“1. By 5pm on16 May 2025 , the JAC must disclose the following information held by it: a. All situational and other questions, specimen answers and the scoring framework utilised in the following exercises: i. The Deputy High Court selection exercises for 2021, 2022 and 2023. ii. The Specialist Circuit Judge selection exercises held in 2021, 2022 and 2023. b. Communications leading to the retirement of Dr Jarvis.” a. All situational and other questions, specimen answers and the scoring framework utilised in the following exercises: i. The Deputy High Court selection exercises for 2021, 2022 and 2023. ii. The Specialist Circuit Judge selection exercises held in 2021, 2022 and 2023. b. Communications leading to the retirement of Dr Jarvis.”
“I write this response with the apt professionalism and lack of vexatiousness. I refer to the disclosure provided by the JAC in purported compliance with the substituted decision notice issued by the tribunal on26 March 2025 . This relates to the information I requested about Dr Jarvis’ employment details and the circumstances of the cessation of that employment. The JAC’s response is an utter nonsense, and a contempt of court. It fails to comply with the order of the tribunal; the failure is both deliberate and contemptuous. I have no doubt that the JAC genuinely thought that I was so naïve that it would get away with sending me information which was not just irrelevant but almost impossible to comprehend. Please do not underestimate my intelligence, hold me in contempt, disrespect me because I happen to be of colour. Brown people can be just as bright and able as white folk. That’s before your obvious contempt of tribunal by sending me material which provides none of the information I requested. Let me do you the courtesy of explaining why. 1. My FOIA sought the following information from the JAC: “(d) Please let me know if Dr Jarvis resigned or retired as CEO in June 2023. Please provide all communications leading to his resignation or retirement, including his letter of resignation of retirement. (e) Did Dr Jarvis retire or resign before his term as CEO had ended? (f) Does he continue to be employed or otherwise engaged (sic.) or continue to have any association (direct or indirect) with the JAC?” 2. The JAC refused to answer the request, claiming the personal data exception. 3. The relevant parts of the judgment of the tribunal on this issue are in the following terms: “217 The JAC states that it holds no further information regarding “his notification on his retirement, including any letter of resignation or retirement”
“Please provide all communication leading to his resignation or retirement, including his letter of resignation or retirement.”
“a) Staff update6 June 2023 The redacted portions of that document are completely unrelated and out of scope to your request. The document is a regular internal update to JAC staff. It includes, for instance, recent changes in other staff roles (not Dr Jarvis), changes to staff pay, training initiatives and similar routine material. It is not within the scope of your FOI request. The redacted portions of that document are completely unrelated and out of scope to your request. The document is a regular internal update to JAC staff. It includes, for instance, recent changes in other staff roles (not Dr Jarvis), changes to staff pay, training initiatives and similar routine material. It is not within the scope of your FOI request. b) Staff update14 February 2023 The redacted parts of this document are similar in nature to those described at a). They are not within the scope of your FOI request. c) Email of18 January 2023 The name of the recipient of the email was redacted as this information was withheld undersection 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as it is personal information. However, in order to provide assurance and context of why the email was sent to this individual, I can inform you that the recipient of the email was [redacted], who is and was at the time of your request, a junior member of staff in the JAC Corporate Services team, who assists with recruitment. I confirm that the email was forwarding the email sent to [redacted]. d) Notification Letter from SSCL The date of this letter has not been redacted. The only redactions made to the document are Dr Jarvis’ home address and his employee number (which are personal information relating to Dr Jarvis, and withheld under section 40(2). This is a letter which is generated upon the inputting of a retirement date on the HR system used by all employees of the JAC and the wider MoJ. e) Form EMR7K This was annex to the letter from the SSCL and therefore that is why it was shared. It is a form completed by some public employees when leaving their employment. It is not a JAC form, and the JAC does not hold a completed version. The JAC does not know if SSCL will hold a version of the completed form, or whether it is disclosable by them.”
“The balance for complying with the substituted decision notice expire on27 June 2025 . I am disappointed, but unsurprised, that, once again, you have failed to heed the judge’s orders. It shows how much you disrespect her office, think that the JAC can operate with impunity, and that the law and rules do not apply to it. You should now comply with the judge’s orders and let me have the documents to which I am entitled – the exercises and the model answers – immediately. Unless the JAC complies fully with the substituted decision notice by 12 noon on9 July 2025 , I will request the FTT to refer this failure to the UT.”
“Thank you for your email. Previously, you threatened costs, to which I took great exception that you would even consider threatening a journalist for something which is clearly his job and so obviously in the public interest. Not only was it bad form, but your threat reminded me of the way Russia, North Korea and China castrate the press and put down dissent. In the UK – this is my home, and I am a loyal and patriotic subject – press freedoms are the cornerstone of democracy and civilisation. So, I’m extending you a courtesy you have never seen fit to grant me. May I respectfully suggest that you apply for a stay of execution pending your application for permission to your appeal being determined. In the meantime, I am perfectly entitled to seek a referral of your client’s failure to comply with the amended decision notice to the UT. I, therefore, intend to make that application, and I invite you to appeal, without the fear of legal threat from you that I am in any way incurring time and legal expenses for your client.”
