Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23

"(5) Before determining an application referred to him under this section, the Secretary of State shall, if either the applicant or the local planning authority wish, give each of them an opportunity of appearing before, and being heard by, a person appointed by the Secretary of State for the purpose."

"it is a feature of the administrative law of all the contracting states that in numerous different fields public authorities are empowered by law to take various forms of action impinging on the private rights of citizens."

"These examples, to which numerous others could be added, seem to indicate that it is a normal feature of contemporary administrative law that the rights and obligations of the citizen, even in matters which relate very closely to his private property or his private activities, are determined by some public authority which does not fulfil the conditions laid down in article 6(1) with respect to independent and impartial tribunals."

"It is also a common feature of their administrative law, and indeed almost a corollary of the grant of discretionary powers, that the scope of judicial review of the relevant decisions is limited."

"An interpretation of article 6(1) under which it was held to provide a right to a full appeal on the merits of every administrative decision affecting private rights would therefore lead to a result which was inconsistent with the existing, and long-standing, legal position in most of the contracting states."

"not capable of embracing all aspects of the inspector's decision. . . In particular, as is not infrequently the case in relation to administrative law appeals in the Council of Europe member states, there was no rehearing as such of the original complaints submitted to the inspector; the High Court could not substitute its own decision on the merits for that of the inspector; and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited."

"either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of article 6(1), or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of article 6(1)."

"works separately from the casework team of which he is nominally a part, does not discuss the merits of the planning decisions before him with an individual either within or without GO East, is not copied into or involved in the preparation of the Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) or the exercise of any of the Secretary of State's powers of intervention under the Town and Country Planning Act, and only has before him the information which the inspector would have had at the inquiry into the particular appeal or called in application, together with any representation made after the close of the inquiries (all relevant parties are given the opportunity to comment on any such representations where they are material or raise new matters)."

"It is self-evident that ministerial or departmental policy cannot be regarded as disqualifying bias. One of the commonest administrative mechanisms is to give a minister power to make or confirm an order after hearing objections to it. The procedure for the hearing of objections is subject to the rules of natural justice in so far as they require a fair hearing and fair procedure generally. But the minister's decision cannot be impugned on the ground that he has advocated the scheme or that he is known to support it as a matter of policy. The whole object of putting the power into his hands is that he may exercise it according to government policy."

"Your Lordships have been asked to say that there is jurisdiction to quash the board's decision because that decision was reached on a material error of fact. Reference has been made to Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, 7th ed. (1994), pp 316-318 in which it is said: 'Mere factual mistake has become a ground of judicial review, described as "misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact", [Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 , 1030], or acting "upon an incorrect basis of fact" . . . This ground of review has long been familiar in French law and it has been adopted by statute in Australia. It is no less needed in this country, since decisions based upon wrong facts are a cause of injustice which the courts should be able to remedy. If a "wrong factual basis" doctrine should become established, it would apparently be a new branch of the ultra vires doctrine, analogous to finding facts based upon no evidence or acting upon a misapprehension of law.' "d e Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed. (1995), p 288: 'The taking into account of a mistaken fact can just as easily be absorbed into a traditional legal ground of review by referring to the taking into account of an irrelevant consideration, or the failure to provide reasons that are adequate or intelligible, or the failure to base the decision on any evidence. In this limited context material error of fact has always been a recognised ground for judicial intervention.'"

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations…everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

"article 6 draws no distinction between questions of fact and questions of law. Both categories of question are equally crucial for the outcome of proceedings relating to 'civil rights and obligations'. Hence the 'right to a court' and the right to a judicial determination of a dispute cover questions of fact just as much as questions of law. Yet the Court of Cassation does not have jurisdiction to rectify factual errors or to examine whether the sanction is proportionate to the fault. It follows that article 6(1) was not satisfied…"

"Nonetheless, in such circumstances the Convention calls at least for one of the two following systems: either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of article 6(1), or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of article 6(1)."

"(a) that permission ought to be granted…for the development to which the enforcement notice relates…(b) that permission has been granted…(c) that no permission was required…(d) that what is assumed in the enforcement notice to be development did not constitute or involve development…(e) that the enforcement notice was not served on the owner or occupier of the land within the relevant period of four years" and some other grounds. Section 33(8) then provided that the validity of an enforcement notice "shall not be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever on any of the grounds specified in paragraphs (b), (c), (d) or (e)…except by way of an appeal under this part of this Act."

