.

[15]The present disciplinary structure is different. In this case the Panel is the body that has the benefit of practical experience. That places it in a good position to consider what is necessary to give effect to the overall, high-level purposes of the police disciplinary system that the Panel had identified at the beginning of its decision in this case.

[16]In other contexts where the High Court exercises jurisdiction over professional regulatory bodies, for example, over the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority and the Fitness to Practise Committee of the General Medical Council, this court has stated clearly that the sanction decisions of such bodies should be afforded considerable respect; see for example the summary of the law in Fuglers v SRA

[2014] EWHC 179

Admin, per Popplewell J at paragraph 13. That is because such bodies are well-placed to assess what is necessary to maintain standards of the professions and maintain public confidence in those professions. In situations where the misconduct considered by a police misconduct panel concerns matters such as those in issue in Salter, which go to the integrity of the exercise of a police officer’s exercise the powers of his office when dealing with member of the public or otherwise, the panel is exercising a role comparable to that of the professional regulatory bodies such as the SRA and the GMC. In such cases the degree of latitude to be afforded by the High Court to sanctions decisions in the solicitors’ and doctors’ cases will readily read-over to decisions taken by a police misconduct panel. This was the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in Salter: see per Maurice Kay LJ at paragraph 21 approving the reasoning of Burnett J which in that case had been set out at paragraph 13 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

[17]The circumstances of the present case are not quite of that character. Inspector Taylor’s misconduct did not involve a misuse of police powers in the exercise of policing functions. The short-lived affair between him and the PCSO resulted in misconduct having no policing-specific aspect. Nevertheless, such matters even though not involving a misuse of police powers, are capable of affecting public confidence in and the reputation of a police force. For this reason, I approach the decision in this case with the question of whether the Panel’s decision was “clearly inappropriate” well in mind, and with careful recognition of the Panel’s position within the statutory scheme as the body possessing expertise on questions of maintaining public confidence in and the reputation of police forces.

[18]A further general point concerns the effect of the “have regard” duty that applies to guidance issued by the College of Policing. This has recently been considered by the Court of Appeal in R(O’Connor) v Panel Chair, PoliceMisconduct Panel

[2025] ICR 1137

. In that case the court considered the effect of the Outcomes Guidance. The court emphasised points made in the introduction of that Guidance: that the Guidance is meant to outline a framework for assessing the seriousness of misconduct; that the contents of the Guidance are “non-exhaustive”; that the Guidance is not intended to “override the discretion of the person(s) conducting the … hearing, whose function is to determine the appropriate outcome”; that each case must depend on its own facts; and that Guidance cannot prescribe the outcome for every case. Thus, in the words of the Court of Appeal, the Outcomes Guidance did not “mandate” any “structured approach” or a specific outcome in any particular case. Instead, the obligation to have regard to the Outcomes Guidance means that a misconduct panel must consider the substance of the matters contained in the Guidance when considering the case before it.

[19]In its substance, the Outcomes Guidance draws heavily on the judgment of Popplewell J in Fuglers (above), and also refers to a small number of other judgments (of the High Court and the Court of Appeal) which consider the disciplinary decisions of professional regulators. The greater part of the Outcomes Guidance comprises description of the three-stage approach applied by Popplewell J when considering a decision of the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal on sanctions to be applied to solicitors in misconduct proceedings. The material part of Popplewell J’s judgment, adopted by the Outcomes Guidance states as follows:

“Correct approach of a Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal to sanction 28. There are three stages to the approach which should be adopted by a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in determining sanction. The first stage is to assess the seriousness of the misconduct. The second stage is to keep in mind the purpose for which sanctions are imposed by such a tribunal. The third stage is to choose the sanction which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question. 29. In assessing seriousness, the most important factors will be (1) the culpability for the misconduct in question and (2) the harm caused by the misconduct. Such harm is not measured wholly, or even primarily, by financial loss caused to any individual or entity. A factor of the greatest importance is the impact of the misconduct upon the standing and reputation of the profession as a whole. Moreover, the seriousness of the misconduct may lie in the risk of harm to which the misconduct gives rise, whether or not as things turn out the risk eventuates. The assessment of seriousness will also be informed by (3) aggravating factors (e.g. previous disciplinary matters) and (4) mitigating factors (e.g. admissions at an early stage or making good any loss). These considerations are reflected in The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal Guidance Note on Sanctions issued in August 2012 at paragraphs 13 to 17. 30. At the second stage, the tribunal must have in mind that by far the most important purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions is addressed to other members of the profession, the reputation of the profession as a whole, and the general public who use the services of the profession, rather than the particular solicitors whose misconduct is being sanctioned. ... [reference to Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512] ... 32. As this and other authorities make clear, although two elements of the sanction’s purpose may be to punish the solicitor in question and to deter repetition of similar or other misconduct by him, these are not the main purposes. The primary purpose of the sanction is to deter others and uphold the reputation of the profession (see e.g. Anderson per Treacy LJ at [72]). In determining sanction, the tribunal will properly have in mind the message which the sanction will send to other solicitors for the purposes of promoting and maintaining the highest standards by members of the profession, and the high standing of the profession itself in its reputation with the public at large. This latter aspect engages not only the public’s confidence in the standards maintained by practising solicitors, but also its confidence in the organs of a self-regulating body to conduct effective and fair disciplinary regulation. 33. At the third stage, the tribunal will first consider which category of sanction is appropriate from the range which is available to it. ...”

Chapter 4 of the Outcomes Guidance contains commentary explaining how that approach might apply in the context of disciplinary proceedings against police officers. For example, the Outcomes Guidance identifies certain types of misconduct that, in the context of policing, have the potential to be particularly serious such as the improper, dishonest or corrupt exercise of police powers, and any action amounting to misuse of the authority that attaches to the office of police constable.

[20]Even though Inspector Taylor’s misconduct did not involve misuse of police powers or misuse of the office of police constable, that did not mean that the obligation to have regard to the Outcomes Guidance was any the less important. Rather, the requirement resting on the Panel was to have regard to the general approach to the assessment of seriousness within the Outcomes Guidance. That assessment in this case also required the Panel to have regard to the matters set out in the Relationships Guidance, so far as any of them served to highlight actions or circumstances relevant to the seriousness of Inspector Taylor’s misconduct.

[21]In its decision the Panel stated two relevant conclusions. The first was that in principle “mental health is a matter that can properly be considered in relation to the seriousness of the misconduct”. No point was or could have been taken with this conclusion since it does no more than recognise one of the general points on potential mitigating factors set out at paragraph 4.81 of the Outcomes Guidance. The second conclusion was that when the misconduct in issue took place, Inspector Taylor “… was dealing with diagnosed mental health conditions and his decision making at the time was impaired”.

[22]The submission for the Chief Constable is that this finding was unsupported by evidence and that the Panel gave no reasons to explain how Inspector Taylor’s health affected his culpability. I do not accept this submission. One matter to have clearly in mind when assessing a submission such as this, which touches on the way in which a misconduct panel has reasoned its decision, is that those decisions must be read realistically and fairly. Notwithstanding that the chairman of a misconduct panel will be a lawyer, panel decisions are not intended to be significant works of legal scholarship. Decisions should state clear conclusions and reasons, but they are not to be picked over in search of respects in which they could have been better or more fully expressed, or for other immaterial error.

