“WSP 39. On29 August 2006 , WSP submitted a fee proposal to Gleeson for advice on fire strategy in two work packages, one for Properties with atria (including Beechmere) and the other for Properties without atria. The fee proposal recorded that one of the purposes for the appointment was to produce a detailed fire strategy report to accompany a formal submission for Building Regulation and/or local authority approval in respect of the Properties. It also recorded that continuity between the design and operation of the buildings was essential with respect to fire safety, and that an operational version of the fire strategy would need to be developed. It said that this operational fire strategy would then be incorporated into the management plans by the operators of the scheme. The “operators” for these purposes were Avantage, Cheshire County Council and/or MDHAL, as WSP was aware. 40. The fee quoted for working on all the projects was£38,000 , which was accepted. 41. On13 November 2006 , and on23 November 2006 , meetings took place attended by both WSP and PRP at which fire strategy issues were discussed. The minutes for these meetings were distributed, as WSP was aware, to Mascot, employer’s agent for Avantage. 42. The minutes for the23 November 2006 meeting recorded that WSP was to confirm “with Avantage/CCC” the mobility of occupants of the Properties. 43. On5 January 2007 , WSP produced Issue 1 of their “Detailed Fire Safety Strategy” document in respect of Beechmere. 44. On21 March 2007 , WSP produced Issue 2 of their Detailed Fire Safety Strategy document. This stated: a. At paragraph 1.1.1 that WSP had been appointed by Gleeson to provide a detailed Fire Safety Strategy report that would support the Building Regulations application for the Cheshire Extra Care PFI scheme at Crewe. b. At paragraph 2.1.1 that the objectives of the report were to (i) support the Building Regulation application, (ii) to detail performance requirements of fire safety measures to be used by the design team, and (iii) to assist operational management with their understanding of the building function with respect to fire safety. The reference to “operational management” was to Avantage, Cheshire County Council and/or MDHAL. c. At paragraph 2.4.2, that the operational fire safety management plan for the scheme had yet to be developed and that would be done by the building owner in conjunction with the operators and the care staff provider. The report set out recommendations in relation to building management in section 8. d. At paragraph 2.4.3, that WSP should be consulted during the development of the operational fire safety plan, and that that plan would take into account the building fire safety features as outlined in the report. e. At paragraph 7.6.1 that sprinklers were not proposed within the atrium or the adjoining spaces. The Claimants will rely at trial upon this report for its full terms and true effect. 45. In or about early to mid-2007, PRP proposed a change to its original fire strategy documents whereby compartment walls would not in all cases be taken up to the underside of the roof above, but instead a fire-rated ceiling would be installed and the roof void above treated as a void to be separated by cavity barriers at approximately 20m centres. WSP knew or ought to have known of this change: a. PRP have alleged that WSP endorsed its amended fire strategy. The Claimants do not know whether this is correct, but if it is will rely upon that fact. b. On17 May 2007 , a team meeting took place attended by PRP, Prestoplan and Mascot among others. WSP did not attend but were provided with minutes. At paragraph 5.12 reference was made to “plaster board ceiling double thickness to avoid need for party walls in roof void – comment”. 46. On2 October 2007 , WSP issued Fire Strategy document 3. WSP continued to be involved in the design of the fire strategy, as evidenced by its email dated3 March 2008 to PRP. Subsequently, WSP provided the Operational Fire Safety Manual referred to above, together with a fire risk assessment. It knew that both documents were for the use of Avantage, Cheshire County Council and/or MDHAL 47. In the premises, WSP owed Avantage, Cheshire County Council and/or MDHAL a duty of care in tort to exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of their obligations under their appointment, which duty extended to protecting those parties from physical damage to property and from pure economic loss. In support of this duty, the Claimants aver as follows: a. At all material times: i. WSP knew that the work that they were carrying out was in respect of Properties that were to be subject to a PFI project in respect of which Avantage, Cheshire County Council and/or MDHAL were to be involved as owners and operators of the Properties. ii. WSP knew, and intended, that those parties would be made