"It is not the role of article 6 of the Convention to give access to a level of jurisdiction which can substitute its opinion for that of the administrative authorities on questions of expediency and where the courts do not refuse to examine any of the points raised: article 6 gives a right to a court that has 'full jurisdiction' (cf… Zumtobel [17 EHRR 116 ]…)"

"In the Zumtobel case [17 EHRR 110, para 32] the European Court of Human Rights referred to the 'respect which must be accorded to decisions taken by administrative authorities on grounds of expediency'. Whilst questions of expediency play a large role in matters relating to, for example, the public interest involved if a particular development is permitted, the present case concerns, at least in part, the fundamental factual issue of whether the building erected by the applicant was, or was not, designed for the purposes of agriculture and so had deemed planning permission. This factual issue was in dispute and in the circumstances of this case the High Court judge was not able to provide a 'determination' of it. For us, this deprived the applicant of access to a 'tribunal' to which article 6(1) of the Convention entitled him."

"It appears to me that the requirement that a court or tribunal should have 'full jurisdiction' cannot be mechanically applied with the result that, in all circumstances and whatever the subject matter of the dispute, the court or tribunal must have full power to substitute its own findings of fact, and its own inferences from those facts, for that of the administrative authority concerned. Whether the power of judicial review is sufficiently wide to satisfy the requirements of article 6 must in my view depend on a number of considerations, including the subject matter of the dispute, the nature of the decision of the administrative authorities which is in question, the procedure, if any, which exists for review of the decision by a person or body acting independently of the authority concerned and the scope of that power of review."

"there is…nothing to suggest that, in finding the primary facts and in drawing conclusions and inferences from those facts, an inspector acts anything other than independently, in the sense that he is in no sense connected with the parties to the dispute or subject to their influence or control; his findings and conclusions are based exclusively on the evidence and submissions before him."

"the review by the inspector does not of itself satisfy the requirements of article 6 of the Convention, despite the existence of various safeguards customarily associated with an 'independent and impartial tribunal'."

"the appeal to the High Court, being on 'points of law', was not capable of embracing all aspects of the inspector's decision…In particular, as is not infrequently the case in relation to administrative law appeals in Council of Europe member states, there was no rehearing as such of the original complaints submitted to the inspector; the High Court could not substitute its own decision on the merits for that of the inspector; and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited."

"the uncontested safeguards attending the procedure before the inspector: the quasi-judicial character of the decision-making process; the duty incumbent on each inspector to exercise independent judgment; the requirement that inspectors must not be subject to any improper influence; the stated mission of the Inspectorate to uphold the principles of openness, fairness and impartiality."

"Such an approach by an appeal tribunal on questions of fact can reasonably be expected in specialised areas of the law such as the one at issue, particularly where the facts have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards required by article 6(1). It is also frequently a feature in the systems of judicial control of administrative decisions found throughout the Council of Europe member states."

"…in assessing the sufficiency of the review available to Mr Bryan on appeal to the High Court, it is necessary to have regard to matters such as the subject matter of the decision appealed against, the manner in which that decision was arrived at, and the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of appeal."

"In terms of article 6 the decision on the merits, which usually involves findings of fact and planning judgment, has not been determined by an independent and impartial tribunal or anyone approaching this, but by someone who is obviously not independent and impartial."

"To treat the minister in his decision-making capacity as someone separate and distinct from the department of government of which he is the political head and for whose actions he alone in constitutional theory is accountable to Parliament is to ignore not only practical realities but also Parliament's intention. Ministers come and go; departments, though their names may change from time to time, remain. Discretion in making administrative decisions is conferred upon a minister not as an individual but as the holder of an office in which he will have available to him in arriving at his decision the collective knowledge, experience and expertise of all those who serve the Crown in the department of which, for the time being, he is the political head."

