MS REBECCA DENHOLM v MS CANDIDA STOBBS [2016] UKUT 288 (LC)

UPPER TRIBUNAL

LANDS CHAMBER

[2016] UKUT 288 (LC)

Case No LRA/111/2015

Between

MS REBECCA DENHOLMApplicant

MS CANDIDA STOBBSRespondent

Before

His Honour Judge Huskinson

Mr Peter D McCrea FRICS

(in person) for Appellant

Stuart Armstrong for Respondent

Venue the Royal Courts of Justice, London WC2A 2LL

Date 2 December 2016

Hearing 18-19 May 2016

Property: Upper Maisonette,, 12 Needham Road,, London, W11 2RP

Catchwords: LEASEHOLD ENFRANCHISEMENT - Premium - Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 Schedule 13, Part II - terms of new lease - unimproved freehold value - gross internal area basis preferred - deferment rate - Sportelli rate of 5% preferred - relativity following Sloane Stanley and Ors v Mundy and Ors - RICS report graphs - Gerald Eve graph preferred starting point - premium determined at £260,000

[1]This is an appeal by way of a re-hearing by Ms Rebecca Denholm (“the appellant”) against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) (“the F-tT”) dated 8 September 2015 within which the F-tT determined that the premium payable by the respondent long leaseholder, Ms Candida Stobbs (“the respondent”) to acquire an extended lease of the upper maisonette, 12 Needham Road, Notting Hill, London, W11 2RP (“the appeal property”) under section 56 of and schedule 13 to the Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (“the 1993 Act”) should be £293,500.

[2]The appeal’s progression through the F-tT was not straightforward. The case was heard on 30 September 2015 following which the F-tT issued a decision of 26 November 2014. Following representations from the parties, that decision was corrected on 23 December 2014. Both parties sought leave to appeal against the corrected decision, which the F-tT refused but indicated that it would review the corrected decision and invited further representations. Following receipt of those representations the F-tT published its reviewed decision on 26 May 2015. Both parties applied for permission to appeal against the reviewed decision. The F-tT again refused these applications but further amended the reviewed decision which was published as above. Both parties applied for permission to appeal against that decision.

[3]On 24 November 2015 the Deputy President granted permission to appeal to the appellant and permission to cross appeal to the respondent, observing that the parties agreed that the final decision of the F-tT contained at least one error of calculation and for that reason permission to appeal must be granted. The F-tT’s decisions provided three different figures for the premium but neither party considered that any of those figures had been arrived at on a correct basis of valuation. The Deputy President therefore determined that the appeal and cross appeal would be heard as a re-hearing with no further concern given to the consideration of the decisions of the F-tT. For convenience, we refer to Ms Denholm as the appellant and Ms Stobbs as the respondent, whilst noting that Ms Stobbs was also granted permission to cross appeal.

[4]The appellant represented herself. At the F-tT, Mr J W Hamand MRICS gave expert valuation evidence for the appellant. Mr Hamand’s report was submitted to us but he did not appear. The respondent was represented by Mr Stuart Armstrong of counsel who called Mr Timothy Lee FRICS to give expert valuation evidence.

[5]On the morning of Friday 20 May we internally inspected the appeal property accompanied by the parties, following which we made unaccompanied external inspections of the properties which the parties had cited as comparable evidence. Facts 4

[6]From our inspections and the evidence, we find the following facts.

[7]Needham Road is a short link street between Artesian Road and Westbourne Grove in Notting Hill within the City of Westminster. The area is primarily residential in nature, with some retail uses and a public house.

[8]12 Needham Road (“the building”) is owned by the appellant. It has two elements. There is a ground floor and basement retail/live-work unit until recently occupied by the respondent. The appeal property is the two-storey first and second floor maisonette which lies above it. The building is not listed but lies within the Westbourne Conservation area.

[9]The building is of brick stucco-fronted construction, with a “London invert” slated roof and flat felt-roofed rear additions. The appeal property has its own front door, giving access to a narrow entrance hall from which a staircase leads to a small half landing and kitchen at mezzanine level with a return staircase leading up to the first floor which comprises a combined reception/dining room. There is a narrow front balcony accessed by sash windows but which, owing to both its limited depth and raised height above the first floor level, is used by the respondent as an area for plants and pots. The landing at first floor has a small desk and telephone point. A short staircase gives access to the bathroom situated above the kitchen, at a mezzanine level between the first and second floors, and a return flight of stairs gives further access to the two second floor bedrooms.

[10]Owing to the configuration of the roof, there are two attic areas, each accessed by a loft hatch, one of which is on the second floor landing and the other of which is in a bedroom. Each attic has a mono-pitch roof with a maximum internal height of around four feet.

[11]The appeal property offers a relatively basic level of accommodation in comparison with the comparable evidence, and would benefit from refurbishment, particularly to the kitchen and bathroom. It has a gross internal area of 907sq ft excluding the attic space.

[12]The appellant purchased the freehold interest of the building at auction in February 2012 at a price of £560,000 plus costs. The Lease

[13]The appeal property is held on a lease dated 28 February 1967, for a term of 90 years from 25 December 1966, at a fixed ground rent of £45 per annum. The First Schedule to the lease defines the demised premises, for which the tenant had an obligation to well and substantially repair etc, as including “….the internal and external walls of the maisonette and the roof thereon.”

[14]Under part 2 of the lease, the tenant covenants: 5 “(x) not at any time during the said term to erect or place any additional building or erection on any part of the demised premises and not to make any alterations in the plan or elevation of the premises hereby demised or in any way [to] the party walls or floors of the principal or bearing walls or timbers thereof nor to affix to or hang from the exterior of the demised premises any window box sign or other matter or thing.”

[15]Under part 3 of the lease, the freeholder covenants:

“(v) at the reasonable request of the Lessee to enforce the repairing covenants given by the present tenant of the lower part in the lease thereof, but without prejudice to the right of the Lessee to enforce such repairing covenants direct against the said tenant of the lower part. (vi) if the lower part comes into the possession and occupation of the Lessor at the expiration or determination of the existing lease thereof to maintain the said lower part in accordance with the terms of the said existing lease as if it were the Lessee thereunder during such time as the said lower part remains in the possession and occupation of the Lessor. (vii) to use its best endeavours to ensure that any subsequent lease tenancy or occupation of the lower part shall contain repairing covenants not less onerous than those at present contained in the existing lease thereof.”

