“Improper” means what it has been understood to mean in this context for at least half a century. The adjective covers, but is not confined to, conduct which would ordinarily be held to justify disbarment, striking off, suspension from practice or other serious professional penalties. It covers any significant breach of a substantial duty imposed by a relevant code of professional conduct. But it is not in our judgment limited to that. Conduct that would be regarded as improper according to the consensus of professional (including judicial) opinion can be fairly stigmatised as such whether or not it violates the letter of a professional code. “Unreasonable” also means what it has been understood to mean in this context for at least half a century. The expression aptly describes conduct which is vexatious, designed 9 to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But conduct cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result or because other more cautious legal representatives would have acted differently. The acid test is whether the conduct permits of a reasonable explanation. If so, the course adopted may be regarded as optimistic and as reflecting on a practitioner’s judgment, but it is not unreasonable. The term “negligent” was the most controversial of the three … We are clear that “negligent” should be understood in an untechnical way to denote failure to act with the competence reasonably to be expected of ordinary members of the profession. … We were invited to give the three adjectives (improper, unreasonable and negligent) specific, self-contained meanings, so as to avoid overlap between the three. We do not read these very familiar expressions in that way. Conduct which is unreasonable may also be improper, and conduct which is negligent will very frequently be (if it is not by definition) unreasonable. We do not think any sharp differentiation between these expressions is useful or necessary or intended.”
“the Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only … if a person has acted unreasonably….”
“I accept that there may be facts and circumstances in relation to a litigant in person which may go to an assessment of promptness but, in my judgment, they will only operate close to the margins. An opponent of a litigant in person is entitled to assume finality without expecting excessive indulgence to be extended to the litigant in person. It seems to me that, on any view, the fact that the litigant in person “did not really understand” or “did not appreciate” the procedural courses open to him for months does not entitle him to extra indulgence.”
“First, the conduct of litigants in person cannot normally be evaluated by reference to the standards of qualified lawyers. Thus the same standard of reasonableness cannot generally be applied. On the other hand the status of unrepresented litigants cannot be 13 permitted to operate as a carte blanche to misuse the process of the tribunal. The appropriate balance must be struck in every case. In conducting this exercise, tribunals will be alert to the distinction between pursuing a doomed appeal in the teeth of legal advice and doing likewise without the benefit thereof… Stated succinctly, every unrepresented litigate must, on the one hand be permitted appropriate latitude. On the other hand, no unrepresented litigate can be permitted to misuse the process of the tribunal. The overarching principle of facts sensitivity looms large once again.”
“In my view, it would be legally erroneous if, acting on a misconceived analogy with the CPR, tribunals took the line that it was unreasonable conduct for Employment Tribunal claimants to withdraw claims and that they should accordingly be made liable to pay all the costs of the proceedings. It would be unfortunate if claimants were deterred from dropping claims by the prospect of an order for costs on withdrawal, which might well not be made against them if they fought on to a full hearing and failed. As Miss MacAtherty appearing for the Applicant, pointed out, withdrawal could lead to a saving of costs. Also, as Thorpe LJ observed during argument, notice of withdrawal might in some cases be the dawn of sanity and the Tribunal should not adopt a practice on costs which would deter applicants from making sensible litigation decisions.”
“In my judgment, rule 14(1) does not impose any such causal requirement in the exercise of the discretion. The principle of relevance means that the tribunal must have regard to the nature, gravity and effect of the unreasonable conduct as factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion, but that is not the same as requiring BNP Paribas to prove that specific unreasonable conduct by the applicant caused particular costs to be incurred.”
“It is not, however, punitive and impermissible for a tribunal to order costs without confining them to the costs attributable to the unreasonable conduct. As I have explained, the unreasonable conduct is a pre-condition of the existence of the power to 15 order costs and it is also a relevant factor to be taken into account in deciding whether to make an order for costs and the form of the order.”
“that prior to determining whether the service charges were reasonable and payable, it was necessary to determine a preliminary issue, concerning whether the Applicant had complied with clause 3(g) of the lease…”
“Provide a supply of hot water to the taps in the demised premises until the Lessee has installed an individual boiler for providing hot water to the Premises.”
“A fair proportion of the expenses outgoings and costs of supplying hot water to the demised premises determined by the Management Company acting reasonably based on the demised premises estimated share of usage likely to be incurred for the ensuing year up to 24 March in connection with the matters mentioned in clause 11 Part C, Schedule 7.”
“Instead, the tribunal is satisfied that it is appropriate to make a Rule 13 Order against the respondent. Apart from her recent payments which she intended to pay for current and ongoing service charges, the Respondent has never paid her service charges unless and until required to do so in order to participate in the enfranchisement and to obtain her new lease. She has sought to defend herself on spurious grounds unsupported by anything like sufficient evidence, as set out in detail above. Her behaviour has clearly passed the high threshold of “unreasonable”
“(b) Paragraph 2 of schedule 3 to the 2010 lease appears to allow for a different apportionment for the expenses of the hot water system but the application does not seem to have made any use of this as the respondent has continued to pay the same apportionment of all costs within her service charges. Therefore there might be an 29 argument that the apportionment should have changed to reflect the possibility that the Respondent used less of the hot water, not using it for heating, until she finally disconnected altogether from the system. However, the problem for the respondent is that the Tribunal was presented with no evidence as to the use made by other flats of the communal heating or how that compared to the use made of hot water, for the period 2010-2012 or any other period. There is not even any evidence that it would result in any difference to the respondent’s charges.”
“It appears that at some point in time Mr Stone contacted LEASE [the Leasehold Advisory Service] and received advice from them. It is not clear when. What is clear is that by a letter received at the tribunal offices on14 January 2015 Mr Stone sought to withdraw the claim. The letter is marked as being copied to the “defendants”
“In that context and to not waste the tribunal’s time I now withdraw my claim/application for a hearing in the tribunal, and now hope that both parties can work closely to resolving any further disagreements that might arise without recourse to the tribunal.”
“11. It does seem to me that [Mr Stone] could have withdrawn the case before he did. The payments had been credited to his account before the end of October. The extract of telephone conversations with LEASE would appear to indicate that he had spoken with them and they had advised him that “there was no benefit to carry on”
“I do not consider that the personal circumstances of Mr Stone are relevant to my determination but may be something the applicant will take into account.”
Showing the 50 most senior of 304.