"guarantees concerning the mode in which claims or disputes concerning legal rights and obligations (of a 'civil' character) are to be resolved. A distinction must be drawn between the acts of a body which is engaged in the resolution of such a claim or dispute and the acts of an administrative or other body purporting merely to exercise or apply a legal power vested in it and not to resolve a legal claim or dispute. Article 6(1) would not, in the Commission's opinion, apply to the acts of the latter even if they do affect 'civil rights'. It could not be considered as being engaged in a process of 'determination' of civil rights and obligations. Its function would not be to decide (' décidera' ) on a claim, dispute or ' contestation'. Its acts may, on the other hand, give rise to a claim, dispute or ' contestation' and article 6 may come into play in that way."

"That decision must be an administrative decision, because it is not to be based purely on the view that he forms of the objections, vis-a-vis the desires of the local authority, but is to be guided by his view as to the policy which in the circumstances he ought to pursue."

"it is not a lis inter partes, and for the simple reason that the local authority and the objectors are not parties to anything that resembles litigation. . . . on the substantive matter, viz whether the order should be confirmed or not, there is a third party who is not present, viz, the public, and it is the function of the minister to consider the rights and interests of the public."

"A distinction must be drawn between the acts of a body which is engaged in the resolution of such a claim or dispute and the acts of an administrative or other body purporting merely to exercise or apply a legal power vested in it and not to resolve a legal claim or dispute. Article 6(1) would not, in the Commission's opinion, apply to the acts of the latter even if they do affect 'civil rights'. It could not be considered as being engaged in a process of 'determination' of civil rights and obligations. Its function would not be to decide ('décidera') on a claim, dispute or 'contestation'. Its acts may, on the other hand, give rise to a claim, dispute or 'contestation' and article 6 may come into play in that way."

"Conformity with the spirit of the Convention requires that this word should not be construed too technically and that it should be given a substantive rather than a formal meaning besides, it has no counterpart in the English text of article 6(1)."

"the acts of a body which is engaged in the resolution of a dispute ('contestation') and the acts of an administrative or other body purporting merely to exercise or apply a legal power vested in it and not to resolve a legal claim or dispute."

"It is clear from the court's established case law that the concept of 'civil rights and obligations' is not to be interpreted solely by reference to the respondent state's domestic law and that article 6(1) applies irrespective of the parties' status, be it public or private, and of the nature of the legislation which governs the manner in which the dispute is to be determined; it is sufficient that the outcome of the proceedings should be 'decisive for private rights and obligations'."

"it must be shown that the 'contestation' (dispute) related to 'civil rights and obligations', in other words that the 'result of the proceedings' was 'decisive' for such a right."

"As regards the question whether the dispute related to the above-mentioned right, the court considers that a tenuous connection or remote consequences do not suffice for article 6 (1) in either of its official versions ('contestation sur'; 'determination of'): civil rights and obligations must be the object - or one of the objects - of the 'contestation' (dispute): the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for such a right."

"article 6(1) of the Convention does not require that the procedure which determines civil rights and obligations is conducted at each of its stages before tribunals meeting the requirements of this provision. An administrative procedure may thus precede the determination of civil rights by the tribunal envisaged in article 6(1) of the Convention."

"In many member states of the Council of Europe, the duty of adjudicating on disciplinary offences is conferred on jurisdictional organs of professional associations. Even in instances where article 6(1) is applicable, conferring powers in this manner does not in itself infringe the Convention. Nonetheless, in such circumstances the Convention calls at least for one of the two following systems: either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of article 6(1), or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of article 6(1)."

"It appears to me that the requirement that a court or tribunal should have 'full jurisdiction' cannot be mechanically applied with the result that, in all circumstances and whatever the subject matter of the dispute, the court or tribunal must have full power to substitute its own findings of fact, and its own inferences from those facts, for that of the administrative authority concerned."

"For civil cases, just as for criminal charges, article 6(1) draws no distinction between questions of fact and questions of law. Both categories of question are equally crucial for the outcome of proceedings relating to 'civil rights and obligations'. Hence, the 'right to a court' and the right to a judicial determination of the dispute cover questions of fact just as much as questions of law."

"it is necessary to have regard to matters such as the subject matter of the decision appealed against, the manner in which that decision was arrived at, and the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of appeal."

"Furthermore, even if the applicant had sought to pursue his appeal under ground (b), the court notes that, while the High Court could not have substituted its own findings of fact for those of the inspector, it would have had the power to satisfy itself that the inspector's findings of fact or the inferences based on them were neither perverse or irrational."