Notices under the 1993 Act

[16]On 12 August 2013 solicitors for Ms Stobbs served a Notice under section 42 of the 1993 Act seeking a new 90-year lease to commence on 26 December 2056 and proposing a premium of £171,275. The Notice also sought changes to the lease relating Ms Stobbs’s repairing obligations, so that Ms Denholm as freeholder would be responsible for the repair, maintenance etc of all external walls, roofs etc, and then to recover a fair proportion of the costs of so doing from her.

[17]On 24 October 2013 solicitors for Ms Denholm served a Counter-Notice under section 45, admitting Ms Stobbs’s right to a new lease, rejecting the proposed changes in terms, and proposing a premium of £264,200.

[18]On 22 April 2014, Ms Stobbs made an application to the F-tT for the determination of the premium, which it did as outlined above, at a premium of £293,500. Statutory provisions

[19]Part II of Schedule 13 to the 1993 Act provides the framework under which the premium payable in respect of the grant of a new reversionary lease shall be calculated. In so far as relevant to this appeal, this is, in essence, that the premium payable by the tenant shall be the aggregate of— 6(a) the diminution in value of the landlord’s interest in the tenant’s flat (being the difference between the value of the landlord’s interest prior to the grant of the new lease and the value of her interest in the flat once the new lease is granted, in each case assuming a sale on the open market subject to the relevant lease, with neither the tenant nor any owner of an intermediate leasehold interest buying or seeking to buy); and

(b) 50% of the marriage value created by the new lease (being the difference between the aggregate of the value of the tenant’s interest under the existing lease and the landlord’s interest prior to the new lease being granted; and the aggregate of those interests following the grant of the new lease). Agreed matters

[20]Both parties have adopted the framework under Schedule 13 in calculating the premium to be paid. Within these calculations there was common ground as to the following:(a) that at the relevant valuation date of 13 August 2013, the existing lease had 43.37 years unexpired.

(b) that a future extended 133.37-year term would have relativity of 99% compared with the unimproved freehold value.

(c) that the unusual repairing covenants of the existing lease, and if mirrored in the new lease, would in each case be reflected by a 1.5% discount to that relativity.

(d) that the freeholder’s current interest has a value of £647, equivalent to the current ground rent of £45 per annum capitalised for 43.37 years at a yield of 6.5%. Issues for Determination

[21]The issues in dispute, which we deal with in turn, are as follows:(a) the terms of the new lease;

(b) the unimproved freehold value of the appeal property at the relevant date of 13 August 2013;

(d) the relativity of a normal short lease value with 43.37 years remaining at the valuation date;

(e) and therefore the premium to be paid for a new 90-year reversionary lease. Ms Denholm, after some alteration at the hearing, contended for a premium of £379,376.07, compared with Mr Lee’s figure of £244,030. 7 The Terms of the New Lease

[22]Notwithstanding their respective positions stated in the Notice and Counter-Notice, by the time of the Ft-T hearing, Ms Stobbs had conceded that the terms of the new lease should not change, and the Ft-T was therefore not required to make a determination. Despite her previous objection, it is now Ms Denholm who seeks to alter the lease terms, to remove from the demise the external walls and roof, which she proposes to repair and maintain subject to recovery of proportionate amounts from Ms Stobbs. She also seeks to recover the cost of employing any managing agents. Ms Denholm submitted correspondence between the parties which she said showed that Mr Stobbs struggled independently to manage her repairing obligations.

[23]For Ms Stobbs, Mr Armstrong submitted that since the Ft-T did not deal with changes to the lease (apart from rent and term), there is no issue to appeal as regards changes to the lease under the scope of the Deputy President’s permission to appeal. In the alternative, Ms Denholm’s proposed changes did not bring the case within any of the circumstances envisaged under section 57(6) of the 1993 Act and Ms Denholm had not shown that the lease was defective. Mr Armstrong said that the current lease terms, under which Ms Stobbs was responsible for external and structural repairs, whilst unusual were perfectly workable.

[24]Whilst we agree with Mr Armstrong on this point, it seems to us that there is a further difficulty, about which we made a provisional observation at the hearing, namely that the proposed changes would involve the demise of the premises physically reducing, in that the exterior of the walls and roof would no longer form part of the demised premises. In the absence of agreement between the parties, we have no power to order the grant of a new lease of less than the extent of the current demise.

[25]Accordingly, our determination of the premium payable is based upon the terms of the new lease mirroring those of the existing lease, save for a rent of a peppercorn, and having a term of 90 years from 26 December 2056. Unimproved freehold value Basic approaches

[26]Prior to dealing with the comparable evidence in any detail, we now outline the valuation approaches of the two parties, and explain why we prefer one to the other.

[27]Mr Hamand’s report to the Ft-T was submitted to us, but since he was no longer instructed by Ms Denholm he did not appear and his evidence was therefore untested. It was not referred to in any detail at the hearing, and we have not placed any weight upon it. By her own admission Ms Denholm is not an expert in the valuation of property, but she does have expertise and experience in architecture, floor plans, and the analysis of data. By any measure, she had put in a large amount of time and effort in presenting her case. 8

[28]Mr Armstrong called Mr Timothy Lee FRICS to give expert evidence. Mr Lee also appeared for Ms Stobbs at the Ft-T. Mr Lee is a Chartered Surveyor of 45 years standing, and has worked for many of the leading residential practices. He has practised in leasehold reform for many years, including acting for several hundred leaseholders, and some freeholders, mostly in central London, and has carried out valuations in Notting Hill for a variety of purposes.

[29]Both Ms Denholm and Mr Lee used comparable transactions in the Notting Hill area as the basis of their valuations of the freehold interest of the appeal property, but they adopted differing methods of devaluation of those comparables.

[30]Ms Denholm’s approach had two strands. First, she used evidence to submit that different floors of a building attracted different values per sq ft, with lower floors (starting at the first floor) being more valuable in general terms than upper floors. Secondly, that the devaluation of comparable transactions, and the valuation of the appeal property, should be on what she termed a net useable area basis.

