“The parties agreed at the Tribunal that the assumed set of facts provided by the Appellant should form the basis of the Tribunal's decision; (1) There was an agreement between MSL and independent third party entity Wigig whereby Wigig would carry out trades as agent for MSL using MSL's working capital in consideration for which Wigig would receive 50% of gross profits on each transaction as commission. (the "MSL Trades") (2) MSL was not directly involved in carrying out the relevant transactions or the due diligence checks which were carried out on its behalf by Wigig. (3) From early 2005 there was a further agreement with Wigig whereby MSL advanced funds to Wigig to allow it to trade on its own account and in its own name. In consideration for providing loan finance MSL was to receive 50% of the profit generated by trades carried out using its funds (the ‘Wigig Trades’). (4) It was a term of the loan agreement that funds loaned to Wigig were for the sole purpose of allowing it to fund its own transactions and in particular the VAT ‘lock up’ on those transactions. (5) It was a further term of the loan agreement that Wigig Trades would not involve giving or receiving trade credit so as not to put the loan balance at risk. (6) MSL relied upon the assurances of the officers and employees of Wigig and in particular its director Richard Jones that (a) transactions were carried out conscientiously and properly with neither the knowledge nor the means of knowledge of the alleged connection to missing traders and (b) the terms of their agreement were being observed. (7) Funds that were removed from or repaid to MSL's bank account to finance Wigig Trades were recorded in a loan account, the balance of which at any time represented the amount owed by Wigig in respect of funds loaned to finance its own trading. (8) Wigig was given access and was a signatory to MSL's bank account and was responsible for dealing with money transfers. (9) Wigig ceased trading in May 2006 and administrators were appointed in October 2009. Wigig had debtors in excess of£6m and trade creditors in excess of£7m . The final balance of the MSL loan account as at15 May 2006 was in excess of£3m and this sum remains outstanding to MSL. (10) Following receipt of a letter dated6 April 2006 from HMRC informing Wigig that they would be withholding their February 2006 VAT reclaim, (relating to Wigig Trades) Wigig carried out no trades using MSL's funds until28 April 2006 when it carried out trades on which the VAT "lock up" was in excess of£500 thousand . (11) In April and May 2006 Wigig withdrew in excess of£1m from MSL's bank account which it used to fund trades on28 April 2006 . (12) Had the trades on28 April 2006 not been carried out and had the funds in excess of£1m not been withdrawn from MSL's bank account, the balance of MSL's loan would have been no higher the£2.2m rather than the final outstanding balance in excess of£3m . (13) Wigig had received stock from its suppliers in respect of the May 2006 purchases before making payment and had released stock before receiving payment. (14) Following receipt of the letter dated6 April 2006 from HMRC, Wigig withdrew from its own bank account almost£400 thousand and distributed the same to its shareholders as dividends. (15) On27 September 2012 Richard Jones gave a director's disqualification undertaking in respect of Gold Digit Limited (an unrelated company) on the ground that he had conducted multiple transactions in respect of which he knew or possessed the means to know of their connection to fraud. Those transactions were carried out over a period that included the dates of the transactions which are the subject matter of this appeal.”
“MSL appointed a third-party agent, Wigig to carry out due diligence and make trading decisions on its behalf including for the transactions to which the disallowed input tax relates (’the Disputed VAT Trades’). It is not disputed that Wigig was properly appointed as MSL's agent and that MSL is therefore liable for Wigig’s actions and imputed with Wigig’s knowledge. It is not disputed that Wigig knew or should have known that the Disputed VAT Trades for the 04/06 periods were connected with fraud.”