"in particular to the court's finding that in the specialised area of town planning law full review of facts may not be required by article 6(1)" and held that the scope of review available in the High Court was sufficient to comply with that article. The Commission stated: "the Secretary of State gave reasoned decisions on the basis of the facts found by the inspectors, and the matters relied on by him in overruling their recommendations could be challenged on appropriate grounds before the High Court."

"An interpretation of article 6(1) under which it was held to provide a right to a full appeal on the merits of every administrative decision affecting private rights would therefore lead to a result which was inconsistent with the existing and long-standing, legal position in most of the contracting states"

"Such an approach by an appeal tribunal on questions of fact can reasonably be expected in specialised areas of the law such as the one at issue, particularly where the facts have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards required by article 6(1). It is also frequently a feature in the systems of judicial control of administrative decisions found throughout the Council of Europe member states."

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …. everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

"The administrative character in which he acts reappears at a later stage because, after considering the objections, which may be regarded as the culminating point of his quasi-judicial functions, there follows something which again, in my view, is purely administrative, viz, the decision whether or not to confirm the order. That decision must be an administrative decision, because it is not to be based purely on the view that he forms of the objection vis-à-vis the desires of the local authority, but is to be guided by his view as to the policy which in the circumstances he ought to pursue."

"71. It is common ground that the independence required by article 6(1) is independence from the executive and from the parties. 72. The Secretary of State is part of the executive as are all or any of his ministerial team or the civil servants involved in the decision making process. The contrary is, we think, unarguable which no doubt explains the Secretary of State's stance in these proceedings …. 84. There is no dispute about the position under domestic law. It is well stated in [ Judicial Review ] passages from Supperstone and Goudie (1997) at para 9.21 : 'In many administrative situations the possibility of bias is built into the system. Proposers of the scheme may have strong and carefully thought out views on the subject, and yet may have to hear and rule on objections to it. Administrators may have guidelines to help them in their day to day application of legislation. In such situations the concept of a fair trial may be impossible and indeed undesirable to achieve. It has been pointed out ….. that the more indifferent to the aim in view the less efficient is the minister or civil servant likely to be. After all, it his job to get things done. So while the obvious pre-judgment of an issue is not allowed, a challenge to a decision on the grounds of departmental bias is unlikely to succeed. It is a minister's job to have a policy and to support it in public.'. . . 85. But the question we have to answer is whether the position under domestic law can withstand the unqualified procedural right conferred by article 6. We do not think it can. The common law approach has inevitably been determined by the constraints imposed by legislation. The logic is that if legislation vests a decision in a person who is biased or provides for a decision to be taken in a manner which is not compatible with the requirements of independence and impartiality, no breach of the requirements of fairness can be found. Such requirements of fairness as there may be must be accommodated to the relevant statutory scheme. But the question now is not how article 6 can best be accommodated in the interests of fairness given the existing statutory scheme, but rather whether the scheme itself complies with article 6. To accept that the possibility of common law bias is inherent in the system and mandated by Parliament is merely to admit that the system involves structural bias and requires determinations to be made by a person who is not impartial. 86. It must follow from these conclusions that the Secretary of State is not impartial in the manner required by article 6 because in each case his policy is in issue. This is not of course to say that there is anything wrong with his role as a policy maker. What is objectionable in terms of article 6 is that he should be the judge in his own cause where his policy is in play. In other words he cannot be both policy maker and decision taker."

"We do not think this process contains sufficient safeguards to justify the High Court's restricted power of review. In terms of article 6 the decision on the merits, which usually involves findings of fact and planning judgment, has not been determined by an independent and impartial tribunal or anyone approaching this, but by someone who is obviously not independent and impartial."

"It is the petitioners' Convention right to have their civil rights determined by an independent and impartial tribunal. In my view the respondents' decision to call in the application for their own decision has brought about a situation in which the determination of the petitioners' civil rights will be made by the respondents, who are admittedly not independent and impartial, and against whose decision there is only a limited right of appeal to this court. The limitations on the right of appeal are such that it may well be impossible for this court, although indisputably an independent and impartial tribunal, to bring those qualities to bear on the real issues in the case."