[31]In respect of the first strand, Ms Denholm relied upon four transactions within two buildings at Sutherland Place – a short distance away from Needham Road. The properties involved, together with Ms Denholm’s devaluations and notes, were as follows: Property Price/Date Adjustment Position/Size Notes Adjusted Price Price per sq ft Flat C, 52 Sutherland Place £500,000 Aug 12 +6.95% 366 sq ft 1st floor Balcony. Low spec and alterations to front window which required replacement. Missing original features £540,151 £1,475 (adjusted to £1,544 mid spec) Flat E, 52 Sutherland Place £415,000 April 12 +7.95% 427 sq ft 3rd floor attic Newly refurbished to a high spec £447,992 £1,049 (adjusted to £962 mid spec) Flat 3, 19 Sutherland Place £650,000 Sep 13 -1%?(sic) 346 sq ft 1st floor Balconette. Good spec original fireplaces and cornices £643,500 £1,860 2nd/3rd Floor Maisonette, 19 Sutherland Place £1,375,000 Dec 14 -7.4% 508 sq ft 2nd floor 444 sq ft attic Good spec £1,280,260 2nd floor £1,083 3rd floor £1,186

[32]Ms Denholm said that the above results showed that, broadly, if the second floor of a property was worth a factor of 1 per sq ft, the first floor, which tended to have higher ceilings of approximately 3m, was worth 1.2 and the attic space was worth 0.8. The Sutherland Place comparables showed a greater range than this, but Ms Denholm said that she had been conservative in adopting ratios of 20%. 9

[33]As regards her second strand, Ms Denholm adopted what she described as a useable floor space method in both analysing comparable evidence and valuing the appeal property to determine the floor area efficiency, as she termed it. This method excluded hallways and stairs, but included the principal rooms together with bathrooms and wc’s. The market operates on a gross internal area basis, and when properties are marketed for sale, floor plans are generally included in the agent’s marketing particulars. Ms Denholm had used a software package in order to convert the gross internal areas of these comparables to her useable floor space basis in each case. This useable floor space was then subjected to multipliers, drawn from Ms Denholm’s analysis on the Sutherland Place properties, in order to arrive at a total number of “points” (an adjusted floor area). Hence for example the first floor was subject to a multiplier of 1.2 in comparison to the second floor rate.

[34]Accordingly, whilst Ms Denholm agreed that the gross internal area of the appeal property was 907 sq ft (without the attic storage space which we shall consider shortly), she calculated that the adjusted useable floor space was 787 sq ft, comprising: Floor/Room Area (sq ft) Factor Adjusted Area (sq ft or “points”) 1st/ Reception Rooms 327 1.2 392 2nd/Bedrms & Laundry 341 1 341 Mezz/Kitchen 34 0.8 27 Mezz/Bathroom 34 0.8 27 Total: 787

[35]Mr Lee’s approach was based on gross internal areas, both for the devaluation of comparable properties and in his valuation of the subject property. He said that he had never come across Mr Denholm’s method in his years in practice, and had never used it himself.

[36]At this point it is convenient to deal with the attic. Ms Denholm calculated this to be 344 sq ft, and, when adjusted using a factor of 0.2, an adjusted area of 69 sq ft or points. She considered that the attic was of benefit, and could be developed as a roof terrace, relying on a precedent at 15 Needham Road, opposite the appeal property.

[37]We do not attribute any material value to the attic, for several reasons. First, having inspected the two attic compartments, we consider that they are of very limited use. They hardly justify the use of the word attic – they are in substance merely areas of roof space into which it would be difficult for a person to gain access. Secondly, Ms Denholm’s thought of the attic having development potential is flawed. In evidence it transpired that the development at 15 Needham Road had been carried out without planning permission, and accordingly is unreliable as a planning precedent. Additionally, the development cannot be carried out without the landlord’s consent. As clause 2(x) referred to at paragraph 14 is an absolute covenant, there is no implication that any consent cannot be unreasonably withheld. 10

[38]Ms Denholm used her adjusted floor area basis in a lengthy examination and analysis of the comparable transactions, and showed how the evidence which that analysis produced can be applied to the appeal property, again on a usable floor area basis. She arrived at an unimproved freehold value of £1,547,000.

[39]Whilst we acknowledge the considerable amount of care and thought Ms Denholm has put into her case, we do not agree with her basic method. As we observed during the hearing, the principle that, all other things being equal, the higher a flat is within a building the less it is worth per sq ft is uncontroversial. Mr Lee agree there would be some difference, but not as high as Ms Denholm’s adopted 20%. But Ms Denholm’s analysis is in our view unreliable for several reasons. It compares flats of differing sizes, ranging from 366 sq ft to 952 sq ft, without any adjustment for quantum. It relies upon her subjective (and by her own admission non-expert) adjustment for quality or fit out. There was no evidence in support of her contentions of the effect on value of specification, or for instance that a purchaser would pay less for a property with an altered front sash window. Accordingly, the basic method of devaluation of the comparables is not, in our view, on a sound footing.

[40]Additionally, Ms Denholm’s internal floor area basis relied upon the accuracy of scanning from sales particulars to arrive at net floor areas, which we are not persuaded is sound. But we have a more fundamental concern about Ms Denholm’s concept of efficiency of floor area. During our inspection of the appeal property we noticed that the stairs were relatively steep. Using Ms Denholm’s approach, the property would attract more value if the steps were even steeper, and thus used less floor area than currently. That cannot be right.

[41]The unreliability of Ms Denholm’s approach was highlighted in her analysis of the appeal property in comparison with 4 Needham Road, where she considered that the value of the attic of the appeal property (at something in the order of £120,000), could be offset against, or cancel out, the value of the garden at 4 Needham Road. That is plainly not right in our view.

[42]In the background to these concerns, (although we would not rely on this with greater force than our views above) there is the question of credibility. Ms Denholm is a layperson, albeit one that has submitted documents of considerable detail. However, we place greater weight on Mr Lee’s opinion, as a Chartered Surveyor who has practised in residential property in the area for decades.

[43]Having made that finding, it is unnecessary for us to recount in detail how Ms Denholm compared the valuation of the appeal property to her analysis of the comparable transactions. Instead we have generally adopted Mr Lee’s approach, although not wholly so as we will now explain. Analysis of comparable evidence

[44]Ms Denholm relied upon a proposed sale of 15 Needham Road, which she said was under offer at £1,649,000. Whilst as a comparable this has the attraction of being immediately opposite the appeal property, both Mr Denholm and Mr Lee confirmed at the hearing that the sale had not taken 11 place. We do not find the proposed sale to be of any assistance, as it does not represent an actual transaction, and we have not placed any weight on this.

