“1— (1) A penalty is payable by a person (P) where— ( a ) P gives HMRC a document of a kind listed in the Table below, and ( b ) Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. (2) Condition 1 is that the document contains an inaccuracy which amounts to, or leads to— ( a ) an understatement of [a] 1 liability to tax, ( b ) a false or inflated statement of a loss … 1 , or ( c ) a false or inflated claim to repayment of tax. (3) Condition 2 is that the inaccuracy was [careless (within the meaning of paragraph 3) or deliberate on P's part] 1 . (4) Where a document contains more than one inaccuracy, a penalty is payable for each inaccuracy.”
“3— (1) [For the purposes of a penalty under paragraph 1, inaccuracy in] 1 a document given by P to HMRC is— ( a ) “careless” if the inaccuracy is due to failure by P to take reasonable care, ( b ) “deliberate but not concealed” if the inaccuracy is deliberate [on P's part] 1 but P does not make arrangements to conceal it, and ( c ) “deliberate and concealed” if the inaccuracy is deliberate [on P's part] 1 and P makes arrangements to conceal it (for example, by submitting false evidence in support of an inaccurate figure)….”
“[4 (1) This paragraph sets out the penalty payable under paragraph 1. (2) If the inaccuracy is in category 1, the penalty is— ( a ) for careless action, 30% of the potential lost revenue, ( b ) for deliberate but not concealed action, 70% of the potential lost revenue, and ( c ) for deliberate and concealed action, 100% of the potential lost revenue.”
“5— (1) “The potential lost revenue” in respect of an inaccuracy in a document [(including an inaccuracy attributable to a supply of false information or withholding of information)] 1 or a failure to notify an under-assessment is the additional amount due or payable in respect of tax as a result of correcting the inaccuracy or assessment. (2) The reference in sub-paragraph (1) to the additional amount due or payable includes a reference to— (a) an amount payable to HMRC having been erroneously paid by way of repayment of tax, and (b) an amount which would have been repayable by HMRC had the inaccuracy or assessment not been corrected. (3) In sub-paragraph (1) “tax” includes national insurance contributions….”
“ It is common ground that the knowledge and dishonest acts of the site managers could not be attributed to MC by virtue of the primary rules of attribution, the general rules of agency or the ordinary rules of vicarious liability of an employer for the acts of or defaults of his employee. As was made clear by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian , the question whether the acts or defaults of an employee of a company may nevertheless be attributed to the company is a matter of interpretation of the relevant substantive rule. In some cases, the acts or defaults of the “directing mind and will” of the company, or at least those of the directing mind and will of its relevant functions, will be attributed to the company. In others, the acts or defaults of other employees who cannot be said to be the “directing mind and will” are to be attributed. The question in each case is whether attribution is required to promote the policy of the substantive rule, or (to put it negatively) whether, if attribution is denied, that policy will be frustrated. 45. Thus in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass[1972] AC 153 , it was held that the acts and defaults of the manager should not be attributed to the company, since otherwise the statutory defence of due diligence would be rendered nugatory, and the clear intention of Parliament would be thwarted. In the Pioneer Concrete case, the employees made a restrictive agreement in breach of an order of the court, and in defiance of a clear express prohibition by the board of directors. The Court of Appeal had accepted Pioneer's argument that it was not liable because of the prohibition by the directors. The House of Lords took a different view. They held that to accept that argument would allow a company to enjoy the benefit of restrictions outlawed by Parliament and the benefit of arrangements outlawed by the courts. Recourse to the “guiding will” rule for attribution would lead to this unacceptable result. As Lord Nolan put it ( 475A–D ): *22 “The Act is not concerned with what the employer says but with what the employee does in entering into business transactions in the course of his employment. The plain purpose of section 35(3) is to deter the implementation of agreements or arrangements by which the public interest is harmed, and the subsection can only achieve that purpose if it is applied to the actions of the individuals within the business organisation who make and give effect to the relevant agreement or arrangement on its behalf”. 46. In Meridian itself, investment officers of a company used funds managed by the company to acquire shares in a public issuer. The company thereupon was required by statute to give notice that it had become a substantial security holder. It did not do so, and proceedings were instituted against the company for breach of statute. The Court of Appeal in New Zealand held that the knowledge of the officers should be attributed to the company on the basis that one of them was its “directing mind and will”