"In the Commission's view the essential role of article 6(1) in this sphere is to lay down guarantees concerning the mode in which claims or disputes concerning legal rights and obligations (of a 'civil' character) are to be resolved. A distinction must be drawn between the acts of a body which is engaged in the resolution of such a claim or dispute and the acts of an administrative or other body purporting merely to exercise or apply a legal power vested in it and not to resolve a legal claim or dispute. Article 6(1) would not, in the Commission's opinion, apply to the acts of the latter even if they do affect 'civil rights'. It could not be considered as being engaged in a process of 'determination' of civil rights and obligations. Its function would not be to decide ( 'décidera' ) on a claim, dispute or 'contestation' . Its acts may, on the other hand, give rise to a claim, dispute or 'contestation' and article 6 may come into play in that way."

"The Commission recalls that the right of property is clearly a 'civil' right within the meaning of article 6(1) of the Convention, and the enforcement notice issued by the local authority and the subsequent enforcement proceedings were directly concerned with the way in which the applicant was entitled to use his land. Consequently, the proceedings in the present case determined a 'civil right'."

"Before the court the Government did not contest, as they had before the Commission, that the impugned planning proceedings involved a determination of the applicant's 'civil rights'. On the basis of its established case law, the court sees no reason to decide otherwise. Article 6(1) is accordingly applicable to the facts of the present case."

"As was explained in the court's Albert and Le Compte v Belgium [5 EHRR 533 ] judgment, even where an adjudicatory body determining disputes over 'civil rights and obligations' does not comply with article 6(1) in some respect, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are 'subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of article 6(1)'. The issue in the present case is whether the High Court satisfied the requirements of article 6(1) as far as the scope of its jurisdiction was concerned." (3) In paragraphs 41, 42, 43 and 44 the court noted that the appeal to the High Court, being on "points of law", was not capable of embracing all aspects of the inspector's decision concerning the enforcement notice served on Mr Bryan and, in particular: "as is not infrequently the case in relation to administrative law appeals in the Council of Europe member states, there was no rehearing as such of the original complaints submitted to the inspector; the High Court could not substitute its own decision on the merits for that of the inspector; and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited."

"In the present case there was no dispute as to the primary facts. Nor was any challenge made at the hearing in the High Court to the factual inferences drawn by the inspector, following the abandonment by the applicant of his objection to the inspector's reasoning under ground (b). The High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the remaining grounds of the applicant's appeal, and his submissions were adequately dealt with point by point. These submissions, as the Commission noted, went essentially to questions involving 'a panoply of policy matters such as development plans, and the fact that the property was situated in a Green Belt and a conservation area'. Furthermore, even if the applicant had sought to pursue his appeal under ground (b), the court notes that, while the High Court could not have substituted its own findings of fact for those of the inspector, it would have had the power to satisfy itself that the inspector's findings of fact or the inferences based on them were neither perverse nor irrational. Such an approach by an appeal tribunal on questions of fact can reasonably be expected in specialised areas of the law such as the one at issue, particularly where the facts have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards required by article 6(1). It is also frequently a feature in the systems of judicial control of administrative decisions found throughout the Council of Europe member states. Indeed, in the instant case, the subject matter of the contested decision by the inspector was a typical example of the exercise of discretionary judgment in the regulation of citizens' conduct in the sphere of town and country planning."