[23]In the present case there was evidence to support a conclusion that Inspector Taylor’s decision making had been impaired. The Panel considered three reports prepared by Dr Ian Rogerson, a consultant psychiatrist, dated 14 February 2022, 7 November 2022, and 14 August 2023, respectively. Each report is addressed to the Greater Manchester Police Occupational Health and Welfare Unit, so it is a fair assumption that each was prepared at the request of those advising the Chief Constable. In the November 2022 report Dr Rogerson stated that he had been instructed “... to advise on whether or not [Inspector Taylor’s] decision making might have been impacted by his mental health at the time of the allegations of sex on duty with a PCSO in early 2020”. His conclusion was “… that it is more likely than not that, at the time of the index incident, [Inspector Taylor’s] decision-making would have been impaired as a consequence of the mental disorder of Major Depressive Disorder and discontinuation of anti-depressant medication” The Panel was entitled to accept that evidence and to rely on it as a matter going to reduce culpability. I can see no error in that course. The submission for the Chief Constable is that the evidence relied on was “insufficient”. However, that submission comes to no more than an invitation to this court to revisit the Panel’s evaluation of evidence. Generally, the submissions on this ground rehearse submissions on questions of evidence that must have been made to the Panel at the misconduct hearing. A court ought not to revisit factual findings other than in the clearest case. While it may be an error of law capable of correction on judicial review for a panel to reach a conclusion that is unsupported by evidence, the submission in this instance amounts only to the contention that the Panel “got the facts wrong” in that it ought to have assessed the evidence before it differently. In this instance, the Panel was entitled by reference to Dr Rogerson’s opinion to reach the conclusion it did. “… that it is more likely than not that, at the time of the index incident, [Inspector Taylor’s] decision-making would have been impaired as a consequence of the mental disorder of Major Depressive Disorder and discontinuation of anti-depressant medication”

[24]This ground of challenge covers some ground already covered by Ground 1. The Panel’s reference to culpability being at the “medium level” is a reference to a notion of its own devising. The Outcomes Guidance does not speak in terms of levels of culpability. Nevertheless, there was nothing wrong with that approach; it is a readily understandable statement of the Panel’s conclusion on the evidence. Nor do I consider there is any reason to conclude that the Panel’s assessment was wrong in law.

[25]When considering culpability, the Panel clearly had in mind that Inspector Taylor and the PCSO had had sex, on police premises, when Inspector Taylor was on duty. Each of the latter two matters were relevant to Inspector Taylor’s culpability. The Panel’s conclusion on culpability was stated after the aggravating and mitigating factors were set out: see the passage quoted above, paragraph 10, at I – J. On a fair reading, the Panel must have had in mind the aggravating matters when considering culpability, and also other matters for example:(a) that the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO was consensual;

(b) that at the time, Inspector Taylor’s judgment had been affected by the depressive disorder he suffered from; and

(c) that the relationship had not entailed “abuse of a position of trust or authority as envisaged by the Guidance”. This latter reference is to the Relationships Guidance. That guidance recognised that many workplace relationships do exist. The Guidance does not seek to prohibit them. Rather, its focus is on the need for such relationships to be conducted “with complete professionalism in order not to impact negatively on service delivery or public confidence” (Relationships Guidance at paragraph 5). To this end, paragraph 6 of the Relationships Guidance states as follows:

“6. Appropriate workplace relationships In determining whether or not a relationship creates any negative impact on the legitimate aims of policing, the following factors could be considered: • a power imbalance is not used to initiate, control or maintain the personal relationship • physical and intimate relations do not take place on duty, or off duty on police premises including police vehicles • the relationship does not have an adverse impact on the workplace e.g., by creating division and/or friction between those in the relationship or amongst work colleagues • there is no fear, fraud or workplace benefit driving the relationship • the relationship has no influence on workplace decisions or activities and is not being used to gain or provide some workplace advantage • lines of reporting are not abused or compromised.” • a power imbalance is not used to initiate, control or maintain the personal relationship • physical and intimate relations do not take place on duty, or off duty on police premises including police vehicles • the relationship does not have an adverse impact on the workplace e.g., by creating division and/or friction between those in the relationship or amongst work colleagues • there is no fear, fraud or workplace benefit driving the relationship • the relationship has no influence on workplace decisions or activities and is not being used to gain or provide some workplace advantage • lines of reporting are not abused or compromised.”

[26]Taking all matters together, the Panel’s assessment of culpability as “at the medium level” was one that was reasonably open to it. It must be had in mind that the Panel’s reference to a “medium level” is set in the context of the conclusion the Panel had already reached that Inspector Taylor’s conduct amounted to gross misconduct. Thus the “medium level” is a medium level within a category of serious misconduct.