“Both parties stressed the need to ensure that the Tribunal came to its decision on the basis of the assumed facts only and not any further extrapolation from those assumed facts. In coming to its decision the Tribunal has relied in particular on the following facts: (1) The deals which are disputed by HMRC and for which input tax has been denied are MSL Deals for the 04/06 period which were carried out in MSL's name by Wigig on28 April 2006 . The input tax reclaim is in MSL's name. They are not deals for which funding provided through the MSL account to Wigig was required. (2) The alleged fraudulent actions of Wigig in respect of the MSL bank account, being (a) the failure to notify MSL of HMRC's letter6 April 2006 (b) the withdrawal of significant sums in April and May 2006 from MSL's bank account to fund trades (c) the payment of large sums by way of dividends to Wigig’s shareholders as dividends and (d) the creation of unauthorised debtors and creditors, all relate to Wigig’s loan agreement with MSL concerning the funding of Wigig Trades.”
“55. In my judgment, the tribunal correctly concluded that there should be attribution in the present case, since the company could not sensibly be regarded as a victim of the fraud. They were right to hold that the fraud was ‘neutral’ from the company's point of view. The circumstances in which the exception to the general rule of attribution will apply are where the person whose acts it is sought to impute to the company knows or believes that his acts are detrimental to the interests of the company in a material respect. This explains, for example, the reference by Viscount Sumner in J C Houghton & Co v Nothard Lowe and Wills Ltd [1028] AC 1 at 19 to making “a clean breast of their delinquency”
“The principle we derive from these authorities is that the Hampshire Land principle is of general application and applies to prevent the knowledge of the agent in breach of his duty to the company being attributed to a company where the company is a victim of his fraud. In determining whether there is a fraud against the company “one should consider the effect of the acts themselves, and not what the position would be if those acts eventually prove to be ineffective.”
“… it was made clear in Greener Solutions by reference to earlier authorities that (i) the scope of those whose knowledge could be imputed to the principal whose VAT was alleged to be connected with fraudulent deals was wide; the knowledge of all employees and agents who are involved in making of the relevant supplies is imputed to the taxpaying entity (ii) the fraud exception is limited to circumstances in which the alleged fraud would cause significant harm to the entity which seeks to rely on the exception; a neutral result (such as the entity being able to claim input tax) was not sufficient to trigger the fraud exception (iii) in determining the harm suffered by the entity seeking to rely on the exception, the test to be applied is on the basis that the fraud has succeeded, not taking account of the costs and results of the failure of that fraud (including in the VAT context the denial of input tax).”
“(1) Are the activities of the person, which do not relate to misconduct of deals on behalf of MSL, relevant to the attribution of knowledge in respect of those deals? (2) Did the person whose acts and or knowledge it is sought to impute to MSL know or believe that his acts and or knowledge, in the context of the agency agreement, were detrimental to the interests of MSL in this respect? (3) Is MSL a true victim of fraud rather than simply being used as a vehicle for the commission of fraud against HMRC i.e. was the risk to his investment not limited to simply the possibility that HMRC would fail to re-pay its own or WIGIG's VAT repayment claims. (4) In judging whether MSL is to be regarded as a victim of the acts for that person, should consideration be given to the effects of the acts themselves, rather than what the position would have been had this act actually proved to be effective i.e. what did the fraudulent individuals intend to happen. (5) As such, should the exception to the general rule of attribution apply?”