"159. The Commission has already noted that in the contracting states discretionary powers are frequently conferred on public authorities to take actions affecting private rights. It is also a common feature of their administrative law, and indeed almost a corollary of the grant of discretionary powers, that the scope of judicial review of the relevant decisions is limited. In the Ringeisen case the majority of the Commission drew attention to this. They observed as follows: 'It is true that there is in all countries a legitimate concern to protect the citizen against arbitrary administrative action. This concern may result in the adoption of legislative or other rules concerning administrative procedure. It may result in the introduction of judicial review of administrative action, and the states members of the Council of Europe have for historical and other reasons adopted widely divergent systems of such judicial review. One common feature, however, seems to be that there are certain elements of administrative discretion which cannot be reviewed by the judge. If the administrative authority has acted properly and within the limits of the law, the judge can very rarely, if ever, decide whether or not the administrative decision was well-founded in substance. To that extent, there is no possibility of bringing the case before an independent and impartial tribunal, even if there is a dispute ( 'contestation' ) between the citizen and the public authority.' 160. Following the court, the Commission does not conclude that article 6 is therefore altogether inapplicable. However, this factor cannot be left out of account in considering the content or scope of the rights which article 6 guarantees. The Commission also recalls that its minority in the same case considered that it guaranteed only a right to judicial control as to the 'lawfulness' of administrative decisions affecting civil rights. It notes further that the limited scope of judicial review in many contracting states is also reflected in the scope of the jurisdiction afforded to the European Court of Justice under article 173 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. Under that provision the court has jurisdiction to review the legality of acts of the Council and Commission of the European Communities only on grounds of 'lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers'. These limited grounds of action appear fairly typical of those existing in a number of the contracting states. 161. An interpretation of article 6(1) under which it was held to provide a right to a full appeal on the merits of every administrative decision affecting private rights would therefore lead to a result which was inconsistent with the existing, and long-standing, legal position in most of the contracting states."

"The subject-matter of the decision appealed against in the present case was a classic exercise of administrative discretion. The legislature had charged the Secretary of State with the express function of ensuring, in the public interest, that only appropriate persons would become chief executive of certain insurance companies, and the contested decision in the present case was the exercise of that discretion."

"While the applicants argue that the scope of review prevents examination of the merits of their claims, the Commission notes that this does not contradict the position, as stated by the court, that the domestic courts will examine whether the Secretary of State had regard to all relevant factors. It is true that the procedures by the inspectors do not themselves satisfy the requirements of article 6(1), the Inspectors being appointed by the Secretary of State who retains the power of decision, and that the safeguards provided by their quasi-judicial role in the process have been diminished in this case by the Secretary of State's dismissal of the applicants' appeals notwithstanding the inspectors' recommendations to the contrary (see paragraph 78). However, the Secretary of State gave reasoned decisions on the basis of the facts found by the inspectors, and the matters relied on by him in overruling their recommendations could be challenged on appropriate grounds before the High Court. Consequently in these circumstances the Commission is satisfied that the power of review of that process by the High Court ensures adequate judicial control of the administrative decisions in issue. It finds that the applicants have not in the circumstances been deprived of a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of any of their civil rights and obligations. It would observe that matters concerning the compatibility of the subject-matter of the planning decisions with the requirements of the Convention fall to be examined under its substantive provisions."

"The court recalls that in the case of Bryan ( [21 EHRR 342 ] paragraphs 34-47) it held that in the specialised area of town planning law full review of the facts may not be required by article 6 of the Convention. It finds in this case that the scope of review of the High Court, which was available to the applicant after a public procedure before an inspector, was sufficient in this case to comply with article 6(1). It enabled a decision to be challenged on the basis that it was perverse, irrational, had no basis on the evidence or had been made with reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors. This may be regarded as affording adequate judicial control of the administrative decisions in issue."

"…[T]he functions of the minister in carrying these provisions into operation are fundamentally administrative… subject only to the qualification that, at a particular stage and for a particular and limited purpose, there is superimposed on his administrative character a character which is loosely described as 'quasi-judicial'. The language which has always been construed as giving rise to the obligations, whatever they may be, implied in the words 'quasi-judicial' is to be found in the duty to consider the objections.…The administrative character in which he acts reappears at a later stage because, after considering the objections, which may be regarded as the culminating point of his quasi-judicial functions, there follows something which again, in my view, is purely administrative, viz, the decision whether or not to confirm the order. That decision must be an administrative decision, because it is not to be based purely on the view that he forms of the objections, vis-a-vis the desires of the local authority, but is to be guided by his view as to the policy which in the circumstances he ought to pursue… [O]n the substantive matter, viz, whether the order should be confirmed or not, there is a third party who is not present, viz, the public, and it is the function of the minister to consider the rights and the interests of the public. That by itself shows that it is completely wrong to treat the controversy between objector and local authority as a controversy which covers the whole of the ground. It is in respect of the public interest that the discretion that Parliament has given to the minister comes into operation.…His views on that matter he must, if necessary, defend in Parliament, but he cannot be called on to defend them in the courts."