[45]Ms Denholm also relied upon the sale of two upper floor maisonettes at 200 and 228 Westbourne Grove. Having inspected them, we do not find the locations to be comparable. This end of Westbourne Grove is a busy shopping street, and the properties are set back behind large garden terraces. We do not derive any assistance from these transactions as comparable evidence.

[46]Mr Lee relied on 12 sales of comparable properties, five of which post-dated the valuation date1. His schedule of these properties, after some amendment at the hearing, is attached at Appendix 1. Many of these were common comparables, as Ms Denholm had also referred to them. Briefly, they were: Locations with pre-claim date transactions Locations with post-claim date transactions Flat 1, 14 Needham Road 154 Westbourne Grove Flat A, 4 Needham Road Flat C, Lonsdale Road Upper Maisonette, 4 Needham Road 19 Sutherland Place 35 Artesian Road 21 Colville Terrace Upper Maisonette, 8 Moorhouse Road Flat 2, 10 Colville Gardens Flat 3, 28 Sutherland Place Flat D, 50 Lonsdale Road

[47]Having externally inspected the comparables, we do not consider the locations of 10 Colville Gardens and 21 Colville Terrace are sufficiently comparable for us to attach any weight the transactions at those locations. The maisonette at 8 Moorhouse Road is considerably larger than the appeal property, and its adjusted price appears to be, perhaps for this reason, noticeably low in comparison with the majority of the comparables. Mr Lee accepted in cross examination that a case could be made for its exclusion. We endorse that, and have placed no weight on the sale of 8 Moorhouse Road as a comparable.

[48]Mr Lee explained the adjustments he had made to the various comparable sales, for example for layout, floor, gardens, parking spaces etc, and we accept that these accurately reflect the differences between the various properties. He also made amendments to reflect the extended lease of the appeal property, and again we accept these.

[49]Both parties reflected the changes in levels of value between the various dates of transactions and the valuation date by using indices. Mr Lee’s approach was to use the Savills Prime London Residential Capital Values Index for Central London flats and maisonettes, and which reports quarterly figures. He said that this accurately reflected the changes in values of properties comparable to the appeal property until a point about 12 months after the valuation date – a period which covered all of the relevant comparable transactions. 1 Neither party indicated that there was any difficulty in applying post-valuation date evidence. 12

[50]For transactions after Autumn 2014, Mr Lee considered the Savills index to be of less help. He said that since changes in SDLT in the autumn/winter of 2014, the market at upper levels - which dominates the Savills index – has been depressed, whereas properties of less than £2 million continued to increase in value. This was only really relevant in respect of 15 Needham Road, but as we have indicated above we do not consider the fact that that property is under offer to be of any assistance, and accordingly we need not comment on this aspect any further.

[51]Despite referring to all of the comparables, and making adjustments to bring them into line with the appeal property, Mr Lee on reflection agreed to the Ft-T’s preference of only four comparable properties – Flat 1, 14 Needham Road, both flats at 4 Needham Road, and 35 Artesian Gardens. We do not agree with that approach. Whilst physically close to the appeal property, we have sufficient doubts in respect of three of the four to consider that limiting the evidence to only them is likely to give an incorrect result.

[52]Flat 1, 14 Needham Road would ordinarily be as good a comparable as one might hope for, being very similar to the appeal property and next door to it. However, it sale in September 2006 is historic, causing an index-based adjustment of over 60% to be necessary. Both flat A and the upper maisonette at 4 Needham Road were purchased by the same party, on the same date, and the whole property is now on the market as a house. Whilst there was no direct evidence that there was any element of special purchase, again we question whether these two sales, forming half of Mr Lee’s limited pool, can be wholly reliable.

[53]We consider a better approach is to take account of Mr Lee’s nine comparables after the exclusions referred to above. The larger the number of comparables, the less one particular comparable can affect the end valuation. We are satisfied that the nine are comparable following adjustment and can be relied upon.

[54]There were some slight errors in Mr Lee’s interpolation exercise in which he calculated index figures for intermediate months not reported in the quarterly index. For instance, for the valuation date of August 2013, he calculated a figure of 215.42. The published indices are 213.1 for June 2013, and 217.7 for September 2013. We consider that the correct index for August 2013, interpolating on a straight line basis, is 216.2 (with July being 214.6). There were similar slight errors elsewhere in Mr Lee’s use of indices, but it is unnecessary for us to outline these in detail. However, we have corrected them in our own analysis.

[55]Additionally, Mr Lee’s table aggregated the adjusted sales prices of his comparables, and divided this by the aggregate square footage of those comparables. We prefer to average the rate per sq ft produced by each individual comparable. Again, the difference is not great.

[56]Following corrections to the index adjustments, outlined as Appendix 2, the average price arrived at is £1,310 per sq ft, but this on the basis of an extended leasehold, not freehold. We agree with the parties that an extended 133.37-year lease would have a relativity of 99%. Accordingly, we consider that the freehold value per sq ft at the valuation date would be £1,323.74, resulting in a total 2We think Mr Lee has divided the difference between the two indices, 4.6, by four rather than three. 13 unimproved freehold value of £1,200,629.59. Neither party felt it necessary to round this figure to reflect an actual sale in the market, and we do not do so.

[57]The equivalent long leasehold value, on an extended lease, and on “normal” lease terms, would be £1,188,623.29. On a “stand back and look” basis, we are satisfied that a long leasehold value of this level sits comfortably with the comparables. 14 Needham Road, next door and slightly larger, would have an equivalent value of £1,219,000. 154 Westbourne Grove, on the corner of Needham Road, would have an equivalent value of £1,390,354 before an adjustment for quality but was far superior. 35 Artesian Road, a much larger property but again just around the corner, would have an equivalent value of £1,772,878 before adjustment.

[58]Mr Lee also relied upon a marketing report on the appeal property from his former firm, Strutt and Parker, in August 2014. We have placed little weight upon this as the valuers were not called as witnesses, but note in passing that the suggested asking price of £1,300,000, once adjusted for time using the Savills index, would suggest an asking price of £1,208,000 which again sits comfortably with our valuation.

