“The ‘Jewish student groups’ you refer to are political lobby groups overseen by the Union of Jewish Students, which is constitutionally bound to promoting Israel. There is a real question of abuse here - of Jewish students on British campuses being used as political pawns by a violent, racist foreign regime engaged in ethnic cleansing. The UJS’ lobbying for Israel is a threat to the safety of Arab and Muslim students as well as of Jewish students and indeed all critics of Israel…”
“Judeophobia barely exists these days” “The facts: 1. Jews are not discriminated against. 2. They are overrepresented in Europe, North America and Latin America in positions of cultural, economic and political power. 3. They are therefore in a position to discriminate against actually marginalised groups.”
“No-one wishes your family ill. What Palestinians ask for is that colonists who are arriving from around the world – including extremists from the UK – cease stealing their land and homes, and simply leave. In reality Zionist colonists who complain about being unsafe in Palestine know they can never be safe on stolen land. Even the first Zionist genocidaires in the late 1800s recognised this, which is why they wanted to deport all of the Palestinians. The answer is to go home. Zionist colonists, virtually universally subscribe to violent, racist, Jewish supremacist and islamophobic ideas. They would need to be thoroughly vetted and de-radicalised before being re-integrated into the societies they came from.”
“And so it begins. #DismantleZionism”
“There is another way that settler racism and genocide ends. That is by decolonisation and liberation. Happened in Algeria Happened in ‘Rhodesia’. #PalestineWillBeFree #FromtheRivertotheSea #DismantleZionism #GazaGenocide” #DismantleZionism”
“… the protection of the University’s reputation and interests and the protection of the rights of others to hold religious beliefs and to associate with the university ‘undaunted by harassment, intimidation or hostility’”
“…even on the respondent’s analysis what the claimant said was accepted as lawful, was not antisemitic and did not incite violence and did not pose any threat to any person's health or safety.”
“The question seems to be whether a written warning or final written warning could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the legitimate aims.”
“Even if we had not found the dismissal to be direct discrimination, we would have found the dismissal to be unfair pursuant to section 98 ERA. As an industrial jury, and taking into account the expertise and experience of the non-legal members on the panel, we consider that dismissal was outside the band of reasonable responses because the actions of the claimant did not amount to gross misconduct and also because inadequate attention was given to the possibility of a sanction short of dismissal.”
“The relationship between the claimant and the University was not so damaged that trust and confidence was undermined to the extent that the employer should no longer be required to retain the claimant in employment. For the reasons we have already set out, dismissal was disproportionate and was inconsistent with the way in which he and at least one other had been treated.”
“What the claimant said and wrote about students and University student societies contributed to and played a material part in his dismissal.”
“It is likely that had the claimant not been dismissed comments such as these would have led to further concern both within and outside the University.”
“We conclude that there is insufficient evidence for us to conclude with precision, or on the balance of probabilities, that the claimant would have been dismissed. However, there is sufficient evidence for us to conclude that there is a realistic chance that the claimant would have been dismissed by the University after these further actions. Factoring in all the matters set out above and noting that our decision on this matter does involve a considerable degree of speculation, we conclude there is a 30% chance that the claimant would have been fairly dismissed two months after the tweets were made in August 2023. We find that it would have taken the respondent two months to convene a disciplinary hearing. Such a disciplinary hearing would be easier to convene and more straightforward than previous hearings.”
“The Ground in Brief”: “51. R’s challenge under this ground can be boiled down to the following. The ET impermissibly stripped away inconvenient aspects of C's true beliefs to focus on its “core” [ET § 238]. This led to inadequate reasoning as to the true nature and effect of C’s beliefs going so far as to exclude plainly relevant evidence as to the expression of those beliefs. 52. Had the ET considered C’s beliefs in their totality, it would have concluded that his belief failed to satisfy the Grainger I, II, IV and V. As to Grainger V, the ET applied an erroneously high threshold for engagement of Art. 17 (cf Thomas v Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust and anor[2025] ICR 368 ). The ET’s reasons for concluding the belief was protected were in any event Meek-incompliant. 53. Even if it was entitled to conclude that C’s belief was protected, it was incumbent on the ET to recognise that the weight of protection it enjoyed was limited since it “scraped” through the threshold: Williamson. This was of importance in the overall balancing exercise of assessing whether dismissal / the rejection of the disciplinary appeal was proportionate assuming Higgs is good law.”
