“67. At what point do we consider that the claimant will find an equivalently remunerated job (Issue 2.2)? We do not consider the claimant will find an equivalently remunerated job prior to retirement at 52 (or indeed 60). It will be apparent from the findings we have made about the Force pension scheme that it is almost a certainty he will not be able to replace a final salary pension scheme with an accrual rate of 1/30 th nor earn the capital needed to save to replace such a fringe benefit.”
“68. … In our judgment there has been a wholesale failure to mitigate the lost earnings, albeit we accept there is little to be done about the pension loss given the rare nature of the scheme.”
“70. … We have made our findings in relation to the national minimum wage and later, more remunerative employment on the basis of our industrial knowledge, which on the part of the lay members of this Tribunal is considerable in relation to the local and wider job market. We think it is right to draw on that knowledge in the circumstances. We have rejected the respondent’s case that the claimant could have achieved a mean salary in excess of£30,000 , in view of the facts set out at paragraphs 33 to 36 above. None of the jobs suggested as being attainable for the claimant included either the advertisement with the essential requirements, nor the qualifications required for the role. The claimant is without qualifications entirely apart from CSEs and his experience and training as a police officer. The latter plainly qualifies him for many things, but not necessarily the jobs suggested or other available jobs in the local market and certainly not at mean salaries in excess of£30,000 .”
“Grounds 1 and 2 contend that the tribunal failed to assess the chance that the claimant’s service would have ended had there been no unlawful discrimination and failed to apply that percentage reduction to the award of compensation. The two matters relied upon as giving rise to a chance that there would have been dismissal are the receipt of housing allowance to which the claimant was not entitled and one occasion when he neglected his duty. The tribunal directed itself to the relevant law and cited Abbey National plc v Chaggar[2010] ICR 397 . It considered that there was no prospect that either the housing allowance issue or the neglect of duty issue would have led to the claimant’s dismissal: see paragraphs 74 and 75 of the remedies decision. The tribunal adopted the correct approach and its decision is not perverse. Grounds 1 and 2 do not disclose any reasonable grounds of appeal. No action need be taken in relation to grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal.”
“(7) Where it appears to a judge or the Registrar that a notice of appeal …. (a) discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the appeal; or (b) is an abuse of the Appeal Tribunal’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of proceedings, he shall notify the Appellant …. accordingly informing him of the reasons for his opinion and, subject to paragraph (10), no further action shall be taken on the notice of appeal … (7A) In paragraphs (7) … reference to a notice of appeal … includes reference to part of a notice of appeal … (10) Subject to paragraph (7ZA), where notification has been given under paragraph (7) and within 28 days of the date the notification was sent, an appellant … expresses dissatisfaction in writing with the reasons given by the judge or Registrar for his opinion, he is entitled to have the matter heard before a judge who shall make a direction as to whether any further action should be taken on the notice of appeal …”
“84. … it seems to us that there is a considerable risk in awarding compensation on the straight line Mr Feeny suggests, which is neither adopted in the 2003 Booklet, the Ogden tables or anywhere else. It potentially produces a windfall for the claimant: he would receive now a sum which on Mr Feeny’s figures and before reduction would amount to some£410,000 , which, if invested now, would put the claimant in a considerably better position than he would have been absent discrimination; he would have the benefit of cash sums immediately which would be payable, on his case, in tranches over thirty years or more. 85. For these reasons, and on the basis that neither the Booklet, nor the approaches contended for by the parties, appear to address [loss over both periods] which we are satisfied will be sustained by the claimant, we have adopted a bespoke approach to calculate [loss from 52 to 60]. We add here we would rather not be in this position, but we cannot see a just alternative without expert actuarial advice, which neither of the parties have sought, notwithstanding the unusual circumstances. We have assumed a life expectancy for someone in the claimant’s circumstances of age 79, in accordance with the tables; his approximate cash pension loss over the period from the ending of his employment to that age then, will be 9 x£24,000 … followed by 19 x£7000 (the difference between his accrued pension and pension had he remained in service) … That cash loss is£216,000 plus£133,000 . I caveat this by saying that we are prepared to be corrected on our maths, but that produces a total cash loss over 28 years of£349,000 . If Mr Feeny’s approach was to be adopted (the substantial loss approach for [age 60 onwards] and the cash approach [for age 52 to 60], the claimant would be overcompensated in our view (receiving£410,000 now for a future cash loss commencing in 2021 of£349,000 ). 86. In relation to [loss for age 52 to 60] then, we consider we have to do something different and bespoke in these very unusual circumstances. We have decided that the right approach, bearing in mind principles of accelerated receipt, upon which we have yet to hear submissions, is to average the£349,000 cash loss over 28 years, producing an average annual loss of pension benefit of£12,500 . What sum would we need to award to the claimant to compensate him for the loss of a prospective annual pension of£12,500 over 29 years, commencing in 2021? We consider the just multiplier for that is that used by HMRC to value pension benefits generally, giving a total sum of£250,000 . There then falls to be deducted£190,000 (the sum to be awarded under the substantial loss approach). That seems to us to strike the right balance in addressing a highly unusual state of affairs and loss to be sustained by the claimant as a result of acts of discrimination. We note, as Mr Gibson says, that the ultimate figure is not a million miles away from the CETV approach he advocated, but we have satisfied ourselves that the claimant is not prejudiced by the simple application of an approach which is neither recommended by the 2003 Booklet, nor appears to take account of the acute and accelerated losses to be sustained if an officer leaves service in the last third of the common thirty year term.”
“84. If it does depart from such an approach, however, it must do so for good reason and must say what its reasons are. Any such reasons require to be cogent and intelligible and appropriate. A Tribunal will only ever stray from such recognised approaches for such carefully articulated good reasons, and will do so at potential peril to the acceptability of its decision. It is not a course which we would recommend, except where it is plain that the interests of justice require it.”
“Awards made by Employment Tribunals for loss of pension rights are tax free; however, tax is payable on the income and gains arising through any investment of the award, although it may be possible to defray the extent of this by investing in suitable tax efficient vehicles. After discussion with the ET chairmen on the working party, it was agreed that some allowance for the possible effects of tax being payable on the proceeds arising from investment of the compensation award should be made in determining the financial assumptions to be used for the rates of return net of earnings and net of revaluation of deferred pension.”