[59]Before leaving this topic we should mention one other aspect. Ms Denholm relied upon her purchase of the freehold interest in February 2012 at £560,000 plus costs. To arrive at a value for the appeal property she deducted the value of the ground floor and basement. To find this, she used a comparable of 15 Needham Road, which she said had the same layout and which she said was sold in June 2010 at £390,000. She then made several adjustments for length of lease and deferment rate, and time using the Savills index, to arrive at a freehold value of the appeal property of between £1.67 million and £1.85 million.

[60]We reject that approach for several reasons. First, it included the costs of purchase which do not represent the net purchase price. Secondly, it assumed that the commercial element of 15 Needham Road was very similar, if not identical, to that of the building, and there is no evidence that this was the case. Thirdly, it assumed that the sum of the parts would equal the whole which is not necessarily the case in valuation. Finally, it ignored the fact that the purchase price at auction, for a property which was the subject to a short residential lease, would include an expectation of a premium receipt when that lease was extended – as it the case here. We are not assisted by this approach, which seems to be founded on the premise that the present exercise should wholly recoup Ms Denholm for her initial purchase. That is not the basis of the statutory valuation exercise.

[61]Accordingly, our determination of the premium payable is based upon an unimproved freehold value of £1,200,629.59. Deferment Rate

[62]We can deal with this point in short order. Mr Lee considered the appeal property to be a flat, and adopted the Sportelli3 rate of 5%. Ms Denholm argued for a rate of 4.75%. She submitted that 3 From Earl Cadogan and Anor v Sportelli and Anor

[2007] 1 EGLR 153

14 the appeal property does not have standard lease terms, and the repairing responsibility lies with Ms Stobbs. The only responsibility of the landlord, Ms Denholm argued, was to insure the building. Otherwise the building is owner occupied, and does not compare to a block of flats.

[63]We do not agree with Ms Denholm. In addition to insuring, the landlord also has obligations which we have outlined at paragraph 15 above, in terms of either enforcing the repairing liabilities of the ground floor/basement occupier, or carrying them out herself should that space be in hand.

[64]As regards individual flats versus blocks of flats, the Lands Tribunal in Sportelli confirmed a previous decision in Arbib v Earl Cadogan

[2005] 3 EGLR 139

that there should be a differential between houses and flats, having regard to the lesser management problems of a single house, and that it was not necessary to assume a different risk factor for a single flat compared with a block of flats.

[65]We consider Mr Lee is correct in adopting 5% as the appropriate deferment rate, and have done so in our determination of the premium. Relativity

[66]Relativity means the ratio between the value of a property held on a lease of a given term, with that property’s freehold vacant possession value. It is expressed as a percentage, and is relevant in a calculation under the 1993 Act as it informs the leasehold interest on a “before” and “after” basis when calculating the marriage value, 50% of which will be payable to the freeholder in return for the new reversionary lease being entered into.

[67]In this case, the parties agree that the unusual terms of the existing lease should be reflected in a 1.5% discount being applied to the relativity. As we have determined above that there should be no change to the terms of the lease, save for rent and duration, this agreed 1.5% discount should also be applied to the relativity of any new lease. Accordingly, the issue between the parties is the appropriate relativity for a lease with normal covenants with an unexpired term 43.37 years.

[68]Relativity is a presently a topical issue. We dealt with it in Kosta v Carnwath & Ors

[2014] UKUT 0319 (LC)

, and the Tribunal (Mr Justice Morgan and Mr A J Trott FRICS) has very recently revisited the subject in The Trustees of the Sloane Stanley Estate v Mundy

[2016] UKUT 0223 (LC)

[69]In his expert report, Mr Lee said that the relativity of a 43.37-year unexpired term, without rights, in Prime Central London (“PCL”), would be 68.7% in accordance with the graph drawn up by Gerald Eve, and included in the RICS Research Report “Leasehold Reform: Graphs of Relativity” (October 2009) (“The RICS report”). The appeal property was not in PCL, and Mr Lee said that he had agreed settlements out of PCL, but close to it, at 1% or sometimes higher than the figures indicated in Gerald Eve graph. 15

[70]Mr Lee said that, following our decision in Kosta, the averaging of all of the graphs in the RICS report, would result in a relativity of 69.5%. He commented that Mr Hamand had agreed this figure as evidenced in the Ft-T decision. Mr Lee therefore adopted 69.5% on normal lease terms, and therefore 68% for the subject lease, as his relativity for the existing short lease term. In giving evidence, he said that his position had not changed as a result of the Tribunal’s decision in Sloane Stanley.

[71]Ms Denholm, relying on Mr Hamand, originally argued for a relativity rate in line with the Gerald Eve graph. Her position subsequently altered after she had studied the RICS graphs. Ms Denholm preferred the evidence of the graphs that deal with transactions, rather than settlements, to avoid what she called a Chinese whisper effect. She preferred the Gerald Eve, WA Ellis and Austin Gray charts, which on average showed a relativity of 67.52% inside PCL4. Outside PCL, the average of the Austin Gray and Beckett & Kay charts produced an average of 60.22%.

[72]Ms Denholm was struck by the comment by Austin Gray in the RICS report that “the assumption has been made that investors will enter the market for leases sub 40 years at around 50% relativity for rental income with a diminishing capital return, for this reason the curve levels somewhat at around 40 years”. This led her to make further investigations, and considered the real issues relevant to prospective buyers who were owner occupiers, and those who were investors. She said that an owner-occupier would be unlikely to pay more than the aggregate rent over the unexpired period of the short lease. She made a series of calculations on this basis, allowing for a rental yield of 3.39% for Notting Hill (based on the John D Wood index for the valuation date), inflation at 0.5%, and an 8% adjustment to reflect costs and responsibilities that would normally be the landlord’s. On this basis she arrived at a relativity of 77.7%. In terms of the investor, she used a similar method, and assuming a yield of 4%, she arrived at a relativity of 56.2%.

[73]Ms Denholm then blended her two results to arrive at a relativity of 65.15% for a lease with normal covenants, adjusted down by the agreed 1.5%, resulting in 63.65% on the unusual lease terms.

[74]Whilst again we note the considerable amount of work Ms Denholm has carried out in her analysis, we reject her approach. It is based on subjective inputs and assumptions from a party who, by her own admission, is not a qualified valuer. In respect of the graphs in the RICS report, the Austin Gray graph is of no assistance as it reflects properties that were primarily in Brighton and Hove, and in respect of leases of less than 50 years unexpired, it relied upon very limited settlement data. The Beckett and Kay graph was based on opinion only, and in respect of mortgage-dependent properties only.