“…the appeal panel adopted the analysis of Professor Norman in her dismissal letter without any material alteration. Professor Norman's reasons were endorsed by the appeal panel”
“As is well known it is not for the Tribunal to substitute its judgment for that of a reasonable employer in deciding whether or not the employer acted reasonably for the purpose of section 98(4). Rather, the Tribunal should ask itself whether or not the decision to dismiss fell within the range of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer.”
“…dismissal was disproportionate and was inconsistent with the way he and at least one other had been treated.”
“In other words, the claimant suggested that instead of being dismissed he could have agreed with the respondent that he would leave in due course. Clearly dismissal put a stop to that, in the sense that it made it very much more difficult for the claimant to obtain alternative employment.”
“A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.”
“The protection of the right of free speech, including speech expressing a person’s religious or other beliefs, has always been regarded as a cardinal principle of the common law, and it is of course now also protected by the incorporation by the 1998 Act of articles 9 and 10 of the Convention.”
“(i) The belief must be genuinely held. (ii) It must be a belief and not, as in McClintock v. Department of Constitutional Affairs[2008] IRLR 29 , an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. (iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. (iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. (v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.”
“…[A] belief must satisfy some modest, objective minimum requirements. These threshold requirements are implicit in article 9… The belief must be consistent with basic standards of human dignity or integrity. Manifestation of a religious belief, for instance, which involved subjecting others to torture or inhuman punishment would not qualify for protection. The belief must relate to matters more than merely trivial. It must possess an adequate degree of seriousness and importance. As has been said, it must be a belief on a fundamental problem... The belief must also be coherent in the sense of being intelligible and capable of being understood. But, again, too much should not be demanded in this regard. Typically, religion involves belief in the supernatural. It is not always susceptible to lucid exposition or, still less, rational justification. The language used is often the language of allegory, symbol and metaphor. Depending on the subject matter, individuals cannot always be expected to express themselves with cogency or precision. Nor are an individual's beliefs fixed and static. The beliefs of every individual are prone to change over his lifetime. Overall, these threshold requirements should not be set at a level which would deprive minority beliefs of the protection they are intended to have under the Convention...”
“…it is important that in applying Grainger V, Tribunals bear in mind that it is only those beliefs that would be an affront to Convention principles in a manner akin to that of pursuing totalitarianism, or advocating Nazism, or espousing violence and hatred in the gravest of forms, that should be capable of being not worthy of respect in a democratic society. Beliefs that are offensive, shocking or even disturbing to others, and which fall into the less grave forms of hate speech would not be excluded from the protection. However, the manifestation of such beliefs may, depending on circumstances, justifiably be restricted under Article 9(2) or Article 10(2) as the case may be.”
“Save in obvious cases, answering the crucial question will call for some consideration of the mental processes of the alleged discriminator. Treatment, favourable or unfavourable, is a consequence which follows from a decision. Direct evidence of a decision to discriminate on [protected] grounds will seldom be forthcoming. Usually the grounds of the decision will have to be deduced, or inferred, from the surrounding circumstances.”
“In a direct discrimination claim the essential question is whether the act complained of was done because of the protected characteristic, or, to put the same thing another way, whether the protected characteristic was the reason for it . . . It is thus necessary in every case properly to characterise the putative discriminator’s reason for acting. In the context of the protected characteristic of religion or belief the Employment Appeal Tribunal case law has recognised a distinction between (1) the case where the reason is the fact that the claimant holds and/or manifests the protected belief, and (2) the case where the reason is that the claimant had manifested that belief in some particular way to which objection could justifiably be taken. In the latter case it is the objectionable manifestation of the belief, and not the belief itself, which is treated as the reason for the act complained of. Of course, if the [circumstances] are not such as to justify the act complained of, they cannot sensibly be treated as separate from an objection to the belief itself.”