[27]One particular submission made for the Chief Constable was that the Panel’s statement that the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO was “not an abuse of a position of trust or authority as envisaged by the guidance”, was inconsistent with the conclusion stated earlier under the heading “Authority, respect and courtesy” that Inspector Taylor had “abused his position of authority in relation to his and [the PCSO’s] rank” (the passage is set out above at paragraph 5). I do not accept this submission. The two conclusions are not inconsistent. The former was reached specifically by reference to provisions to the Relationships Guidance. The latter was made by reference to the second of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in the Schedule to the 2020 Regulations which speaks in terms of “treating … colleagues with respect and courtesy”. It is notable that although the Panel did characterise the relationship as showing a lack of courtesy and respect, it nevertheless stated that the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO was consensual and that there was no evidence of “manipulation” by him. If the totality of the Panel’s findings on this matter are considered, there is no material inconsistency.

[28]The Chief Constable’s other submissions in support of this ground comprised a rerun of submissions that must have been made to the Panel at the hearing. Those submissions emphasise, for example, the aggravating factors listed in the Panel’s decision including that the sexual intercourse took place at work. The submission is that these matters were “ignored” by the Panel. I disagree. These matters were not ignored. On a fair reading of its decision, the Panel took these matters into account and evaluated all of them (and all other circumstances). The conclusion the Panel reached was a conclusion reasonably available to it.

[29]The Panel’s conclusion was that “harm and the risk of harm [was] at the medium to high level”. The Chief Constable’s submission relies on paragraph 4.74 of the Outcomes Guidance: “4.74 Where gross misconduct has been found and the behaviour has caused – or could have caused – serious harm to individuals, the community and/or public confidence in the police service, dismissal is likely to follow. A factor of the greatest importance is the impact of misconduct on the standing and reputation of the profession as a whole. … The substance of the submission, however, is not really that the Panel did not have regard to this part of the Outcomes Guidance. Rather the submission is that the Panel’s assessment of the level of harm was an assessment not reasonably open to it. The Chief Constable’s primary point is that “no reasonable member of the public” would share the panel’s view that Inspector Taylor’s conduct was merely “unprofessional”.

[30]I do not consider this is a matter where it is appropriate to go behind the assessment of an experienced misconduct panel. A reasonable member of the public would be aware of all the circumstances of the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO: that it was a consensual relationship; that it had not rested on any misuse of a position of authority; that Inspector Taylor’s decision-making had been impaired by depression; that the relationship had been short-lived; and that it had not had any significant impact on policing. Taking all these matters into account the Panel’s conclusion was a permissible option.

[31]The submissions for the Chief Constable also placed emphasis on how knowledge of the relationship had affected other members of the neighbourhood policing team, including the PCSO. I was taken to the evidence before the Panel on this point. In its decision, the Panel recognised both the upset suffered by the PCSO, and the difficulties caused to other officers (both those in the neighbourhood team and Inspector Taylor’s peers) who had to deal with what the Panel referred to as the “fallout” from the end of the relationship.

[32]I consider the Panel was right to refer to these matters, but also right not to exaggerate their significance. It is clear that when the relationship ended the PCSO was upset. That was most likely a reflection of her sadness and distress that the relationship was over, mixed with elements of shame or embarrassment that the relationship had ever occurred (at the time the relationship developed both she and Inspector Taylor were in relationships with others). These are all ordinary human emotions; they are intense for a brief period but then tend to pass. Likewise, other officers in the neighbourhood team will have felt awkward and embarrassed. Yet the Panel was entitled not to overstate such matters. In particular it is evident that the Panel did not accept the assertion in the Regulation 30 notice that Inspector Taylor had “caused a toxic working environment for junior colleagues”. Having reviewed the evidence gathered prior to the Regulation 30 notice it is clear that this allegation was not supported by evidence; it was a gross exaggeration of the evidence that was available (or a gross misuse of language to describe the circumstances as “toxic”). It is deeply regrettable that such an allegation appeared in the Regulation 30 notice at all. Be that as it may, what is material for present purposes is that the Panel’s assessment that the harm caused was “medium to high” was a conclusion reasonably open on the evidence. This ground of challenge therefore also fails.