aware of the advice and recommendations that WSP made and that they would rely upon WSP’s competent performance of its duties. iii. WSP knew that it was likely that those parties would have a significant financial interest in the Properties and would suffer loss in the event that the Properties were damaged. b. WSP’s personnel attended meetings at which, to WSP’s knowledge, representatives of both Gleeson and Avantage were present and/or received the minutes thereof, including the meetings referred to above, and at which WSP’s advice in respect of fire strategy for the Properties was presented and discussed. c. In the premises: i. it was reasonably foreseeable to WSP that Avantage, Cheshire County Council and/or MDHAL would rely on WSP’s work; ii. WSP was in a relationship of proximity with those parties; iii. WSP assumed responsibility towards those parties in respect of the advice that it gave. d. Those parties did in fact rely upon the careful and skilful performance by WSP of its duties under its appointment”
“123. In breach of the duty of care owed to Avantage, Cheshire County Council and MDHAL at common law, WSP: a. Failed to update its Fire Strategy Report in light of changes to PRP’s design in July 2007. In particular WSP: i. Failed to identify or take account of the fact that under the changed design the majority of the compartment walls were no longer to continue up to meet the underside of the roof tiles and instead cavity barriers were to be installed at 20m centres, thus allowing the roof void to span several flats and the corridor in between them. ii. Failed to identify that the solution proposed by PRP would not comply with the Building Regulations and/or ADB, for the reasons set out in paragraph 121(j) to (o) above. iii. Failed to identify that the change in strategy for the roof void would deviate from the ‘stay-put’ strategy for the apartments which was the fundamental basis for the design by WSP. iv. Failed to report the above to Gleeson and/or Avantage with a recommendation that PRP reinstate the design stipulated by ADB. b. Deviated, without any adequate justification, from BS5588 Part 7, in: i. Providing escape distances from some flats which were much longer than the recommended limit of 18 metres for escape via an unenclosed balcony in an atrium. ii. Failing to specify that a sprinkler system was required and/or advising Gleeson and/or Avantage that that was the case. In this context, section 5 of BS 5306-2 stipulates, in relevant part, that “Spaces between roofs and ceilings (including those at the apexes and sides of buildings) more than 0.8 m deep, measured between the highest point under the roof and the top of the ceiling, shall be sprinkler-protected.” (26.6.1). c. In the premises, failed to exercise the skill and care of a reasonably competent fire engineer experienced in construction projects of this sort.”
“As to the applicable test itself: (a) The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman[2001] 1 All ER 91 . A realistic claim is one that carries some degree of conviction: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel[2003] EWCA Civ 472 . But that should not be carried too far: in essence, the court is determining whether or not the claim is “bound to fail”: Altimo Holdings v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd[2012] 1WLR 1804 at [80] and [82]. (b) The court must not conduct a mini-trial: Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3)[2003] 2 AC 1 , in particular paragraph 95. Although the court should not automatically accept what the claimant says at face value, it will ordinarily do so unless its factual assertions are demonstrably unsupportable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel; Okpabi and others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and another[2021] UKSC 3 , at paragraph 110. The court should also allow for the possibility that further facts may emerge on discovery or at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5)[2001] EWCA Civ 550 ; Sutradhar v Natural Environmental Research Council[2006] 4 All ER 490 at [6]; and Okpabi at paragraphs 127-128.”
“A reasonable man, knowing that he was being trusted or that his skill and judgment were being relied on, would, I think, have three courses open to him. He could keep silent or decline to give the information or advice sought: or he could give an answer with a clear qualification that he accepted no responsibility for it or that it was given without that reflection or inquiry which a careful answer would require: or he could simply answer without any such qualification. If he chooses to adopt the last course he must, I think, be held to have accepted some responsibility for his answer being given carefully, or to have accepted a relationship with the inquirer which requires him to exercise such care as the circumstances require.”