“On9 July 2025 , the JAC sent most (but not all) of the outstanding information requested by the Applicant via email to the Applicant and his legal representatives, Mr Jacob Meagher. That email was in response to an email dated18th June 2025 that Mr Meagher had sent to the JAC on behalf of the Applicant, in which Mr Meagher set out in clear terms what the Applicant needed to know so he could bring the Certification Application to a conclusion. The obtaining of the information requested by Mr Meagher was crucial. The Applicant had made it clear to the JAC that he intended to write several follow-up articles about the JAC. It was as much in the interest of the JAC, the GLD, and Dr Jarvis as it was in the interest of the Applicant for the follow-up articles to be accurate in all respects. His several pieces in the Eastern Eye have already resulted in Parliamentary questions being asked about how the JAC operates. He has little doubt that the JAC will come under more scrutiny as and when he publishes further articles about its operations. The Applicant confirms that both he and Mr Meagher received the9 July 2025 email sent to Mr Meagher. As the JAC had forwarded a copy of that email to the Applicant, Mr Meagher neither sent nor considered the contents of the email himself as it was sent as a response to a FOIA request sent from the JAC not correspondence from the GLD. Under the terms of the Applicant’s retainer with Mr Meagher, Mr Meagher assumed (as he was entitled to) that the Applicant would contact him if he needed his assistance. As confirmed above, the Applicant confirms that he received a copy of the9 July 2025 email on the date and at the time it was sent to him. He had received several emails about his appeals from the FTT and various other quarters on9 July 2025 . In addition, he was also on holiday at the time. By what was a complete oversight, he did not look at that email. He did not realise that the JAC had responded to the18 June 2025 letter until4 September 2025 , when he received the GLD’s letter dated that day (and subsequently Ms Barling’s witness statement and supporting documents, as well as the JAC’s skeleton argument), that the JAC had purported to respond to the queries he had raised with it. The fact that neither Mr Meagher’s email dated 27 August nor any other communication passing by or on behalf of the parties refers to the9 July 2025 is clear evidence of this. The Applicant accepts total responsibility for this oversight. He unreservedly apologises for it.”
“2. Overriding objective and parties’ obligation to co-operate with the tribunal (1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with cases fairly and justly includes – (a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; (b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; (c) ensuring so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; (d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and (e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with the proper consideration of the issues. (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it – (a) exercises any power under these Rules; or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction. (4) Parties must – (a) help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and (b) co-operate with the Tribunal generally.” (a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; (b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; (c) ensuring so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; (d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and (e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with the proper consideration of the issues. (a) exercises any power under these Rules; or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction. (a) help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and (b) co-operate with the Tribunal generally.”
“Unreasonable” also means what it has been understood to mean in this context for at least half a century. The expression aptly describes conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But conduct cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result or because other more cautious legal representatives would have acted differently. The acid test is whether the conduct permits of a reasonable explanation. If so, the course adopted may be regarded as optimistic and as reflecting on a practitioner’s judgment, but it is not unreasonable.”
“When considering objectively whether a party has acted unreasonably or not, the question is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances in which the party in question found themselves would have acted in the way in which that party acted. In making that assessment it would be wrong, we consider, to assume a greater degree of legal knowledge or familiarity with the procedures of the tribunal and the conduct of proceedings before it, that is in fact possessed by the party whose conduct is under consideration. The behaviour of an unrepresented party with no legal knowledge should be judged by the standards of a reasonable person who does not have legal advice. The crucial question is always whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the party has acted unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings. We also consider that the fact a party who has behaved unreasonably does not have the benefit of legal advice may be relevant, though to a lesser extent, at the second and third stages, when considering whether an order for costs should be made and form that order should take.”
“It is important that parties in tribunal proceedings, especially unrepresented parties, should be assisted to make sensible concessions and to abandon less important points of contention or even, where appropriate, their entire claim. Such behaviour should be encouraged, not discouraged by the fear that it will be treated as an admission that the abandoned issues were unsustainable and ought never to have been raised, and as a justification for a claim of costs.”
“In my view, it would be legally erroneous if, acting on misconceived analogy with the CPR, tribunal took the line that it was unreasonable conduct for Employment Tribunal claimants to withdraw claims and that they should accordingly be made liable to pay all of the costs of the proceedings. It would be unfortunate if claimants were deterred from dropping claims by the prospect of an order for costs on withdrawal, which might well not be made against them if they fought on to a full hearing and failed. As Miss MacAtherty, appearing for the Applicant, pointed out, withdrawal could lead to a saving of costs. Also, as Thorpe LJ observed during argument, notice of withdrawal might in some cases be the dawn of sanity and the Tribunal should not adopt a practice on costs which would deter applicants from making sensible litigation decisions.”
“We also consider that the fact that a party who has behaved unreasonably does not have the benefit of legal advice may be relevant, though to a lesser extent, at the second and third stages, when considering whether an order for costs should be made and what form that order should take. When exercising the discretion…the tribunal should have regard to all of the relevant facts known to it, including any mitigating circumstances, but without either “excessive indulgence” or allowing the absence of representation to become an excuse for unreasonable conduct.”