[33]The Panel listed both the aggravating factors and the mitigating ones. The submission for the Chief Constable is that the Panel failed to evaluate these matters. This submission relies on the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in O’Connor (above). Following consideration of the panel decision in that case, Nicola Davies LJ concluded as follows:

“54 Notwithstanding the listing of aggravating and mitigating factors, I am satisfied that the Panel did not provide an adequate analysis and, resulting from it, adequate reasons for its findings in respect of seriousness and within the finding of seriousness the levels of culpability and harm. These findings were important as they provided the factual basis for the first stage of the Panel’s determination upon sanction. In my view the absence of such reasoning is a significant omission and represents an error of law. ... 56 My finding that the absence of analysis and reasoning by the Panel on the issues of seriousness, culpability and harm represents an error of law, means that the essence of Ground 2 of the appeal, as it was presented to this court, is made out. ...”

[34]The central point here concerns the sufficiency of the Panel’s reasoning. In this context, lack of analysis or evaluation is synonymous with an absence of reasoning. Sufficiency of reasoning must depend on the circumstance of the case in hand and must rest on a fair and reasonable consideration of a panel’s decision, looked at in the round.

[35]In this case there are criticisms that could be levelled at the Panel’s identification of aggravating and mitigating considerations. Some of the aggravating factors (the references to “multiple proven breaches of standards” and to the “messaging” taking place “over several weeks”) are matters already accounted for in the description of the misconduct. Similarly, some of the mitigating factors do not show mitigation, only the absence of matters that if present would have aggravated the misconduct (for example, the references to Inspector Taylor “not blaming others” and to the fact that there was only one sexual encounter). However, if the Panel’s decision is read in the round, I consider such criticisms would be unfair and would rest on an over-reading of the decision, akin to treating it as if it were a sentencing exercise conducted pursuant to Sentencing Council Guidelines.

[36]Overall, the decision is sufficiently reasoned. The decision identifies Inspector Taylor’s misconduct: that he had sex with the PCSO on police premises while he was on duty and then failed to disclose this when asked by Inspector Smith. The decision acknowledges that the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO was not of itself objectionable by reference to the Relationships Guidelines because the relationship was consensual and had not been initiated or pursued by Inspector Taylor through misuse of his authority as a police inspector. The decision further recognised that when other officers became aware of the relationship (which was around the time the relationship came to an end) the working relationships in the neighbourhood policing team were disrupted. Officers within the team were taken aback that the relationship had happened at all. The PCSO was very upset. The sergeant in charge of the neighbourhood team was left to deal with all this the best he could. The decision stated that these matters in different ways engaged three of the Standards of Professional Behaviour. When it came to identifying aggravating and mitigating factors what the Panel did was to identify aspects of what had happened that explained why and to what extent what had happened was serious. While it is correct to say that these matters were not “analysed” there was no need to do that in this case because all the matters identified spoke for themselves. Further “analysis” would have served no purpose beyond repeating the same points using different words.

[37]A further issue is whether the overall approach described in the reasons given was consistent with the Outcomes Guidance to the extent of the “have regard” duty at section 87(3) of the Police Act 1996. I consider it was. The point of substance in that Guidance is that misconduct panels should assess the seriousness of misconduct by reference to the general method described by Popplewell J at paragraph 29 of his judgment in Fuglers. That method promotes consideration of all the circumstances of a situation. In this case, and considering the decision in the round, the Panel did consider all circumstances, and the decision is a sufficiently reasoned explanation, including by reference to matters that the Panel highlighted the gravamen of the misconduct and those the Panel considered placed what had happened in fair context. This ground of challenge therefore fails.