“… The policy ofsection 20 of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 is to compel, in fast moving markets, the immediate disclosure of the identity of persons who become substantial security holders in public issuers. Notice must be given as soon as that person knows that he has become a substantial security holder. In the case of a corporate security holder, what rule should be implied as to the person whose knowledge for this purpose is to count as the knowledge of the company? Surely the person who, with the authority of the company, acquired the relevant interest. Otherwise the policy of the Act would be defeated. Companies would be able to allow employees to acquire interests on their behalf which made them substantial security holders but would not have to report them until the board or someone else in senior management got to know about it. This would put a premium on the board paying as little attention as possible to what its investment managers were doing. Their Lordships would therefore hold that upon the true construction of section 20(4)(e) , the company knows that it has become a substantial security holder when that is known to the person who had authority to do the deal. It is then obliged to give notice under section 20(3) .”
“a well-recognised exception from the general rule that a principal is affected by notice received by his agent that, if the agent is acting in fraud of his principal and the matter of which he has notice is relevant to the fraud, that knowledge is not to be imputed to the principal.” …The circumstances in which the exception to the general rule of attribution will apply are where the person whose acts it is sought to impute to the company knows or believes that his acts are detrimental to the interests of the company in a material respect. This explains, for example, the reference by Buckmaster LJ to making “a clean breast of their delinquency”
“The question arose as to whether the dishonest acts and intentions of the site managers should be attributed to the company. The judge (Dyson J) held that those acts and intentions should be attributed to the company. Even though such attribution did not result from the primary rules of attribution or the general rules of agency or the ordinary rules as to vicarious liability, it was appropriate in the relevant statutory context to attribute to the company the acts and knowledge of the persons who had a part to play in the making and receiving of the supplies involved in the VAT arrangements. This was appropriate in order to advance the policy of the statutory provisions which was to discourage the dishonest evasion of VAT.”
“That penalty applies if the inaccuracy in the relevant document is due to a failure on the part of the taxpayer… to take reasonable care. We consider that the standard by which this falls to be judged is that of a prudent and reasonable taxpayer in the position of the taxpayer in question.”
“ In our view, a deliberate inaccuracy occurs when a taxpayer knowingly provides HMRC with a document that contains an error with the intention that HMRC should rely upon it as an accurate document. This is a subjective test. The question is not whether a reasonable taxpayer might have made the same error or even whether this taxpayer failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the return was accurate. It is a question of the knowledge and intention of the particular taxpayer at the time ”
“The fact that the deliberate conduct is tied to the inaccuracy, indicates that for this penalty to apply the person must have, in a subjective sense, acted with some level of knowledge or consciousness as regards the inaccuracy. In the case of a Company we take the relevant awareness or knowledge to be that of the relevant officers, such as the appellant acting as director, acting on its behalf…. 86 However, we consider that the term “deliberate inaccuracy on a person's part” can extend beyond this. Our view is that, depending on the precise circumstances, an inaccuracy may also be held to be deliberate where it is found that the person consciously or intentionally chose not to find out the correct position, in particular, where the circumstances are such that the person knew that he should do so. A person cannot simply escape liability by claiming complete ignorance where the person clearly knew that he should have taken steps to ascertain the position. We view the case where a person makes such a conscious choice not to take such steps with the result that an inaccuracy occurs, as no less of a “deliberate inaccuracy” on that person's part than making the inaccuracy with full knowledge of the inaccuracy.”
“By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’… It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.”