[75]Ms Stobbs’s purchase of the leasehold interest is of no assistance, as it pre-dates the valuation date by some years, and the purchase price was not in evidence. Ordinarily, that would have been the best guide to value, once adjusted for Act rights. In its absence, we look to the relativity graphs. 4 We suspect Ms Denholm meant a firm other than Austin Gray as they did not provide a graph for properties inside PCL. 16

[76]In Sloane Stanley, the Tribunal had the benefit of extensive evidence in respect of the various relativity graphs that featured in the RICS report which was not available to us in Kosta. We have no hesitation in endorsing the Tribunal’s approach in Sloane Stanley. It is apparent from Mr Lee’s evidence, and the evidence before the Tribunal in Sloane Stanley, that the market only began to take a relativity figure from an average of the graphs in the RICS report following our decision in Kosta, which was issued in July 2014. It would not have been available to the parties at the valuation date in this case. We are satisfied that, at that time, the Gerald Eve graph would have been the starting point. Mr Lee used it. We note, in passing, that Mr Hamand also adopted it, without adjustment, as evidenced in the Ft-T decision. We endorse the Tribunal’s comments (Appendix C, paragraph 64) in Sloane Stanley that the Gerald Eve graph might overstate relativities.

[77]Another approach from Sloane Stanley would be to use the Savills 2002 enfranchiseable graph, and make an adjustment for Act rights. The Savills 2002 graph has relativity at 75.2% for a 40-year unexpired term, and 78.1 % for 45 years. We estimate that for 43.37 years the relativity would be something in the order of 77%. A ten percent deduction for Act rights would arrive at a relativity of 70%. We follow the Tribunal’s approach in Sloane Stanley in considering that to be too high, as relativity is likely to have fallen since 2002.

[78]Based on the material before us, we accept Mr Lee’s evidence that there is a slight differential between properties in PCL and properties just outside it. However, we also endorse the Tribunal’s findings in Sloane Stanley, that whilst the Gerald Eve graph is the most reliable (or, the least least- reliable graph), it is only a starting point. Doing the best we can, we consider that the correct relativity at the valuation date for an unexpired term of 43.37 years, without Act rights, was 67.7%, arrived at by reducing the figure from the Gerald Eve graph by 1%. With a discount to reflect the unusual lease terms, agreed at 1.55, the relativity reduces to 66.2%. Determination of the Premium Payable

[79]There is one final point at issue. In her valuation, Ms Denholm applied a multiplier to the freeholder’s reversion of 0.1536 which she said reflected an assumed completion date of the transaction of August 13 2016.

[80]We reject that approach. The statute provides a fixed valuation date which we must adopt. The fact that a freeholder can be effectively kept out of their money by the tenant first applying to the Ft- T, and then the Tribunal, is part of the value of the Act rights. If we were to adopt Ms Denholm’s approach, our determination of the premium would alter depending upon when the case was heard by the Tribunal. That cannot be right. We prefer the figure of 0.12015 which is the present value of £1 after 43.37 years at an assumed growth rate of 5%.

[81]Accordingly, having regard to our decisions outlined above, viz.: that the lease terms will remain unaltered save for rent and term; a freehold value of £1,200,629.59; a deferment rate of 5%, and relativity of 66.2%; we arrive at a premium payable for a new 99-year term commencing on 26 December 2056 of £259,669.36, say £260,000. The Tribunal’s valuation is attached as Appendix 3. 17 Conclusion

[82]We determine the premium payable by the respondent for the extended lease of the upper maisonette, 12 Needham Road, London, W11 2RP to be £260,000.

[83]We would conclude by saying that Ms Denholm submitted evidence of an impressive amount of detail, and whilst we did not agree with the thrust of her submissions, she is to be commended for the way in which she presented her case. However, we found her repeated and at times trenchant criticisms of Mr Lee to be totally unfounded. Dated :20 June 2016 His Honour Judge Huskinson P D McCrea FRICS 18 Addendum on costs

[84]After the publication our decision dated 20 June 2016 upon the substantive matter the Tribunal has received an application by the appellant for an order for costs against the respondent.

[85]The basis for the appellant's application being unclear to us, the Tribunal sent an e-mail dated 27 July 2016 to both parties drawing attention to the two potentially relevant bases for a costs claim, namely the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010 rule 10(3)(b) and section 60 of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993.

[86]The Tribunal invited the parties to attempt to agree the costs which the appellant was entitled to recover under section 60; pointed out that in the absence of agreement either party would in normal circumstances have to make an application to the F-tT to determine those costs; and indicated that in the circumstances of the present case the Tribunal would be prepared to determine these costs by way of written representations - but only if both parties agreed that it should do so.

[87]As regards any potential claim by the appellant under rule 10 the Tribunal ordered that the appellant, if she wished to do so, should make an application within 28 days (the time for which was subsequently extended) and ordered that her application should explain why it was that she said that the respondent or her representatives had acted unreasonably within the meaning of rule 10(3)(b).

[88]The appellant in due course submitted a detailed application for costs running to 177 paragraphs and accompanied by several appendices of documentation. Subsequently the appellant made further representations dated 16 November 2016 in response to the representations which had been made regarding costs on the part of the respondent.

[89]By an e-mail dated 28 October 2016 the respondent's solicitors indicated that no complete claim for costs under section 60 had been received from the appellant; that the respondent had commenced proceedings in the County Court under section 48(3) of the 1993 Act seeking an order that the appellant enter into the lease; that the respondent would in due course seek to offset any judgement for costs obtained in those County Court proceedings against any section 60 cost liability; that when a full section 60 costs claim was made by the appellant consideration would be given by the respondent as to whether this could be agreed or whether the question of section 60 costs should be determined by the Tribunal; and that the Tribunal could not determine the section 60 costs on a piecemeal basis. They requested that the Tribunal should refuse to deal with the section 60 costs until such time as the lease had been completed and all the appellant's costs were known and had been submitted to the respondent for consideration. 19

[90]The Tribunal was only prepared (in the hope that this might assist the parties) to consider the question of section 60 costs if both parties agreed. The jurisdiction to deal with costs under section 60 is conferred by section 91 of the 1993 Act upon the appropriate tribunal - which is the F-tT rather than the Upper Tribunal (the matter could come before the Upper Tribunal on appeal subject to any necessary permission being granted). In the light of this absence of express agreement between the parties that the Upper Tribunal should deal with section 60 costs, we conclude that we must leave section 60 costs to be dealt with in the future either by agreement or by an application to the F-tT.