[38]In large part, this ground of challenge overlaps with all other grounds considered so far. Each of those grounds challenged a different aspect of the Panel’s assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct, an essential part of any decision on the sanction to be imposed. However, the specific focus of this ground of challenge is two-fold. The first part is direct to the Panel’s reference, under the heading “Sanction”, to “exceptional” features of the case – that the situation was not “… a case of sexual predation or of an abuse of power for sexual purposes … [but] … based upon the evidence the panel have seen, a mutual interaction between the parties.”. The direction of the Panel’s reasoning is to the effect that it is these matters (which the Panel also describes as “unique”) that caused the Panel to impose a final written warning rather than dismissal. The submission is that this language shows the Panel mis-evaluated matters: the things it described as “exceptional” and “unique” were nothing of the sort.

[39]As the 2020 Regulations now stand (since 28 May 2025). the language of “exceptionality” appears in regulation 42(3)(b) of the 2020 Regulations as the marker between cases where gross misconduct will result in summary dismissal and other (“exceptional”) cases where a different, lesser, penalty will be imposed. However, this Panel’s decision pre-dates that alteration to regulation 42(3)(b) which, at the material time was in the form set out above at paragraph 8.

[40]By reference to regulation 42 as it then stood it might be thought that the references to “exceptional” and “unique in the Panel’s decision are a little awkward. That may be so, but I do not consider that this betrays any legal error.

[41]The Panel’s conclusion in the sanction part of its decision should be considered taking account of what had gone before. The Panel had concluded that Inspector Taylor’s misconduct amounted to gross misconduct for which his culpability was “at the medium level”, and which had caused a medium to high risk of harm. The overall conclusion was that the seriousness was “at the medium level of seriousness”. The Panel had also (under the heading “Outcome”):(a) referred to the purpose of the misconduct regime (as stated at paragraph 2.3 of the Outcomes Guidance);

(b) noted that the sexual encounter at work, on duty, was a one-off which had happened at a time when Inspector Taylor’s decision-making had been impaired; and

[42]This context is important. The sections of the decision prior to the heading “Sanction” show that the Panel considered Inspector Taylor’s misconduct to be serious and of the sort that could justify dismissal. The point the panel is making, on a fair reading of the decision, is that it was the matters it described as “exceptional” (lack of either predation or abuse of power) that tipped the balance between a decision to impose a final written warning and a decision to dismiss. Understood in this way this approach is consistent with the Outcomes Guidance which, at paragraph 7.4 states “… The more serious the conduct found proven against the officer, the more likely it is that dismissal will be justified”. In this sense, in every decision on sanctions there will be tipping points which will identify for the decision-maker which sanction to apply. That is what this part of the Panel’s decision described: i.e., to explain why it had decided not to dismiss Inspector Taylor.

[43]The second part of this ground concerns the Panel’s assessment of the likely public reaction to Inspector Taylor’s misconduct. The Panel stated (at paragraph S of the passage set out above at paragraph 10) that informed members of the public – those aware of all matters known to the Panel – “would see this decision as fulfilling the purpose of the misconduct regime”, namely maintaining public confidence, upholding high standards of conduct and deterring misconduct, and protecting the public. The Chief Constable’s submission is that that conclusion was irrational and that “any reasonable member of the public would be appalled” by Inspector Taylor’s misconduct.

[44]I do not consider that the Panel’s conclusion was irrational. The Panel had carefully assessed the seriousness of the misconduct. On matters on such as what disciplinary action is appropriate to maintain public confidence, the expertise of a panel, derived from the experience of its members, is not lightly to be second-guessed. When this Panel sought to put itself into the shoes of an informed, reasonable member of the public, it reached a conclusion that was within the range permissibly open to it having regard to the objectives of the police misconduct regime which, as is clear from the decision, were objectives that the Panel had well in mind.

[45]At the hearing, the Chief Constable accepted that this ground, as set out in his Skeleton Argument, did not raise any matter beyond those raised by the first five grounds of challenge, taken together. That is correct. The Outcomes Guidance is directed to the substantive consideration of the circumstances of a case. It does not set procedural rules. Moreover, in this case, the points pursued by the Chief Constable under this heading are all to the effect that the Panel mis-evaluated the situation before it and for that reason reached a wrong conclusion. All such matters have already been considered under the first five grounds.

Disposal

[46]In the premises, each of the grounds of challenge fails. The application for judicial review is dismissed. ---------------------------------------------------------