“If there was or there might have been a material difference to the scoring of the bids, were the breaches sufficiently serious to justify an award of Francovich damages, having regard to the relevant case law touching on Francovich damages?”
“What it is important to recognise at this stage is that: (i) the test is objective (p.554D) (if a government acts in bad faith that is an additional factor which falls objectively to be considered); (ii) the weight to be given to these various factors will vary from case to case, and no single factor is necessarily decisive; and (iii) the seriousness of the breach will always be an important factor.”
“In my view, it would be wrong in principle to hold that (subject to the separate point about the causal link) a claimant in the position of Ocean was automatically entitled to claim damages as a result of a contracting authority's failure to follow the Regulations. That would mean that every breach of the procedural requirements would automatically trigger a claim for damages, regardless of any other factor. That is emphatically not the law. In order to attract damages, the breach has to be "sufficiently serious", and that will always depend on the individual facts of the case.”
“it is likely that any breach of the Regulations that deprived Alstom of a framework contract worth£1.8 billion would amount to a sufficiently serious breach to satisfy the Francovich conditions.”
“the main aim of the current EU policy on public procurement is to remove barriers to the internal market” (at 3-07) and “the directive’s main objective is to promote the internal market” (at 3-12) whereas “value for money is a key objective of the regulatory rules of most national procurement systems and is promoted by various policy measures and legal rules in the UK domestic system.”
“The broad purpose of the Directive and the Regulations is to open up the field of public works contracts to fair competition. Lord Hope made this clear at [10] in Risk Management Partners Ltd v Brent London Borough Council[2011] UKSC 7 ,[2011] 2 AC 34 , which concerned what is called the Teckal exemption, where a public authority contracts with another public authority or with a body which is owned by such authorities, and only provides goods and services for public functions. He stated: “The 2006 Regulations were made undersection 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 . They give effect to Council Directive 2004/18/EC of31 March 2004 on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L134, p 114). The broad object of Directive 2004/18/EC, and of the Regulations that give effect to it, is to ensure that public bodies award certain contracts above a minimum value only after fair competition, and that the award is made to the person offering the lowest price or making the most economically advantageous offer.”” “The 2006 Regulations were made undersection 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 . They give effect to Council Directive 2004/18/EC of31 March 2004 on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L134, p 114). The broad object of Directive 2004/18/EC, and of the Regulations that give effect to it, is to ensure that public bodies award certain contracts above a minimum value only after fair competition, and that the award is made to the person offering the lowest price or making the most economically advantageous offer.””
“There is no need to embark upon an analysis of economic doctrine in order to realise that fair competition, whether across borders in different Member States or internally in domestic markets, is considered highly beneficial to society. Regardless of its benefits, it is what the Directive and the Regulations require.”
“The application to complex facts even of a rule which is reasonably clear in itself may render the situation open to doubt.”
“It is also relevant to look at the state of mind of the infringer, and in particular whether the infringer was acting intentionally or involuntarily. A deliberate intention to infringe would obviously weigh heavily in the scales of seriousness. An inadvertent breach might be relatively less serious on that account. Liability may still be established without any intentional infringement. More broadly, the purpose of the infringer should be considered. If the purpose was to advance the interests of the Community a breach committed with that end in view might be seen as less serious than one committed with the purpose of serving merely national interests.”
“The final factor therefore is the seventh one, namely the persons affected by the breach, including whether there has been a complete failure to take account of the specific situation of a defined economic group. There are two groups directly affected by the breach in this case, rather different in scale. The first group is the other tenderers, in particular RSS. This is a very small group. It has however been very powerfully affected by the breach. A tenderer who should have won the procurement competition did not do so, with the effect that a very sizeable and valuable contract (over£4.2 billion in value, for a contract period of 14 years) was awarded to a competitor. Its personnel were, for the most part, made redundant and its UK business sold. The second group is not a defined economic group, and so does not come to be considered within this factor, but is a wider group. It could be said that the whole of society has been affected in that such a very sizeable public contract has been awarded to a tenderer that is not the most economically advantageous tenderer. However, I doubt whether Lord Hope intended to include such considerations within his seventh factor in a case such as this one. I do not therefore consider that second wider group to be relevant. However, were I to do so, it would only reinforce my conclusion as that factor could only weigh towards a finding that this was a sufficiently serious breach.”
“[69] In my judgment, each of the breaches of obligation in respect of the Evaluation Requirements are sufficiently serious for the purposes of the second Francovich condition when, or if, their effect, either individually or cumulatively, upon the scoring is such that the outcome of the competition would be altered. … [71] … it is their effect upon the outcome of the competition (that is, the overall score of the tender) that is important. … [72] For all other breaches of obligation in relation to Evaluation Requirements, these are sufficiently serious to warrant an award of damages if they would have affected the conclusion (whether individually or cumulatively) of the competition and which tenderer had submitted the most economically advantageous tender.”
“Q. If there was or there might have been a material difference to the scoring of the bids, were the breaches sufficiently serious to justify an award of Francovich damages, having regard to the relevant case law touching on Francovich damages?”