“84 … Patten LJ, delivering the leading judgment, considered that the answer depended on the duty which was sought to be enforced and the parties between whom the issue was raised. In an action against the company by a third party who had been defrauded, the company was responsible. But it did not follow that the company was to be treated as responsible for a fraud for the purposes of an action against the dishonest director. In such an action, the illegality defence cannot be available, whether the damages claimed arose from the liability which the company was caused to incur to a third party or from the direct abstraction of the company's assets. Patten LJ's reasoning on these points is encapsulated in paras 34 – 35 of his judgment: “34. … attribution of the conduct of an agent so as to create a personal liability on the part of the company depends very much on the context in which the issue arises. In what I propose to refer to as the liability cases like El Ajou, Tan, McNicholas and Morris, reliance on the consequences to the company of attributing to it the conduct of its managers or directors is not enough to prevent attribution because, as Mummery LJ pointed out, it would prevent liability ever being imposed. As between the company and the defrauded third party, the former is not to be treated as a victim of the wrongdoing on which the third party sues but one of the perpetrators. The consequences of liability are therefore insufficient to prevent the actions of the agent being treated as those of the company. The interests of the third party who is the intended victim of the unlawful conduct take priority over the loss which the company will suffer through the actions of its own directors. “35. But, in a different context, the position of the company as victim ought to be paramount. Although the loss caused to the company by its director's conduct will be no answer to the claim against the company by the injured third party, it will and ought to have very different consequences when the company seeks to recover from the director the loss which it has suffered through his actions. In such cases the company will itself be seeking compensation by an award of damages or equitable compensation for a breach of the fiduciary duty which the director or agent owes to the company. As between it and the director, it is the victim of a legal wrong. To allow the defendant to defeat that claim by seeking to attribute to the company the unlawful conduct for which he is responsible so as to make it the company's own conduct as well would be to allow the defaulting director to rely on his own breach of duty to defeat the operation of the provisions of sections 172 and 239 of the Companies Act whose very purpose is to protect the company against unlawful breaches of duty of this kind. For this purpose and (it should be stressed) in this context, it ought therefore not to matter whether the loss which the company seeks to recover arises out of the fraudulent conduct of its directors towards a third party (as in McNicholas and Morris) or out of fraudulent conduct directed at the company itself which Sir Andrew Morritt C accepted was what is alleged in the present case. There is a breach of fiduciary duty towards the company in both cases.”
“86 The problem posed by the authorities is that until the Court of Appeal's decision in this case, they have generally treated the imputation of dishonesty to a company as being governed by tests dependent primarily on the nature of the company's relationship with the dishonest agent, the result of which is then applied universally. This was the point made by Lord Walker in Stone & Rolls at para 145, from which he resiled in Moulin. The fundamental point made by the Court of Appeal in this case and the Court of Final Appeal in Moulin is that, while the basic rules of attribution may apply regardless of the nature of the claim or the parties involved, the breach of duty exception does not. I agree with this. It reflects the fact that the rules of attribution are derived from the law of agency, whereas the fraud exception, like the illegality defence which it qualifies, is a rule of public policy. Viewed as a question of public policy, there is a fundamental difference between the case of an agent relying on his own dishonest performance of his agency to defeat a claim by his principal for his breach of duty; and that of a third party who is not privy to the fraud but is sued for negligently failing to prevent the principal from committing it.”
“87 There are three situations in which the question of attribution may arise. First, a third party may sue the company for a wrong such as fraud which involves a mental element. Secondly, the company may sue either its directors for the breach of duty involved in causing it to commit that fraud, or third parties acting in concert with them, or (as in the present case) both. Third, the company may sue a third party who was not involved in the directors' breach of duty for an indemnity against its consequences. 88 In the first situation, the illegality defence does not arise. The company has no claim which could be barred, but is responding to a claim by the third party. It will be vicariously liable for any act within the course of the relevant agent's employment, and in the great majority of cases no question will arise of attributing the wrong, as opposed to the liability, to the company. Where the law requires as a condition of liability that … the company should be personally culpable, as Lord Nicholls appears to have assumed it did in Royal Brunei Airlines, the sole function of attribution is to fix the company with the state of mind of certain classes of its agents for the purpose of making it liable. The same is true in cases like McNicholas, involving statutory civil penalties for quasicriminal acts. It is also true of cases like El Ajou where the relevant act (receipt of the money) was unquestionably done by the company but the law required as a condition of liability that it should have been done with knowledge of some matter. This will commonly be the case with proprietary claims, where vicarious liability is irrelevant.”
“93 This makes it unnecessary to address the elusive distinction between primary and secondary victimhood. That distinction could arise only if the application of the breach of duty exception depended on where the loss ultimately fell, or possibly on where the culpable directors intended it to fall. If, however, the application of the exception depends on the nature of the duty and the parties as between whom the question arises, the only question is whether the company has suffered any loss at all.”