[91]The Upper Tribunal is therefore only concerned, upon the present application for costs by the appellant, with a claim for costs under rule 10(3)(b). The relevant provisions of rule 10 read as follows: 10.—(1) The Tribunal may make an order for costs on an application or on its own initiative. (2) Any order under paragraph (1)—(a) may only be made in accordance with the conditions or in the circumstances referred to in paragraphs (3) to (6);

(b) …………….. (3) The Tribunal may in any proceedings make an order for costs— (a) …………. (b) if the Tribunal considers that a party or its representative has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings;

[92]Accordingly an order for costs can only be made against the respondent in the present proceedings if the Tribunal considers that the respondent (or her representative) has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings.

[93]The Tribunal is concerned with whether there has been unreasonable conduct in bringing, defending or conducting "the proceedings". The relevant proceedings are, in our view, the proceedings before the Upper Tribunal. Accordingly, what we must do is to consider whether the respondent (or her representative) has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the present proceedings before the Upper Tribunal - i.e. the proceedings upon the appeal from the F-tT.

[94]For the reasons given below we do not consider that the respondent or her representative has acted in any way unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting these proceedings before the Upper Tribunal. Accordingly, we make no order for costs under rule 10(3)(b) against the respondent.

[95]If we were to assume in favour of the appellant (and without deciding this point) that the reference to "the proceedings" in rule 10(3)(b) could include the proceedings before the F-tT and if we therefore were to assume that we had jurisdiction to make an order for costs against the respondent in relation to those proceedings before the F-tT, once again for the reasons given below we do not consider that the respondent or her representative has acted in any way unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting those proceedings before the F-tT. Accordingly, we would not have made any order for costs under rule 10(3)(b) even taking into account the proceedings before the F-tT. 20

[96]The costs claimed by the appellant are quantified in four separate alternative sums in paragraphs 155, 164, 171 and 165 of her application namely (and respectively) £90,319, £137,315, £163,729, and £191,385.

[97]One of the fundamental themes running through the appellant's application for costs (to be found, inter alia, in paragraphs 46, 71, 76, 101 and 105 of her document) is that there must be preserved for her a position of being indemnified against the adverse financial consequences of the requirement to grant the new lease under the 1993 Act. Building upon this theme the appellant has calculated the adverse consequences to her (as she sees them) from the grant of the new lease not having gone through at a premium of (or about) the finally decided figure of £260,000 at or about 24 October 2013, which was the date of her counter notice. The appellant appears to take the figure finally decided upon by the Upper Tribunal as the premium and then to seek to put herself (through a costs claim) into as good a position as she perceives she would have been in if she had promptly received that sum soon after the date of her counter notice and had thereby been saved from various adverse consequences including professional fees; interest payments incurred by her upon various loans (which she would have been able to discharge in whole or in part had matters been completed in about October 2013 at a premium of £260,000); and loss of earnings caused to her by the time and care of personally dealing with the present enfranchisement claim which has led to a diminution in her income and an adverse impact on her health.

[98]It is not necessary for the purpose of the present decision upon the appellant's costs application to examine whether as a matter of law all (or any) of these claimed heads of costs could properly have been recovered. The reason this is not necessary is because the appellant is only entitled to an order for costs if the respondent or her representative has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting these proceedings. This is the prior question which must be decided before any consideration is given to quantification or recoverability of the costs. It is upon this prior question that the appellant fails for the following reasons.

[99]The principal points raised by the appellant in her detailed application document (and in her letter of 28 August 2016 which forms her appendix 7.5) are as follows:(a) (A) The final figure determined as the premium payable by the Upper Tribunal was £260,000 which was within 1.5% of the price originally asked for by her in her counter notice in October 2013.

(b) (B) The later offer by the respondent in August 2014 to pay a premium of £264,200, which was the figure the appellant had originally asked for in her counter notice, was not a satisfactory offer because (i) there was still reserved the question of whether the lease terms should be amended in favour of the respondent and (ii) it failed to recognise that by August 2014 the appellant had sustained substantial costs (of the types described in paragraph 97 above) such that in real terms the offer of £264,200 was worth substantially less than that.

(c) (C) The original offer made by the respondent in her section 42 notice (as originally apparently supported by her valuer Mr Lee) was an unreasonably low figure of £171,275 and was based upon calculations made by Mr Lee which proceeded upon an erroneous basis in various respects. 21

(d) (D) The appellant was unreasonably forced to become involved in proceedings before the F-tT.

(e) (E) The respondent was responsible for unreasonable delays in settlement of the case.

(f) (F) The respondent originally raised the question of whether the terms of the lease should be altered (see paragraphs 22 and following above of our substantive decision) but later by the time of the F-tT hearing she conceded that the lease terms should not change - however the raising of this point had given rise to costs.

(g) (G) The communication from the appellant on 21 February 2014 (relied upon by the respondent) when properly understood was not a request for payment in the region of £313,000. Instead in paragraph 12 of her further representations dated 16 November 2016 the appellant states "So the opening figure Ms Denholm contended for in February 14 was £293k."

(h) (H) Any subsequent offer made by the respondent (i.e. subsequent to receipt of the appellant's counter notice in October 2013) should be analysed in the following manner, namely if the offer was in the sum of £X and was made on date Y there should be calculated all the costs to the appellant (of the type described in paragraph 97 above) which the appellant had incurred by date Y. If such costs were £Z then the offer of £X must be treated as in effect an offer of £X minus £Z. So analysed the subsequent offers made on behalf of the respondent were in fact less than the premium ultimately decided by the Upper Tribunal of £260,000.

[100]The respondent has submitted a detailed response dated 28 October 2016 to the appellant's application for costs. The principal points which are raised in resistance to the appellant's application for costs can be summarised as follows:(a) (A) The respondent's valuer Mr Lee was throughout the proceedings ready willing and able to discuss matters with any properly instructed valuer on behalf of the appellant, but difficulties arose in this occurring by reason of the fact that the appellant in all used three separate valuers (before taking over the conduct of the case herself) and the appellant delayed in giving (or failed to give) adequate instructions to her valuers to discuss matters. Also the instruction of three separate valuers by the appellant contributed to delay in the proceedings before the F-tT.