“In summary, Pagewas decided on the basis that adverse treatment in response to an employee's manifestation of their belief was not to be treated as having occurred “because of” that manifestation if it constituted an objectively justifiable response to something “objectionable” in the way in which the belief was manifested: it thus introduced a requirement of objective justification into the causation element in section 13(1). Further, we held that the test of objective justification was not substantially different from that required under article 9(2) (and also article 10(2)) of the Convention. I should clarify two points about language: (1) The word “objectionable”… is evidently a (possibly rather inapt) shorthand for the phrase in para 68 “to which objection could justifiably be taken”
“Whether a limitation or restriction is objectively justified will always be context-specific. The fact that the issue arises within a relationship of employment will be relevant, but different considerations will inevitably arise, depending on the nature of that employment…. It will always be necessary to ask (per Bank Mellat): (i) whether the objective the employer seeks to achieve is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of the right in question; (ii) whether the limitation is rationally connected to that objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive limitation might be imposed without undermining the achievement of the objective in question; and (iv) whether, balancing the severity of the limitation on the rights of the worker concerned against the importance of the objective, the former outweighs the latter…. In answering those questions, within the context of a relationship of employment, the considerations identified by the intervener are likely to be relevant, such that regard should be had to: (i) the content of the manifestation; (ii) the tone used; (iii) the extent of the manifestation; (iv) the worker’s understanding of the likely audience; (v) the extent and nature of the intrusion on the rights of others, and any consequential impact on the employer’s ability to run its business; (vi) whether the worker has made clear that the views expressed are personal, or whether they might be seen as representing the views of the employer, and whether that might present a reputational risk; (vii) whether there is a potential power imbalance given the nature of the worker’s position or role and that of those whose rights are intruded upon; (viii) the nature of the employer’s business, in particular where there is a potential impact on vulnerable service users or clients; (ix) whether A the limitation imposed is the least intrusive measure open to the employer.”
“must so undermine the trust and confidence which is inherent in the particular contract of employment that the [employer] should no longer be required to retain the [employee] in his employment”
“…shall be such amount as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all of the circumstances having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in so far as that loss is attributable to action taken by the employer.”
“Political beliefs are outwith the scope of s. 10 EqA…and / orArt 9 ECHR ”
“The claimant’s beliefs about Zionism and the basis for those beliefs, are set out comprehensively in his statement. These are things that he has incorporated into his teachings and writings. We conclude that they have played a significant role in his life for many years. We are satisfied that they are genuinely held. It is said by the Respondent that the belief was ‘not held by the claimant as a belief or touchstone to his life’. However that is not the test set out in the first part of Grainger. In any event the beliefs on which he relies did play a significant part in his life.”
“…if a person can establish that he holds a philosophical belief which is based on science, as opposed, for example, to religion, then there is no reason to disqualify it from protection...”
“…save in respect of her analysis of the difference between Professor Greer and the claimant, the appeal panel adopted the analysis of Professor Norman in her dismissal letter without any material alteration. Professor Norman’s reasons were endorsed by the appeal panel.”
“Even if we had not found the dismissal to be direct discrimination, we would have found the dismissal to be unfair pursuant to section 98 ERA. As an industrial jury, and taking into account the expertise and experience of the non-legal members of the panel, we consider that dismissal was outside the band of reasonable responses because the actions of the claimant did not amount to gross misconduct and also because inadequate attention was given to the possibility of a sanction short of dismissal.”
“The issue here is whether the respondent dismissed the claimant in breach of contract, specifically in breach of its obligation to provide him with notice. The test for determining if there is a repudiatory breach of contract is not whether an employer reasonably believes that there has been such a breach but proof that there has actually been such a breach. Repudiatory conduct is conduct undermining the trust and confidence which is inherent in the particular contract of employment such that the employer should no longer be required to retain the employee in his employment. In determining whether an employee has repudiated the contract of employment, factors such as the nature of the employment and the employee's past conduct could be relevant. We also remind ourselves that the motivation for wanting to dismiss summarily is not relevant.”
“We conclude that the claimant did not commit repudiatory breach of contract. The relationship between the claimant and the University was not so damaged that trust and confidence was undermined to the extent that the employer should no longer be required to retain the claimant in employment. For the reasons we have already set out dismissal was disproportionate and was inconsistent with the way in which he and at least one other had been treated.”
“It was clearly open to the claimant to articulate his views about Zionism without reference to students and student societies.”