“it is clear that the assumption of responsibility test is to be applied objectively and is not answered by consideration of what the defendant thought or intended. Thus Lord Griffiths said in Smith v Eric S Bush[1990] 1 AC 831 , 862 that: “The phrase assumption of responsibility can only have any real meaning if it is understood as referring to the circumstances in which the law will deem the maker of the statement to have assumed responsibility to the person who acts upon the advice”.”
“In a commercial context, the nature and extent of a common law duty of care will be framed by the contractual nexus or lack of contractual nexus between the parties, together with the wider factual and contractual arrangements, including any stated limitations or exclusions from liability. The cases all serve to emphasise the importance of the factual matrix when considering whether any common law duty of care arises, including the nature and scope of any such duty.”
“9.1.1 Upon building occupation the operator will be required to have an operational fire strategy in place which takes into account the buildings the inherent passive fire safety provisions [e.g. compartmentation], and the active fire safety systems [e.g. fire alarm and detection, smoke curtains and hold open devices etc.]. 9. 1.2 It is advised that WSP are involved with the operator in producing such an operational fire plan to ensure continuity. 9. 1.3 The operational fire plan will be developed as the scheme progresses. ”
“WSP Fire strategy report •. Part of on going design •. WSP need detailed operational fire strategy from Harvest”
“This manual has been developed from information presented in architectural plans, the detailed fire strategy produced prior to construction by WSP Fire…and discussions with Avantage management”
“NOTE. For full details see the WSP Detailed Fire Safety Strategy (Issue 3) issued on2nd October 2007 ”
“ "1.2 Please confirm managers/carers (minimum of 2 on duty 24/7) as detailed within fire strategy – [WSP Response]: This statement was included in the "Operational Safety Manual" following discussions with Avantage – [Proposed Action]: Confirm the policy – [Responsible Person/Organisation]: Avantage – [Comments]: Confirmation received from Linda Brookes (Avantage) 2/02/09". "2.1… It is also noted that the level of combustibles will need to be continually limited and managed as part of the engineered design. Whilst smoke modelling has been provided for the proposed system it is noted that no guidance has been provided in connection with the levels of combustibles within the atria base – [WSP Response]: Detailed guidance on permissible level of combustibles included at 7.2 in WSP Detailed Fire Strategy2nd October 2007 …" ”
“All negligence claims involve acts (things done which should not have been done) and/or omissions (things which ought to have been done which have not been done). As Lord Hoffman made clear, that is unexceptionable. It does not mean that a claim like this one, where the failure to do something (locking the door) was part of the activity undertaken by the tortfeasor that gave rise to the loss, can be said to be a claim based on 'pure omissions'.”
“In his classical exposition in Donoghue v. Stevenson[1932] A.C. 562, 580-581, Lord Atkin was expressing himself in the context of the infliction of direct physical injury resulting from a carelessly created latent defect in a manufactured product. In his analysis of the duty in those circumstances he clearly equated "proximity" with the reasonable foresight of damage. In the straightforward case of the direct infliction of physical injury by the act of the plaintiff there is, indeed, no need to look beyond the foreseeability by the defendant of the result in order to establish that he is in a "proximate" relationship with the plaintiff”
“In the important passage in Marc Rich where Lord Steyn said that “the law more readily attaches the consequence of actionable negligence to directly inflicted physical loss rather than to indirectly inflicted physical loss” (at [1996] 1 A.C. 237 D-E) he went on to give the example of a surveyor carelessly dropping a lighted cigarette into a cargo hold known to contain a combustible cargo, thus having in mind a negligent act.”
“As to (b)(i), the allegation concerns escape routes, which are unconnected to any loss said to have been caused by the breaches alleged against WSP. In the premises, the allegation forms no part of any cause of action and stands to be struck out.”