(b) (B) Although the original price stated in the counter notice was £264,200, the appellant by 21 February 2014 had increased the premium she was seeking to over £313,000.

(c) (C) The respondent was obliged to make an application for determination of the premium to the F-tT in order to avoid transgressing the deadline laid down in the 1993 Act.

(d) (D) In a letter dated 24 August 2014 the respondent offered to concede the premium at £264,200 (as asked for in the counter notice) - it is true the letter left over the question of possible amendment of the lease but that could easily have been dealt with and in due course was abandoned by the respondent. The important point to notice was that this sum (being a sum more than the premium ultimately decided by the Upper Tribunal) was offered by the respondent as long ago as August 2014.

(e) (E) In July 2014 the appellant's then valuer Mr Hammond was proposing a premium of £369,486 (which was far more than the figure ultimately decided). 22

(f) (F) It was unfortunate for both parties (but neither party was at fault regarding this) that the decision of the F-tT was so unsatisfactory (see paragraphs 1 to 3 of our substantive decision above). However, the ultimate decision of the F-tT was £293,500 which the respondent would have been prepared to accept (the respondent only cross appealing in relation to this when the appellant had herself appealed).

(g) (G) In any event by a letter written without prejudice save as to costs dated 14 December 2015 the respondent offered a premium of £285,000 - which was £25,000 more than the premium ultimately decided by the Upper Tribunal.

[101]As regards Ms Denholm’s criticism of Mr Lee in paragraph 99(C), she referred to several passages of an email from Mr Lee to her, dated 15 April 2014, to which there was attached a schedule of evidence and a valuation (neither of which we have seen) of the premium payable at £180,050. Ms Denholm submitted that Mr Lee had made several errors: first by including in his schedule of evidence a former local authority flat, which was a low outlier; secondly by applying a discount of £150 per sq ft to the freehold value rather than to the short lease value; and finally that in any event he intended to apply a discount of only £50. Ms Denholm submitted a calculation of her own, in which she had corrected these errors, and submitted that had they not been made, Mr Lee’s calculation should in fact have been at £268,903 had the discount applied to reflect onerous lease terms been at £150 per sq ft, or £239,874 had it been at £50 per sq ft.

[102]However, we consider that Ms Denholm made several errors in her analysis, the most significant one being that in calculating the leasehold interest on a before and after basis, in order to arrive at a marriage value, she assumed that the onerous repairing terms were present in the existing lease, and reflected in a reduction per sq ft, but her calculation of the new lease value assumed that they had been removed from the new lease (her figure of £1,099,066 being simply her unimproved freehold value of £1,110,168 at a relativity of 99% with no deduction for onerous lease terms). The effect of this was to considerably inflate the marriage value, and hence the premium payable.

[103]But that was not the basis on which Mr Lee was at that point making his offer. He did indicate that if Ms Denholm agreed to change the repair/service charge proposals in the new lease then he would be prepared to talk about an increase in the extended lease value within the calculation. In arriving at the figures which she said Mr Lee should have offered, Ms Denholm has assumed changes to the lease which in fact she was not, at that stage, prepared to agree to. Accordingly, we again find that Ms Denholm’s criticism of Mr Lee to be unfounded.

[104]We also reject the contention that the respondent effectively brought the entire set of proceedings upon the parties by unreasonably failing promptly after the date of the counter notice to agree the suggested price of £264,200. It is commonplace for there to be a period of negotiation after the service of notice and counter notice including negotiation not merely upon price but upon the terms of the lease. We also notice that by 21 February 2014 the appellant had moved away from the previously suggested price of £264,200 and thereafter maintained a position that the price payable must be well over £300,000. The premium ultimately decided by the Upper Tribunal was 23 £260,000. The respondent offered £264,200 by a letter dated 28 August 2014. We consider that the reservation in that letter upon the point regarding the terms of the lease could easily and cheaply have been resolved if the appellant had accepted this price (her own original figure) rather than rejected it. We also notice the offer made without prejudice save as to costs at £285,000 in December 2015, which is a sum substantially more than the premium ultimately decided by us.

[105]We conclude that the appellant's attitude after 21 February 2014 (when she raised the price required to over £313,000 - or £293,000 if the appellant's contention as summarised in paragraph 99(G) is correct) made it inevitable that the determination of the premium payable would proceed to the F-tT and thereafter to the Upper Tribunal. The respondent tried to avert this by offering on two occasions a price more than the premium ultimately decided by the Upper Tribunal. We do not consider that those offers should be analysed in the manner contended for by the appellant (as summarised in paragraph 99 (H) above). The respondent in our view had no realistic option but to resist the appellant's appeal to the Upper Tribunal and we consider it was reasonable for her to pursue her cross-appeal. In the event her cross-appeal was successful and the premium ultimately decided by the Upper Tribunal was substantially less than the figure decided by the F-tT and less again than the figure contended for by the appellant. We also find that the conduct of the respondent and her representatives in the proceedings before the Upper Tribunal was appropriate and professional. There is no evidence before us to persuade us that their conduct was anything other than appropriate and professional before the F-tT.

[106]We reject the appellant's contention that the respondent (or her representatives) acted in any way unreasonably in bringing defending or conducting the proceedings before the Upper Tribunal or the proceedings before the F-tT.

[107]We reach this conclusion quite apart from the point which we next mention, but this point merely serves to confirm us in the view we have reached without taking this point into account. The point is this. We heard the appellant's appeal in this case over a two-day hearing. The appellant represented herself. As recorded in paragraph 83 of our substantive decision the appellant made repeated and at times trenchant criticisms of Mr Lee which we concluded were totally unfounded. The manner in which the appellant conducted the hearing serves to confirm us in our conclusion that her argument that the respondent (or her advisers) acted unreasonably in bringing defending or conducting the proceedings is ill founded.

[108]We make no order for costs under rule 10(3)(b) against the respondent.

[109]The respondent’s solicitors have explained that consideration was given on the part of the respondent as to whether she should make an application for costs against the appellant under rule 10(3)(b) but that in the light of observations made in Willow Court Management Company v Alexander

[2016] UKUT 0290 (LC)

it was decided not to do so. 24 Dated : 2 December 2016 His Honour Judge Huskinson P D McCrea FRICS

MS REBECCA DENHOLM v MS CANDIDA STOBBS [2016] UKUT 288 (LC)

Cited in 2 later judgments